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PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS 



COMPILED FROM 



PROF. JOWETT'S TRANSLATION 



OF THE 



DIALOGUES OF PLATO 






BX 



REV. C. H. A. BULKLEY, D.D. 

PROFESSOR OF RHETORIC AND LITERATURE IN HOWARD 
UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D. C. 



NEW EDITION 






NEW YORK 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

1883 






%& 



COPYRIGHT, 1876, 

Br SCRIBNER ARMSTRONG, AND COMPANf 



48 6555 

JUL 2 4 1942 



RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE*. 

STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BI 

H. 0. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY. 



To 
PROFESSOR JOWETT, 

WHOSE SCHOLARSHIP IS UNEXCELLED IN EITHER HEMISPHERE, 

AND WHO PREEMINENTLY MERITS 
THE TITLE OP 

"PLATO'S INTERPRETER," 

K%\% Folume, 

THE GATHERED FRUIT OP HIS TOIL, 

IS RESPECTFULLY 

DEDICATED. 



Ralph Waldo Emerson, in his Essay on Boots, writes thus: "Of Plato i 
hesitate to speak, lest there should be no end. You find in him that which you 
have already found in Homer, now ripened to thought, — the poet converted to a 
philosopher, with loftier strains of musical wisdom than Homer reached; as if 
Homer were the youth, and Plato the finished man; yet with no less security of bold 
and perfect song, when he cares to use it, and with some harp-strings fetched 
from a higher heaven. He contains the future, as he came out of the past. In 
Plato, you explore modern Europe in its causes and seed, — all that in thought 
which the history of Europe embodies or has yet to embody. The well-informed 
man finds himself anticipated, — Plato is up with him too. Nothing has escaped 
him. Every new crop in the fertile harvest of reform, every fresh suggestion of 
modern humanity is there. If the student wish to see both sides, and justice done 
to the man of the world, pitiless exposure of pedants, and the supremacy of truth 
and the religious sentiment, he shall be contented also. Why should not young 
men be educated on this book ? It would suffice for the tuition of the race, — to test 
their understanding and to express their reason. Here is that which is so attractive 
to all men, — the literature of aristocracy shall I call it ? — the picture of the best 
persons, sentiments, and manners, by the first master, in the best times, — portraits 
of Pericles, Alcibiades, Crito, Prodicus, Protagoras, Anaxagoras, and Socrates, with 
the lovely background of the Athenian and suburban landscape, — or, who can over- 
estimate the images with which Plato has enriched the minds of men, and which pass 
like bullion in the currency of all Nations ? Read the * Phaedo,' the « Protagoras,' 
the « Phsedrus,' the < Timseus,' the Republic, — and the < Apology of Socrates.' " 



II^TEODXJOTIO^. 

BY THE COMPILER. 



The late Dr. Nott, who, for so many years, was the efficient 
President of Union College, is said to have remarked that, " a 
professional man — especially a clergyman — needed to be 
familiar with but three books, namely the Bible, Butler's 
Analogy, and Shakespeare." To complete the circle, he might 
have added Plato. With his dialectic skill, universality of 
thought, subtle philosophy and purity of style, every scholar 
and thinker should familiarize himself. Their influence on 
all one's mental processes cannot fail to be stimulating and 
strengthening. 

Few readers of the Greek, however, in this land, are suffi- 
ciently versed in that language to read Plato's original with 
much freedom and pleasure. Fewer professional men, in our 
age of active toil, have the time and opportunity even, to pe- 
ruse throughout, the admirable translation of Prof. Jowett, 
Nevertheless, every thoughtful man — and even ordinary 
readers — may desire to reap the benefits of such a work, and 
become somewhat acquainted with the best thoughts of the 
great Greek Philosopher. The present volume has been un- 
dertaken with this design. It presents, in the most accessible 
form, the wide range of subjects upon which Plato dwells, and 
exhibits him in all his varied aspects of philosopher, moralist, 
socialist, logician, rhetorician, scientist, and critic. The ex- 
tracts here given have been carefully collated, so as to be 
unique and integral in thought A few of the discussions, 
however, may seem to end somewhat abruptly, as could 



Vi INTRODUCTION. 

scarcely be avoided when taken from the midst of a prolonged 
dialogue. 

These quotations are not to be regarded as giving, in every 
case, the proper views of Plato, or even of Socrates. Other 
characters, opposed and refuted, are made to speak. Their 
words are here given to be read and received as germs of 
thought, and stimulants to inquiry in the reader, even as they 
were first written by Plato, rather than as expressions of his 
own opinions. ^ ? " 

Many fine passages have been necessarily omitted with re- 
gret, because their introduction here would swell this volume 
beyond the dimensions designed for the ordinary reader. 
Every theme, therefore, upon which Plato dilates, has not 
been presented in full. But there has been such a selection as 
may give the reader a fair idea of his diversity of thought. 

While those who are able to purchase, and desirous to pe- 
ruse the complete translation of Prof. Jowett, will doubtless do 
this, yet there are many others to whom this volume will be 
welcome as giving them the finest wheat of Plato in a ready, 
readable form, at a moderate rate. Even the possessor and 
reader of the fuller work may be glad to have with him a com- 
pendium of Platonic thought so available, — because alphabet- 
ical, — for cursory perusal and casual quotation. 

It is hoped, at least, by the compiler, that these limited 
morsels of Plato's Hymettian honey will excite the desire for 
a fuller feast from the rich banquet which Prof. Jowett has so 
laboriously and sumptuously provided for those who relish true 
thought and elegant language, whether coming from ancient or 
modern thinkers. 

The design at first was to interweave the choicest para- 
graphs of this Translator from his learned and thoughtful 
Introductions, but it was found that this would have made too 
large a book. Those who desire to enter Plato's temple of 
thought with the clearest comprehension of his master-mind, 
should pass through the grand gateways which this eminent 
English scholar has erected 



INTRODUCTION. vii 

These interpretations of the great Greek thinker, are essen- 
tial to the full understanding of his ideas. Meanwhile, those 
who cannot yet reach the head- waters of such mental invigora- 
tion, may refresh themselves with the limited draughts of 
Plato's lore, herein bottled up for them, from his perennial 
springs of thought. C. H. A. B. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 



Ability and strength, difference between. 

Socrates, When you asked me, I certainly did say that 

the courageous are the confident ; but I was not asked whether 
the confident are the courageous ; for if you had asked me that, 
I should have answered, " Not all of them : " and what I did 
answer you have not disproved, although you proceed to show 
that those who have knowledge are more courageous than they 
were before they had knowledge, and more courageous than 
others who have no knowledge ; and this makes you think that 
courage is the same as wisdom. But in this way of arguing 
you might come to imagine that strength is wisdom. You 
might begin by asking whether the strong are able, and I 
should say, " Yes : " and then whether those who know how to 
wrestle are not more able to wrestle than those who do not 
know how to wrestle, and more able after than before they had 
learned, and I should assent. And when I had admitted this, 
you might use my admissions in such a way as to prove that 
upon my view wisdom is strength ; whereas in that case I 
should not have admitted, any more than in the other, that the 
able are strong, although I have admitted that the strong are 
able. For there is a difference between ability and strength; 
the former is given by knowledge as well as by madness or rage, 
but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of the body. 
And in like manner I say of confidence and courage, that they 
are not the same ; and I argue that the courageous are confi- 
dent, but not all the confident courageous. For confidence may 
be given to men by art, and also, like ability, by madness and 
rage ; but courage comes to them from nature and the healthy 
state of the soul. — Protagoras, i. 150. 









10 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Absolute, the. 

Simmias : Is there or is there not an absolute justice ? 

Assuredly there is. 

And an absolute beauty and absolute good ? 

Of course. 

But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes ? 

Certainly not. 

Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense ? 
(and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and 
health, and strength, and of the essence or true nature of 
everything). Has the reality of them ever been perceived by 
you through the bodily organs ? or rather, is not the nearest 
approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by 
him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most 
exact conception of the essence of that which he considers ? 

Certainly. 

And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes 
to each of them with the mind alone, not allowing when in the 
act of thought the intrusion or introduction of sight or any 
other sense in the company of reason, but with the very light 
of the mind in her clearness searches into the very truth of 
each ; he has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and of 
the whole body, which he conceives of only as a disturbing 
element, hindering the soul from the acquisition of truth and 
knowledge when in company with her — is not this the sort of 
man who, if any man, is likely to attain to the knowledge of true 
being? — Phaedo, i. 391. 
Absolute knowledge in God. 

Would you, or would you not, say that absolute knowl- 
edge, if there is such a thing, must be a far more exact knowl- 
edge than our knowledge, and the same of beauty and of all 
other things ? 

Yes. 

And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute 
knowledge no one is more likely than God to have this most 
exact knowledge ? 

Certainly. 

But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a 
knowledge of human things ? 

Why not ? 

Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that 
the ideas are not relative to human things, nor human things 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 11 

to them ; the relations of either are in their respective 
spheres. 

Yes, that has been admitted. 

And if God has this perfect authority, perfect knowledge, 
his authority cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or 
any human thing ; just as our authority does not extend to the 
gods, nor our knowledge know anything which is divine, so by 
parity of reason they, being gods, are not our masters ; neither 
do they know the things of men. 

Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of 'knowledge is 
monstrous. 

These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a 
few, of the difficulties which arise on the hypothesis that there 
are ideas of things and that each idea is an absolute and de- 
terminate unity ; they will lead him who is told of them to 
doubt the very existence of ideas — he will say that even if they 
do exist they must of necessity be unknown to man ; and he 
will seem to have reason on his side ; and as we were re- 
marking just now, will be very difficult to convince ; a man 
must be a man of very considerable ability before he can learn 
that everything has a class and an absolute essence ; and still 
more remarkable will he be who discovers all these things for 
himself, and can teach another to understand them thoroughly. 
Parmenides, iii. 252. 
Abstract ideas. See Ideas, abstract, 
Achilles ; his self-sacrifice. 

Now Achilles was quite aware, for he had been told by 

his mother, that he might avoid death and return home, and 
live to a good old age, if he abstained from slaying Hector. 
Nevertheless he gave his life to revenge his friend, and dared 
to die, not only on his behalf, but after his death. Where- 
fore the gods honored him even above Alcestis, and sent him 
to the Islands of the Blest. These are my reasons for affirm- 
ing that Love is the eldest and noblest and mightiest of the 
gods, and the chiefest author and giver of virtue, in life and 
of happiness after death. — The Symposium, i. 475. 
Achilles ; condemned. 

Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved 

or regarded as having given his pupil good counsel when he told 
him that he should take the gifts of the Greeks and assist them ; 
but that without a gift he should not be reconciled to them. 
Neither will we believe or allow Achilles himself to have been 



12 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon's gifts, or 
required a price as the ransom of the dead. 

Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which ought 
to be approved. 

Loving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say what I must 
say, nevertheless, that in speaking thus of Achilles, or in believ- 
ing these words when spoken of him by others, there is down- 
right impiety. As little can I credit the narrative of his inso- 
lence to Apollo, where he says, — 

" Thou hast wronged me, O far-darter, most abominable of dei- 
ties. Verily I would be even with thee, if I had only the power ; " 

or his insubordination to the river-god, on whose divinity he is 
ready to lay hands; or the dedication to the dead Patroclus 
of his own hair, which had been previously dedicated to the 
other river-god Spercheius ; or his dragging Hector round the 
tomb of Patroclus, and his slaughter of the captives at the 
pyre ; of all this I cannot believe that he was guilty, any more 
than I can allow our citizens to believe that he, Cheiron's pupil, 
the son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest of 
men and third in descent from Zeus, was in such rare perturba- 
tion of mind as to be at one time the slave of two seemingly 
inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by avarice, com- 
bined with overwhelming contempt of gods and men. — The 
Republic, ii. 214. 

Actual and Ideal. See State, actual. 
Adulterations. See Oaths. 

Advocate, Art of the, corrupting the State. See State, etc. 
Affections; opposing. 

Ath. Each one of us has in his bosom two counselors, 

both foolish and also antagonistic ; of which, the one we call 
pleasure and the other pain. 

Gle. True. 

Ath. Also there are opinions about the future, which have 
the general name of expectations ; and the specific name of 
fear, when the expectation is of pain ; and of hope, when of 
pleasure; and further, there is reflection about the good or evil 
of them, and this when embodied in a decree by the State, is 
called Law. 

Cle. I am hardly able to follow you ; proceed, however, as 
if I were. 

Meg. I am in the like case. 

Ath. Let us look at the matter in this way : May we not 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 13 

regard every living being as a puppet of the gods, either their 
plaything only, or created with a purpose — which of the two 
we cannot certainly know ? But this we know, that these affec- 
tions in us are like cords and strings, which pull us different and 
opposite ways, and to opposite actions ; and herein lies the dif- 
ference between virtue and vice. According to the argument 
there is one among these cords which every man ought to grasp, 
and never let go but to pull with it against all the rest ; and this 
is the sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the com- 
mon law of the state ; there are others which are hard and of 
iron, but this is soft because golden; and there are several 
other kinds. Now we ought always to cooperate with the lead 
of the best, which is law. For inasmuch as reason is beauti- 
ful and gentle, and not violent, her rule must needs have min- 
isters in order to help the golden principle in vanquishing the 
other principles. And thus the moral of the tale about our 
being puppets will not be lost, and the meaning of the expres- 
sion " superior or inferior to a man's self " will become clearer ; 
as also that in this matter of pulling the strings of the puppet, 
cities as well as individuals should live according to reason ; 
which the individual attains in himself, and the city receives 
from some god, or from the legislator ; and makes it her law 
in her dealings with herself and with other states. In this way 
virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished by us. And 
when they have become clearer, education and other institu- 
tions will in like manner become clearer. — Laws, iv. 175. 
Age ; its evil and its good. 

I find that at my time of life, as the pleasures and de- 
lights of the body fade away, the love of discourse grows upon 
me. I only wish that you would come oftener, and be with 
your young friends here, and make yourself altogether at home 
with us. 

I replied : There is nothing which I like better, Cephalus, 
than conversing with aged men like yourself; for I regard 
them as travelers who have gone a journey which I too may 
have to go, and of whom I ought to inquire, whether the way is 
smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult. And this is a ques- 
tion which I should like to ask of you who have arrived at 
that time which the poets call the " threshold of old age," — 
Is life harder towards the end, or what report do you give 
of it? 

I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. 



14 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Old men flock together ; they are birds of a feather, as the 
proverb says ; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance 
commonly is — I cannot eat, I cannot drink ; the pleasures of 
youth and love are fled away : there was a good time once, 
but that is gone, and now life is no longer life. Some of 
them lament over the slights which are put upon them by 
relations, and then they tell you plaintively of how many 
evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, they 
seem to blame what is not to blame ; for if old age were the 
cause, I too being old, and every other old man, would have 
felt the same. Such however is not my experience, nor that 
of others whom I have known. How well I remember the 
aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How 
does love suit with age, Sophocles, — are you still the man 
you were ? Peace, he replied ; most gladly have I escaped 
that, and I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious 
master. His words have often come into my mind since, and 
they seem to me still as good as at the time when I first heard 
them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and 
freedom ; when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles 
says, you have escaped from the control not of one mad master 
only, but of many. And of these regrets, as well as of the 
complaint about relations, Socrates, the cause is to be sought, 
not in men's ages, but in their characters and tempers ; for he 
who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure 
of age, but he who is of an opposite disposition will find youth 
and age equally a burden. — The Republic, ii. 149. 
Age, poverty and riches in. See Poverty. 
Age, love in old. See Ibycus. 
Age, as viewing eternity. 

Let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks him- 
self to be near death he has fears and cares which never entered 
into his mind before ; the tales of a life below and the punish- 
ment which is exacted there of deeds done here were a laughing 
matter to him once, but now he is haunted with the thought that 
they may be true : either because of the feebleness of age, or from 
the nearness of the prospect, he seems to have a clearer view of 
the other world ; suspicions and alarms crowd upon him, and he 
begins to reckon up in his own mind what wrongs he has done 
to others. And when he finds that the sum of his transgres- 
sions is great, he will many a time like a child start up in his 
sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But to 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 15 

him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charm- 
ingly says, is the kind nurse of age : 

" Hope," as he says, " cherishes the soul of him who lives in holi- 
ness and righteousness, and is the nurse of his age and the com- 
panion of his journey ; — hope, which is mightiest to sway the rest- 
less soul of man." 

How admirable his words are ! — The Republic , ii. 151. 
Age, Philosophy in. See Philosophy, etc. 
Age ; learning in. 

Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man as he 

is growing older may learn many things — for he can no more 
learn than he can run ; youth is the time of toil. 

Very true. 

And, therefore, calculation and geometry, and all the other 
elements of instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, 
should be presented to the mind in childhood ; not, however, 
under any notion of forcing them. — The Republic, ii. 364. 
Allegory ; not for youth. 

The narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, 

or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking 
her part when she was being beaten, — such tales must not 
be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have 
an allegorical meaning or not. For the young man cannot 
judge what is allegorical and what is literal ; anything that 
he receives into his mind at that age is apt to become indel- 
ible and unalterable; and therefore the tales which they first 
: hear should be models of virtuous thoughts. — The Republic, 
ii. 201. 

Ambition, inordinate. See Inordinate, etc. 
Ambition of money-making. 

Suppose the representative of timocracy to have a son : 

at first he begins by emulating his father and walking in his 
footsteps, but presently he sees him founder in a moment on a 
sunken reef, and he and all that he has are lost ; he may 
have been a general or some other high officer who is brought 
to trial under a prejudice raised by informers, and either put 
to death, or exiled, or deprived of the privileges of a citizen, 
and all his property taken from him. 

Nothing more likely. 

And the son has seen and known all this — he is a ruined 
man, and his fear has taught him to knock ambition and pas- 



16 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

sion headforemost from his bosom's throne ; humbled by poverty 
he takes to money-making, and by mean and miserly savings 
and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such an one 
likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous elements on the 
vacant throne ? They will play the great king within him, 
and he will array them with tiara and collar and scimitar. 

Most true, he replied. 

And when he has made reason and spirit sit on the ground 
obediently on either side, and taught them to know their place, 
he compels the one to think only of the method by which lesser 
sums may be converted into larger ones, and schools the other 
into the worship and admiration of riches and rich men ; and 
to be ambitious only of wealth, and of the pursuits which lead 
to it. 

Of all conversions, he said there is none so speedy or so 
sure as when the ambitious youth changes into the avaricious 
one. — The Republic, ii. 381. 
Ambitious men. 

If they cannot be generals, they are willing to be cap- 
tains ; and if they cannot be honored by really great and im- 
portant persons, they are glad to be honored by inferior people, 
— but honor of some kind they must have. — The Republic, 
ii. 302. 
Ambitious woman. 

The character of the son begins to develop when he hears 

his mother grumbling at her husband for not having a seat in 
the government, of which the consequence is that she loses her 
precedence among other women. Further, when she sees her 
husband not very eager about money, and instead of battling 
and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking whatever 
happens to him quietly ; and when she observes that his 
thoughts always centre in himself, while he treats her with 
considerable indifference, she is annoyed, and says to her son 
that his father is only half a man and far too easy-going ; not 
to mention other similar complaints which women love to utter. 
The Republic, ii. 376. 
Amusement; arguing for. 

— — Young men, as you may have observed, when they first 
get the taste in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are 
always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those 
who refute them; like puppy-dogs, they delight to tear and 
pull at all who come near them. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 17 

Yes, lie said, there is nothing of which they are fonder. 

And when they have made many conquests and received 
defeats at the hands of many, they violently and speedily get 
into a way of not believing anything that they believed before, 
and hence, not only they, but philosophy generally, has a bad 
name with the rest of the world. 

Too true, he said. 

But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be 
guilty of such insanity ; he will imitate the dialectician who is 
seeking for truth, and not the eristic, who is contradicting for 
the sake of amusement; and the greater moderation of his 
character will increase instead of diminishing the honor of the 
pursuit. — The Republic, ii. 367. 
Amusement and harmless pleasure. 

Ath. I should say that learning has a certain accompanying 

charm which is the pleasure ; and that the right and the profit- 
able, the good and the noble, are qualities given to it by the 
truth. 

Cle. Exactly. 

Ath. And so in the imitative arts, if they succeed in making 
likenesses, and are accompanied by pleasure, may not their 
works be said to have a charm ? 

Cle. Yes. 

Ath. But equal proportions, whether of quality or quantity, 
and not pleasure, speaking generally, would give them truth 
or Tightness. 

Cle. Yes. 

Ath. Then that only can be rightly judged by the standard 
of pleasure, which makes or furnishes no utility, or truth, or like- 
ness, nor on the other hand is productive of any hurtful quality, 
but exists solely for the sake of the accompanying charm ; and 
the term " pleasure " is most appropriately used when these 
other qualities are absent. 

Cle. You are speaking of harmless pleasure, are you not ? 

Ath. Yes ; and this I term amusement, when doing neither 
harm nor good in any degree worth speaking of. — Laws, iv. 
197. 
Anarchy resulting from freedom. 

I Freedom in a democracy is the glory of the State, and 

therefore, in a democracy only will the freeman of nature deign 
to dwell. 

Yes \ the saying is often enough repeated. 



18 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

I was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this 
and the neglect of other things introduces the change in de- 
mocracy, which occasions a demand for tyranny. 

How so ? 

When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil 
cup-bearers presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of 
the strong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers are very 
amenable and give a plentiful draught, she calls them to ac- 
count and punishes them, and says that they are cursed oligarchs. 

Yes, he replied, a very common thing. 

Yes, I said ; and loyal citizens are insulted by her as lovers 
of slavery and men of naught ; she would have subjects who 
are like rulers, and rulers who are like subjects : these are 
men after her own heart, whom she praises and honors both 
in private and public. Now, in such a state, can liberty have 
any limit ? 

Certainly not. 

By degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and 
ends by getting among the animals and infecting them. 

How do you mean ? 

I mean that the father gets accustomed to descend to the 
level of his sons and to fear them, and the son to be on a 
level with his father, he having no shame or fear of either of 
his parents ; and this is his freedom, and the me tic is equal with 
the citizen and the citizen with the metic, and the stranger on a 
level with either. 

Yes, he said, that is true. 

That is true ; and there are other slight evils such as the 
following ; the master fears and flatters his scholars, and the 
scholars despise their masters and tutors ; and, in general, 
young and old are alike, and the young man is on a level 
with the old, and is ready to compete with him in word or deed ; 
and old men condescend to the young, and are full of pleasantry 
and gayety ; they do not like to be thought morose and au- 
thoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the 
young. 

Quite true, he said. 

The last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought 
with money, whether male or female, is just as free as his or 
her purchaser ; nor must I forget to tell of the liberty and equal- 
ity of the two sexes in relation to each other. — The Republic^ 
ii. 391. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 19 

Animal, — the world a great and intelligent. 

Let me tell you why the creator created and made the 

universe. He was good, and no goodness can ever have any 
jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired 
that all things should be as like himself^ as possible. This is 
the true beginning of creation and of the world as we shall 
do well in believing on the testimony of wise men : God de- 
sired that all things should be good and nothing bad in so far 
as this could be accomplished. Wherefore also finding the 
whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular 
and disorderly manner, out of disorder he brought order, consid- 
ering that this was far better than the other. Now the deeds 
of him who is the best can never be or have been other than 
the fairest, and the creator, reflecting upon the visible works of 
nature, found that no unintelligent creature taken as v a whole 
was fairer than the intelligent taken as a whole ; and that in- 
telligence could not exist in anything which was devoid of soul. 
For these reasons he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, 
and framed the universe to be the best and fairest work in the 
order of nature. And therefore, using the language of proba- 
bility, we may say that the world became a living soul and truly 
rational through the providence of God. 

This being supposed, let us proceed to consider the fur- 
ther question, in the likeness of what animal did the Creator 
make the world ? Certainly we cannot suppose that the form 
was like that of any being which exists in parts only ; for 
nothing can be beautiful which is like any imperfect thing ; but 
we may regard the world as the very likeness of that whole of 
which all other animals, both individually and in their tribes 
are portions. For the original of the universe contains in itself 
all intelligible beings, just as this world comprehends us and all 
other visible creatures. For the Deity, intending to make this 
world like the fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings, 
framed one visible animal comprehending all other animals of 
a kindred nature. Are we right m saying that there is one 
heaven, or shall we rather say that there are many and infi- 
nite ? There is one, if the created heaven accords with the 
original. For that which includes all other intelligible creat- 
ures cannot have a second or companion ; in that case there 
would be need of another living being which would include 
those two, and of which they would be parts, and the likeness 
would be more truly said to resemble not those two, but that 



20 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

other which included them. In order then that the world 
might be like the perfect animal in unity, he who made the 
worlds made them not two or infinite in number ; but there ia 
and ever will be one only-begotten and created heaven.— 
Timaeus, ii. 524 
Animalism. 

Those who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always 

busy with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far 
as the mean ; and in this region they move at random through- 
out life, but they never pass into the true upper world ; thither: 
they neither look, nor do they ever find their way, neither are 
they truly filled with true being, nor do they taste of true and 
abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always looking, 
down and their heads stooping, not indeed to the earth but* 
to the dining-table, they fatten and feed and breed, and, im 
their excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at- 
one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron f 
and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust. 
For they fill themselves with that which is not substantial, 
and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsubstantial 
and incontinent. 

Their pleasures are mixed with pains. How can they be 
otherwise? For they are mere images and pictures of the 
true, and are colored by contrast, which exaggerates both light 
and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools insane de- 
sires of themselves ; and they are fought about as Stesichorus 
says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at 
Troy in ignorance of the truth. 

And must not the like happen with the spirited or pas- 
sionate element of the soul ? Will not the passionate man who 
carries his passion into action be in a like case whether he is 
envious and ambitious, or violent and contentious, or angry and 
discontented, if he be seeking to attain honor and victory and 
the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense ? — The 
Republic, ii. 417. 
Antagonisms; human. 

There is a story which I remember to have heard, and 

on which I rely. The story is that Leontius, the son of 
Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north 
wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the 
ground by the executioner. He felt a longing desire to see 
them, and also a disgust and abhorrence of them ; for a time 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 21 

he turned away and averted his eyes, and then, suddenly over- 
come by the impulse, forced them open, and ran up, saying (to 
his eyes), Take your fill, ye wretches, of the lovely sight. 

I have heard the story myself, he said. 

The moral is that anger differs from the desires, and is some- 
times at war with them. 

Yes, that is the meaning, he said. 

And are there not many other cases in which we observe 
that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he 
reviles himself, and is angry at the violence within him, and 
that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions in a 
state, his spirit is on the side of his reason; but for the pas- 
sionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when 
reason decides that she should not be opposed, is a sort of 
thing which, I believe, that you never observed occurring in 
yourself, nor, as I think, in any one else ? 

Certainly not, he said. 

Suppose, I said, that a man thinks he has done a wrong to 
another, the nobler he is the less able he is to feel indignant ; 
his anger refuses to be excited at the hunger or cold or other 
suffering, which he deems that the injured person may justly 
inflict upon him ? 

True, he said. 

But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, 
then he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he be- 
lieves to be justice ; and because he suffers hunger or cold or 
"other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and 
conquer ; he must do or die, and will not desist, until he hears 
the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark 
no more. — The Republic, ii. 266. 
Antagonisms and counterparts in nature. 

Soc. "Whereas the sharp and flat, the swift and the slow are 

infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of them introduce a 
limit, and perfect the whole frame of music ? 

Pro. Yes, certainly. 

Soc. Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not the in- 
troduction of them take away excess and indefiniteness and in- 
fuse moderation and harmony ? 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite 
come the seasons, and all the delights of life ? 

Pro. Most true. 



22 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Soc. I omit to speak of ten thousand other things, such as 
beauty and health and strength, and of the many beauties and 
high perfections of the soul ; methinks, O my fair Philebus, 
that the goddess saw the universal wantonness and wickedness 
of all things, having no limit of pleasure or satiety, and she de- 
vised the limit of law and order, tormenting, as you say, Phile- 
bus, or, as I affirm, saving the soul. — Philebus, iii. 161. 
Appearance of good. 

Do we not see that many are willing to appear to have, 

or to do, or to be the just and honorable without the reality ; 
but no one is satisfied with the appearance of good — the 
reality is what they seek ; in the case of the good, appearance 
is despised by every one. 

Very true, he said. 

This, then, which every man pursues and makes his end, 
having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet hesi- 
tating because neither knowing the nature nor having the 
same sure proof of this as of other things, and therefore having 
no profit in other things, — is this, I would ask, a principle 
about which the best men in our State, to whom everything is 
to be intrusted, ought to be in darkness ? — The Republic, ii. 
333. 
Appetites natural. 

I see that among men all things depend upon three wants 

and desires, of which the end is virtue, if they are rightly led 
by them, or the opposite, if wrongly. Now these are eating 
and drinking, which begin at birth ; every animal has a natural 
desire for them, and is violently excited, and rebels against him 
who says that he must not satisfy all his pleasures and appe- 
tites, and get rid of the corresponding pains. And the third 
and greatest and sharpest want and desire breaks out last, and 
is the fire of sexual lust, which kindles in men every species of 
wantonness and madness. And these three disorders we must 
endeavor to master by the three great principles of fear and 
law and right reason ; turning them away from that which is 
called pleasantest to the best, using the muses and the Gods 
who preside over contests to extinguish their increase and in- 
flux. — Laws, iv. 303. 
Argument ; the state of mind for. 

Let us be careful of admitting into our souls the notion 

that there is no truth or health or soundness in any arguments 
at all ; but let us rather say that there is as yet no health in 






PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 23 

us, and that we must quit ourselves like men and do our best to 
gain health, — you and all other men with a view to the whole 
of your future life, and I myself with a view to death. For 
at this moment I am sensible that I have not the temper of a 
philosopher ; like the vulgar, I am only a partisan. For the 
partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about 
the rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his 
hearers of his own assertions. And the difference between him 
and me at the present moment is only this, — that whereas he 
seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is true, I am 
rather seeking to convince myself ; to convince my hearers is a 
secondary matter with me. And do but see how much I gain 
by the argument. For if what I say is true, then I do well to 
be persuaded of the truth ; but if there be nothing after death, 
still, during the short time that remains, I shall not distress my 
friends with lamentations, and my ignorance will not last, but 
will die with me and therefore no harm will be done. This is 
the state of mind, Simmias and Cebes, in which I approach the 
argument. And I would ask you to be thinking of the truth 
and not of Socrates ; agree with me, if I seem to you to be 
speaking the truth ; or if not, withstand me might and main, 
that I may not deceive you as well as myself in my enthusiasm, 
and like the bee, leave my sting in you before I die. — Phaedo, 
i. 419. 

Argument, less than character. 

Let others praise the rewards and appearances of jus- 
tice ; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from them, 
I am ready to tolerate, but from you who have spent your 
whole life in thinking about the question, unless I hear the con- 
trary from your own lips, I expect something better. And 
therefore, I say, not only prove to us that justice is better 
than injustice, but show what they either of them do to the 
possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and the 
other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men. — The 
Republic, ii. 189. 
Argument, not found in numbers. 

If you have no better argument than numbers, let me 

have a turn, and do you make trial of the sort of proof 
which, as I think, ought to be given ; for I shall produce one 
witness only of the truth of my words, and he is the person 
with whom I am arguing ; his suffrage I know how to take ; 
but with the many I have nothing to do, and do not even 
address myself to them. — Gorgias, iii. 60. 



24 PLATO'S BUST THOUGHTS. 

Art, — nature and chance as opposed to. See Nature, etc. 
Art imitative. See Likeness-making. 
Art-colors less than words. 

Our discussion might be compared to a picture of some 

living being which had been fairly drawn in outline, but had 
not yet attained the life and clearness which is given by the 
blending of colors. Now to intelligent persons a living being 
is more truly delineated by language and discourse than by 
any painting or work of art; to the duller sort by works of 
art. — Statesman, iii. 561. 
Art military, youth instructed in. See Military. 
Arts ; the higher, what they require. 

All the superior arts require many words and much 

discussion of the higher truths of nature ; hence comes all 
loftiness of thought and perfectness of execution. And this, 
as I conceive, was the quality which, in addition to his natural 
gifts, Pericles acquired from Anaxagoras whom he happened 
to know. He was thus imbued with the higher philosophy and 
attained the knowledge of Mind, which was the favorite theme 
of Anaxagoras and applied what he learned to the art of speak- 
ing. — Phaedms, i. 575. 
Arts; experimental. 

O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which 

are experimental, and have their origin in experience, for ex- 
perience makes the days of men to proceed according to art, 
and inexperience according to chance, and different persons in 
different ways are proficients in different arts, and the best 
persons in the best arts. — Gorgias, iii. 32. 
Arts ; inquiry ruinous to. 

Str. Yet once more, we shall have to enact, that if any 

one is detected inquiring into sailing and navigation or health, 
or into the true nature of medicine, or about the winds, or other 
conditions of the atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, 
and has any ingenious notions about such matters, he is not 
to be called a pilot or physician, but a cloudy talking sophist ; 
also a corrupter of the young, who would persuade them to fol- 
low the art of medicine or piloting in an unlawful manner, as 
the irresponsible masters of the patients or ships ; and any one 
who is qualified by law may inform against him, and indict 
him in some court, and then if he is found to be corrupting any, 
whether young or old, he is to be punished with the utmost 
rigor of the law ; for no one should presume to be wiser than 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 25 

the laws ; and as touching healing and health and piloting and 
navigation^ the nature of them is known to all, for anybody 
may learn the written laws and the national customs. If such 
were the mode of procedure, Socrates, about these sciences and 
about generalship, and any branch of hunting, or about paint- 
ing or imitation in general, or carpentry, or any sort of manu- 
facture, or husbandry, or planting, or if we were to see an art 
of rearing horses, or tending herds, or divination, or any minis- 
terial service, or draught-playing, or any science conversant 
with number, whether simple or square or cube, or comprising 
motion, — I say, if all these things were done in this way ac- 
cording to written regulation, and not according to art, what 
would be the result? 

Y. Soc. All the arts would utterly perish, and could never 
be recovered, because inquiry would be unlawful. And human 
life, which is bad enough already, would then become utterly 
unendurable. — Statesman, iii. 585. 
Artists ; what they should be. 

Are they also to be prohibited from exhibiting the oppo- 
site forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency 
in sculpture and building and the other creative arts ; and is he 
who does not conform to this rule of ours to be prohibited 
from practicing his art in our State, lest the taste of our citi- 
zens be corrupted by him ? We would not have our guardians 
grow up amid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious 
pasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb 
and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather 
a festering mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our 
artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nat- 
ure of beauty and grace ; then will our youth dwell in a land 
of health, amid fair sights and sounds ; and beauty, the effluence 
of fair works, will visit the eye and ear, like a healthful breeze 
from a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul even in child- 
hood into harmony with the beauty of reason. — The Republic, 
ii. 225. 
Artists ; their work. 

Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with 

a view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and 
not at random ; just as all other artists, whether the painter, 
the builder, the shipwright, or any other, look to their work, 
and do not select and apply at random what they apply, but 
keep in view the form of their work? The artist disposes 



26 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

all things in order, and compels the one part to harmonize and 
accord with the other part, until he has constructed a regular 
and systematic whole ; and this is true of all artists, and in the 
same way the trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke be- 
fore, give order and regularity to the body. — Gorgias, iii. 94. 
Astronomy, how learned. See Heavenly bodies. 
Authority of the State. 

" Tell us what complaint you have to make against us 

which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the State ? 
In the first place did we not bring you into existence ? Your 
father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say 
whether you have any objection to urge against those of us 
who regulate marriage ? " None, I should reply. " Or against 
those of us who after birth regulate the nurture and education 
of children in which you also were trained ? Were not the 
laws, which have the charge of education, right in commanding 
your father to train you in music and gymnastic ? " Right, I 
should reply. " Well then, since you were brought into the 
world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the 
first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers 
were before you ? And if this is true you are not on equal 
terms with us ; nor can you think that you have a right to do 
to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right 
to strike or revile or do any other evil to your father or to 
your master, if you had one, because you have been struck or 
reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands ? — 
you would not say this ? And because we think right to de- 
stroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us 
in return, and your country as far as in you lies ? Will you, 
O professor of true virtue, pretend that you are justified in 
this ? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our 
country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than 
mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in 
the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding ? also to be 
soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when angry, even 
more than a father, and if not persuaded, obeyed ? And when 
we are punished by her, whether with imprisonment or stripes, 
the punishment is to be endured in silence ; and if she lead us 
to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right ; 
neither may any one yield or retreat or leave his rank, but 
whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, 
he must do what his city and his country order him ; or he 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 27 

must change their view of what is just : and if he may do no 
violence to his father or mother, much less may he do violence 
to his country." — Grito, i. 355. 
Authorship ; motives to. 

i 1 see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno is your sec- 
ond self in his writings too ; he puts what you say in another 
way, and would fain deceive us into believing that he is telling 
what is new. For you, in your poems, say All is one, and 
of this you adduce excellent proofs ; and he, on the other hand, 
says There is no many ; and on behalf of this he offers over- 
whelming evidence. To deceive the world, as you have done, 
by saying the same thing in different ways, one of you affirm- 
ing the one and the other denying the many, is a strain of art 
beyond the reach of most of us. 

► Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen 
as a Spartan hound in pursuing the track, you do not quite ap- 
prehend the true motive of the composition, which is not really 
such an ambitious work as you imagine ; for what you speak 
of was an accident ; I had no serious intention of deceiving the 
world. The truth is, that these writings of mine were meant 
to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who 
scoff at him, and show the many ridiculous and contradictory 
results which they supposed to follow from the affirmation of 
the one. My answer is an address to the partisans of the 
many, whose attack I return with interest by retorting upon 
them that their hypothesis of the being of many, if carried 
out, appears in a still more ridiculous light than the hypoth- 
esis of the being of one. A love of controversy led me to 
write the book in the days of my youth, and some one stole 
the copy ; and therefore I had no choice of whether it should 
be published or not ; the motive, however, of writing, was not 
the ambition of an old man, but the pugnacity of a young one. 
— Parmenides, iii. 244. 
Avaricious men. See Miserly men, etc. 

Bachelorhood an impiety. See Immortality in time. 
Bad man's faults increased by power. 

He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is 

the real slave, and is obliged to practice the greatest adulation 
and servility, and to be the flatterer of the vilest of mankind. 
He has desires which he is utterly unable to satisfy, and has 
more wants than any one, and is truly poor, if you know how 



28 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

to inspect the whole soul of him : all his life long he is beset 
with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions, even as the 
State which he resembles ; and surely the resemblance holds ? 

True, he said. 

Moreover, as we said before, he grows worse from having 
power : he becomes of necessity more jealous, more faithless, 
more unjust, more friendless, more impious than he was at 
first ; he entertains and nurtures every evil sentiment, and the 
consequence is that he is supremely miserable, and he makes 
everybody else equally miserable. — The Republic, ii. 409. 
Battle ; death in. 

O Menexenus ! death in battle is certainly in many re- 
spects a noble thing. The dead man gets a fine and costly 
funeral, although he may have been poor, and an elaborate 
speech is made over him by a wise man who has long ago pre- 
pared what he has to say, although he who is praised may not 
have been good for much. The speakers praise him for what 
he has done and for what he has not done — that is the beauty 
of them — and they steal away our souls with their embellished 
words ; in every conceivable form they praise the city ; and 
they praise those who died in war, and all our ancestors who 
went before us ; and they praise ourselves also who are still 
alive. — Menexenus, iv. 565. 
Beauties tyrannical. 

Soc. A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you 

talking, and he would know that you are a fair creature and 
have still many lovers. 

Men. Why do you say that ? 

Soc. Why, because you always speak in imperatives : like 
all beauties when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical ; 
and also, as I suspect, you have found out that I have a weak- 
ness for the fair, and therefore I must humor you and answer. 
— Meno, i. 249. 
Beautiful true and good, the. 

Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the 

power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you 
term the idea of good, and that you will regard as the cause of 
science and of truth, as known by us; beautiful too, as are 
both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this 
other nature as more beautiful than either ; and, as in the pre- 
vious instance, light and sight may be truly said to be like the 
sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 29 

and truth may be deemed like the good, but not the good ; the 
good has a place of honor yet higher. 

What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the 
author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty. 
— The Republic, ii. 336. 
Beauty permeating our souls. 

Beauty is certainly a soft, smooth, slippery thing, and 

therefore of a nature which easily slips in and permeates our 
souls. For I affirm that the good is the beautiful. You will 
agree to that ? 

Yes. 

This I say from a sort of notion that what is neither good 
nor evil is the friend of the beautiful and the good, and I will 
tell you why I am inclined to think so ; I assume that there 
are three principles — the good, the bad, and that which is 
neither good nor bad. What do you say to that? 

I agree. 

And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil 
of the evil, nor the good of the evil, — that the preceding ar- 
gument will not allow; and therefore the only alternative is — 
if there be such a thing as friendship or love at all — that what 
is neither good nor evil must be the friend, either of the good, 
or of that which is neither good nor evil, for nothing can be 
the friend of the bad. — Lysis, i. 56. 
Beauty, absolute. 

There is nothing new, he said, ia what I am about to tell 

you ; but only what I have been always and everywhere re- 
peating in the previous discussion and on other occasions ; I 
want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied 
my thoughts, and I shall have to go back to those familiar words 
which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all assume 
that there is an absolute beauty and goodness, and greatness, 
and the like ; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you 
the nature of the cause, and to prove the immortality of the 
soul. 

Cebes said: You may proceed at once with the proof, for I 
grant you this. 

Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree 
with me in the next step ; for I cannot help thinking that if 
there be anything beautiful other than absolute beauty, that can 
only be beautiful in as far as it partakes of absolute beauty — 
and this I should say of everything. Do you agree in this no- 
tion of the cause ? 



30 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Yes, he said, I agree. 

He proceeded : I know nothing and can understand nothing 
of any other of those wise causes which are alleged ; and if a 
person says to me that the bloom of color, or form, or anything 
else of that sort is a source of beauty, I leave all that, which is 
only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and perhaps fool- 
ishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothiDg makes 
a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty 
in whatever way or manner obtained ; for as to the manner I 
am uncertain, but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful 
things become beautiful. That appears to me to be the only 
safe answer that I can give, either to myself or to any other, 
and to that I cling, in the persuasion that I shall never be 
overthrown. — Phaedo, i. 429. 

The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, 
fond of fine tones and colors and forms, and all the artificial 
products that are made out of them, but their mind is incapable 
of seeing or loving absolute beauty. 

True, he replied. 

Few are they who are able to attain the sight of this. 

Very true. 

And he who, having a sense of beautiful things, has no sense 
of absolute beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge 
of that beauty is unable to follow — of such an one I ask, Is 
he awake or in a dream only ? Reflect : is not the dreamer, 
sleeping or waking, one who puts the resemblance in the place 
of the real object ? 

I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming. 

But take the case of the other, who recognizes the existence 
of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the 
objects which participate in the idea, neither putting the ob- 
jects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the place of the 
objects — is he a dreamer, or is he awake ? 

He is wide awake. — The Republic, ii. 304. 
Beauty, one and everlasting. 

" These are the lesser mysteries of love, into which even 

you, Socrates, may enter ; to the greater and more hidden ones 
which are the crown of these, and to which, if you pursue them 
in a right spirit, they will lead, I know not whether you will be 
able to attain. But I will do my utmost to inform you, and 
Co you follow if you can. For he who would proceed aright 
in this matter should begin in youth to visit beautiful forms ; 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 31 

and first, if he be guided by his instructor aright to love one 
such form only — out of that he should create fair thoughts ; 
and soon he will of himself perceive that the beauty of one 
form is akin to the beauty of another ; and then if beauty of 
form in general is his pursuit, how foolish would he be not to 
recognize that the beauty in every form is one and the same ! 
And when he perceives this he will abate his violent love of 
the one, which he will despise and deem a small thing, and will 
become a lover of all beautiful forms ; in the next stage he 
will consider that the beauty of the mind is more honorable 
than the beauty of the outward form. So that if a virtuous 
soul have but a little comeliness, he will be content to love and 
tend him, and will search out and bring to the birth thoughts 
which may improve the youug, until he is compelled to con- 
template and see the beauty of institutions and laws, and to 
understand that the beauty of them all is of one family, and 
that personal beauty is a trifle ; and after laws and institutions 
he will go on to the sciences, that he may see their beauty, be- 
ing not like a servant in love with the beauty of one youth or 
man or institution, himself a slave, mean and narrow-minded, 
but drawing toward and contemplating the vast sea of beauty, 
he will create many fair and noble thoughts and notions in 
boundless love of wisdom ; until on that shore he grows and 
waxes strong, and at last the vision is revealed to him of a 
single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere. To 
this I will proceed ; please to give me your very best attention. 
He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and 
who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succes- 
sion, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a 
nature of wondrous beauty — (and this, Socrates, is the final 
cause of all our former toils,)' a nature which in the first place 
is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and wan- 
ing ; in the next place not fair in one point of view and 
foul in another, or at one time or in one relation or at one 
place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another 
place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in the like- 
ness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, 
or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any 
other being ; as for example, in an animal, or in heaven or in 
earth, or in any other place, but beauty only, absolute, sepa- 
rate, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution and 
without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-grow- 



32 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

ing and perishing beauties of all other things. He who under 
the influence of true love rising upward from these begins to 
see that beauty, is not far from the end. And the true order 
of going or being led by another to the things of love, is to use 
the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts upwards 
for the sake of that other beauty, going from one to two, and 
from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, 
and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions 
he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows 
what the essence of beauty is. This, my dear Socrates," said 
the stranger of Mantineia, " is that life above all others which 
man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute ; a 
beauty which if you once beheld, you would see not to be after 
the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, 
whose presence now entrances you ; and you and many a one 
would be content to live seeing only and conversing with them 
without meat or drink, if that were possible — you only want 
to be with them and to look at them. But what if man had 
eyes to see the true beauty — the divine beauty, I mean, pure 
and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of 
mortality, and all the colors and vanities of human life — 
thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty 
divine and simple ? Do you not see that in that communion 
only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be 
enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities ; (for 
he has hold not of an image but of a reality,) and bringing forth 
and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be 
immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life ? " 
— The Symposium,, i. 502. 
Beauty, madness of. 

Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last 

kind of madness, which is imputed to him who, when he sees 
the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the 
true beauty ; he would like to fly away, but he cannot ; he is 
like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the 
world below ; and he is therefore esteemed mad. And I have 
shown this is of all inspirations to be the noblest and highest, 
and the offspring of the highest, and that he who loves the 
beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it. For, as 
has been already said, every soul of man has in the way of 
nature beheld true being ; this was the condition of her pass- 
ing into the form of man. But all souls do not easily recall 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 33 

the things of the other world ; they may have seen them for 
a short time only, or they may have been unfortunate in their 
earthly lot, and may have lost the memory of the holy things 
which they saw there, through some evil and corrupting asso- 
ciation. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them ; 
and they, when they behold any image of that other world, 
are rapt in amazement ; but they are ignorant of what this 
rapture means, because they do not clearly perceive. For 
there is no light in the earthly copies of justice or temperance 
or any of the higher qualities which are precious to souls : 
they are seen but through a glass dimly ; and there are few 
who, going to the images, behold in them the realities, and 
they only with difficulty. They might have seen beauty shin- 
ing in brightness, when, with the happy band following in the 
train of Zeus, as we philosophers, or of other gods as others did, 
they saw a vision and were initiated into mysteries, which may 
be truly called most blessed, and which we celebrated in our 
state of innocence; having no experience of evils as yet to 
come ; admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and sim- 
ple and calm and happy ; shining in pure light, pure ourselves 
and not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry 
about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster 
in his shell. Let me linger thus long over the memory of 
scenes which have passed away. — Phaedrus, i. 554. 
Beauty, celestial. 

But of beauty, I repeat again that we saw her there 

shining in company with the celestial forms ; and coming to 
earth we find her here too, shining in clearness through the 
clearest aperture of sense. For sight is the keenest of our 
bodily senses ; though not by that is wisdom seen ; her loveli- 
ness would have been transporting if there had been a visible 
image of her, and the same is true of the loveliness of the 
other ideas as well. But this is the privilege of beauty that she 
is the loveliest and also the most palpable to sight. Now he 
who is not newly initiated, or who has become corrupted, does 
not easily rise out of this world to the sight of true beauty 
in the other ; he looks only at her earthly namesake, instead of 
being awed at the sight of her, like a brutish beast he rushes 
on to enjoy and beget ; he consorts with wantonness and is 
not afraid or ashamed of pursuing pleasure in violation of nat- 
ure. But he whose initiation is recent, and who has been 
the spectator of many glories in the other world, is amazed 
3 



34 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

when he sees any one having a godlike face or form, which is 
the expression of divine beauty ; and at first a shudder runs 
through him, and again the old awe steals over him. — Phae- 
drus, i. 556. 
Beauty, proportionate. 

If we were painting a statue, and some one were to come 

and blame us for not putting the most beautiful colors on the 
most beautiful parts of the body - — for the eyes, he would say, 
ought to be purple, but they are black — in that case we might 
fairly answer, " Sir, do not imagine that we ought to beautify 
the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes ; but see 
whether, by giving this and the other features their due, we 
make the whole beautiful." — The Republic, ii. 244. 
Beauty of figure and melody. 

Ath. What is beauty of figure, or beautiful melody ? 

When a manly soul is in trouble, and when a cowardly soul is 
in a similar case, are they likely to use the same figures and 
gestures, or to give utterance to the same sounds ? 

Cle. How can they, when the very colors of their faces dif- 
fer? 

Ath. Good, my friend; I may observe, however, in passing, 
that in music there certainly are figures and there are melo- 
dies ; and music is concerned with harmony and rhythm, so 
that you may speak of a melody or figure having rhythm or 
harmony ; the term is correct enough, but you cannot speak 
correctly, as the masters of choruses have a way of talking 
metaphorically of the " color " of a melody or figure. Al- 
though you can speak of the melodies or figures of the brave 
and the coward, praising the one and censuring the other. 
And not to be tedious, the figures and melodies which are ex- 
pressive of virtue of soul or body, or of images of virtue, are 
without exception good, and those which are expressive of vice 
are the reverse of good. 

Cle. You are right in calling upon us to make that division. 
Ath. But are all of us equally delighted with every sort of 
dance ? 

Cle. Far otherwise. 

Ath. What is the cause of error or division among 

us? Are beautiful things not the same to us all, or are they 
the same in themselves, but not in our opinion of them ? For 
no one will admit that forms of vice in the dance are more 
beautiful than forms of virtue, or that he himself delights in 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 35 

the forms of vice, and others in a muse of another character. 
And yet most persons say, that the excellence of music is to 
give pleasure to our souls. But this is intolerable and blas- 
phemous ; there is, however, a more plausible account of the 
delusion. — Laws, iv. 185. 
Being, real. 

Which classes of things have a greater share in pure ex- 
istence, in your judgment — those of which food and drink and 
condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or the 
class which contains true opinion and mind and, in general, all 
virtue ? Put the question in this way : — Which has a more 
pure being, — that which is concerned with the invariable, the 
immortal, and the true, and is found in the invariable, immor- 
tal, true ; or that which is concerned with the variable and 
mortal, and is found in the variable and mortal ? 

Far purer, he replied, is that which is concerned with the 
invariable. — The Republic, ii. 41 6. 
Belief and learning. 

Soc. Let me raise this question : you would say that 

there is such a thing as " having learned ? " 

Gor. Yes. 

Soc. And there is also " having believed ? " 
- Gor. Yes. 

Soc. And is the " having learned " the same as " having be- 
lieved," and are learning and belief the same things ? 

Gor. In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same. 

Soc. And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in 
this way : If a person were to say to you, " Is there, Gorgias, 
a false belief as well as a true ? " you would reply, if I am not 
mistaken, that there is. 

Gor. Yes. 

Soc. Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true ? 

Gor. No. 

Soc. No, indeed ; and this again proves that knowledge and 
belief differ. 

Gor. That is true. 

Soc. And yet those who have learned as well as those who 
have believed are persuaded ? 

Gor. That is so. 

Soc. Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion, — one 
which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is 
of knowledge ? 

Gor. By all means. — Gorgias, iii. 39. 



36 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Beliefs and opinions, true. 

Now when the Creator had framed the soul according 

to his will, he formed within her the corporeal universe, and 
brought them together, and united them centre to centre. The 
soul, interfused everywhere from the centre to the circumfer- 
ence of heaven, of which she is the external envelopment, her- 
self turning in herself, began a divine beginning of never-ceas- 
ing and rational life enduring throughout all time. The body 
of heaven is visible, but the soul is invisible, and partakes of 
reason and harmony, and being made by the best of intellectual 
and everlasting natures is the best of things created. And be- 
cause she is composed of the same and of the other and of the 
essence, thes^e three, and divided and bound together in pro- 
portion, and is revolving backwards and forwards in herself, 
the soul, when touching anything which has essence, whether 
dispersed in parts or undivided, is stirred through all her pow- 
ers to declare the sameness or difference of that and some 
other thing, and in relation to what and in what way and how 
and when individuals are connected or affected, both in the 
world of generation and in the world of immutable being. 
And when reason, which works with equal truth both in the 
circle of the diverse and of the same, — in the sphere of the 
self-moved in voiceless silence moving, — when reason, I say, 
is hovering around the sensible world and the circle of the 
diverse also moving truly imparts the intimations of sense to 
the whole soul, then arise fixed and true opinions and beliefs. 
But when reason is dwelling in the rational, and the circle of 
the same moving smoothly indicates this, then intelligence and 
knowledge are of necessity perfected. And if any one affirms 
that in which these are found to be other than the soul, he 
will say the very opposite of the truth. — Timaeus, ii. 529. 
Bodily pleasures desired by men. 

Consider, my friend, whether you and I are agreed about 

another question, which will probably throw light on our pres- 
ent inquiry : Do you think that the philosopher ought to care 
about the pleasures — if they are to be called pleasures — of 
eating and drinking? 

Certainly not, answered Simmias. 

And what do you say of the pleasures of love — should he 
care about them ? 

By no means. 

And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 37 

body, for example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, 
or other adornments of the body ? Instead of caring about 
them, does he not rather despise anything more than nature 
needs ? What do you say ? 

I should say that the true philosopher would despise them. 

Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the 
soul and not with the body ? He would like, as far as he can, 
to be quit of the body and turn to the soul. 

That is true. 

In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, 
may be observed in every sort of way to dissever the soul from 
the communion of the body. 

That is true. 

Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that 
a life which has no share in bodily pleasures is not worth hav- 
ing ; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as 
dead. 

That is quite true. 

What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowl- 
edge ? — is the body, if invited to share in the inquiry, a hin- 
derer or a helper ? I mean to say, have sight and hearing any 
truth in them ? Are they not, as the poets are always telling 
us, inaccurate witnesses ? and yet, if even they are inaccurate 
and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses ? — for 
you will allow that they are the best of them ? 

Certainly, he replied. 

Then when does the soul attain truth ? — for in attempting 
to consider anything in company with the body she is obviously 
deceived. 

Yes, that is true. 

Then must not existence be revealed to her in thought, if at 
all? 

Yes. 

And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself 
&nd none of these things trouble her — neither sounds nor 
sights nor pain nor any pleasure, — when she has as little as 
possible to do with the body, and has no bodily sense or feel- 
ing, but is aspiring after true being ? 

Certainly. 

And in this the philosopher dishonors the body ; his soul 
runs away from the body and desires, to be alone and by her- 
self? 

That is true. — Phaedo, i. 391, 



38 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Body, soul the life of. See Soul, etc. 

Body and soul, their relative value. See Soul, etc. 

If you were going to commit your body to some one, 

who might do good or harm to it, would you not carefully con- 
sider and ask the opinion of your friends and kindred, and 
deliberate many days as to whether you should give him the 
care of your body ? But when the soul is in question, which 
you hold to be of far more value than the body, and upon the 
good or evil of which depends the well-being of your all, — 
about this you never consulted either with your father or with 
your brother or with any one of us who are your companions. 
But no sooner does this foreigner appear, than you instantly 
commit your soul to his keeping. In the evening, as you say, 
you hear of him, and in the morning you go to him, never de- 
liberating, or taking the opinion of any one as to whether you 
ought to intrust yourself to him or not ; you have quite made 
up your mind that you will be a pupil of Protagoras, and are 
prepared to expend all the property of yourself and of your 
friends in carrying out at any price this determination, although, 
as you admit, you do not know him, and have never spoken 
with him ; and you call him a Sophist, but are manifestly igno- 
rant of what a Sophist is ; and yet you are going to commit 
yourself to his keeping. — Protagoras, i. 113. 
Body, affecting soul. 

The lovers of knowledge are conscious that their souls, 

when philosophy takes them in hand, are simply fastened and 
glued to their bodies : the soul is able to view real existence 
through the bars of a prison, and not of herself unhindered ; 
she is wallowing in the mire of all ignorance ; and philosophy 
beholding the terrible nature of her confinement, inasmuch as 
the captive through lust becomes a chief accomplice in her own 
captivity — for the lovers of knowledge are aware that this was 
the original state of the soul, but that when she was in this 
state philosophy adopted and comforted her, and wanted to re- 
lease her, pointing out to her that the eye and the ear and the 
other senses are full of deceit, and persuading her to retire from 
them in all but the necessary use of them, and to be gathered 
up and collected into herself, and to trust only to herself and 
her own pure apprehensions of pure existence, and to mistrust 
whatever comes to her through other channels and is subject to 
ricissitude — philosophy, I say, shows her that all this is visible 
and tangible, but that what she sees in her own nature is in- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 39 

tellectual and invisible. And the soul of the true philosopher 
thinks that she ought not to resist this deliverance, and there- 
fore abstains from pleasure and desires and pains and fears, as 
far as she is able ; reflecting that when a man has great joys 
or sorrows or fears or desires, he suffers from them, not merely 
the sort of evil which might be anticipated — as for example, 
the loss of his health or property which he had sacrificed to 
his lusts — but an evil greater far, which is the greatest and 
worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks. 

And what is that, Socrates ? said Cebes. 

Why, that when the feeling of pleasure or pain in the soul 
is most intense, all of us naturally suppose that the object of 
this intense feeling is then plainest and truest : but such is not 
the case. 

Very true. 

And this is the state in which the soul is most enthralled by 
the body. 

How is that ? 

Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which 
nails and rivets the soul to the body, until she becomes like the 
body and believes that to be true which the body affirms to be 
true ; and from agreeing with the body and having the same 
delights, she is obliged to have the same habits and haunts, and 
is not likely ever to be pure at her departure to the world 
below, but is always infected by the body; and so she sinks 
into another body and there germinates and grows, and has 
therefore no part in the communion of the divine and -pure and 
simple. 

That is most true, Socrates, answered Cebes. 

And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowl- 
edge are temperate and brave ; and not for the reason which 
the world gives. 

Certainly not. 

Certainly not ! For the soul of a philosopher will reason 
in another way ; she will not ask philosophy to release her in 
order that when released she may deliver herself up again to 
the thralldom of pleasures and pains, doing a work only to be 
undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope's 
web. But she will calm passion and follow Reason, and dwell 
in her, beholding the true and divine (which is not matter of 
opinion), and thence derive nourishment. Thus she seeks to 
•live while she lives, and after death she hopes to go to her own 



40 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

kindred and to a congenial world and to be freed from human 
ills. Never fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which has 
been thus nurtured and has had these pursuits, will at her 
departure from the body be scattered and blown away by the 
winds and be nowhere and nothing. — Phaedo, i. 411. 
Body, affections of the. 

The most important of the affections which concern the 

whole body, remains to be considered. This is the cause of 
pleasure and pain in the things which we have mentioned, and 
in all other things which are perceived by sense through the 
parts of the body, and have pleasures and pains consequent 
upon them. Let us imagine the causes of every affection, 
whether of sense or not, to be of the following nature, remem- 
bering that we have already distinguished between the nature 
which moves and that which is immovable ; for this is the di- 
rection in which we must hunt the prey which we mean to 
take. A body which is easily moved on receiving any slight 
impression communicates this to the parts affected, and these to 
other parts in an ever widening circle, until at last reaching 
the principle of mind they announce the power of the produc- 
ing cause. But a body of the opposite kind, being at rest, and 
having no circular motion, is alone affected, and does not move 
any of the neighboring parts ; and thus the parts not distribut- 
ing their first impression to other parts, having no effect of 
motion on the whole animal, produce no effect on the patient. 
This is true of the bones and hair and other more earthly parts 
of the human body ; whereas what was said above relates 
mainly to sight and hearing, because they have in them the 
greatest force of fire and air. Now, we must conceive of 
pleasure and pain in this way. An impression produced in us 
contrary to nature and violent, if sudden, is painful ; and, again, 
the sudden return to nature is pleasant, and that which is gentle 
and gradual is imperceptible, and vice versa. But the impres- 
sion which is most easily produced is most readily felt, and is 
not accompanied by pleasure or pain ; such, for example, are 
the affections of the sight itself, which has been already said to 
be a kindred body communicating with us in the daytime ; for 
cuttings and burnings and other affections which happen to the 
sight do not give pain, nor is their pleasure when the sight re- 
turns to its natural state ; but the impressions are clearest and 
strongest according to the manner of the affection and the num- 
ber of the objects perceived ; for there is no violence either 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 41 

in the contraction or dilation of the eye. But bodies which 
are formed of larger particles yield to the agent only with a 
struggle ; and then they impart their motions to the whole and 
cause pleasure and pain — pain when alienated from then 
natural conditions, and pleasure when restored to them. 
Things which experience gradual withdrawings and emptyings 
of their nature, and great and sudden replenishments, fail to 
perceive the emptying, and do perceive the replenishment ; 
these occasion no pain, but the greatest pleasure to the mortal 
part of the human soul, as is manifest in the case of perfumes. 
But things which are changed all of a sudden, and only gradu- 
ally and with difficulty return to their own nature, have all 
the opposite effects, as is evident in the case of burnings and 
cuttings of the body. — Timaeus, ii. 556. 
Body ; construction of the. 

When all things were in disorder, God created in each 

thing, both internally in relation to itself and externally in re- 
lation to other things, certain harmonies in which were in- 
cluded all possible harmonies and proportions. For in those 
days nothing had any order except by accident ; nor did any 
of the things which now have names deserve to be named at 
all — as, for example, fire, water, and the rest of the elements. 
All these the Creator first arranged, and out of them he con- 
structed the universe, which was a single animal comprehend- 
ing all other animals, mortal and immortal, in itself. Now of 
the divine, he himself was the Creator, but the creation o2 the 
mortal he committed to his offspring. And they, imitating 
him, received from him the immortal principle of the soul ; 
and around this they fashioned a mortal body, and made the 
whole body to be a vehicle of the soul, and constructed within 
a soul of another nature which was mortal, subject to terrible 
and irresistible affections, ■ — first of all, pleasure, the greatest 
incitement of evil ; then pain, which deters from good ; also 
rashness and fear, two foolish counselors, anger hard to be ap- 
peased and hope easily deceived by sense without reason and 
by all-daring love ; these they mingled together according to 
necessary laws, and framed man. Wherefore, fearing to pol- 
lute the divine any more than is necessary, they separated 
the mortal nature, and to that gave a habitation in another 
part of the body, placing the neck between them to be the 
isthmus and boundary, which they constructed between the 
head and breast, in order that they might be kept distinct. 



42 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

And in the breast, and in what is termed the thorax they en- 
cased the mortal soul, and as one part of this was superior and 
the other inferior they divided the cavity of the thorax into 
two parts, as the women's and men's apartments are divided in 
houses ; and placed the midriff to be a wall of partition be- 
tween them. 

That part of the inferior soul which is endowed with cour- 
age and passion and loves contention they settled nearer the 
head, in the interval between the midriff and the neck, in 
order that it might be under the rule of reason, and might 
join with it in controlling and restraining the desires when they 
are no longer willing of their own accord to obey the word of 
command issuing from the citadel. 

The heart, which is the knot of the veins and the fountain of 
the blood flowing rapidly through all the limbs, was set in the 
place of guard that when passion was roused by reason mak- 
ing proclamation of any wrong assailing them from without or 
being perpetrated by the desires within, quickly the whole 
power of feeling in the body, perceiving these commands and 
threats, might obey and follow through every turn and alley, 
and thus allow the principle of the best to have the command 
in all of them. But as the gods foreknew that the palpitation 
of the heart in the expectation of danger and the swelling and 
excitement of passion was caused by fire, they formed and im- 
planted as a supporter to the heart the lung, which was, in the 
first place, soft and bloodless, and also had within hollows like 
the pores of a sponge, in order that, receiving the breath and 
the drink and cooling them, it might give the power of respi- 
ration and alleviate the heat. For which reason they cut the 
arteries or air vessels as passages to the lung, and placed the 
lung about the heart as a soft spring, that, when passion was 
rife within, the heart, beating against the yielding body, might 
be refreshed and suffer less, and might thus become more ready 
to enlist passion in the service of reason. 

The part of the soul which* desires meats and drinks and 
such things as the bodily frame needs, they placed between 
the midriff and the navel, contriving in all this region a sort 
of manger for the food of the body; and there they bound 
the desires down as a wild animal which was chained up with 
man, and must be nourished if man was to exist. They ap- 
pointed this lower creation his place here in order that he 
might be always feeding at the manger, and have his dwell- 






PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 43 



ing as far as possible from the council chamber, making as 
little noise and disturbance as possible, and permitting the 
best part to advise quietly for the good of the whole. And 
knowing and considering that this lower principle in man 
would not listen to reason, and even if attaining to some de- 
gree of perception would never naturally care for any argu- 
ments, and was liable to be led away by phantoms and visions 
of the night and also by day, God framed the liver, to dwell 
in the same house with the lower nature, contriving that it 
should be solid and smooth, and bright and sweet, and also bit- 
ter, in order that the power of thought, which originates in the 
mind, might be reflected as in a mirror which receives and 
gives back images of them to the sight. And this power 
making use of the bitter part of the liver, to which it is akin, 
inspires terror, and comes threatening and invading, and sud- 
denly mingling with the entire liver produces colors like bile, 
and contracts every part, and makes it wrinkled and rough ; 
or, on the other hand, twisting out of their right place and 
contracting the lobe and receptacles and gates, or again, closing 
and shutting them up — in these and other ways creates pain 
and disgust. And the converse happens when some gentle in- 
spiration of the understanding pictures images of an opposite 
character, and allays the bile and bitterness by not stirring 
them, and refuses to touch the nature opposed to itself, but by 
making use of the natural sweetness of the liver, corrects all 
things and makes them to be right and smooth and free, and 
makes the portion of the soul which resides about the liver 
happy and joyful, having in the night a time of peace and 
moderation, and the power of divination in dreams, inasmuch 
as it does not share in mind and reason. For the authors of 
our being, remembering the command of their father when he 
bade them make the human race as good as they could, thus 
ordered our inferior parts in order that they too might obtain 
a measure of truth, and in the liver placed their oracle, and 
herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination not 
to the wisdom, but to the foolishness of man. For no man, 
when in his wits, attains prophetic truth and inspiration ; but 
when he receives the inspired word either his intelligence is 
enthralled by sleep, or he is demented by some distemper or 
possession. And he who would understand what he remein 
bers to have been said, whether in a dream or when he was 
awake, by the prophetic and enthusiastic nature, or what he 






44 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

has seen, must first recover his wits ; and then he will be able 
to explain rationally what all such words and apparitions 
mean, and what indications they afford to this man or that, of 
past, present, or future good and evil. But, while he contin- 
ues demented, he cannot judge of the visions which he sees or 
the words which he utters ; the ancient saying is very true, that 
" only a man who has his wits can act or judge about himself 
and his own affairs." And for this reason it is customary to 
appoint diviners or interpreters to be judges of the true inspi- 
ration. Some persons call them prophets ; they do not know 
that they are only repeaters of dark sayings and visions, and 
are not to be called prophets at all, but only interpreters of 
prophecy. 1 — Timaeus, ii. 561. 
Body and soul, health of. 

Soc. What use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body 

of a sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the 
most delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which 
may be really as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or 
even worse, if rightly estimated. Is not that true ? 

Gal. I will not say no to that. 

Soc. For in my opinion there is no profit in a man's life ii 
his body is in an evil plight — in that case his life also is evil ; 
am I not right ? 

Gal. Yes. 

Soc. When a man is in health the physicians will generally 
allow him to eat when he is hungry, and drink when he is 
thirsty, and to satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is 
sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires at all : even 
you will admit that ? 

Gal. Yes. 

Soc. And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my 
good sir ? While she is in a bad state and is senseless and in- 
temperate and unjust and unholy, her desires ought to be con- 
trolled, and she ought to be prevented from doing anything 
which does not tend to her own improvement. 

Gal. Yes. 

Soc. And that will be for her true interests ? 

Gal. To be sure. 

Soc. And controlling her desires is chastising her ? 

l Plato's ideas on the physical structure of man are given at large in succeeding 
pages too lengthily to be inserted here. Those who are curious to know in full his 
views on human physiology should read the whole of the " Timaeus." 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 45 

Gal. Yes. 

Soc. Then control or chastisement is better for the soul than 
intemperance or the absence of control. — Gorgias, iii. 96. 
Body and soul, two processes of training. 

< Oh, my friend ! I want you to see that the noble and the 

good may possibly be something different from saving and being 
saved, and that he who is truly a man ought not to care about 
living a certain time ; he knows, as women say, that we must 
all die, and therefore he is not fond of life ; he leaves all that 
with God, and considers in what way he can best spend his 
appointed term ; whether by assimilating himself to that con- 
stitution under which he lives, as you at this moment have to 
consider, how you may become as like as possible to the Athe- 
nian people, if you intend to be dear to them, and to have 
power in the State ; whereas I want you to think and see 
whether this is for the interest of either of us ; I would not 
have us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this 
power, like the Thessalian enchantresses, who, as they say, 
bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own 
perdition. But if you suppose that any man will show you the 
art of becoming great in the city, and yet not conforming your- 
self to the ways of the city, whether for better or worse, then 
I can only say that you are mistaken, Callicles ; for he who 
would deserve to be the true natural friend of the Athenian 
Demus, aye, or of Pyrilampes' darling, who is called after 
them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. 
He, then, who will make you most like them, will make you 
as you desire, a statesman and orator : for every man is pleased, 
when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and dis- 
likes any other. But perhaps you, sweet Callicles, may be of 
another mind. What do you say ? 

Gal. Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear 
to me to be good words ; and yet, like the rest of the world, I 
am not quite convinced by you. 

Soc. The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which 
abides in your soul is an adversary to me ; but I dare say 
that if we recur to these same matters, and consider them 
more thoroughly, you may be convinced for all that. Please, 
then, to remember that there are two processes of training 
all things, including body and soul ; in the one, as we said, 
we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other 
with a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge 






46 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

but resist them : was not that the distinction which we 
drew ? 

Gal. Very true. — Gorgias, Lii. 104. 
Body after death. 

« Death, if I am right, is in the first place the separation from 

one another of two things, soul and body ; nothing else. And 
after they are separated they retain their several characteristics, 
which are much the same as in life ; the body has the same 
nature and ways and affections, all clearly discernible ; for ex- 
ample, he who by nature or training or both was a tall man 
while he was alive, will remain as he was, after he is dead ; and 
the fat man will remain fat ; and so on ; and the dead man, 
who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair, will have flowing 
hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints 
of the scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you 
might see the same in the dead body ; and if his limbs were 
broken or misshapen when he was alive the same appearance 
would be visible in the dead. And in a word, whatever was 
the habit of the body during life would be distinguishable after 
death, either perfectly, or in a great measure and for a con- 
siderable time. And I should imagine that this is equally true 
of the soul, Callicles ; when a man is stripped of the body, all 
the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to 
view. — And when they come to the judge, as those from Asia 
come to Rhadamanthus, he places them near him and inspects 
them quite impartially, not knowing whose the soul is : per- 
haps he may lay hands on the soul of the great king, or of some 
other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his 
soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and sgars 
of perjuries, and crimes with which each action has stained him, 
and he is all crooked with falsehood and imposture, and has no 
straightness, because he has lived without truth. Him Rhada- 
manthus beholds, full of all deformity and disproportion, which 
is caused by license and luxury and insolence and incontinence, 
and dispatches him ignominiously to his prison, and there he 
undergoes the punishment which he deserves. 1 — Gorgias, iii. 
115. ' 
Body and soul, mixtures of. 

Soc. There are some mixtures which are of the body, 

and only in the body, and others which are of the soul, and 

i The mythology of the Greeks as to the future state is largely given by Plato in 
his " Gorgias." 



PLATO'S BEST THOwHTS. 47 

only in the soul ; while there are other mixtures of pleasures 
with pains, common both to soul and body, which in their com- 
posite state are called sometimes pleasures and sometimes pains. 

Pro. How is that ? 

Soc. Whenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of 
nature, a man experiences two opposite feelings ; for example, 
when he is cold and is growing warm, or again, when he is hot 
and is being cooled, and he wants to have the one and be free 
from the other ; the sweet has a bitter, as they say, and both 
together fasten upon him, and create irritation and in time 
drive him to distraction. 

Pro. That description is very true to nature. — Philehus, iii. 
185. 
Body, honor of the. 

Speaking generally, our glory is to follow the better and 

improve the inferioi*, which is susceptible of improvement, in 
the best manner possible. And of all the possessions which a 
man has, the soul is by nature most inclined to avoid the evil, 
and search out and find the chief good ; and having found, to 
dwell with the good, during the remainder of life. Wherefore 
the soul also is second in honor ; and third, as every one will 
perceive, comes the honor of the body in natural order. Hav- 
ing determined this, we have next to consider that there is 
a genuine honor of the body, and that of honors some are and 
some are not genuine. The legislator, as I suspect, ranks them 
in the following order : — Honor is not to be given to the fair, or 
the strong, or the swift, or the tall, or the healthy body (although 
many may think otherwise), any more than to their opposites ; 
but the mean states of all these habits are by far the safest and 
most moderate ; for the one extreme makes the soul braggart 
and insolent, and the other, illiberal and mean ; and money, 
and property, and distinction, all go to the same tune. The 
excess of any of these things is apt to be a source of hatreds and 
divisions among states and individuals ; and the defect of them 
is commonly a cause of slavery. — Laws, iv. 253. 
Boldness of the Philosopher as to death. 

Simmias, as the true philosophers are ever studying death, 

to them, of all men, death is the least terrible. Look at the 
matter in this way : if they have been always enemies of the 
body, and wanting to have the soul alone, when this is granted 
to them, how inconsistent would they be to be trembling and 
repining ; instead of rejoicing at their departing to that place 



48 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

where, when they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life 
they loved (and this was wisdom), and at the same time to be 
rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man has been 
willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of see- 
ing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with 
them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is 
strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below 
he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death ? Will he not 
depart with joy ? Surely he will, my friend, if he be a true 
philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction that there 
only, and nowhere else, he can find wisdom in her purity. And 
if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he 
were to fear death. 

He would indeed, replied Simmias. 

And when you see a man who is repining at the approach 
of death, is not his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a 
lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body, and probably at the 
same time a lover of either money or power, or both ? 

That is very true, he replied. 

There is a virtue, Simmias, which is named courage. Is not 
that characteristic of the philosopher ? 

Certainly. — Phaedo, i. 394 
Boldness in thought. 

Theaet. I cannot say, Socrates, that knowledge is all opin- 
ion, because there may be a false opinion ; but I will venture 
to say, that knowledge is true opinion ; let this then be my 
answer ; and if this is hereafter disproved, I must try to find 
another. 

Soc. That is the way in which you ought to answer, Theaet- 
etus, and not in your former hesitating strain, for if we are 
bold we shall gain one of two advantages ; either we shall find 
that which we seek, or we shall be less likely to think that we 
know what we do not know — and this surely is no mean re- 
ward. — Theaetetus, iii. 391. 
Boundaries, removal of. See Landmarks. 
Brave, honor to the. See Battle, death in. 

There is another manner in which, according to Homer, 

brave youths should be honored ; for he tells how Ajax, after 
he had distinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long 
chines, which seems to be a complement appropriate to a hero 
in the flower of his age, being not only a tribute of honor but 
also a very strengthening thing. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 49 

Very true, he said. 

Then in this, I said, Homer will be our teacher ; and we 
too, at sacrifices and on the like occasions, will honor the brave, 
whether men or women, with hymns — 

" and seats of precedence, and meats and flowing goblets ; " 

and in honoring them, we shall also be training them. 

That, be replied, is excellent. 

Yes, I said ; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall 
we not say, in the first place, that he is of the golden race ? 

To be sure. 

Nay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that 
when they are dead — 

" They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters of ill, the guardians 
of speech-gifted men? " 

Yes, and we believe him. 

We must inquire of the God how we are to order the sepul- 
ture of divine and heroic personages, and do as he bids ? 

By all means. 

And in ages to come we will do service to them and worship 
at their shrines as heroes. And not only they but any who 
are preeminently good, whether they die from age, or in any 
other way, shall be admitted to the same honors. 

That is very right, he said. 

Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies ? What do 
you say about this ? 

In what respect do you mean ? 

I mean, shall they be made slaves ? Do you think that 
Hellenes ought to enslave Hellenes, or allow others to en- 
slave them, if they can help ? Should not their custom be to 
spare them, considering the danger which there is that the 
whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians ? 

To spare them is infinitely better. — - The Hepublic, ii. 296. 
Brave sons of brave parents. See State, Heroes, etc. 
Burial and remembrance of the dead. 

At their death, the most moderate funeral is best, neither 

exceeding the customary expense, nor yet falling short of the 
honor which has been usually shown by the former generation 
to their parents ; and let a man not forget to pay the yearly 
tribute of respect to the dead, honoring them chiefly by omitting 
nothing that conduces to a perpetual remembrance of them, 
and giving a reasonable portion of his fortune to the dead. 
4 



50 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Doing this, and living after this manner, we shall receive our 
reward from the Gods and those who are above us ; and we 
shall spend our days for the most part in good hope. — Laws, 
iv. 245. 
Business, men of — their money-sting. 

On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they 

walk, and pretending not even to see those whom they have 
already ruined, insert the sting — that is, their money — into 
some one else who is not on his guard against them, and re- 
cover the parent sum many times over multiplied into a family 
of children : and so they make drone and pauper to abound in 
the State. 

Yes, he said, there are plenty of them, that is certain. 

The evil is like a fire which is blazing up, and which they 
will not extinguish. — The Republic, ii. 383. 

Calmness in view of death. See Courage. 

Soc. Why have you come at this hour, Crito ? it must be 

quite early ? 

Crito. Yes, certainly. 

Soc. What is the exact time ? 

Cr. The dawn is breaking. 

Soc. I wonder the keeper of the prison would let you in. 

Cr. He knows me because I often come, Socrates ; more 
over, I have done him a kindness. 

Soc. And are you only just arrived ? 

Cr. No, I came some time ago. 

Soc. Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of at 
once awakening me ? 

Cr. By the Gods, Socrates, I would rather not myself have 
all this sleeplessness and sorrow. I have been wondering at 
your peaceful slumbers, which was the reason why I did not 
awaken you, because I wanted you to be out of pain. I have 
always thought you of a happy disposition ; but never did I 
see anything like the easy, tranquil manner in which you bear 
this calamity. 

Soc. Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he ought 
not to be repining at the prospect of death. 

Cr. And yet other old men find themselves in similar mis- 
fortunes, and age does not prevent them from repining. — . 
Crito, i. 347. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 51 

Causes and conditions confounded. 

I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any 

other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, 
and water, and other eccentricities. I might compare him to 
a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the 
cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavored 
to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on 
to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones 
and muscles ; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and 
have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and 
they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environ- 
ment of flesh and skin which contains them ; and as the bones 
are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the 
muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sit- 
ting here in a curved posture ; — that is what he would say, and 
he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, 
which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and 
he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, 
forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, that the Athe- 
nians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have 
thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo 
my sentence ; for I am inclined to think that these muscles and 
bones of mine would have gone off long ago to Megara or Boe- 
otia, — by the dog of Egypt they Would, if they had been moved 
only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen 
as the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and run- 
ning away, to undergo any punishment which the State inflicts. 
There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in 
all this. It may be said, indeed, that without bones and mus- 
cles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my pur- 
poses. But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that 
this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of 
the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. I won- 
der that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, 
which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistak- 
ing and misnaming. — Phaedo, i. 427. 
Cause, limit and, in the Universe. See Limit, etc. 
Cause for every creation. 

What is that which always is and has no becoming ; and 

what is that which is always becoming and never is ? That 
which is apprehended by intelligence and reason always is, and 
is the same ; but that which is conceived by opinion with the 



52 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

help of sensation and without reason, is always in a process of 
becoming and perishing, but never really is. Now everything 
that becomes or is created must of necessity be created by 
some cause, for nothing can be created without a cause. The 
work of the artificer who looks always to the abiding and the 
unchangeable, and who designs and fashions his work after an 
unchangeable pattern, must of necessity be made fair and per- 
fect ; but that of an artificer who looks to the created only, 
and fashions his work after a created pattern, is not fair or 
perfect. Was the heaven then or the world, whether called by 
this or any other more acceptable name — assuming the name, 
I am asking a question which has to be asked at the beginning 
of every inquiry — was the world, 1 say, always in existence 
and without beginning ? or created and having a beginning ? 
Created, I reply, being visible and tangible and having a body, 
and therefore sensible ; and all sensible things which are ap- 
prehended by opinion and sense are in a process of creation 
and created. Now that which is created must of necessity be 
created by a cause. — Timaeus, ii. 523. 
Cause, mind a. See Mind, etc. 
Causes ; two kinds of, intelligent and unintelligent. 

• These are the works of the second and cooperative causes 

which God, carrying into execution the idea of the best as far 
as possible, uses as his ministers. They are thought by most 
men not to be the second, but the prime causes of all things, 
because they freeze and heat, and contract and dilate, and the 
like. But they are not so, for they are incapable of reason or 
intellect ; the only being which can properly have mind is the 
invisible soul, whereas fire and water, and earth and air, are 
all of them visible bodies. The lover of intellect and knowl- 
edge ought to explore causes of intelligent nature first of all, 
and, secondly, of those which are moved by others and of ne- 
cessity move others. And this we too must now do. Both 
kinds of causes should be considered by us, but a distinction 
should be made between those which are endowed with mind 
and are the workers of things fair and good, and those which 
are deprived of intelligence and accomplish their several works 
by chance and without order. Of the second or concurrent 
causes of sight, which give to the eyes the power which they 
now possess, enough has been said. I will therefore now pro- 
ceed to speak of the higher use and purpose for which God 
has given them to us. The sight in my opinion is the source 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 53 

of the greatest benefit to us, for had the eyes never seen the 
stars, and the sun, and the heaven, none of the words which 
we have spoken about the universe would ever have been ut- 
tered. But now the sight of day and night, and the revolution 
of the months and years, have given us the invention of number, 
and a conception of time, and the power of inquiring about the 
nature of the whole ; and from this source we have derived 
philosophy, than which no greater good ever was or will be 
given by the gods to mortal man. This is the greatest boon 
of sight : and of the lesser benefits why should I speak, even 
the ordinary man if he were blind would in vain bewail the 
loss of them. 

Thus much let me say however : God invented and gave us 
sight to the end, that we might behold the courses of intelli- 
gence in the heaven, and apply them to the courses of our own 
intelligence which are akin to them, the unperturbed to the per- 
turbed ; and that we, learning them and being partakers of the 
true computations of nature, might imitate the absolutely un- 
erring courses of God and regulate our own vagaries. The 
same may be affirmed of speech and hearing ; they have been 
given by the gods to the same end and for a like reason. 
For this is the principal end of speech, and there is a similar 
use of musical sound, which is given to the hearing for the sake 
of harmony. And harmony, which has motions akin to the 
revolutions of our souls, is not regarded by him who intelli- 
gently uses the Muses as given by them with a view to irra- 
tional pleasure, which is the prevailing opinion in our day, but 
with a view to the inharmonical course of the soul, and to be 
our ally in reducing this into harmony and agreement with 
itself ; and rhythm was given by them for the same reason, on 
account of the irregular and graceless ways which prevail 
among mankind generally, and to help us against them. 

Thus far in what we have been saying, with small exceptions 
the works of intelligence have been set forth ; and now we 
must place by the side of them the things done from necessity 
■ — for the creation is mixed, being made up of necessity and 
mind. Mind, the ruling power, persuaded necessity to bring 
the greater part of created things to perfection, and thus in the 
beginning, when the influence of reason got the better of neces- 
sity, the universe was created. But if a person will truly tell 
of the way in which the work was accomplished, he must in- 
clude the other influence of the variable cause as well. Where- 



54 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

fore, we must return again and find another suitable beginning, 
as about the former matters, so also about these. To which 
end we must consider the nature of fire, and water, and air, and 
earth, which were prior to the creation of the heavens, and 
what happened before there were elements ; for no one has as 
yet explained them, but we speak of fire and the rest of them, 
whatever they mean, as though men knew their natures, and 
we maintain them to be the letters or elements of the whole, 
when they cannot reasonably be compared by a man of any 
sense even to the syllables or first compounds. And let me 
say thus much : I will not speak of the first principle or prin- 
ciples of all things, or by whatever name they are to be called, 
for this reason, — because it is difficult to set forth my opinion 
according to the mode of discussion which we are at present 
employing. Do not imagine, any more than I can bring my- 
self to imagine, that I should be right in undertaking so diffi- 
cult a task. I will observe the rule of probability with which 
I began, not less but more than others and especially when I 
speak of the beginning of each and all. Once more, then, I 
call upon God, at the beginning of my discourse, and beg him 
to be our saviour out of a strange and unwonted inquiry, and 
to bring us to probability. — Timaeus, ii. 539. 
Censorship of Fiction. See Fiction. 
Censure, right and good. 

Ath. At our time of life, Cleinias, there should be no feel- 
ing of irritation. 

Gle. Certainly not. 

Ath. I will not at present determine whether he who cen- 
sures the Cretan or Lacedaemonian polities is right or wrong. 
But I believe that I can tell better than either of you what 
the many say about them. For assuming that you have rea- 
sonably good laws, one of the best of* them will be a law for- 
bidding any young men to inquire which of them are right or 
wrong ; but with one mouth and one voice, they must all agree 
that the laws are all good and of divine origin ; and any one 
who says the contrary is not to be listened to. But an old man 
who remarks any defect, may communicate his observation to a 
ruler or to an equal when no young man is present. 

Cle. Exactly so, Stranger ; and like a diviner, although not 
there at the time, you seem to me quite to have hit the mean- 
ing .of the legislator, and to say what is most true. 

Ath. As there are no young men present, and the legislator 



PLATO* S BEST THOUGHTS. 55 

has given old men free license, there will be no impropriety in 
our discussing these matters now that we are alone. 

Cle. True. And, therefore, you may be as free as you like 
in your censure of our laws, for there is no discredit in know- 
ing what is wrong ; he who receives what is said in a generous 
and friendly spirit will be the better for it. 

Ath. Very good ; however, I am not going to censure your 
laws until to the best of my ability I have examined them, but 
I am going to raise doubts about them. For you are the only 
people known to us, whether Greek or barbarian, whom the 
legislator commanded to eschew all great pleasures and amuse- 
ments ; whereas in the matter of pains or fears which we have 
just been discussing, he thought that they who from infancy 
had always avoided the pains, and fears and sorrows which 
must be, when they were compelled to face them would run 
away from those who were hardened in them, and become their 
subjects. 

Now the legislator ought to have considered that this was 
equally true of pleasure ; he should have said to himself, that 
if our citizens are from their youth upward unacquainted with 
the greatest pleasure, and unused to endure amid the tempta- 
tions of pleasure, and are not disciplined to refrain from all 
things evil, the sweet feeling of pleasure will overcome them 
just as fear would overcome the former class ; and in another, 
and even a worse manner, they will be the servants of those 
who are able to endure amid pleasures, and have had the 
opportunity of enjoying them, they being often the worst of 
mankind. One half of their souls will be a slave, the other half 
free ; and they will not be worthy to be called in the true sense 
men and freemen. Tell me whether you assent to my words ? 

Cle. On first hearing, what you say appears to be the truth ; 
but to be hasty in coming to a conclusion about such important 
matters, would be very childish and simple. — Laws, iv. 165. 
Chance and Nature. See Nature. 
Chance in legislation. See Legislation, etc. 
Changeableness of Youth. 

When a young man who has been brought up as we were 

just now describing, in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted 
drones' honey and has come to associate with fierce and danger- 
ous natures who are able to provide for him all sorts of refine- 
ments and varieties of pleasure, — then, as you may imagine, 
the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him 
into the democratical. 



56 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Inevitably. 

And as in the city like was helping like, and the change was 
effected by an alliance from without assisting one division of 
the citizens, so the young man also changes by a class of de- 
sires from without assisting the unsatisfied desires within him, 
that which is akin and alike again helping that which is akin 
and alike. 

Certainly. 

And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical princi- 
ple within him, whether the influence of friends or kindred, 
advising or rebuking him, then there arises a faction and an 
opposite faction, and the result is a civil war. 

It must be so. 

And there are times when the democratical principle gives 
way to the oligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others 
are banished ; a spirit of reverence enters into the young man's 
soul and order is restored. 

Yes, he said, that sometimes happens. 

And then, again, after the old desires have been driven out 
fresh ones spring up, which are akin to them ; and because he 
their father does not know how to educate them, wax fierce 
and numerous. 

Yes, he said, that is apt to be the way. 

They draw him to his old associates, and holding secret in- 
tercourse with them, breed and multiply in him ? 

Yery true. 

At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's 
soul, which they perceive to be void of all fair accomplish- 
ments and pursuits of every true word, which are the best 
guardians and sentinels in the minds of men who are dear to 
the gods. 

None better. 

False and boastful words and conceits mount upwards in- 
stead of them, and occupy the vacant post. 

They are sure to do so. 

And so the young man. returns into the country of the lotus- 
eaters, and takes up his abode there in the face of all men, 
and if any help be sent by his friends to the oligarchical part 
of him, the same vain conceits shut the gate of the king's fast- 
ness ; they will not allow the new allies to pass. And if pri- 
vate individuals, venerable for their age, come and parley, they 
do not receive them ; there is a battle and they win : then 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 57 

modesty, which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into 
exile by them. They affirm temperance to be un manliness, 
and her also they contemptuously eject ; and they pretend that 
moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and mean- 
ness ; and, by the help of a rabble of evil appetites they drive 
them beyond the border. 

Yes, with a will. 

And when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of 
him who is now in their power, and is being initiated by them 
in great mysteries, the next thing is to bring back to their 
house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in 
bright array, having garlands on their heads, with a great com- 
pany, while they hymn their praises and call them by sweet 
names ; insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and 
waste magnificence, and impudence courage. And so the 
young man passes out of his original nature, which was 
trained in the school of necessity, into the freedom and liber- 
tinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures. 

Yes, he said, the change in him is visible enough. 

After this he lives on, spending his money and labor and 
time on unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary 
ones ; but if he be fortunate, and is not too much intoxicated 
with passion, when he gets older, after the great tumult has 
passed away — supposing that he then readmits into the city 
some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give him- 
self up to their successors — in that case he balances his pleas- 
ures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government 
of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and 
wins the turn ; and when he has had enough of that, then into 
the hands of another, and is very impartial in his encourage- 
ment of them all. 

Very true, he said. 

Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any 
true word of advice ; if any one says to him that some pleas- 
ures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires, and others 
of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honor some and 
curtail and reduce others — whenever this is repeated to him 
he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that 
one is as honorable as another. 

Yes, he said ; that is the way with him. 

Yes, I said, he lives through the day indulging the appetite 
of the hour ; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains 



58 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

of the flute ; then he is for total abstinence, and tries to get 
thin ; then, again, he is at gymnastics ; sometimes idling and 
neglecting everything, then once more living the life of a phil- 
osopher ; often he is at politics, and starts to his feet and says 
and does whatever comes into his head ; and, if he is emulous 
of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of 
men of business, once more in that. His life has neither 
order nor law ; and so he goes on continually and. he terms 
this joy and freedom and happiness. 

Yes, his life is all liberty, and equality. 

Yes, I said ; and multiform and full of the most various 
characters; — he answers to the State which we described as 
fair and spangled. And many a man and many a woman will 
emulate him and many a constitution and many an example of 
life is contained in him. — The Republic, ii. 388. 
Children, spoiled by friends. 

Soc. The question is, Which of us is skillful or successful 

m the treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good 
teachers ? 

La. Well but, Socrates ; did you never observe that some 
persons, who hav.e had no teachers, are more skillful than those 
who have, in some things ? 

Soc. Yes, Laches, I have observed that ; but you would not 
be very willing to trust them if they only professed to be mas- 
ters of their art, unless they could show some proof of their 
skill or excellence in one or more works. 

L>a. That is true. 

Soc. And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lysimachus and 
Melesias, in their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, 
have asked our advice about them, we too should tell them 
who our teachers were, if we say that we have had any, and 
prove them to be men of merit and experienced trainers of the 
minds of youth and really our teachers. Or if any of us says 
that he has no teacher, but that he has works to show of his 
own ; then he should point out to them, what Athenians or 
strangers, bond or free, he is generally acknowledged to have 
improved. But if he can show neither teachers nor works, 
then he should tell them to look out for others ; and not to 
run the risk of spoiling the children of friends, which is the 
most formidable accusation that can be brought against any 
one by those nearest to him. — Laches, i. 78. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 69 

Children, training of, not easy. 

Just as I thought that I had finished, and was only too 

glad that I had laid this question to sleep, and was reflecting 
how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then said, 
you begin again, ignorant of what a hornet's nest of words, 
you are arousing. Now I foresaw this coming trouble, and 
avoided it. 

For what do you think that we are here ? said Thrasyma- 
chus ; to find the philosopher's stone, or to hear discourse ? 

Yes, but discourse should have a limit. 

Yes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the 
only limit which wise men assign to the hearing of such dis- 
courses. But never mind about us ; only get on and in your 
own way answer the question : What sort of community of 
women and children is this which is to prevail among the guard- 
ians ? and how shall we manage the period between birth and 
education which seems to require the greatest care ? Tell us 
how these things will be. 

Yes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy ; 
many more doubts arise about this than about our previous 
speculations. For the practicability of what is said may be 
doubted ; and looked at in another point of view, whether the 
scheme, if ever so practicable, will be for the best, is also 
doubtful. Hence there arises a fear, as we draw near, lest our 
aspiration should be a dream only. — The Republic, ii. 274. 
Children, taught their letters. 

Str. I will proceed, finding as I do, such a ready listener in 

you : when children are beginning to know their letters — 

Y. Soc. What are you going to say ? 

Str. That they easily recognize the several letters in very 
short and easy syllables, and are able to tell you them cor- 
rectly. 

Y. Soc. Certainly. 

Str. Whereas in other syllables they do not recognize them, 
and think and speak falsely of them. 

Y. Soc. Very true. 

Str. Will not the best and easiest way of guiding them to 
the letters which they do not as yet know, be to refer them to 
the same letters in the words which they know, and to compare 
these with the letters which as yet they do not know, and show 
them that they are the same, and have the same character in 
their different combinations, until the letters, which they do not 



60 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

know, have been all placed side by side with the letters which 

they do know ? in this way they have examples, and are made 

to learn that every letter in every combination is pronounced 

always either as the same or not the same. — Statesman, iii. 

562. 

Children, what they owe to their parents. See Parents. 

Next comes the honor of living parents, to whom, as is 

meet, we have to pay the first and greatest and oldest of all 
debts, considering that all which a man has belongs to those 
who gave him birth and brought him up, and that he must do 
all that he can to minister to them : first, in his property ; 
secondly, in his person ; and thirdly, in his soul ; paying the 
debts due to them for the care and travail which they bestowed 
upon him of old, in the days of his infancy, and which he is 
now to pay back to them when they are old and in the ex- 
tremity of their need. And all his life long he ought never to 
utter, or to have uttered, an unbecoming word to them ; for of 
all light and winged words he will have to give an account ; 
Nemesis, the messenger of Justice, is appointed to watch over 
them. When they are angry, and want to satisfy their feel- 
ings in word or deed, he should not resist them, for a father 
who thinks that he has been wronged by his son, may be rea- 
sonably expected to be very angry. — Laws, iv. 245. 
Children, falsely trained. 

Ath. I imagine that Cyrus, though a great and patriotic gen- 
eral, had never given his mind to education, and never attended 
to the order of his household. 

Cle. What makes you say so ? 

Ath. I think that from his youth upwards he was a soldier, 
and intrusted the bringing up of his children to the women ; 
and they brought them up from their childhood as the favorites 
of fortune, who were blessed already, and needed no more 
blessings. They thought that they were happy enough, and 
that no one should be allowed to oppose them in any way, and 
they compelled every one to praise all that they said or did. 
This was the manner in which they brought them up. 

Cle. A splendid education truly ! 

Ath. Such an education as women were likely to give them, 
and especially princesses who had recently grown rich, and in 
the absence of the men, too, who were occupied in wars and 
dangers, and too busy to look after them. 

Cle. What would you expect? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 61 

Ath. Their father had possessions of cattle and sheep, and 
many herds of men and other animals ; but he did not con- 
sider that those to whom he was about to make them over, 
were not trained in his own calling, which was Persian ; for 
the Persians are shepherds — sons of a rugged land, which was 
a stern mother, and well fitted to produce a sturdy race able to 
live in the open air and watch, and to fight also, if fighting was 
required. . He did not observe that his sons were trained dif- 
ferently ; through the so-called blessing of being royal, they 
were educated in the corrupt Median fashion by women and 
eunuchs, which led to their becoming such as people do become 
when they are brought up un reproved. And so, after the 
death of Cyrus, his sons, in the fullness of luxury and license, 
took the kingdom, and first one slew the other because he 
could not endure a rival ; and, afterwards, the slayer himself, 
mad with wine and brutality, lost his kingdom through the 
Medes and the eunuch, as they called him, who despised the 
folly of Cambyses. 

Gle. That is what is said, and is probably the truth. 

Ath. Yes ; and the tradition says, that the empire came back 
to the Persians, through Darius and the seven chiefs. 

Gle. True. 

Ath. Let us note the rest of the story. Observe, that Darius 
was not the son of a king, and had not received a luxurious 
education. When he came to the throne, being one of the 
seven, he divided the country into seven portions, and of this 
arrangement there are some shadowy traces still remaining ; he 
made laws upon the principle of introducing universal equality 
in the order of the State, and he embodied in a law the settle- 
ment of the tribute which Cyrus promised, — thus creating a 
feeling of friendship and community among all the Persians, 
and attaching the people to him with money and gifts. Hence 
his armies cheerfully acquired for him countries as large as 
those which Cyrus had left behind him. Darius was suc- 
ceeded by his son Xerxes, and he again was brought up in the 
royal and luxurious fashion. Might we not justly say, " O 
Darius, why did you not learn wisdom from the misfortunes of 
Cyrus, instead of bringing up Xerxes in the same w T ay in which 
he brought up Cambyses ? " For Xerxes being the creation of 
the same education, met with much the same fortune as Camby- 
ses ; and from that time to this there has never been a really 
great king among the Persians, although they are all called 



62 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

great. And their degeneracy is not to be attributed to chance, 
as I maintain ; the reason is rather the evil life which is gen- 
erally led by the sons of very rich and royal, persons ; for 
never will boy or man, young or old, excel in virtue, who has 
been thus educated. And this, I say, is what the legislator 
has to consider, and what at this moment has to be considered 
by us. Justly may you, O Lacedaemonians, be praised for 
this — that you do not give special honor or maintenance to 
wealth rather than to poverty in particular, or to a royal rather 
than to a private station, where the divine and inspired law- 
giver has not originally commanded them to be given. For no 
man ought to have preeminent honor in a state because he sur- 
passes others in wealth, any more than because he is swift or 
fair or strong, unless he have some virtue in him ; nor even if 
he have virtue, unless he have this particular virtue of temper- 
ance.— Laws, iv. 223. 
Children, riches an evil left to. 

I would not have any one fond of heaping up riches for 

the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as 
rich as possible. For the possession of great wealth is of no 
use, either to them or to the State. The condition of youth 
which is free from flattery, and at the same time not in need of 
the necessaries of life,. is the best and most harmonious of all, 
being in accord and agreement with our nature, and making 
life to be most entirely free from sorrow. Let parents, then, 
bequeath to their children not riches, but the spirit of rever- 
ence. We, indeed, fancy that they will inherit reverence from 
us, if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. 
But this quality is not really imparted to them by the present 
style of admonition, which only tells them that the young ought 
always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather ex- 
hort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take 
heed that no young man sees or hears him doing or saying 
^ anything base ; for where old men have no shame, there young 
s men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. The best way 
/ of training the young, is to train yourself at the same time ; 
not to admonish them, but to be always carrying out your own 
principles in practice. — Laws, iv. 254. 
Children ; education of. See Youth, etc. 

And now, assuming that children of both sexes have 

been born, their nurture and education will properly follow 
next in order; this cannot be left altogether unnoticed, and 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 63 

yet may be thought to be rather a subject for precept and ad- 
monition than for law. In private life there are many little 
things, not always apparent, arising out of the pleasures and 
desires and pains of individuals, which are contrary to the in- 
tention of the legislator ; these minutiae alter and discompose 
the characters of the citizens, and cause great evil in states ; 
for they are so small and of such frequent occurrence, that 
there would be an unseemliness and want of propriety in mak- 
ing them penal by law ; and if made penal, they are the de- 
struction of the written law, because mankind get the habit of 
frequently transgressing in small matters. The result is that 
you cannot legislate about them, and still less can you say 
nothing. I speak somewhat darkly, but I shall endeavor also 
to bring my wares into the light of day, for I acknowledge 
that at present there is a want of clearness in what I am say- 
ing. 

Cle. Very true. 

Ath. Am I not right in maintaining that a good education 
is that which tends most to the improvement of mind and 
body ? 

Cle. Undoubtedly. 

Ath. And nothing can be plainer than that the fairest bodies 
ought to grow up from infancy in the best and straightest 
manner ? 

Cle. Yery true. 

Ath. And do we not further observe that the first shoot of 
every living thing is by far the greatest and fullest ? Many 
will even contend that a man at twenty-five does not grow to 
twice the height which he attained at five. 

Cle. True. 1 — Laws, iv. 306. 
Choral song; harmony in. 

Ath. I was speaking at the commencement of our dis- 
course, as you will remember, of the fiery nature of young 
creatures ; I said that they were unable to keep quiet either in 
limb or voice, and that they called out and jumped about in a 
disorderly manner ; and that no other animal attained to any 
perception of order, but man only. Now the order of motion 
is called rhythm, and the order of the voice, in which high 
and low are duly mingled, is called harmony ; and both to- 
gether are termed choric song. And I said that the gods had 

i In Book vii. of his " Laws," Plato discusses quite extensively the education of 
children. 



64 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

pity on us, and gave us Apollo and the Muses to be our play- 
fellows and leaders in the dance ; and Dionysus, as I dare say 
that you will remember, was the third. 

Cle. I quite remember. 

Ath. Thus far I have spoken of the chorus of Apollo and 
the Muses, and I have still to speak of the remaining chorus, 
which is that of Dionysus. 

Cle. How is that arranged ? There is something strange, at 
any rate, on first hearing, in a Dionysiac chorus of old men, if 
you really mean that those who are above thirty, and may be 
fifty, or from fifty to sixty years of age, are to form a dance in 
his honor. 

Ath. That is very true ; and I think with you that some 
reason should be given for the proposal. 

Cle. Certainly. 

Ath. Are we agreed thus far ? 

Cle. About what ? 

Ath. That every man and boy, slave and free, both sexes, 
and the whole city, should never cease charming themselves 
with the strains of which we have spoken ; and that there 
should be every sort of change and variation of them in order 
to take away the effect of sameness, so that the singers may 
always receive pleasure from their hymns, and may never 
weary of them. — Laws, iv. 194. 
Choristers ; how they should sing. 

Music is more celebrated than any other kind of imita- 
tion, and therefore requires the greatest care of them all. For 
if a man makes a mistake here, he may do himself the greatest 
injury by welcoming evil dispositions, and the mistake may be 
very difficult to discern, because the poets are artists very infe- 
rior in character to the Muses themselves, who would never 
fall into the monstrous error of assigning to the words of men 
the gestures and songs of women ; nor combine the melodies 
and gestures of freemen with the rhythms of slaves and men 
of the baser sort ; or, beginning with the rhythms and gestures 
of freemen, assign to them a melody or words which are of an 
opposite character ; nor would they mix up the voices and 
sounds of animals and of men and instruments,' and every 
other sort of noise, as if they were all one. But human poets 
are fond of introducing this sort of inconsistent mixture, and 
thus make themselves ridiculous in the eyes of those who, as 
Orpheus says, " are ripe for pleasure." The experienced see all 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 65 

this confusion, and yet the poets go on and make still further 
havoc by separating the rhythm and the figure of the dance 
from the melody, setting words to metre without music, and 
also separating the melody and rhythm from the words, using 
the lyre or the flute alone. For when there are no words, 
it is very difficult to recognize the meaning of the harmony 
and rhythm, or to see that any worthy object is imitated by 
them. And we must acknowledge that all this sort of thing, 
which aims only at swiftness and smoothness and a brutish 
noise, and uses the flute and the lyre not as the mere accom- 
paniments of the dance and song, is exceedingly rude and 
coarse. The use of either, when unaccompanied by the others, 
leads to every sort of irregularity and trickery. This is all 
true enough. But we are considering not how our choristers, 
who are from thirty to fifty years of age, and may be* over 
fifty, are not to use the Muses, but how are they to use them. 
And the considerations which we have urged seem to show in 
what way these fifty years' old choristers w r ho are to sing, may 
be expected to be better trained. For they need to have a 
quick perception and knowledge of harmonies and rhythms ; 
otherwise, how will they ever know which melodies would be 
rightly sung to the Dorian mode, or to the rhythm which the 
poet has assigned to them ? — Laws, iv. 199. 
Christ, unconsciously described. See Just man. 
Cities, maritime, evil of, 

Ath. Str. And now, what will this city be ? I do not 

mean to ask what is or will be the name of the place ; that 
may be determined by the accident of locality or of the origi- 
nal settlement, — a river or fountain, or some local deity may 
give the sanction of a name to the newly founded city ; but I 
do want to know what the situation is ; whether maritime or 
inland ? 

Cleinias. I should imagine, Stranger, that the city of which 
we are speaking is about eighty stadia distant from the sea. 

Ath. And are there harbors on the seaboard ? 

Cle. Excellent harbors, Stranger ; there could not be better. 

Ath. You don't say so ! And is the surrounding country 
productive, or in need of importations ? 

Cle. Hardly in need of anything. 

Ath. And is there any neighboring State ? 

Cle. None whatever, and that is the reason for selecting the 
place; in days of old, there was a migration of the inhab- 



66 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

itants, and the region has been deserted from time immemo- 
rial. 

Ath. And has the place a fair proportion of hill, and plain, 
and wood ? 

Ole. Like the rest of Crete in that. 

Ath. You mean to say that there is more rock than plain ? 

Ole. Exactly. 

Ath. Then there is some ho.pe that your citizens may be 
virtuous ; had you been on the sea, and well provided with 
harbors, and an importing rather than a producing country, 
some mighty saviour would have been needed, and lawgivers 
more than mortal, if you were ever to have a chance of pre- 
serving your state from degeneracy and discordance of manners. 
But there is comfort in the eighty stadia ; although the sea is 
too near, especially if, as you say, the harbors are so good. 
Still we must be satisfied. The sea is pleasant enough as a 
daily companion, but has also a bitter and brackish quality ; 
filling the streets with merchants and shopkeepers, and beget- 
ting in the souls of men uncertain and unfaithful ways — mak- 
ing the State unfriendly and unfaithful both to her own citizens, 
and also to other nations. There is a consolation, therefore, in 
the country producing all things at home ; and yet, owing to 
the ruggedness of the soil, not providing anything in great 
abundance. Had there been abundance there might have been 
a great export trade, and a great return of gold and silver ; 
which, as we may safely affirm, has the most fatal result on a 
state whose aim is the attainment of just and noble sentiments ; 
this was said by us, if you remember, in the previous discussion. 
— Laws, iv. 233. 
Cities need faithful watchers. 

Thus, O my friends, and for the reasons given, should a 

state act which would endure and be saved. But as a ship sail- 
ing on the sea has to be watched night and day, in like manner 
a city also is sailing on a sea of politics, and is liable to all sorts 
of insidious assaults ; and therefore from morning to night, and 
from night to morning, rulers must join hands with rulers, and 
watchers succeed watchers, receiving and giving up their trust 
in a perpetual order. A multitude can never fullfii a duty of 
this sort with anything like energy ; moreover, the greater 
number of the senators will have to be left during the greater 
part of the year to order their concerns at their own homes. 
They must be arranged in twelve portions, answering to twelve 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 67 

months, and serve as guardians each portion for a single month. 
Their business is to be at hand and receive any foreigner or 
citizen who comes to them, whether to give information, or to 
put questions of which other states are to receive the answers ; 
or when the city desires to ask a question and receive an an- 
swer, or again, when there is a likelihood of internal commo- 
tions, which are always liable to happen in some form or other, 
they will, if they can, prevent their occurring ; or if they have 
already occurred, will lose no time in making them known to the 
city, and healing the evil. Wherefore, also, this which is the 
presiding body of the State, ought always to have the control of 
their assemblies, and the dissolutions of them, regular as well 
as occasional. All this is to be ordered by the twelfth part of 
the council, which is always to keep watch together with the 
officers of the State during one portion of the year and to rest 
during the remaining eleven portions. 

Thus will the city be fairly ordered. — Laws, iv. 280. 
Citizen, right of the State to the. See Authority. 
Citizen, obligation of the. 

Soc. Then the laws will say : " Consider, Socrates, if 

we are speaking truly, that in your present attempt you are 
going to do us an injury. For, after having brought you into 
the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given you and 
every other citizen a share in every good which we had to give, 
we further proclaim to every Athenian, that if he does not 
like us when he has come of age and has seen the ways of 
the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he 
pleases and take, his goods with him; and none of us laws will 
forbid him or interfere with him. Any of you who does not 
like us and the city, and who wants to emigrate to a colony or 
to any other city, may go where he likes, and take his goods 
with him. But he who has experience of the manner in which 
we order justice and administer the State, and still remains, 
has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we 
command him. And he who disobeys us is, as vve maintain, 
thrice wrong : first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying 
his parents ; secondly, because we are the authors of his educa- 
tion ; thirdly because he has made an agreement with us that 
he will duly obey our commands ; and he neither obeys them 
nor convinces us that our commands are unjust ; and we do not 
rudely impose them, but give him the alternative of obeying or 
convincing us ; that is what we offer, and he does neither. 



68 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

These are the sort of accusations to which, as we were saying, 
you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your inten- 
tions ; you, above all other Athenians." Suppose I ask, why is 
this ? they will justly retort upon me that I above all other men 
have acknowledged the agreement. " There is clear proof," 
they will say, " Socrates, that we and the city were not displeas- 
ing to you. Of all Athenians you have been the most con- 
stant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may 
be supposed to love. For you never went out of the city 
either to see the games, except once when you went to the Isth- 
mus, or to any other place unless when you were on military 
service ; nor did you travel as other men do. Nor had you any 
curiosity to know other states or their laws : your affections did 
not go beyond us and our State ; we were your special favorites, 
and you acquiesced in our government of you ; and here in 
this city you begat your children, which . is a proof of your 
satisfaction. Moreover, you might, if you had liked, have 
fixed the penalty at banishment in the course of the trial — the 
State which refuses to let you go now would have let you go 
then. But you pretended that you preferred death to exile, 
and that you were not grieved at death. And now you have 
forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no respect to us the 
laws, of whom you are the destroyer ; and are doing what only 
a miserable slave would do, running away and turning your 
back upon the compacts and agreements which you made as a 
citizen. And first of all answer this very question : Are we right 
in saying that you agreed to be governed according to us in 
deed, and not in word only ? Is that true or not ? " How shall 
we answer that, Crito ? Must we not assent ? 

Cr. There is no help, Socrates. — Crito, i. 356. 
Citizen, improvement of the. 

Soc. And now, my friend, as you are already beginning 

to be a public character, and are admonishing and reproaching 
me for not being one, suppose that we ask a few questions of 
one another. Tell me, then, Callicles, how about making any 
of the citizens better ? Was there ever a man who was once 
vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the 
help of Callicles good and noble ? Was there ever such a man, 
whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman ? Tell me, Cal- 
licles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what 
would you answer ? Whom would you say that you had im- 
proved by your conversation? There may have been good 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 69 

deeds of this sort which were done by you as a private person, 
before you came forward in public. Why will you not answer ? 

Gal. You are contentious, Socrates. 

Soc. Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but 
because I really want to know in what way you think that 
affairs should be administered among us — whether, when you 
come to the administration of them, you have any other aim 
but the improvement of the citizens? Have we not already 
admitted many times over that such is the duty of a public 
man ? Nay, we have surely said so ; for if you will not answer 
for yourself I must answer for you. But if this is what the 
good man ought to effect for the benefit of his own State, allow 
me to recall to you the names of those whom you were just 
now mentioning, Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and The- 
mistocles, and ask whether you still think that they were good 
citizens. 

Gal. I do. — Gorgias, iii. 106. 
City, heavenly. See Heavenly idea of the earth. 
City — the mother of her citizens. See State, a parent, etc. 
Clever unjust, the. 

Look at things as they really are and you will see that 

the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well from 
the starting-place to the goal, but not back again from the 
goal : they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look 
foolish, slinking away with their ears down on their shoulders, 
and without a crown ; but the true runner comes to the finish 
and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way 
with the just ; he who endures to the end of every action and 
occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off the 
prize which men bestow. 

True. 

And now you must allow me to repeat the blessings which 
you attributed to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of the just 
as you were saying of them, that as they grow older, if that is 
their desire, they become rulers in their own city, if they care 
to be ; they marry whom they like and give in marriage to 
whomsoever they like ; all that you said of the others I now 
say of these. And, on the other hand, I say of the unjust that 
the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, 
are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their 
course, and when they come to be old and miserable are 
flouted alike by stranger and citizen ; they are beaten and 



70 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term 
them ; they will be racked and burned, as you were saying — 
but I shall ask you to imagine that I have repeated your tale 
of horrors. — The Republic, ii. 445. 
Cognitions, ideas that are. 

■ But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, 

and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmen- 
ides ? For in that case each idea may still be, one, and not 
experience this infinite subdivision. 

And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of 
nothing ? 

That is impossible, he said. 

The thought must be of something ? 

Yes. 

Of something that is or is not ? 

Of something that is. 

Must it not be of a single something, which the thought rec- 
ognizes as attaching to all, being a single form or nature ? 

Yes. 

And will not this something, so apprehended which is al- 
ways the same in all, be an idea ? 

From that, again, there is no escape. 

Then, said Parmenides, if you say that everything else par- 
ticipates in the ideas, must you not say either that everything 
is made up of thoughts and that all things think ; or that they 
are thoughts having no thought ? 

But that, Parmenides, is no more rational than the other. 
The more probable view is, that the ideas are, as it were, pat- 
terns fixed in nature, and that other things are like them, and 
resemblances of them ; and that what is meant by the partici- 
pation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to 
them. — Parmenides, iii. 249. 

Colonization, a means of purification. See Purification. 
Colonization, the best kind of. 

Cities find colonization in some respects easier when the 

colonists are of one race, which like a swarm of bees is sent 
out from a single country, friends from friends, owing to some 
pressure of population, or other similar necessity, or because 
a portion of a state is driven by factions to emigrate. And 
there have been whole cities which have taken flight, when 
utterly conquered by a superior power in war. This, however, 
which is in one way an advantage to the colonist or legislator, 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 71 

in another point of view creates a difficulty. There is an ele- 
ment of friendship in the community of race, and language, 
and laws, and in common sacrifices, and the like ; but colonies 
which are of this homogeneous sort are apt to kick against 
any laws different from their own ; and although the badness 
of their own laws has undone them, yet because of the force of 
habit they would fain preserve the very customs which were 
their ruin ; and the leader of the colony, who is their legisla- 
tor, finds them troublesome and rebellious. On the other hand, 
the conflux of several populations might be more disposed to 
listen to new laws; but then, to make them combine and pull 
together, as they say of horses, is a most difficult task, and the 
work of years. And yet there is nothing which perfects the 
virtue of men like legislation and colonization. — Laws, iv. 
235. 
Color what is it ? 

Soc. And now, as Pindar says, "Read my meaning:" 

color is an effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and 
sensible. 

Theaet. I believe, Socrates, that you have truly explained 
his meaning. 

Soc, Then apply his doctrine to perception, my good friend, 
and first of all to vision ; that which you call white colsi? 
is not in your eyes, and is not a distinct thing which exists 
out of them, nor can you assign any place to it ; for if it had 
position it would be and be at rest, and there would be no 
process of becoming. 

Theaet. Then what is color ? 

Soc. Let us carry out the principle which has just been 
affirmed, that nothing is self-existent, and then we shall see 
that every color, white, black, and every other color, arises out 
of the eye meeting the appropriate motion, and that what we 
term the substance of each color is neither the active nor the 
passive element, but something which passes between them, 
and is peculiar to each percipient ; are you certain that the 
several colors appear to every animal — say to a dog — as they 
appear to you ? 

Theaet. Indeed I am not. 

Soc. Or that anything appears the same to you as to an- 
other man ? Would you not rather question whether you 
yourself see the same thing at different times, because you are 
never exactly the same ? 



72 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Theaet. I should. 

Soc. And if that with which I compare myself in size, or 
which I apprehend, were great or white or hot, it could not 
without actually changing become different by mere contact 
with another ; nor again, if the apprehending or comparing 
subject were great or white or hot, could this, when unchanged 
from within, become changed by any approximation or affec- 
tion of any other thing. For in our ordinary way of speaking 
we allow ourselves to be driven into most ridiculous and won- 
derful contradictions, as Protagoras and all who take his line 
of thought would remark. — Theaetetus, iii. 354. 
Colors. 

There is a fourth class of sensible things, having many 

varieties, which have now to be distinguished. They are 
called by the general name of colors, and are a flame which 
emanates from all bodies and has particles corresponding to 
the sense of sight. I have spoken already, in what has pre- 
ceded, of the generation of sight, and this will be a natural 
and suitable place in which to give some account of colors. 

Of the particles coming from other bodies which fall upon 
the sight, some are less and some are larger, and some are 
equal to the parts of the sight itself. Those which are equal 
are imperceptible, or transparent, as they are called by us ; 
whereas the larger produce contraction, the smaller dilation, in 
the sight, by the exercise of a power akin to that of hot and 
cold bodies on the flesh, or of astringent bodies on the tongue, 
or of those heating bodies which are termed pungent by us. 
"White and black, although they are found in another class of 
objects, and for this reason are imagined to be different, are 
affections of the same kind. Wherefore, we ought to term 
white that which dilates the visual ray, and the opposite of 
this black. There is also a swifter motion and impact of an- 
other sort of fire which dilates the ray of sight and reaches 
the eyes, forcing a way through their passages and melting 
them, and eliciting from them a union of fire and water which 
we call tears, being itself an opposite fire which comes to them 
from without — the inner fire flashes forth like lightning, and 
the outer finds a way in and is extinguished in the tear-drop, 
and all sorts of colors are generated by the mixture. This 
affection is termed dazzling, and the object which produces it 
is called bright and flashing. There is another sort of fire 
which is intermediate, and which reaches and mingles with the 



PLATO'S BJSST THOUGHTS. 78 

moisture of the eye without flashing ; and in this the fire 
mingling with the ray of the tear-drop produces a color like 
blood, to which we give the name of red. A bright hue 
mingled with red and white gives the color called auburn 
(<£av66v). The law of proportion, however, according to which 
the several colors are formed, even if a man knew he would 
be foolish if he attempted to tell, as he could not give any 
necessary reason, nor even any tolerable or probable account 
of them. Again, red, when mingled with black and white, 
gives a purple hue, which becomes umber (op^vivov) when the 
colors are burnt as well as mingled and the black is more thor- 
oughly mixed with them. Flame color (irvppov) is produced 
by a union of auburn and dun (</>cuov) and dun by an admix- 
ture of black and white ; yellow (wxpcw) by an admixture 
of white and auburn. White and bright meeting, and falling 
upon a full black, become dark blue (kvclvovv), and when dark 
blue mingles with white, light blue (yXavKov) color is formed, 
as leek green (Trpaaiov) is formed also out of the union of 
flame color and black. There will be no difficulty in seeing 
how the colors derived from these are mingled and assimi- 
lated in accordance with probability. He, however, who 
should attempt to verify all this by experiment, would forget 
the difference of the human and divine nature. For God only 
has the knowledge and also the power which are able to com- 
bine many things into one and again dissolve the one into 
many. But no man either is or ever will be able to accom- 
plish either the one or the other operation. — Timaeus, ii. 559. 
Community of wives. 

■ Here, then, is one difficulty in our law about women which 

we have escaped ; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for 
enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their 
pursuits in common ; to the utility and possibility of this the 
argument is its own witness. 

Yes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped. 

Yes, I said, but a much greater is coming ; you will not 
think much of this when you see the next. 

Go on, let me see. 

The law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that 
has preceded, is to the following effect, — " that the wives of 
these guardians are to be common, and their children also com- 
mon, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his 
parent." 



74 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Yes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other ; 
and the utility as well as the possibility of such a law is far 
more doubtful. 

I do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute about 
the very great utility of having wives and children in common; 
the possibility is quite another matter, and will be very much 
disputed. — The Republic, ii. 282. 
Community, the first form of government. 

The first and highest form of the State and of the govern* 

ment and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely 
the ancient saying, that " Friends have all things in common." 
Whether there is now, or ever will be, this communion of 
women and children and of property, in which the private and 
individual is altogether banished from life, and things which 
are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have 
become common, and in some way see and hear and act in 
common, and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy 
and sorrow, on the same occasions, and the laws unite the city 
to the utmost, — whether all this is possible or not, I say that 
no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a 
state more exalted in virtue, or truer or better than this. Such 
a state, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of Gods, will make 
them blessed who dwell therein ; and therefore to this we are 
to look for the pattern of the State, and to cling to this, and, as 
far as possible, to seek for one which is like this. The State 
which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest im- 
mortality and unity in the next degree ; and, after that, by the 
grace of God, we will complete the third one. And, we will 
begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second. 

Let them at once distribute their land and houses, and not 
till the land in common, since a community of goods goes be- 
yond their proposed origin, and nurture, and education. But 
in making the distribution, let the several possessors feel that 
their particular lots also belong to the whole city ; and seeing 
that the earth is their parent, let them tend her more carefully 
than children do their mother. For she is a goddess and their 
queen, and they are her mortal subjects. — Laws, iv. 264. 
Comparatives. 

Soc. Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there 

enters a more and a less. 

Pro. True. 

Soc. Then, says the argument, they have never any end, 
and being endless must also be infinite. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 75 

Pro. Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true. 

Soc. Yes, my dear Protarchus, and the word which you 
have just uttered suggests to me that such expressions as " ex- 
ceedingly " and also the term " mildly " mean the same as 
more or less ; for whenever they occur they do not allow of 
the existence of quantity — they are always introducing de- 
grees into actions, instituting a comparison of the more or less 
violent or more or less mild, and at each creation of more or 
less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now saying, if 
quantity and measure did not disappear, but were allowed to 
intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other compara- 
tives, these last would themselves be driven out of their own 
domain. When definite quantity is once admitted, there can 
be no longer a " hotter " or a " colder " (for these are always 
progressing, and are never in one stay) ; but definite quantity 
is at rest, and progresses not. Which proves that compara- 
tives, such as the hotter and the colder, are to be ranked in 
the class of the infinite. — Philebus, iii. 159. 

Compulsory and voluntary care of men. See Education, compul- 
sion in. 

■ Str. Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the 

name, so as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding, 
and then to divide, for there may be still considerable divisions. 

T. Soc. How can they be made ? 

Str. First by separating the divine shepherd from the human 
guardian or manager. 

T. Soc. True. 

Str. And the art of management which is assigned to man 
would again have to be subdivided. 

T. Soc. On what principle ? 

Str. On the principle of voluntary and compulsory. 

K Soc. Why ? 

Str. Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error 
here ; for our simplicity led us to rank them together, whereas 
they are utterly different, and their modes of government are 
different. 

T. Soc. True. 

Str. Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and 
divide human care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary 
and compulsory. 

T. Soc. Certainly. 

Str. And if we call the management of violent rulers tyr- 



76 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

anny, and the voluntary management of voluntary bipeds poli- 
tics, may we not further assert that he who has this latter art 
of management is the true king and statesman ? 

T. Soc. I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the 
account of the Statesman. — Statesman, iii. 560. 
Concealment of evil. 

Probably the youth will say to himself in the words of 

Pindar : — 

" Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier 
tower, which may be a fortress to me all my life ? " 

For what men say is that, if I am really just without being 
thought just, this is no profit, but evident pain and loss. But 
if, though unjust, I acquire the character of justice, a heavenly 
life is to be mine. Since then, as philosophers say, appearance 
tyrannizes over truth and is the lord of happiness, to appearance 
I must wholly devote myself. I will have in front of me the 
painted form and figure of virtue ; behind I will trail the subtle 
and crafty fox, as Archilochus, first of sages, counsels. But I 
hear some one exclaiming that wickedness is not easily con- 
cealed ; to which I answer, — Nothing great is easy. Never- 
theless, this must be the way to happiness, and the way by 
which we must go, if we follow in the steps of the argument. 
As to concealment, that may be secured by the formation of 
societies and political clubs. And there are professors of 
rhetoric who teach the philosophy of persuading courts and 
assemblies ; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, 
I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear 
a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can 
they be compelled. But what if there are no gods ? or, sup- 
pose that the gods have no care about human things — why in 
either case should we care about concealment? And even if 
there are gods, and they have a care of us, yet we know about 
them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets ; 
and the poets are the persons who say that they may be influ- 
enced and turned by "sacrifices and soothing entreaties." Let 
us be consistent then, and either believe both or neither. And 
if we believe them, why then we had better be unjust, and offer 
of the fruits of injustice ; for if we are just we shall indeed 
escape the vengeance of heaven, but we shall lose the gains of 
injustice ; whereas, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, 
and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 77 

gods will be propitiated, and we shall be forgiven. " But there 
is a world below in which either we or our children will suffer 
for our deeds." Yes, my friend, will be the reply, but there 
are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great power. 
That is what mighty cities declare ; and the children of the 
gods, who were their poets and prophets, affirm the same. — 
The Republic, ii. 187. 
Conception and generation, divine nature of. 

"There is a certain age at which human nature is desirous 

of procreation — procreation which must be in beauty and not 
in deformity ; and this procreation is the union of man and 
woman, and is a divine thing ; for conception and generation 
are an immortal principle in the mortal creature, and in the 
inharmonious they can never be. But the deformed is always 
inharmonious with the divine, and the beautiful harmonious. 
Beauty, then, is the destiny or goddess of parturition who pre- 
sides at birth, and therefore when approaching beauty the con- 
ceiving power is propitious, and diffuse, and benign, and begets 
and bears fruit : at the sight of ugliness it frowns and con- 
tracts in pain, and is averted and morose, and shrinks up, and 
not without a pang refrains from conception. And this is the 
reason why, when the hour of conception arrives, and the 
teeming nature is full, there is such a flutter and ecstasy about 
beauty whose approach is the alleviation of the pain of travail. 
For love, Socrates, is not, as you imagine, the love of the beau- 
tiful only." " What then ? " " The love of generation and of 
birth in beauty." " Yes," I said. " Yes, indeed," she replied. 
"But why of generation ?" I said. "Because to the mortal, 
generation is a sort of eternity and immortality," she replied ; 
" and if as has been already admitted, love is of the ever- 
lasting possession of the good, all men will necessarily desire 
immortality together with good, wherefore love is of immor- 
tality." 

All this she taught me at various times when she spoke of 
love. And I remember that she once said to me, " What is 
the cause, Socrates, of love, and the attendant desire ? See 
you not how all animals, birds as well as beasts, in their desire 
of procreation, are in agony when they take the infection of 
love ; this begins with the desire of union ; whereto is added 
the care of offspring, on behalf of whom the weakest are ready 
to battle against the strongest even to the uttermost, and to die 
for them, and will let themselves be tormented with hunger or 



78 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

suffer anything in order to maintain their offspring." — The 
Symposium, i. 498. 
Concupiscent nature ruled. 

Ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has 

the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or 
spirited principle to be the subject and ally ? 

Certainly. 

And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and 
gymnastic will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining 
the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating and 
soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony and 
rhythm ? 

Quite true, he said. 

And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having 
learned truly to know their own functions, will rule over the 
concupiscent part of every man, which is the largest and of all 
things most insatiable ; over this they will keep guard, lest, 
waxing great with the fullness of bodily pleasures, as they are 
termed, and no longer confined to her own sphere, the concu- 
piscent soul should attempt to enslave and rule those who are 
not her natural-born subjects, and overturn the whole life of 
man ? 

Very true, he said. 

The two will be the . defenders of the whole soul and the 
whole body against attacks from without; the one counseling, 
and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously exe- 
cuting his commands and counsels. — The Republic, ii. 268. 
Confidence and courage. See Ability, etc. 
Conjecture in art. 

Soc. I mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and 

weighing be taken away from any art, that which remains will 
not be much. 

Pro. Not much, certainly. 

Soc. The rest will be only conjecture, and the better use of 
the senses, which is given by experience and exercise in addi- 
tion to a certain power of guessing, which is commonly called 
art, and is perfected by attention and practice. 

Pro. Nothing more assuredly. 

Soc. Music, for instance, is full of this empiricism ; as is 
seen in the harmonizing of sounds, not by rule, but by conject- 
ure ; the music of the flute is always trying to guess the 
pitch of each vibrating note, and is therefore mixed up with 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 79 

much that is doubtful and has very little certainty. — Philebus, 

iii. 196. 

Consonances and harmonies. 

■ I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at the 

stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions, and these 
are sister sciences — as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glau- 
con, agree with them ? 

Yes, he replied. 

But this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we had 
better go and learn of them ; and they will tell us whether 
there are any other applications of these sciences. At the 
same time, we must not lose sight of our own higher object. 

What is that ? 

There is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, 
and which our pupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short 
of, as I was saying that they did in astronomy. For in the 
science of harmony, as you probably know, they are equally 
empirical. The sounds and consonances which they compare 
are those which are heard only, and their labor, like that of 
the astronomers, is in vain. 

Yes, by heaven ! he said ; and 'tis as good as a play to 
hear them talking about their condensed notes, as they call 
them ; they put their ears alongside of their neighbors as if to 
get a sound out of them — one set of them declaring that they 
catch an intermediate note and have found the least interval 
which should be the unit of measurement ; the others main- 
taining the opposite theory that the two sounds have passed 
into the same — either party setting their ears before their un- 
derstanding. 

You mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture 
the strings and rack them on the pegs of the instrument : I 
might carry on the metaphor and speak after their manner of 
the blows which the plectrum gives, and make accusations 
against the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to 
sound ; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will only say 
that these are not the men, but that I am speaking of the 
Pythagoreans, of whom I was just now proposing to inquire 
about harmony. For they too are in error, like the astrono- 
mers ; they investigate the numbers of the harmonies which 
are heard, but they never attain to problems — that is to say, 
they never reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect 
why some numbers are harmonious and others not. — The Re 
public, ii. 358. 



80 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Conspirators and traitors. 

Whoever by promoting a man to power enslaves the 

laws, and subjects the city to factions, using violence and stir- 
ring up sedition contrary to law, him we will deem the greatest 
enemy of the whole State. But he who takes no part in such 
proceedings, and yet being the chief magistrate of the State, 
knowing of them or not knowing of them, by reason of cow- 
ardice does not interfere on behalf of his country, such an one 
we must consider nearly as bad. Every man who is worth 
anything will inform the magistrates, and bring the conspirator 
to trial for making a violent and illegal attempt to change the 
government. The judges of the traitor shall be the same as 
of the robbers of temples ; and let the whole proceeding be 
carried on in the same way, and the vote of the majority con- 
demn to death. But let there be a general rule, that the dis- 
grace and punishment of the father is not to be visited on the 
children, except in the case of some one whose father, grand- 
father, and great-grandfather have successively undergone the 
penalty of death. Such persons the city shall send away with 
all their possessions, reserving only and wholly their appointed 
lot to their original city and country. And out of the citizens 
who have more than one son of not less than ten years of age, 
they shall select ten whom their father or grandfather by the 
mother's or father's side shall appoint, and let them send to 
Delphi the names of those who are selected, and him whom 
the God appoints they shall establish as heir of the house 
which has failed ; and may he have better fortune than his 
predecessors ! — Laws, iv. 369. 
Constituency, legislators not always to obey their. 
— — -Str. They say, that if any one knows how the ancient laws 
may be improved, he must first persuade his own State of the 
improvement, and then he may legislate, but not otherwise. 

Y. Soc. And are they not right ? 

Str. I dare say. But supposing that he does use some gen- 
tle violence for their good, what is this violence to be called? 
Or rather, before you answer, let me ask the same question in 
reference to our previous instance. 

Y. Soc. What do you mean ? 

Str. Suppose that a skillful physician has a patient, of what- 
ever sex or age, whom he compels against his will to do some- 
thing for his good which is contrary to the written rules, what 
is this compulsion to be called ? Would you ever dream of 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 81 

calling it a violation of the art, or breach of the laws of health? 
Nothing could be more unjust than for the patient to whom such 
a gentle violence is applied, to charge the physician who prac- 
tices the violence with wanting skill or aggravating his disease. 

Y. Soc. Most true. 

Str. In the political art the error is not called disease, but 
evil, or disgrace, or injustice. 

Y. Soc. Quite true. 

Str. And when the citizen, contrary to law and custom, is 
compelled to do what is juster and better and nobler than he 
did before, and this sort of violence is blamed, the last and 
most absurd thing which he could say, is that he has incurred 
disgrace or evil or injustice at the hands of the legislator who 
uses the violence. 

Y Soc. That is very true. 

Str. And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a 
rich man, is just, and if by a poor man, unjust ? May not any 
man, rich or poor, with or without written laws, with the will 
of the citizens or against the will of the citizens, do what is 
for their interest ? Is not this the true principle of govern- 
ment, in accordance with which the wise and good man will 
order the affairs of his subjects ? As the pilot watches over 
the interests of the ship, or of the crew, and preserves tl\e 
lives of his fellow-sailors, not by laying down rules, but by 
making his art a law — even so, and in the self -same way, may 
there not be a true form of polity created by those who are 
able to govern in a similar spirit, and who show a strength of 
art which is superior to the law ? Nor can wise rulers ever 
err while they regard the one great rule of distributing justice 
to the citizens with intelligence and art, and are able to pre- 
serve, and, so far as that is possible, to improve them. — 
Statesman, iii. 582. 
Contradiction, the art of. 

Verily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art 

of contradiction ! 

Why do you say so ? 

Because I think that many a man falls into the practice 
against his will. When he thinks that he is reasoning he is 
really disputing, just because he cannot define and divide, and 
so know that of which he is speaking ; and he will pursue a 
merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of 
fair discussion. 

6 



82 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Yes, he replied, such is very often the case ; but what has 
that to do with us and our argument ? 

A great deal ; for there is certainly a danger of our getting 
unintentionally into a verbal opposition. 

In what way ? 

Why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal 
truth, that different natures ought to have different pursuits, 
but we never considered at all what was the meaning of same- 
ness or difference of nature or why we distinguished them when 
we assigned different pursuits to different natures. — The Re- 
public, ii. 278. 
Controversy. 

Str. Let us consider once more whether there may not be 

another aspect of sophistry ? 

Theaet. What is that ? 

Str. In the acquisitive there was a subdivision of the com- 
bative or fighting art. 

Theaet There was. 

Str. Perhaps we had better divide it. 

Theaet. What shall be the divisions ? 

Str. There shall be one division of the competitive, and the 
other of the pugnacious. 

Theaet. Very good. 

Str. That part of the pugnacious which is a contest of bodily 
strength may be properly called by some such name as violent. 

Theaet. True. 

Str. And when the war is one of words, that may be termed 
controversy ? 

Theaet. Yes. 

Str. And controversy may be of two kinds. 

Theaet. What are they ? 

Str. When long speeches are answered by long speeches, 
and there is public discussion about the just and unjust, that is 
forensic con trovers v. 

Theaet. Yes. 

Str. And there is a private sort of controversy, which is cut 
up into questions and answers, and this is commonly called dis- 
putation. ? 

Theaet. Yes, that is the name. 

Str. And of disputation, that sort which is only a discussion 
about contracts, and is carried on at random, and without rules 
of art, is recognized by dialectic to be a distinct class, but has 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 83 

hitherto had no distinctive name, and does not deserve to re- 
ceive one at our hands. 

Tkeaet. No ; for the different species are too minute and 
heterogeneous. 

Str. But that which proceeds by rules of art to dispute 
about justice and injustice in their own nature and about things 
in general, have we not been accustomed to call argumentation 
(Eristic) ? 

Theaet. Very true. — Sophist, iii. 459. 
Conventional notions of right. 

Soc. I declare, O Callicles,that Callicles will never be at one 

with himself, but that his whole life will be a discord. And 
yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre should be inharmo- 
nious, and that there should be no music in the chorus which I 
provided ; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with 
me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at odds 
with myself, and contradict myself. 

Cal. O, Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and are man- 
ifestly running riot in the argument. And now you are de- 
claiming in this way because Polus has met with the same evil 
fate himself which he accused you of bringing upon Gorgias : 
he said, if I remember rightly, that when Gorgias was asked 
by you, whether, if some one came to him who wanted to learn 
rhetoric, and did not know justice, he would teach him justice ? 
And Gorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he 
thought that mankind in general would expect this of him, and 
would be displeased if he said " No ; " in consequence of this 
admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, and 
you were delighted ; Polus laughed at you at the time, deserv- 
edly, as I think ; and now he has himself experienced the same 
misfortune. I cannot say very much for his wit when he con- 
ceded to you, that to do is more dishonorable than to suffer 
injustice, for this was what led to his being entangled by you ; 
and because he was too modest to say what he thought, he had 
his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who 
pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing 
now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not 
"latural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are 
generally at variance with one another : and hence, if a person 
is too modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contra- 
dict himself ; and you, in your ingenuity, perceiving the advan- 
tage to be hereby gained, slyly ask of him who is arguing con- 



84 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

ventionally a question which is to be determined by the rule of 
nature ; and if he is talking of the rule of nature, you slip away 
to custom: as you did in this very discussion about doing and 
suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the conven- 
tionally dishonorable, you assailed him from the point of view 
of nature ; for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the 
greater disgrace, because the greater evil ; but conventionally, 
to do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering of injus- 
tice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had 
better die than live ; since when he is wronged and trampled 
upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom 
he cares. 

The reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the 
majority who are weak; and they make laws and distribute 
praises and censures with a view to themselves and to their own 
interests ; and they terrify the stronger sort of men, and those 
who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may 
not get the better of them; and they say, that dishonesty is 
shameful and unjust ; meaning, by the word injustice, the de- 
sire of a man to have more than his neighbors ; for knowing 
their own inferiority I suspect they are too glad of equality. 
And therefore the endeavor to have more than thejnany, is 
conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called in- 
justice, whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the 
better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than 
the weaker ; and in many ways she shows, among men as well 
as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, 
that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more 
than the inferior. For on what principle of justice did Xerxes 
invade Hellas, or his father the Scythians (not to speak of 
numberless other examples) ? These are men who act accord- 
ing to nature ; yes, by Heaven, and according to the law of 
nature : not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, which we 
forge and impose upon our fellows of whom we take the best 
and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like 
young lions, charming them with the sound of the voice, and 
saying to them, that with equality they must be content, and 
\hat the equal is the honorable and the just. But if there 
were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off and 
break through, and escape from all this ; he would trample 
under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our 
laws, sinning against nature : the slave would rise in rebellion 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 85 

and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would 
shine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of Pindar, in 
the poem in which he says that — 

" Law is the king of all, mortals as well as immortals. " 

— Gorgias, iii. 71. 
Conversion, the process of. 

Whether I am right or not God only knows. But, whether 

true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the 
idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort ; 
and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of 
all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of 
light in this world, and the source of truth and reason in the 
other ; and is the power upon which he who would act ration- 
ally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed. 

I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you. 

Moreover, you must not wonder that those who attain to this 
beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs ; for 
their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they 
desire to dwell ; and this desire of theirs is very natural, if our 
allegory may be trusted. 

Yes, very natural. 

And is there anything surprising in one who passes from 
divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving 
himself in a ridiculous manner ; if, while his eyes are blinking 
and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding dark- 
ness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, 
about the images or shadows of images of justice, and is en- 
deavoring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet 
seen the absolute justice ? 

Anything but surprising, he replied. 

Any one who has common sense will remember that the be- 
wilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two 
causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into 
the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of 
the bodily eye ; and he who remembers this when he sees any 
one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready 
o laugh ; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come 
out of the brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccus- 
tomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day 
is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy 
in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other ; 
or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from 



86 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in 
the laugh which greets the other coming from above into the 
den. 

That, he said, is a very just remark. 

But if I am right, then certain professors of education must 
be mistaken in saying that they can put a knowledge into the 
soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes. 

Nevertheless, they do say so, he replied. 

"Whereas, I said, our argument shows that the power is 
already in the soul ; and that as the eye may be imagined un- 
able to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so 
too, when the eye of the soul is turned round, the whole soul 
must be turned round from the world of becoming into that of 
being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and 
of the brightest and best of being — or in other words, of the 
good. 

Very true. 

And there must be some art which will affect conversion 
in the easiest, quickest manner ; not implanting eyes, for they 
exist already, but giving them a right direction, which they 
have not. — The Republic, ii. 344. 
Cookery, not an art. 

Soc. Let me now remind you of what I was saying to 

Gorgias and Polus ; I was saying, as you will not have for- 
gotten, that there were some processes which aim at pleasure, 
and at pleasure only, and know nothing of good and evil, and 
there are other processes which know good and evil. And I 
considered that cookery, which I do not call art, but only an 
experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with 
pleasure, and the art of medicine was of the class which is con- 
cerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I 
must beg you, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am 
jesting with you ; do not answer at random what is not your 
real opinion ; for you will observe that we are arguing about 
the way of human life ; and to a man* who has any sense at all 
what question can be more serious than this ? whether he should 
follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act 
what you call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and 
cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, after your 
manner ; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy ; 
and in what the latter way of life differs from the former. 
But perhaps we had better distinguish them first, as I attempted 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 87 

to do before, and when we come to an agreement that they 
are distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ 
from one another, and which of them we should choose. Per- 
haps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean ? 

Cal. No, I do not. 

Soc. Then I will explain myself more clearly : seeing that 
you and I have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and 
that there is such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not 
the same as good, and that the pursuit and process of acquisi- 
tion of the one, that is pleasure, is different from the pursuit 
and process of acquisition of the other, which is good — I wish 
that you would tell me whether you agree thus far or not ? 

Gal. Yes, I agree. 

Soc. Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree 
with me, and whether you think that I spoke the truth when 
I further said to Gorgias and Polus — that cookery in my 
opinion is only an experience, not an art at all ; and that 
whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and con- 
stitution of the patient, and has principles of action and reason 
in each case, cookery, in attending upon pleasure, never regards 
either the nature or the reason of that pleasure to which she 
devotes herself, nor ever considers or calculates anything, but 
works by experience and routine, and just preserves the recol- 
lection of what she had usually done when producing pleasure. 
And first I would have you consider whether I have proved 
what I was saying, and then whether there are not other simi- 
lar processes which have to do with the soul — some of them 
processes of art, making a provision for the soul's highest inter- 
est — others despising the interest, and, as in the previous case, 
considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be 
acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, 
and having no other aim but to afford gratification, whether 
good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, 
and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery, whether 
concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed 
with a view to pleasure, and without any consideration of good 
and evil. — Gorgias, iii. 91. 
Cookery, medicine, etc. 

■ Now, seeing that there are these four arts which are 

ever ministering to the body and the soul for their highest 
good ; flattery knowing or rather guessing their natures, has 
distributed herself into four shams or simulations of them ; 



88 PLA TO'S BEST THO UGHTS. 

she puts on the likeness of one or other of them, and pretends 
to be that which she simulates, and has no regard for men's 
highest interests, but is ever making pleasure the bait of the 
unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is of the 
highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of 
medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the 
body ; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a 
competition in which children were the judges, or men who 
had no more sense than children, as to which of them best un- 
derstands the goodness or badness of food, the physician would 
be starved to death. A flattery I deem this and an ignoble 
sort of thing, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, 
because it aims at pleasure instead of good. An art I do not 
call it but only an experience because it is unable to explain 
or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications. And 
I do not call any irrational thing an art ; if you dispute my 
words, I am prepared to argue in defense of them. 

Cookery, then, as I maintain, is a flattery which takes the 
form of medicine, and dressing up, in like manner, is a flattery 
which takes the form of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, igno- 
ble, illiberal, working deceitfully by the help of lines, and 
colors, and enamels, and garments, and making men affect a 
spurious beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is 
given by gymnastic. 

I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, 
after the manner of the geometricians (for I think that by this 
time you will be able to follow), 

As dressing up : gymnastic : : cookery : medicine ; 
or rather — 

As dressing up : gymnastic : : sophistry : legislation ; 
and — 

As cookery : medicine : : rhetoric : justice. 
And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetori- 
cian and the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, 
they are apt to be jumbled up together neither do they know 
what to make of themselves, nor do other men know what to 
make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and 
were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not 
discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but 
the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judg- 
ment was the bodily delight which was given* by them, then 
the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 89 

Polus, are so well acquainted, would come true ; Chaos would 
return, and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an 
indiscriminate mass. And now I have told you my notion of 
rhetoric, which is in relation to the soul what cookery is to 
the body. — Gorgias, iii. 51. 
Corporeal, and spiritual essence. 

— — Now God did not make the soul after the body, although 
we have spoken of them in this order ; for when he put them 
together he would never have allowed that the elder should 
serve the younger, but this is a random manner of speaking 
which we have, because we ourselves too are very largely af- 
fected by chance. Whereas he made the soul in origin and 
excellence prior to and older than the body, to be the ruler 
and mistress, of whom the body was to be the subject. And 
he made her out of the following elements and on this man- 
ner : of the unchangeable and indivisible, and also of the 
divisible and corporeal he made a third sort of intermediate 
essence, partaking of the same and of the other or diverse, 
and this compound in like manner he placed in a mean be- 
tween the indivisible and the divisible or corporeal. He took 
the three elements of the same, the other, and the essence, and 
mingled them all together, compressing the reluctant and un- 
sociable nature of the other into the same. And when he had 
mixed them and out of all the three made one, he again di- 
vided this whole into as many portions as was fitting, each of 
them containing an admixture of all three. — Timaeus, iii. 528. 

Counterparts and antagonisms in nature making harmony. See 

Antagonisms. 
Country, motherhood of. See Motherhood. 
Courage, a man of. 

Soc. Laches, suppose that we first set about deter- 
mining the nature of courage, and in the second place pro- 
ceed to inquire how the young men may attain this quality by 
the help of studies and pursuits. Try, and see whether you 
can tell me what is courage. 

La. Indeed, Socrates, that is soon answered : he is a man 
of courage who remains at his post, and does not run away, 
but fights against the enemy ; of that you may be very cer- 
tain. 

Soc. That is good, Laches ; and yet I fear that I did not 
express myself clearly ; and therefore you have answered not 
the question which I intended to ask, but another. 



90 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

La. What do you mean, Socrates ? 

Soc. I will endeavor to explain ; you would call a man 
courageous, who remains at his post, and fights with the 
enemy ? 

La. Certainly I should. 

Soc. And so should I ; but what would you say of another 
man who fights flying, instead of remaining ? 

La. How flying? 

Soc. Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well 
as pursuing ; and as Homer says in praise of the horses of 
Aeneas, that they knew "how to pursue, and fly quickly hither 
and thither;" and he passes an encomium on Aeneas himself, 
as having a knowledge of fear or flight, and calls him " an au- 
thor of fear or flight." 

La. Yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right; for he was 
speaking of chariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian 
cavalry, who have that way of fighting; but the heavy-armed 
Greek fights, as I say, remaining in his rank. 

Soc. And yet, Laches, you must except the Lacedaemonians 
at Plataea, who, when they came upon the light shields of the 
Persians, are said not to have been willing to stand and fight, 
and to have fled ; but when the ranks of the Persians were 
broken, they turned upon them like cavalry, and won the bat- 
tle. 

La. That is true. 

Soc. That was my meaning when I said that I was to 
blame in having put my question badly, and that this was the 
reason of your answering badly. For I meant to ask you not 
only about the courage of heavy-armed soldiers, but about the 
courage of cavalry and every other style of soldier ; and not 
only who are courageous in war, but who are courageous in 
perils by sea, and who in disease, or in poverty, or again in poli- 
tics, are courageous ; and not only who are courageous against 
pain or fear, but mighty to contend against desires and pleas- 
ures, either fixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy. 
There is this sort of courage, is there not, Laches ? 

La. Certainly, Socrates. 

Soc. And all these are courageous, but some have courage 
in pleasures, and some in pains ; some in desires, and some in 
fears ; and some are cowards under the same conditions, as I 
should imagine. 

La. Very true. — Laches, i. 83. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 91 

Courage, generic. 

Soc. Now I was' asking about courage and cowardice in 

general. And I will begin with courage, and once more ask, 
What is that common quality, which is the same in all these 
cases, and which is called courage ? Do you understand now 
what I mean ? 

La. Not over well. 

Soc. I mean this : As I might ask what is that quality 
which is called quickness, and which is found in running, play- 
ing the lyre, in speaking, in learning, and in many other similar 
actions, or rather which we possess in nearly every action that 
is worth mentioning of arms, legs, mouth, voice, mind ; would 
you not apply the term quickness to all of them ? 

Za. Quite true. 

Soc. And suppose I were to be asked by some one : What 
is that common quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the 
word, you call quickness ? I should say that which accom- 
plishes much in a little time — that I call quickness in running, 
speaking, and every other sort of action. 

La. You would be quite correct. 

Soc. And now, Laches, do you try and tell me, What is 
that common quality which is called courage, and which includes 
all the various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure 
and pain, and in all the cases which I was just now mention- 
ing ? 

La. I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the 
soul, if I am to speak of the universal nature which pervades 
them all. 

Soc. But that is what we must do if we are to answer the 
question. And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance 
is, in my opinion, to be deemed courage. Hear my reason : I 
am sure, Laches, that you would consider courage to be a very 
noble quality. 

La. Most noble, certainly. 

Soc. And you would say that a wise endurance is also good 
and noble? 

La. Very noble. 

Soc. But what would you say of a foolish endurance ? 
Is not that, on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and 
hurtful ? 

La. True. 

Soc. And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful ? 



92 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

La. I ought not to say that, Socrates. 

Soc. Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to 
be courage — for that is not noble, but courage is noble ? 

La. You are right. 

Soc. Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is 
courage ? 

La. True. 

'Soc. But as to the epithet "wise," — wise in what? In 
all things small as well as great ? For example, if a man en- 
dures in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spend- 
ing he will acquire more in the end, do you call him coura- 
geous ? 

La. Assuredly not. 

Soc. Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, 
or some patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs 
that he may be allowed to eat or drink something, and the 
other refuses ; is that courage ? 

La. No ; that is not courage at all, any more than the last. 

Soc. Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and 
is willing to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others 
will help him, and that there will be fewer and inferior men 
against him than there are with him ; and suppose that he has 
also advantages of position ; would you say of such an one 
who endures with all this wisdom and preparation, that he, or 
some man in the opposing army who is in the opposite circum- 
stances to these and yet endures and remains at his post, is the 
braver ? 

La. I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver. 

Soc. But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison 
with the other ? 

La. That is true. 

Soc. And you would say that he who in an engagement of 
cavalry endures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not 
so courageous as he who endures, having no knowledge of 
horsemanship ? 

La. That is my view. 

Soc. And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use 
of the sling, or the bow, or any other art, is not so courageous 
as he who endures, not having such a knowledge ? 

La. True. 

Soc. And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds 
out in this or any similar action, having no knowledge of div- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 93 

ing, or the like, is, as you would say, more courageous than 
those who have this knowledge ? 

La. Why, Socrates, what else can a man say ? 

Soc. Nothing, if that is what he thinks. 

La. But that is what I do think. 

Soc. And yet men who thus run risks and endure are fool- 
ish, Laches, in comparison of those who do the same things, 
having the skill to do them. 

La. That is true. 

Soc. But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to 
be base and hurtful to us. 

La. Quite true. 

Soc. Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble 
quality. 

Ija. True. 

Soc. And now on the contrary we are saying that the fool- 
ish endurance, which was before held in dishonor, is cour- 
age. 

La. Very true. 

Soc. And are we right in saying that ? 

La. Indeed, Socrates, I am sure we that are not right. 

Soc. Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, 
are not attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of 
words and deeds ; for our deeds are not in accordance with our 
words. Any one would say that we had courage who saw us 
in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard us talking about 
courage just now. 

La. That is most true. 

Soc. And is this condition of ours satisfactory ? 

La. Quite the reverse. 

Soc. Suppose, however, that we admit the principle to a 
certain extent. 

La. What principle ? And to what extent ? 

Soc. The principle of endurance. We too must endure 
and persevere in the inquiry, and then courage will not laugh 
at our faint-heartedness in searching for courage ; which after 
all may, very likely, be endurance. 

Za. I am ready to go on, Socrates ; and yet I am unused to 
investigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has 
been aroused in me by what has been said ; and I am really 
grieved at being thus unable to express my meaning. For I 
fancy that I do know the nature of courage ; but, somehow or 



94 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

other, she has slipped away from me, and I cannot get hold of 

her and tell her nature. — Laches, i. 84. 

Courage, a special trait of the philosopher. See Calmness, 

The true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking 

to release the soul. Is not the separation and release of the 
soul from the body their especial study ? 

That is true. 

And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous 
contradiction in men studying to live as nearly as they can in 
a state of death, and yet repining when death comes. 

Certainly. 

Then, Simmias, as the true philosophers are ever studying 
death ; to them, of all men, death is the least terrible. Look at 
the matter in this way ; if they have always been enemies of 
the body, and wanting to have the soul alone, when this is 
granted to them, how inconsistent would they be, to be trem- 
bling and repining ; instead of rejoicing at their departing to 
that place where, when they arrive, they hope to gain that 
which in life they loved (and this was wisdom), and at the 
same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a 
man has been willing to go to the world below in the hope of 
seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing 
with them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and 
is strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world 
below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death ? Will 
he not depart with joy ? Surely, he will, my friend, if he be a 
true philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction that 
there only, and nowhere else, he can find wisdom in her purity. 
And if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, 
if he were to fear death. 

He would indeed, replied Simmias. 

And when you see a man who is repining at the approach 
of death, is not his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not 
a lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body, and probably at 
the same time a lover of either money or power, or both ? 

That is very true, he replied. 

There is a virtue, Simmias, which is named courage. Is 
not that a characteristic of the philosopher ? 

Certainly. — Phaedo, i. 394. 
Courage improved by love. 

I say that a lover who is detected in doing any dishonor- 
able act, or submitting through cowardice when any dishonor 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 95 

is done him by another, will be more pained at being detected 
by his beloved than at being seen by his father, or by his com- 
panions, or by any one else. The beloved, too, when he is 
seen in any disgraceful situation, has the same feeling about 
his lover. And if there were only some way of contriving 
that a state or an army should be made up of lovers and their 
loves, they would be the very best governors of their own 
city, abstaining from all dishonor, and emulating one another in 
honor ; and when fighting at one another's side, although a 
mere handful, they would overcome the world. For what 
lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than 
by his beloved, either when abandoning his post or throwing 
away his arms ? He would be ready to die a thousand deaths 
rather than endure this. Or who would desert his beloved or 
fail him in the hour of danger ? The veriest coward would 
become an inspired hero, equal to the bravest, at such a time ; 
Love would inspire him. That courage which, as Homer says, 
the God breathes into the soul of heroes, Love of his own nat- 
ure infuses into the lover. 

Love will make men dare to die for their beloved — love 
alone; and women as well as men. Of this Alcestis the 
daughter of Pehas is a monument to all Hellas ; for she was 
willing to lay down her life on behalf of her husband, when 
no one else would, although he had a father and mother ; but 
the tenderness of her love so far exceeded theirs, that she 
made them seem to be as strangers in blood to their own son, 
and in name only related to him ; and so noble did this action 
of hers appear to the gods, as well as to men, that among the 
many who have done virtuously she was one of the very few 
to whom the gods have granted the privilege of returning to 
earth, in admiration of her virtue ; such exceeding honor is 
paid by them to the devotion and virtue of love. But Or- 
pheus, the son of Oeagrus, the harper, they sent empty away, 
and showed him an apparition only of her whom he sought, 
but herself they would not give up ; because he appeared to 
them to be enervated by his art and not daring like Alcestis 
to die for love, to have been contriving how he might enter 
Hades alive ; moreover, they afterward caused him to suffer 
death at the hands of women, as the punishment of his coward- 
liness. — The Symposium, i. 473. 
Courage in the State. 
Again, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature 



96 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

of courage, and in what part that quality resides which gives 
the name of courageous to the State. 

How do you mean ? 

Why, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or 
cowardly, will be thinking of the part which fights and goes 
out to battle on the State's behalf. 

No one, he replied, would ever think of any other. 

The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be 
cowardly, but their courage or cowardice will not, as I con- 
ceive, have the effect of making the city either one or the 
other. 

Certainly not. 

The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of the 
citizens in whom resides a never-failing quality preservative of 
that opinion about things to be feared and not to be feared, 
in which the legislator educated them ; and this is what you 
term courage. 

I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I 
do not think that I perfectly understand you. 

I mean that courage is a kind of salvation. 

Salvation of what? 

The salvation, I said, of the opinion about proper objects of 
fear which the law implants through education ; and I mean by 
the word " never-failing," to intimate that in pleasure or in 
pain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, 
and does not lose this opinion. — The Republic, ii. 254. 
Courage and confidence. See Ability, etc. 
Courage and cowardice. 

Al. I rather think, Socrates, that some honorable things are 

evil. 

Soc. And are some dishonorable things good ? 

AL Yes. 

Soc. You mean in such a case as the following : In time of 
war, men have been wounded or have died in rescuing a com- 
panion or kinsman, when others who have neglected the duty 
of rescuing them have escaped in safety ? 

AL True. 

Soc. And to rescue another under such circumstances is hon- 
orable, because of the attempt to save those whom we ought to 
save ; and this is courage ? 

AL True. 

Soc. But evil because of death and wounds ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 9? 

Al. Yes. 

Soc. And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one 
thing, and the death another. 

Al. Certainly. 

Soc. Then the rescue of one's friends is honorable in one 
point of view, but evil in another ? 

Al. True. 

Soc. And if honorable, then also good : Will you consider 
now whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging 
that the courage which is shown in the rescue is honorable ? 
Now is this courage good or evil ? Look at the matter thus : 
which would you rather choose, good or evil ? 

M.. Good. 

Soc. And the greatest goods you would be most ready to 
choose, and would least like to be deprived of them ? 

Al. Certainly. 

Soc. What would you say of courage ? At what price would 
you be willing to be deprived of courage ? 

Al. I would rather die than be a coward. 

Soc. Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils ? 

Al. I do. 

Soc. As bad as death, I suppose ? 

Al. Yes. 

Soc. And life and courage are the extreme opposites of 
death and cowardice ? 

Al. Yes. 

Soc. And they are what you would most desire to have, and 
the opposites you would least desire ? 

Al. Yes. 

Soc. Is this because you think life and courage the best, and 
death and cowardice the worst? 

Al Yes. 

Soc. And you would regard the rescue of a friend in battle 
as good, because of the courage which is there shown ? 

AL I should. 

Soc. But evil because of the death which ensues ? 

Al. Yes. 

Soc. Might we not describe their different effects as follows : 
You may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which 
is the effect, and good in respect of the good which is the effect 
of either of them ? 

Al. Yes. 

7 



98 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Soc. And they are honorable in so far as they are good, and 
dishonorable in so far as they are evil ? 

Al. True. 

Soc. Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle 
is honorable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the 
rescue is good and yet evil ? 

Al. I believe that you are right, Socrates. 

Soc. Nothing honorable, regarded as honorable, is evil ; nor 
anything base, regarded as base, good. 

Al. Clearly not. — Alcibiades I. iv. 530. 
Courage untempered. 

Str. Courage, when untempered by the gentler nature 

during many generations, may at first bloom and strengthen, 
but at last bursts forth into every sort of madness. 

Y. Soc. Like enough. 

Str. And then, again, the soul which is over-full of modesty 
and has no element of courage in many successive generations, 
is apt to grow very indolent, and at last to become utterly 
paralyzed and useless. 

Y. Soc. That, again, is quite likely. 

Str. It was of these bonds I said that there would be no 
difficulty in creating them, if only both classes originally held 
the same opinion about the honorable and good ; indeed, in 
this single word, the whole process of royal weaving is com- 
prised — never to allow temperate natures to be separated from 
the brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and the 
woof, by common sentiments and honors and opinions, and by 
the giving of pledges to one another ; and out of them form- 
ing one smooth and even web, to intrust to them the offices of 
State. 

Y. Soc. How do you mean ? 

Str. Where one officer only is needed, you must choose a 
ruler who has both these qualities ; when many, you must 
mingle some of each, for the temperate ruler is very careful 
and just and safe, but is wanting in thoroughness and go. 

Y. Soc. Certainly, that is very true. 

Str. The character of the courageous, on the other hand, 
falls short of the former in justice and caution, but has the 
power of action in a remarkable degree, and where either of 
these two qualities is wanting, there cities cannot altogether 
prosper either in their public or private life. — Statesman, iii, 
598. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 99 

Courts of Law and lawyers. 

— — In courts of law men literally care nothing about truth, 
but only about conviction : and this is based on probability, to 
which he who would be a skillful orator should therefore give 
his whole attention. And they say also that there are cases in 
which the actual facts ought to be withheld, and only the prob- 
abilities should be told either in accusation or defense, and that 
always in speaking the orator should keep probability in view, 
and say good-bye to the truth. And the observance of this 
principle throughout a speech furnishes the whole art. 

Phaedr. That is what the professors of rhetoric do actually 
say, Socrates. I remember that we have touched lightly upon 
this matter already, but with them the point is all-important. 

Soc. I dare say that you are familiar with Tisias. Does he 
not define probability to be that which the many think? 

Phaedr. Certainly he does. 

Soc. I believe that he has a clever and ingenious case of this 
sort : He supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted 
a strong and cowardly one, and to have robbed him of his coat 
or of something or other ; he is brought into court, and then 
Tisias says that both parties should tell lies : the coward should 
say that he was assaulted by more men than one ; the other 
should prove that they were alone, and should use this argu- 
ment : " How could a man like me have assaulted a man like 
him ? " The complainant will not like to confess his own cow- 
ardice, and will therefore invent some other lie which his adver- 
sary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting. And there are 
other devices of the same kind which have a place in the sys- 
tem. Am I not right, Phaedrus ? 

Phaedr. Certainly. — Phaedrus, i. 578. 
Courts of justice, establishment of. 

■ A city which has no regular courts of law ceases to be a 

city ; and again, if a judge is silent and says no more than the 
litigants in preliminary trials and in private arbitrations, he will 
never be able to decide justly ; wherefore a multitude of judges 
will not easily judge well, nor a few if they are not good judges. 
The point in dispute should be made clear by both parties, and 
time, and deliberation, and repeated examination, greatly tend 
to clear up doubts. For this reason, he who goes to law with 
another, should go first of all to his neighbors and friends who 
know best the questions at issue. And if he be unable to ob- 
tain from them a satisfactory decision, let him have recourse 



100 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS 

to another court ; and if the two courts cannot settle the mat- 
ter, let the third put an end to the suit. 

Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded 
as a choice of magistrates, for every magistrate must also be a 
judge of some things ; and the judge, though he be not a mag- 
istrate, yet in certain respects is a very important magistrate 
on the day on which he is determining a suit. Regarding then 
the judges also as magistrates, let us say who are fit to be 
judges, and of what they are to be judges, and how many of 
them are to judge in each suit. Let that be the supreme tri- 
bunal which the ligitants agree to appoint in common for them- 
selves. And let there be two other tribunals : one for private 
individuals, who desire to have causes of action decided against 
one another ; the other for public causes, in which some citizen 
is of opinion that the public has been wronged by an individ- 
ual, and is willing to vindicate the common interests. — Laws, 
iv. 288. 

Cowards, children made. See Courage. 
I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that 

" The gods, taking the disguise of strangers, haunt cities in all sorts of forms; " 

and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let any one, 
either in tragedy or any other kind of poetry, introduce Here 
disguised in the likeness of a priestess, — 

." Asking an alms for the life-giving daughters of the river Inachus; " 

let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have 
mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children 
with abominable tales of certain gods who, as they say, 

" Go about by night in the likeness of strangers from every land; " 

let them beware lest they blaspheme against the gods and at 
the same time make cowards of their children. — The Repub- 
lic, ii. 204. 
Creation, beginning and reason of the. 

If the world be indeed fair and the artificer good, then, 

as is plain, he must have looked to that which is eternal. But 
if what cannot be said without blasphemy is true, then he 
looked to the created pattern. Every one will see that he 
must have looked to the eternal, for the world is the fairest of 
creations and He is the best of causes. And having been cre- 
ated in this way the world has been framed with a view to 
that which is apprehended by reason and mind and is un- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 101 

changeable, and must, if this be admitted, of necessity be the 
copy of something. Now that the beginning of everything 
should be according to nature is a great matter. And in 
speaking of the copy and original we may assume that words 
are akin to the matter which they describe, when they relate 
to the lasting and permanent and intelligible, they ought to be 
lasting and unfailing, and as far as is in their nature irrefut- 
able and immovable — nothing less. But when they express 
only the copy or image and not the eternal things themselves, 
they need only be .probable and analogous to the real words. 
As being is to becoming, so is truth to belief. If then, Soc- 
rates, amid the many opinions about the gods and the genera- 
tion of the universe, we are not able to give notions which are 
in every way exact and consistent with one another, do not be 
surprised. Enough, if we adduce probabilities as likely as any 
others, for we must remember that I who am the speaker, and 
you who are the judges, are only mortal men, and we ought to 
accept the tale which is probable and not inquire further. — 
Timaeus, ii. 524. 
Creations of God indissoluble. 

Oceanus and Tethys were the children of Earth and 

Heaven, and from these sprang Phorcys and Cronos and Rhea, 
and many more with them ; and from Cronos and Rhea sprang 
Zeus and Here, and all those whom we know as their brethren, 
and others who were their children. 

Now, when all of them, both those who visibly appear in 
their revolutions as well as those other gods who are of a 
more retiring nature, had come into being, the Creator of 
the universe spoke to them as follows : Gods and sons of gods 
who are my works, and of whom I am the artificer and father, 
my creations are indissoluble, if so I will. All that is bound 
may be dissolved, but only an evil being would wish to dis- 
solve that which is harmonious and happy. And although 
being created, ye are not altogether immortal and indissoluble, 
ye shall certainly not be dissolved, nor be liable to the fate of 
death ; having in my will a greater and mightier bond than 
those which bound you at the time of creation. — Timaeus, ii. 
533. 
Creator, artist. 

There is another artist, — I should like to know what 

you would say of him. 

Who is he ? 



102 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

One who is the maker of all the works of all other work- 
men. 

What an extraordinary man ! 

Wait a little, and there will be more reason for yonr saying 
so. For this is he who makes not only vessels of every kind, 
but plants and animals, himself and all other things — the 
earth and heaven, and the things which are in heaven, or un- 
der the earth ; he makes the gods also. 

He must be a rare master of his art. 

Oh ! you are unbelieving, are you ? Do you mean that there 
is no such maker or creator, or that in one sense there might 
be a maker of all these things but not in another ? Do you 
not see that there is a way in which you could make them 
yourself ? 

What way ? 

An easy way enough ; or rather, there are many ways in 
which the feat might be accomplished, none quicker than that 
of turning a mirror round and round, you would soon make 
the sun and the heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other 
animals and plants, and all the other creations of art as well 
as nature, in the mirror. 

Yes, he said, but that is an appearance only. 

Very good, I said, you are coming to the point now ; and 
the painter, as I conceive, is just a creator of this sort, is he 
not? 

Of course. — The Republic, ii. 426. 
Crimes and criminals — treatment of. 

There is a sense of disgrace in legislating, as we are 

about to do, for all the details of crime in a state which, as we 
say, is to be well regulated and will be perfectly adapted to 
the practice of virtue. To assume that in such a state there 
will arise so*me accomplice in crimes as great as any which are 
ever perpetrated in other states, and that we must legislate for 
him by anticipation, and threaten and make laws against him 
if he should arise ; in order to deter him, and punish his acts, 
under the idea that he will arfse — this, as I was saying, is in 
a manner disgraceful. But seeing that we are not like the an- 
cient legislators, who gave laws to demi-gods and sons of Gods, 
being themselves, according to the popular belief, the offspring 
of the gods, and legislating for others, who were also the chil- 
dren of divine parents, whereas we are only men who are leg- 
islating for the sons of men, there is no uncharitableness in ap- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 103 

pretending that some one of our citizens may be like a seed 
which has touched the ox's horn, and have a heart which cannot 
be softened any more than those seeds can be softened by fire". 

Among our citizens there may be those who cannot be sub- 
dued by all the strength of the laws ; and for their sake, 
though an ungracious task, I will proclaim my first law about 
the robbing of temples, in case such a crime should ever be 
committed. I do not expect or imagine that any well-brought- 
up citizen will ever take the infection, but their servants, and 
strangers, and strangers' servants, may be guilty of many im- 
pieties. And with a view to them especially, and yet not with- 
out a provident eye to the weakness of human nature generally, 
I will proclaim the law about robbers of temples and similar 
incurable, or almost incurable criminals. Having already 
agreed that such enactments ought always to have a short pre- 
lude, we may speak to the criminal whom some tormenting de- 
sire by night and by day tempts to go and rob a temple, in 
words of admonition and exhortation : O sir, we will say to 
him, the impulse which moves you to rob temples is not an or- 
dinary human malady, nor yet a visitation of Heaven, but a 
madness which is begotten in men from ancient and unexpi- 
ated crimes of his race, destroying him when his time is come ; 
against this you must guard as well as you can, and how you 
are to guard I will explain to you. When any such thought 
comes into your mind, go and perform expiations, go as a supli- 
ant to the temples of the Gods who avert evils, go to the society 
of those who are called good men among you ; hear them tell 
and yourself try to repeat after them, that every man should 
honor the noble and the just. Fly from the company of the 
wicked — fly, and turn not back ; and if thy disorder is light- 
ened sensibly by these remedies, well and good, but if not, then 
acknowledge death to be nobler than life, and depart hence. 

Such are the preludes which we sing to all who have 
thoughts of unholy and treasonable actions, and to him who 
hearkens to them the law has nothing more to say. But to him 
who is disobedient when the prelude is over, cry with a loud 
voice, — He who is taken in the act of robbing temples, if he 
be a slave or stranger, shall have his evil deed engraven on his 
face and hands, and shall be beaten with as many stripes as 
may seem good to the judges, and be cast naked beyond the 
borders of the land. And if he suffers this punishment he will 
probably be corrected and improved ; for no penalty which the 



104 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

law inflicts is designed for evil, but always makes him who 
suffers either better or not so bad. But if any citizen be 
found guilty of any great or unmentionable wrong, either in 
relation to the Gods or his parents, or the State, let the judge 
deem him to be incurable, remembering what an education and 
training he has had from youth, upward, and yet has not ab- 
stained from the greatest of crimes. The penalty of death is 
to him the least of evils ; and others will be benefited by his 
example, if he be put away out of the land with infamy.— 
Laws, iv. 366. 

Crimnality and punishment of bad public men. 
- — - Of these fearful examples, most, as I believe, are taken 
from the class of tyrants and kings and potentates and public 
men, for they are the authors of the greatest and most impious 
crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses 
to the truth of this; for they are always kings and potentates 
whom he has described as suffering everlasting punishment in the 
world below ; — such were Tantalus, and Sisyphus, and Tityus. 
But no one ever described Thersites, or any private person who 
was a villain, as suffering everlasting punishment or as incura- 
ble. For to commit the worst crimes, as I am inclined to 
think, was not in his power, and he was happier than those 
who had the power. Yes, Callicles, the very bad men come 
from the class of those who have power. And yet in that 
very class there may arise good men, and worthy of all ad- 
miration they are, for where there is a great power to do 
wrong, to live and to die justly is a hard thing, and greatly to 
be praised, and few there are who attain this. Such good and 
true men, however, there have been, and will be again, in 
Athens and in other states, who have fulfilled their trust right- 
eously ; and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, 
Aristides, the son of Lysimachus. But, in general, great men 
are also bad, my friend. 

And, as I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of 
the bad kind, knows nothing about him, neither who he is, nor 
who his parents are ; he knows only that he has got hold of a 
villain ; and seeing this, he stamps him as curable or incurable, 
and sends him away to Tartarus, whither he goes and receives 
his recompense. — Gorgias, iii. 117. 
Criminals co-existing with paupers. 

God has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without 

stings, whereas of the walking drones he has made some with- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 105 

out stings and others with dreadful stings ; of the stingless class 
are those who in their old age end as paupers ; of the stingers 
come all the criminal class, as they are termed. 

Most true, he said. 

Clearly then, whenever you see paupers in a state, some- 
where in that neighborhood there are hidden away thieves and 
cut-purses, and robbers of temples, and other malefactors. 

Clearly. 

Well, I said, and in oligarchical states do you not find pau- 
pers ? 

Yes, he said ; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a 
ruler. 

And may we be so bold as to suppose that there are also 
many criminals to be found in them, rogues who have stings, 
and whom the authorities are careful to restrain by force ? 

Certainly, we may be so bold. 

The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of 
education, ill-training, and an evil constitution of the State ? 

True. — The Republic, ii. 380. 
Cures, why unknown to physicians. 

This Thracian told me that in these notions of theirs, 

which I was mentioning, the Greek physicians are quite right 
as far as they go ; but Zamolxis, he added, our king, who is 
also a god, says further, " that as you ought not to attempt to 
cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the eyes, 
so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the 
soul ; and this," he said, " is the reason why the cure of many 
diseases is unknown to the physicians of Hellas, because they 
are ignorant of the whole, which ought to be studied also ; for 
the part can never be well unless the whole is well." For all 
good and evil, whether in the body or in human nature, origi- 
nates, as he declared, in the soul, and overflows from thence, as 
from the head into the eyes. And therefore if the head and 
the body are to be well, you must begin by curing the soul ; 
that is the first thing. And the cure, my dear youth, has to be 
effected by the use of certain charms, and these charms are 
fair words; and by them temperance is implanted in the soul, 
and where temperance is, there health is speedily imparted, not 
only to the head, but to the whole body. And he who taught 
me the cure and the charm at the same time added a special di- 
rection : " Let no one," he said, " persuade you to cure the 
bead, until he has first given you his soul to be cured by the 



106 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

charm. For this" he said, " is the great error of our day in 
the treatment of the human body, that physicians separate the 
soul from the body." — Gharmides, i. 10. 
Curiosity does not make a philosopher. 

May we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not 

of a part of wisdom only, but of the whole ? 

True. 

Then he who dislikes knowledge, especially in youth, when 
he has no power of judging what is good and what is not, 
such an one we maintain not to be a philosopher or a lover of 
knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not hungry, and 
may be said to have a bad appetite, and not a good one ? 

There we are right, he said. 

Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and 
who is curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly 
termed a philosopher ? Am I not right ? 

Glaucon said : If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will 
find many a strange being claiming the name. For all the 
lovers of sights have a delight in learning, and will therefore 
have to be included. Musical amateurs, too, are a folk won- 
derfully out of place among philosophers, for they are the last 
persons in the world who would come to anything like a philo- 
sophical discussion, if they could help, while they run about at 
the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear 
every chorus ; whether the performance is in town or country 
— that makes no difference — they are there. Now are we to 
maintain that all these and any who have similar tastes, as well 
as the professors of minor arts, are philosophers ? 

Certainly not, I replied, they are only an imitation. — The 
Republic, ii. 303. 
Custom and Law. See Colonization, etc. 

Dancing, natural. 

The Gods, pitying the toils which our race is born to un- 
dergo, have appointed holy festivals, in which men alternate 
rest with labor; and have given them the Muses, and Apollo 
the leader of the Muses, and Dionysus, to be partners in their 
revels, that they may improve what education they have, at the 
festivals of the gods, and by their aid. I should like to know 
whether a common saying is true to nature or not. For what 
men say is that the young of all creatures cannot be quiet in 
their bodies or in their voices ; they are always wanting to 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 107 

move, and cry out ; at one time leaping and skipping, and over- 
flowing with sportiveness and delight at something, and then 
again uttering all sorts of cries. But, whereas other animals 
have no perception of order or disorder in their movements, 
that is, of rhythm or harmony, as they are called, to us the 
Gods, who, as we say, have been appointed to be our partners 
in the dance, have given the pleasurable sense of harmony and 
rhythm ; and so they stir us into life, and we follow them and 
join hands with one another in dances and songs ; and these 
they call choruses, which is a term naturally expressive of cheer- 
•fulness. Shall we begin, then, with the acknowledgment that 
education is first given through Apollo and the Muses ? What 
do you say ? 

Gle. I assent. — Laws, iv. 183. 
Bead, burial and remembrance of the. See Burial, etc. 
Dead, they are our shades and images. 

Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that 

the soul is in all respects superior to the body, and that even 
in life what makes each one of us to be what we are is only 
the soul ; and that the body follows us about in the likeness o£ 
each of us, and therefore, when we are dead, the bodies of the 
dead are rightly said to be our shades or images ; for that the 
true and immortal being of each one of us which is called the 
soul goes on her way to other gods — that before them she may 
give an account — an inspiring hope to the- good, but very ter- 
rible to the bad, as the laws of our fathers tell us, which also 
say that not much can be done in the way of helping a man 
after he is dead. But the living — he should be helped by 
all his kindred, that while in life he may be the holiest and 
justest of men, and after death may have no great sins to be 
punished in the world below. If this be true, a man ought not 
to waste his substance under the idea that all this lifeless mass 
of flesh which is in process of burial is connected with him ; he 
should consider that the son, or brother, or the beloved one, 
whoever he may be, whom he thinks he is laying in the earth, 
has gone away to complete and fulfill his own destiny, and that 
his duty is rightly to order the present, and to spend moder- 
ately on the lifeless altar of the Gods below. — Laws, iv. 468. 
Dead ; heroic. See Battle, death in. 
Death, escape from, not always right. 

Not much time will be gained, Athenians, in return for 

the evil name which you will get from the detractors of the 



108 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 

city, who will say that you killed Socrates, a wise man ; for 
they will call me wise even although I am not wise, when they 
want to reproach you. If you had waited a little while, your 
desire would have been fulfilled in the course of nature. For 
I am far advanced in years, as you may perceive, and not far 
from death. I am speaking now only to those of you who have 
condemned me to death. And I have another thing to say to 
them : You think that I was convicted because I had no words 
of the sort which would have procured my acquittal — I mean, 
if I had thought fit to leave nothing undone or unsaid. Not 
so ; the deficiency which led to my conviction was not of words 
— certainly not. But I had not the boldness or impudence or 
inclination to address you as you would have liked me to ad- 
dress you, weeping and wailing and lamenting, and saying and 
doing many things which you have been accustomed to hear 
from others, and which, as I maintain, are unworthy of me. I 
thought at the time that I ought not to do anything common 
or mean when in danger : nor do I now repent of the manner 
of my defense, and I would rather die having spoken after my 
manner, than speak in your manner and live. For neither in 
war nor yet at law ought any man to use every way of escap- 
ing death. Often in battle there can be no doubt that if a man 
will throw away his arms, and fall on his knees before his pur- 
suers, he may escape death ; and in other dangers there are 
other ways of escaping death, if a man is willing to say and do 
anything. The difficulty, my friends, is not in avoiding death, 
but in avoiding unrighteousness ; for that runs faster than death. 
I am old and move slowly, and the slower runner has overtaken 
me, and my accusers are keen and quick, and the faster runner, 
who is unrighteousness, has overtaken them. And now I de- 
part hence condemned by you to suffer the penalty of death, 
and they too go their ways condemned by the truth to suffer 
the penalty of villainy and wrong; and I must abide by my 
award — let them abide by theirs. I suppose that these things 
may be regarded as fated, — and I think that they are well. — 
Apology, i. 336. 
Death and life, chances of, not to be calculated. 

Some one will say : And are you not ashamed, Socrates, 

of a course of life which is likely to bring you to an untimely 
end ? To him I may fairly answer : There you are mistaken : 
a man who is good for anything ought not to calculate the 
chance of living or dying ; he ought only to consider whether 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 109 

in doing anything he is doing right or wrong — acting the part 
of a good man or of a bad. Whereas, according to your view, 
the heroes who fell at Troy were not good for much, and the 
son of Thetis above all, who altogether despised danger in com- 
parison with disgrace ; and when his goddess mother said to him, 
in his eagerness to slay Hector, that if he avenged his com- 
panion Patroclus, and slew Hector, he would die himself, — 
"Fate," as she said, "waits upon you next after Hector;" he, 
hearing this, utterly despised danger and death, and instead of 
fearing them, feared rather to live in dishonor, and not to 
avenge his friend. " Let me die next," he replies, " and be 
avenged of my enemy, rather than abide here by the beaked 
ships, a scorn and a burden of the earth." Had Achilles any 
any thought of death and danger? For wherever a man's 
place is, whether the place which he has chosen or that in which 
he has been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain 
in the hour of danger : he should not think of death or of any- 
thing, but of disgrace. And this, O men of Athens, is a true 
saying. — Apology, i. 326. 
Death, fear of, no wisdom. 

Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, men of Athens, 

if I who, when I was ordered by the generals whom you chose 
to command me at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, re- 
mained where they placed me, like any other man, facing 
death, — if, I say, now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God 
orders me to fulfill the philosopher's mission of searching into 
myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear 
of death, or any other fear ; that would indeed be strange, and 
I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence 
of the Gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of 
death : then I should be fancying that I was wise when I was 
not wise. For the fear of death is indeed the pretense of wis- 
dom, and not real wisdom, being a pretended knowledge of 
the unknown ; and no one knows whether death, which men in 
their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the 
greatest good. Is there not here conceit of knowledge, which 
is a disgraceful sort of ignorance ? And this is the point in 
which, as I think, I differ from others and in which I might per- 
haps fancy myself wiser than men in general, — that whereas 
I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I 
know : but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a bet- 
ter, whether God or man, is evil and dishonorable, and I will 



110 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 



never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil 
And therefore if yon let me go now, and reject the counsels of 
Anytus, who said that if I were not put to death I ought not 
to have been prosecuted, and that if I escape now, your sons 
will all be utterly ruined by listening to my words, — if you 
say to me, Socrates, this time we will not mind Anytus, and 
will let you off, but upon one condition, that you are not to in- 
quire and speculate in this way any more, and that if you are 
caught doing this again you shall die ; — if this was the condi- 
tion on which you let me go, I should reply : Men of Athens, 
I honor and love you ; but I shall obey God rather than you, 
and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from 
the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting any one 
whom I meet after my manner, and convincing him. — Apol- 
ogy, i. 327. 

Death, calmness in view of. See Calmness, etc. 
Death and life not to be considered in questions of duty. 

I proceed to argue the question whether I ought or ought 

not to try and escape without the consent of the Athenians : 
and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the at- 
tempt ; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations 
which you mention, of money and loss of character and the 
duty of educating one's children, are, as I fear, only the doc- 
trines of the multitude, who would be as ready to call people 
to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death — 
and with as little reason. But now, since the argument has 
thus far prevailed, the only question which remains to be con- 
sidered is, whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in 
suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in 
money and thanks, or whether we shall not do rightly ; and if 
the latter, then death or any other calamity which may ensue 
on my remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the 
calculation. — Crito, i. 353. 

Death, presentiment of in Socrates. See Presentiment, 
Death, life from. 

Here is a new way in which we arrive at the inference 

that the living come from the dead, just as the dead come from 
the living; and this, if true, affords the satisfactory proof that 
the souls of the dead must exist in some place out of which 
they come again. 

Yes, Socrates, he said ; the conclusion seems to flow neces- 
sarily out of our previous admissions. 






PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. Ill 

And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, 
may be shown, I think, as follows : If generation were in a 
straight line only, and there were no compensation or circle in 
nature, no turn or return of elements into one another, then 
you know that all things would at last have the same form and 
pass into the same state, and there would be no more genera- 
tion of them. 

What do you mean ? he said. 

A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case 
of sleep, he replied. You know that if there were no alter- 
nation of sleeping and waking, the story of the sleeping En- 
dymion would in the end have no meaning, because all other 
things would be asleep too, and he would not be distinguishable 
from the rest. Or if there were composition only, and no di- 
vision of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would 
come again. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things 
which partook of life were to die, and after they were dead 
remained in the form of death, and did not come to life again, 
all would at last die, and nothing would be alive — how could 
this be otherwise ? For if the living spring from any others 
who are not the dead, and they die, must not all things at last 
be swallowed up in death ? 

There is no escape from that, Socrates, said Cebes ; and I 
think that what you say is entirely true. 

Yes, he said, Cebes, I entirely think so too ; nor is this a 
delusion in which we are agreeing: but I am confident in the 
belief that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that 
the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead 
are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion 
than the evil. — Phaedo, i. 399. 

Death in age; nearness of. See Age, as viewing eternity. 
Death, willingness for, how consistent. 

There may be reason in saying that a man should wait, 

and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is 
now summoning me. 

Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there is surely reason in that. 
And yet how can you reconcile the seemingly true belief that 
God is our guardian and we his possessions, with this willing- 
ness to die which we were attributing to the philosopher ? That 
the wisest of men should be willing to leave a service in which 
they are ruled by the Gods who are the best of rulers, is not 
reasonable, for surely no wise man thinks that when set at lib- 



112 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

erty he can take better care of himself than the Gods take of 
him. A fool may perhaps think so — he may argue that he had 
better run away from his master, not considering that his duty 
is to remain to the end, and not to run away from the good, 
and that there would be no sense in his running away. But 
the wise man will want to be ever with him who is better than 
himself. Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just now 
said ; for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the 
fool rejoice at passing out of life. — Phaedo, i. 388. 
Death, fear of, contrary to courage. See Courage. 
• Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself of a sickly con- 
stitution, by a happy combination of training and doctoring, 
found out a way of torturing first and chiefly himself, and sec- 
ondly the rest of the world. 

How was that? he said. 

By the invention of lingering death ; for he had a mortal 
disease which he perpetually tended, and as recovery was out 
of the question, he passed his entire life as a valetudinarian ; 
he could do nothing but attend upon himself, and he was in 
constant torment whenever he departed in anything from his 
usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science he 
struggled on to old age. 

A rare reward of his skill ! 

Yes, I said ; such a reward as a man might fairly expect 
who could not be made to see that if Asclepius did not instruct 
his descendants in valetudinarian arts, the omission arose not 
from ignorance or inexperience of such a department of medi- 
cine, but because he knew that in all well-ordered states every 
individual had an occupation to which he must attend, and 
therefore has no leisure to spend in continually being ill. This 
we remark in the case of the artisan, but, ludicrously enough, 
do not apply the same rule to people of the richer sort. — The 
Republic, ii. 230. 

Death, welcome to the philosopher. See Philosopher, and Bold- 
ness. 
Death may be life. 

Soc. But surely according to you, life is an awful thing ; 

and indeed I think that Euripides may have been right in say- 
ing,— 

" Who knows if life be not death and death life; " 

and that we are very likely dead ; I have heard a philosopher 
say that at this very moment we are dead, and that the body 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 113 

(o-w/xa) is a tomb (o"?7/xa), and that the part of the soul which 
is the seat of the desires is liable to be blown and tossed about ; 
and some ingenious man, probably a Sicilian or Italian, playing 
with the word, invented a tale ; in which he called the soul a 
vessel (7t10os), meaning a believing vessel (itlottckos), and the 
ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in the 
souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being 
the intemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel 
full of holes, because they can never be satisfied. He is not of 
your way of thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the 
souls in Hades, meaning the invisible world (deiSes), these un- 
initiated or leaky persons are the most miserable, and that they 
carry water to a vessel which is full of holes in a similarly holey 
colander. The colander, as he declares, is the soul, and the soul 
which he compares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, 
which is full of holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a 
bad memory and want of faith. These are strange words, but 
still they show what, if I can, I desire to prove to you ; that 
you should change your mind, and, instead, of the intemperate 
and insatiate life, you should choose that which is orderly and 
sufficient, and has a due provision for daily needs. — Gorgias> 
iii. 81. 

Death in battle. See Battle, 
Deceit and falsehood. 

— — Str. Not-being has been acknowledged by us to be one 
among many classes of being, diffused over all being. 

Theaet. True. 

Str. And thence arises the question, whether not-being min- 
gles with opinion and language. 

Theaet. How so ? 

Str. If not-being has no part in the proposition, then all 
things must be true ; but if not-being has a part, then false 
opinion and false speech are possible, for to think or to say 
what is not, is falsehood, which thus arises in the region of 
thought and in speech. 

Theaet. That is quite true. 

Str. And if there is falsehood there is deceit. 

Theaet. Yes. 

Str. And if there is deceit, then all things must be full of 
idols and images and fancies. 

Theaet. To be sure. 

Str. Into that region the Sophist, as we said, made his es- 
3 



114 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

cape, and when he had got there, denied the very possibility of 
falsehood ; no one, he argued, either conceived or uttered 
falsehood, inasmuch as not-being did not in any way partake of 
being. — Sophist, iii. 500. 
Deceiver as to truth. 

To know and to declare the truth in matters of high in- 
terest which a man loves, among wise men who love him, is a 
safe thing and gives confidence ; but to carry on an argument 
when you are yourself only a doubting inquirer, which is my 
case, is a dangerous and slippery thing ; and the danger is not 
that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be child- 
ish), but that I shall miss the truth where I most need to be 
sure of my footing, and drag my friends after me in my fall. 
And I pray Nemesis not to visit upon me the words which I 
am going to utter. For I do indeed believe that to be an in- 
voluntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about 
the beauty or goodness or justice of institutions. And that 
is a risk which I would rather run among enemies than among 
friends, and therefore you do well to console me. 

Glaucon laughed and said : Well then, Socrates, in case you 
and your argument do us any serious injury you shall be ac- 
quitted beforehand of the homicide, and shall not be held to 
be a deceiver ; take courage then and speak. 

Wel.1, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he 
is free from guilt, and what holds in the one case may hold in 
the other. — The Republic, ii. 275. 
Deception. See Concealment of evil 
Deception, how practiced and avoided. 

■ Soc. The art of disputation, then, is not confined to the 

courts and the assembly, but is one and the same in every use 
of language ; this is that art, if such an art there be, which 
finds a likeness of everything to which a likeness can be found, 
and draws into the light of day the likenesses and disguises 
which are used by others ? 

Phaedr. How do you mean ? 

Soc. Let me put the matter thus : When will there be 
more chance of deception — when the difference is large or 
small ? 

Phaedr. When the difference is small. 

Soc. And you will be less likely to be discovered in passing 
by degrees into the other extreme than when you go all at 
once? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 115 

Phaedr. Of course. 

Soc. He, then, who would deceive others, and not be de- 
ceived, must exactly know the real likenesses and differences 
of things ? 

Phaedr. Yes, he must. 

Soc. And if he is ignorant of the true nature of anything, 
how can he ever distinguish the greater or less degree of like- 
ness to other things of that which he does not know ? 

Phaedr. He cannot. 

Soc. And when men are deceived, and their notions are at 
variance with realities, it is clear that the error slips in through 
some resemblances ? 

Phaedr. Yes, that is the way. 

Soc. Then he who would be a master of the art must know 
the real nature of everything ; or he will never know either 
how to make the gradual departure from truth into the oppo- 
site of truth which is effected by the help of resemblances, or 
how to avoid it ? 

Phaedr. He will not. 

Soc. He then, who being ignorant of the truth aims at ap- 
pearances, will only attain an art of rhetoric which is ridiculous 
and is not an art at all ? 

Phaedr. That may be expected. — Phaedrus, i. 566. 
Deception in the soul, detestable, and in God impossible. 

— But although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still 

by witchcraft and deception they may make us think that they 
appear in various forms ? 

Suppose that, he replied. 

Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, or 
make a false representation of himself whether in word or 
deed ? 

I cannot say, he replied. 

Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if I may use such 
an expression, is hated of gods and men ? 

What do you mean ? he said. 

I mean this, I said, — that no one will admit falsehood into 
that which is the truest and highest part of himself, or about 
the truest and highest matters ; there he is most afraid of a 
lie having possession of him. 

Still, he said, I do not comprehend you. 

The reason is, I replied, that you attribute some grand 
meaning to me ; I am but saying only that deception, or being 



116 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

deceived or uninformed about realities in the highest faculty, 
which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold 
the lie, is what mankind least like, — that, I say, is what they 
utterly detest. 

There is nothing more hateful to them. 

And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the 
soul of him who is deceived may be called the true lie ; for the 
lie in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of 
a previous affection of the soul, not pure unadulterated false- 
hood. Am I not right ? 

Perfectly right. 

The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men ? 

Yes. 

Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not 
hateful ; in dealing with enemies — that would be an instance ; 
or again, as a cure or preventive of the madness of those who 
are called your friends ; also in the tales of mythology, of which 
we were just now speaking — because we do not know the 
truth about ancient traditions, we make falsehood as much like 
truth as may be, and so of use. 

Very true, he said. 

But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we sup- 
pose that he is ignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse 
to invention ? 

That would be ridiculous, he said. 

The lying poet then has no place in our idea of God ? 

I should say not. 

But peradventure again he may tell a lie because he is 
afraid of enemies ? 

That is inconceivable. 

But he may have friends who are senseless or mad ? 

But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God. 

Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie ? 

None. 

Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of 
falsehood ? 

Yes. 

Then is God perfectly simple and true both in deed and 
word ; he changes not ; he deceives not, either by dream or 
waking vision, by sign or word. — The Republic, ii. 205. 
Deeds and Words, tribute of. 
- There is a tribute of deeds and of words. The departed 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 117 

have already had the first, when going forth on their destined 
journey they were attended on their way by the State and by 
their friends ; the tribute of words remains to be given to them, 
as is meet and by law ordained. For noble words are a me- 
morial and a crown of noble actions, which are given to the 
doers of them by the hearers. A word is needed which will 
duly praise the dead and gently admonish the living, exhorting 
the brethren and descendants of the departed to imitate their 
virtue and consoling their fathers and mothers and the surviv- 
ors, if any, who may chance to be alive of the previous genera- 
tion. What sort of a word will this be, and how shall we 
rightly begin the praises of these brave men ? In their life 
they rejoiced their own friends with their virtue, and their 
death they gave in exchange for the salvation of the living. 
And I think that we should praise them in the order in which 
nature made them good, for they were good because they were 
sprung from good fathers. Wherefore let us first of all praise 
the goodness of their birth ; secondly, their nurture and educa- 
tion ; and then let us set forth how noble their actions were, 
and how worthy of the education which they had received. — 
Menexenus, iv. 567. 
Definition needed for knowledge. 

— — Soc. Methought that I too had a dream, and I heard in my 
dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you 
and I and all other things are compounded, have no reason or 
explanation, but are names only, of which not even existence 
or non-existence can be predicated ; you cannot say of them that 
they are or are not, for either of the two implies existence, 
which must not be added on, if one means to speak of this or 
that thing taken by itself alone. You may not say itself, or 
that, or each, or alone, or this, or the like ; for these go about 
everywhere and are applied to all things, and are distinct from 
them ; whereas, if the first elements could be described, and had 
a definition suitable to them, they would be spoken of apart 
from all else. But none of these primeval elements can be de- 
fined ; they can only be named, for they have nothing but a 
name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they 
are complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the 
combination of names is the essence of a proposition. Thus, 
then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and 
cannot be defined or known ; but the combinations or syllables 
of them are known and expressed and apprehended by true 



118 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

opinion. When, therefore, any one forms the true opinion of 
anything without definition, you may say that his mind is truly 
exercised, but has no knowledge ; for he who cannot give and 
receive a definition of a thing, has no knowledge of that thing ; 
but when he adds the definition, then he is perfected in knowl- 
edge, and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was 
that the form in which the dream appeared to you ? 

Theaet. Precisely. 

Soc. And you allow and maintain that true opinion, com- 
bined with definition, is knowledge ? 

Theaet. Exactly. 

Soc. Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that to-day, and in 
this casual manner, we have found a truth which in former 
times many wise men have grown old and have not found ? 

Theaet. At any rate, Socrates, I am satisfied with the pres- 
ent statement. 

Soc. W^hich is probably correct, — for how can there be 
knowledge apart from definition and true opinion ? — Theaet- 
etus, iii. 408. 
Definition, how attained 

Soc. Understand why; — just now the reason is, as I was 

saying, that if you get at the difference and distinguishing 
characteristic of each thing, then, as many persons affirm, you 
will get at the definition or explanation of it ; but while you 
lay hold only of the common and not of the characteristic no- 
tion, you will only have the definition of those things to which 
this common quality belongs. 

Theaet. I understand you, and your account of definition is, 
in my judgment, correct. 

Soc. But he who, having a right opinion about anything, 
can find out the difference which distinguishes it from other 
things, will know that of which before he had only an opinion. 

Theaet. Yes, that is what we are maintaining. 

Soc. Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find my- 
self quite disappointed in the picture, which at a distance was 
not so bad. 

Theaet. What do you mean ? 

Soc. I will endeavor to explain : I will suppose myself to 
have true opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition, 
then I have knowledge, but if not, opinion only. 

Theaet. Yes. 

Soc. The definition was assumed to be the interpretation of 
your difference. — Theaetetus. iii. 417. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 119 

Deluge, tradition and effects of the. 

Ath. Do you believe that there is any truth in ancient 

traditions ? 

Ole. What traditions ? 

Ath. The traditions about the many destructions of mankind 
which have been occasioned by deluges and diseases, and in 
many other ways, and of the preservation of a remnant. 

Ole. Every one is disposed to believe them. 

Ath. Let us imagine one of them : I will take the famous 
one which was caused by a deluge. 

Ole. What is to be remarked in them ? 

Ath. I mean to say that those who then escaped would only 
be hill- shepherds, — small sparks of the human race preserved 
on the tops of mountains. 

Ole. Clearly. 

Ath. Such survivors would necessarily be unacquainted with 
the arts of those who live in cities, and with the various de- 
vices which are suggested to them by interest or ambition, and 
all the wrongs which they contrive against one another ? 

Cle. Very true. 

Ath. Let us suppose, then, that the cities in the plain and 
on the sea-coast were utterly destroyed at that time. 

Ole. Very good. 

Ath. Would not all implements perish and every other ex- 
cellent invention of political or any other sort of wisdom ut- 
terly fail at that time ? 

Ole. Why, yes, my friend ; and if things had always con- 
tinued as they are at present ordered, how could any discovery 
have ever been made even in the least particular? For it is 
evident that the arts were unknown during thousands and 
thousands of years. And no more than a thousand or two 
thousand years have elapsed since the discoveries of Daedalus, 
Orpheus, and Palamades, — since Marsyas and Olympus in- 
vented music, and Amphion the lyre, — not to speak of num- 
berless other inventions which are but of yesterday. — Laws, 
iv. 205. 
Demons, Hesiod's use of the term. 

Soc. I wish that you would consider what is the real 

meaning of this word " demons." I wonder whether you 
would think my view right ? 

Her. Let me hear. 

Soc. You know how Hesiod uses the word? 



120 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Her. Indeed I do not. 

Soc. Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race 

of men who came first? 

Her. Yes, I know that. 

Soc. He says of them, — 

" But now that fate has closed over this race, 
They are holy demons upon the earth, 
Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men." 

Her. What of that? 

Soc. "What of that ! Why, I suppose that he means by the 
golden men, not men literally made of gold, but good and 
noble ; and I am convinced of this, because he further says 
that we are the iron race. 

Her. That is true. 

Soc. And do you not suppose that good men of our own day 
would by him be said to be of that golden race ? 

Her. Very likely. 

Soc. And are not the good wise ? 

Her. Yes, they are wise. 

Soc. And therefore I have the most entire conviction that 
he called them demons, because they were Sa^/xovcs (knowing 
or wise), and in the ancient Attic dialect this is the very form 
of the word. Now he and other poets say truly, that when a 
good man dies he has honor and a mighty portion among the 
dead, and becomes a demon ; which is a name given to him 
signifying wisdom. And I say too that every wise man who 
happens to be a good man is more than human (oatjuovtov) 
both in life and death, and is rightly called a demon. — Cra- 
tylus, i. 636. 
Democracy. 

— ■ — Next comes democracy and the democratical man : the 
origin and nature of them we have still to learn, that we may 
compare the individual and the State, and so pronounce upon 
them. 

That, he said, is our method. 

Well, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy into 
democracy arise ? — Is it not on this wise ? The end which 
such state desires is to become as rich as possible ; and the 
rulers, who are aware that their own power rests upon prop- 
erty, refuse to curtail by law the extravagance of the spend- 
thrift youth because they will gain by their ruin ; they lend 
them money, and buy their land, and grow more wealthy and 
honorable than ever? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 121 

Exactly. 

There can be no doubt that you cannot have in the citizens 
of the same state the love of wealth and the spirit of moder- 
ation ; one or the other will have to be disregarded. 

That is tolerably clear 

Now in this state of things the rulers and their subjects 
come in one another's way, whether on a journey or some other 
occasion of meeting, or on a pilgrimage or a march as fellow- 
soldiers or fellow-sailors ; they observe each other in the mo- 
ment of danger (and where danger is there is no fear that the 
poor will be despised by the rich), and very likely the wiry, 
sunburnt poor man, may be placed in battle at the side of a 
wealthy one who has never spoilt his complexion, and has 
plenty of superfluous flesh — - when he sees such an one puff- 
ing and at his wits'-end, can he avoid drawing the conclusion that 
men like him are only rich because no one has the courage to 
despoil them ? And when they meet in private will not people 
be saying to one another that our " warriors are not good for 
much ? " 

Yes, he said, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking. 

And, as where a body is weak the addition of a touch from 
without may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there 
is no external provocation a commotion may arise within, in 
the same way where there is weakness in the State there is 
also likely to be illness, of which the occasion may be very 
slight, one party introducing their democratical, the other their 
oligarchical allies, and the State falls sick, and is at war with 
herself ; and may be at times distracted, even when there is no 
external cause? 

Yes, surely. 

And then democracy comes into being after the poor have 
conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing 
some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of free- 
dom and power ; and this is the form of government in which 
the magistrates are commonly elected by lot. 

Yes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the 
revolution has been affected by arms or whether fear has 
caused the opposite party to withdraw. 

And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a 
government have they ? For as the government is, such will 
be the man. 

Clearly, he said. 



122 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

In the first place, are they not free ? and the city is full of 
freedom and frankness — a man may do as he likes. 

They say so, he replied. 

And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to or- 
der his own life as he pleases ? 

Clearly. 

Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety 
of human natures ? 

There will. 

This, then, is likely to be the fairest of States ; and will appear 
the fairest, being spangled with the manners and characters of 
mankind like an embroidered robe which is spangled with 
every sort of flowers. And just as women and children think 
variety charming, so there are many men who will deem this 
to be the fairest of States. 

Yes. 

Yes, my good sir, and there will be no better in which to 
look for a government. 

Why? 

Because of the liberty which reigns there : they have a 
complete assortment of constitutions : and he who has a mind 
to establish a State, as we have been doing, must go to a de- 
mocracy as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them, and 
pick out one that suits him ; then when he has made his choice, 
he may found his State. 

He will be sure to have patterns enough. 

And there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in 
this State, even if you have the capacity, or to be governed 
unless you like, or to go to war when the others go to war, or 
to be at peace when others are at peace, unless you are dis- 
posed — there being no necessity also because some law forbids 
you to hold office or be a dicast, that you should not hold office 
or be a dicast, if you take a fancy — is not that a way of life 
which for the moment is supremely delightful ? 

For the moment, yes. 

And is not their humanity to the condemned often charm- 
ing? Under such a government there are men who, when 
they have been sentenced to death or exile, stay where they 
are and walk about the world ; the gentleman parades like a 
hero, as though nobody saw or cared. 

Yes, he replied, many and many a one. 

See too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 123 

" don't care " about trifles, and the disregard which she shows 
of all the fine principles which we were solemnly affirming at the 
foundation of the city — as when we said that, except in the 
case of some rare natures, never will there be a good man who 
in his early youth has not made things of beauty a delight and 
a study — how grandly does she trample our words under her 
feet, never giving a thought to the pursuits which make a 
statesman, and promoting to honor any one who professes to 
be the people's friend. 

Yes, she is of a noble spirit. 

These and other kindred characteristics are proper to de- 
mocracy, which is a charming form of government, full of 
variety and disorder, and dispensing equality to equals and un- 
equals alike. — The Republic, ii. 382. 
Despot. See King, 
Dialectic, what is it ? 
Pro. What is dialectic ? 

Soc. Clearly the science which knows all that knowledge of 
which we are now speaking ; for I am sure that all men who 
have a grain of intelligence will admit that the knowledge 
which has to do with being and reality, and sameness and un- 
changeableness, is by far the truest of all. And would you, 
Protarchus, say or decide otherwise? 

Pro. I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that 
the art of persuasion far surpassed every other ; this, as he 
says, is by far the best of them all, for to it all things submit, 
not by compulsion, but of their own free will. — Philebus, iii* 
198. 

Dialectic, power of. See Science, etc. 
Dialectical skill of Socrates. 

Nic. You do not seem to be aware that any one who has 

an intellectual affinity to Socrates, and enters into conversation 
with him, is liable to be drawn into an argument; and whatever 
subject he may start will be continually carried round and 
round by him, until at last he finds that he has to give an ac- 
count both of his present and past life ; and when he is once 
entangled, Socrates will not let him go until he has completely 
and thoroughly sifted him. Now I am used to his ways ; and 
I know that he will certainly do as I say and also that I my- 
self will be the sufferer ; for I am fond of his conversation, 
Lysimachus. Neither do I think that there is any harm in 
being reminded of the evil which we are, or have been doing: 



124 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

he who does not fly from reproof will be sure to take more 
heed of his after life ; as Solon says, he will wish and desire 
to be learning so long as he lives, and will not think that old 
age of itself brings wisdom. To me, to be cross-examined by 
Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant ; indeed, I knew all 
along that where Socrates was, the argument would soon pass 
from our sons to ourselves ; and therefore, as I say, that for 
my part, I am quite willing to discourse with Socrates in his 
own manner ; but you had better ask our friend Laches what 
his feeling may be. 

La. I have but one feeling, Nicias, or (shall I say?) two 
feelings about discussions. Some would think that I am a 
lover, and to others I may seem to be a hater of discourse ; 
for when I hear a man discoursing of virtue, or of any sort of 
wisdom, who is a true man and worthy of his theme, I am 
delighted beyond measure : and I compare the man and his 
words, and note the harmony and correspondence of them. — 
Laches, i. 80. 

Dialecticians and Rhetoric. See Rhetoric. 
Dialectic progress. 

But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and 

take a reason will have the knowledge which we require of 
them ? 

Neither can this be said any more than the other. 

And so, Glaucon, we have at last arrived at dialectic. This 
is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which the 
faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate ; for 
sight, as you may remember, was finally imagined by us to 
behold real animals and the stars, and last of all the sun him- 
self ; and so with dialectic ; when a person starts on the discov- 
ery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without 
any assistance of sense, if he perseveres by pure intelligence, 
he attains at last to the idea of good, and finds himself at the 
end of the intellectual world, as in the other case at the end of 
the visible. 

Exactly, he said. 

Then this is the progress which you call dialectic ? 

True. — The Republic, ii. 359. 
Differences as to right opinion. 

Soc. Then right opinion implies the perception of differ* 

ences ? 

TheaeL Clearly. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 125 

Soc. What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explana- 
tion to right opinion ? If the meaning is that we should form 
an opinion of the way in which something differs from another 
thing, the proposal is ridiculous. 

Theaet. How so ? 

Soc. We are required to have a right opinion of the differ- 
ences which distinguish one thing from another when we have 
already a right opinion of them, and so we go round and 
round ; the revolution of the scytal, or pestle, or any other 
rotatory engine, in the same circles, is as nothing compared to 
our mode of proceeding; and we may be truly described as 
the blind directing the blind ; for to add those things which we 
already have, in order that we may learn what we already 
think, implies a depth of darkness. 

Theaet Tell me, then; what were you going to say just 
now, when you asked the question ? 

Soc. If, my boy, the argument, when speaking of adding 
the definition, had used the word to " know," and not merely 
" have an opinion " of the difference, this which is the most 
promising of all the definitions of knowledge would have come 
to a pretty end, for to know is surely to get knowledge. — 
Theaetetus, iii. 418. 
Discord and war. 

There is a difference in the names " discord " and " war," 

and I imagine there is also a difference in their natures ; the 
one is expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of 
what is external and foreign ; and the first of the two is prop- 
erly termed discord, and only the second, war. 

That is a very just distinction, he replied. 

Shall I further add that the Hellenic race is all united to- 
gether by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and strange 
to the barbarians ? 

Very good, he said. 

And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and bar- 
barians with Hellenes, they will be described by us as being at 
war when they fight, and by nature enemies, and this kind of 
antagonism should be called war ; but when Hellenes fight with 
one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a state of dis- 
order and discord, and such enmity is to be called discord, they 
being by nature friends. 

I agree. 

Consider then, I said, when that which is now acknowledged 



126 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

by us to be discord occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties 
destroy the lands and burn the houses of one another, how 
wicked does the strife appear, — how can either of them be a 
lover of his country ? for no true lover of his country would 
tear in pieces his nurse and mother ; there might be reason in 
the conqueror depriving the conquered of their harvest, but still 
they would have the idea of peace in their hearts, and not go 
on fighting forever. 

Yes, he said, a better temper than the other. 

And when you found a State, will it not be an Hellenic 
State ? 

It ought to be, he replied. 

Then will not the citizens be good and civilized ? 

To be sure. 

And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas 
as their own land, and share in the common temples ? 

Most certainly. 

And any difference that arises among Hellenes will be re- 
garded by them as discord only, — a quarrel among friends, 
which is not to be called a war ? 

Certainly not. — The Republic, ii. 297. 
Discord and disease. 
Str. In the soul there are two kinds of evil. 

Theaet. What are they ? 

Str. The one may be compared to disease in the body, the 
other to deformity. 

Theaet. I do not understand. 

Str. Perhaps you have never reflected that disease and dis- 
cord are the same. 

Theaet. To this, again, I know not what I should reply. 

Str. Do you not conceive discord to be a dissolution of 
kindred elements originating in some disagreement ? 

Theaet. Just that. 

Str. And is deformity anything but the want of measure, 
which is always unsightly ? 

Theaet. Exactly. 

Str. And do we not see that opinion is opposed to desire, 
pleasure to anger, reason to pain, and that all similar elements 
are opposed to one another in the souls of bad men ? 

Theaet. Certainly. 

Str. And yet they must all be akin ? 

Theaet. Of course. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 127 

Str. Then we shall be right in calling vice a discord and 
disease of the soul ? Most true. — Sophist, iii. 462. 
Discourse, Khetoric the art of. See RJietoric. 
Discourses, long or short. 

Str. I would like to observe that you and I, remembering 

what has been said, would praise or blame the shortness of dis- 
cussions, not by comparing them with one another, but accord- 
ing to a standard of measure, having in view what is fitting, 
which as we were saying, must be borne in mind. 

Y. Soc. Very true. 

Str. And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a 
view to what is fitting in all respects ; for we do not want such 
a length as is suited to give pleasure — which is quite a sec- 
ondary matter ; and reason tells us that we should be contented 
to make the ease or rapidity with which an inquiry is attained, 
not the first but the second object ; the first and highest of all 
being to assert the great method of division according to species, 
— whether the discourse be shorter or longer is not to the point. 
No offense should be taken at length, but the longer and shorter 
are to be employed indifferently, according as either of them is 
better calculated to sharpen the wits of the auditors. Reason 
would also say to him who censures the length of discourses 
and cannot away with their circumlocution, that he should not 
at once lay them aside or censure them as tedious, but he 
should prove that if they had been shorter they would have 
made those who took part in them better dialecticians, and 
more capable of expressing the truth of things, — about any 
other praise and blame, he need not trouble himself ; he need 
not be supposed to hear them. — Statesman, iii. 571. 
Diseases, cures of, why unknown. 
Diseases. See Cures, etc. 
Diseases, how origin ating. 

— Now every one can see whence diseases arise. There are 

four natures out of which the body is compacted — earth and 
fire and water and air, and the unnatural excess and defect 
of these, or the change of any one of them from their own 
natural place into another (for there are more kinds than one), 
and the assumption of that which does not belong to them, or 
any similar irregularity, produces diseases and disorders ; for 
each being produced or changed in a manner contrary to 
nature, the elements which were previously cool grow warm, 
and those which were dry become moist, and the light becomes 



128 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

heavy, and the heavy light ; all sorts of changes occur. For 
we affirm that only the same, in the same and like manner and 
proportion added or subtracted to or from the same, will allow 
the body to remain in the same state, whole and sound, and 
that whatever comes or goes away in violation of these rules 
causes all manner of changes and infinite diseases and disorders. 

— Timaeus, ii. 572. 
Disorders and excesses. 

— Gle. The probability is that ignorance will be a more preva- 
lent disorder among kings, because they lead a proud and lux- 
urious life. 

Ath. Is it not palpable that the kings of that time were guilty 
of trying to be above the established laws, and that they did not 
consistently observe what they had agreed to observe by word 
and oath ? This inconsistency of theirs may have had the ap- 
pearance of wisdom, but was really, as we assert, the greatest 
ignorance, and utterly overthrew the whole empire through 
fatal error and perversity. 

Gle. Very likely. 

Ath, Good ; and what ought the then legislator to have done 
in order to avert this calamity ? Truly there is no great wis- 
dom in knowing, and no great difficulty in telling, after the evil 
has happened ; but to have foreseen the remedy at the time 
would have taken a much wiser head than ours. 

Meg. What do you mean ? 

Ath. Any one who looks at what has occurred with you, Me- 
gillus, may easily know and may easily say what ought to have 
been done at that time. 

Meg. Speak a little more clearly. 

Ath. Nothing can be clearer than the observation which I 
am about to make. 

Meg. What is it ? 

Ath. That if any one gives too great a power to anything, 
too large a sail to a vessel, too much food to the body, too much 
authority to the mind, and is regardless of the mean, everything 
is overthrown, and, in the wantonness of excess, runs in the 
one case to disorder, and in the other to injustice, which is the 
child of excess. I mean to say, my dear friends, that there is 
no soul of man, young and irresponsible, who will be able to 
sustain the temptation of arbitrary power — no one who will 
not, under such circumstances, become filled with folly f that 
worst of diseases, and be hated by his nearest and dearest 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 129 

friends : when this happens his kingdom is undermined, and all 
his power vanishes from him. And great legislators who know 
the mean should take heed of the danger. — Laws, iv. 220. 
Disorders of the soul. See Mind. 
Disputers, self-wise. 

1 was led on by you to say more than I had intended ; 

but the point of comparison was, that when a simple man who 
has no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which 
he afterward imagines to be false, whether really false or not, 
and then another and another, he has no longer any faith left. 
and great disputers, as you know, come to think at last that 
they have grown to be the wisest of mankind ; for they alone 
perceive the utter unsoundness and instability of all arguments, 
or indeed, of all things, which, like the currents in the Euripus, 
are going up and down in never-ceasing ebb and flow. 

That is quite true, I said. 

Yes, Phaedo, he replied, and very melancholy too, if there 
be such a thing as truth or certainty or possibility of knowledge, 
that a man should have lighted upon some argument or other 
which at first seemed true and then turned out to be false, and 
instead of blaming himself and his own want of wit, because he 
is annoyed, should at last be too glad to transfer the blame 
from himself to arguments in general ; and forever afterwards 
should hate and revile them, and lose truth and the knowledge 
of realities. — Phaedo, i. 419. 
Dissembler, the. 

Str. Let us, then, examine our imitator of appearance, 

and see whether he is all of a piece, or whether there is any 
cleft in him. 

Theaet. Let us examine him. 

Str. Indeed, there is a very considerable cleft in him ; for if 
you unfold him you find that one of the two classes of imitators 
is a simple being, who thinks that he knows that which he only 
fancies ; the other sort has knocked about among arguments, 
until he suspects and fears that he is ignorant of that which to 
the many he pretends to know. 

Theaet. There are certainly the two kinds which you describe. 

Str. Shall we regard one as the simple imitator — the other 
as the dissembling or ironical imitator ? 

Theaet. That is good. 

Str. And shall we further speak of this latter class as having 

one or two members ? 
9 



130 PLATO* S BEST THOUGHTS. 

TJieaet. Answer yourself. 

Str. Upon consideration, then, there appear to me to be two ; 
there is the dissembler, who harangues a multitude in public in 
a long speech, and the dissembler, who in private and in short 
speeches compels the person who is conversing with him to con- 
tradict himself. 

Theaet. What you say is most true. 

Str. And who is the maker of the long speeches ? Is he the 
statesman or the public orator? 

Theaet The latter. 

Str. And what shall we call the other ? Is he the philoso- 
pher or the Sophist ? 

Theaet. The philosopher he cannot be, for upon our view he 
is ignorant ; but since he is an imitator of the wise he will have 
a name which is formed by an adaptation of the word croc£o$. 
What shall we name him? I am pretty sure that I cannot be 
mistaken in terming him the true and very Sophist. 

Str. Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a 
chain from one end to the other ? 

Theaet. By all means. 

Str. He, then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows : 
He who, belonging to the conscious or dissembling section of 
the art of making contradictions, is an imitator of appearance 
and has divided off from the art of image-making which is a 
branch of phantastic, that further division of creative art, the 
juggling of words, a creation human, and not divine — any one 
who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood and lineage 
will say the very truth. 

Theaet. Undoubtedly. — Sophist, iii. 509. 
Diversities of opinion. 

Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception of 

these subtleties and excellent devices of wisdom ; I am afraid 
that I hardly understand them, and you must forgive me there- 
fore if I ask a very stupid question : if there be no falsehood 
or false opinion or ignorance, there can be no such thing as 
erroneous action, for a man cannot fail of acting as he is acting 
— that is what you mean ? 

Yes, he replied. 

And now, I said, I will ask my stupid question : If there is 
no such thing as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in 
the name of goodness, do you come hither to teach ? And were 
you not just now saying that you could teach virtue, best of all 
men, to any one who could learn ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 131 

And are you such an old fool, Socrates, rejoined Dionyso- 
dorus, that you bring up now what I said at first — and if I 
had said anything last year, I suppose that you would bring 
that up — but are nonplussed at the words I have just ut- 
tered ? 

Why, I said, they are not easy to answer ; for they are the 
words of wise men : and indeed I know not what to make of 
this word " nonplussed " which you used last. What do you 
mean by that, Dionysodorus ? You must mean that I cannot 
refute your argument. Tell me if the words have any other 
sense. 

Certainly, he said ; that is my meaning ; and I wish that you 
would answer. 

What, before you, Dionysodorus ? I said. 

Answer, said he. 

And is that fair? 

Yes, quite fair, he said. 

Upon what principle ? I said. I can only suppose that you 
are a very wise man, who comes to us in the character of a 
great logician, and who knows when to answer and when not 
to answer — and now you will not open your mouth at all, be- 
cause you know that you ought not. 

You prate, he said, instead of answering. But if, my good 
sir, you admit that I am wise, answer as I tell you. 

I suppose that I must obey, for you are master. Put the 
question. 

Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless ? 

They are alive. 

And do you know of any word which is alive ? 

I cannot say that I do. 

They why did you ask me what sense my words had ? 

Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, 
perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words have a 
sense ; what do you say, wise man ? If I was not in error, 
you will not refute me, and all your wisdom will be non- 
plussed ; but if I did fall into error, then again you are wrong 
in saying that there is no error, — and this remark was made 
by you not quite a year ago. I am inclined to think, however, 
Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that this argument is not very 
likely to advance ; even your skill in the subtleties of logic, 
which is really amazing, has not found out the way of throw- 
ing another and not falling yourself. — Euthydemus, i. 190. 



132 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Diversities of pleasure. 

Soc. The awe which I feel, Protarchus, about the names 

of the Gods is more than human, and now I would not sin 
against Aphrodite by naming her amiss ; of her, then, I say 
nothing. But I will begin with Pleasure which I know to be 
diverse, and will consider and ask what her nature is. She 
has one name and therefore you will imagine that she is one, 
and yet surely she takes the most various and even unlike 
forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, 
and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance, 
and that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies 
and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom ; 
and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these 
opposite pleasures are severally alike. 

Pro. Why, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they 
spring from opposite causes, but they are not in themselves op- 
posite, for must not pleasure be of all things most absolutely 
like pleasure, — that is, like itself ? 

Soc. Yes, my good friend, just as color is like color ; in so 
far as they are colors, there is no difference between them ; 
and yet we all know that black is not only unlike, but even 
absolutely opposed to white ; or again, as figure is like figure, 
for they are all comprehended under one class ; and yet some 
figures are absolutely opposed to one another, and there is an 
infinite diversity of them. And we might find similar examples 
in many other things ; therefore do not rely upon this argu- 
ment, which would go to prove the unity of the most extreme 
opposites. And I suspect that we shall find a similar opposi- 
tion among pleasures. 

Pro. Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argu- 
ment? 

Soc. Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you ap- 
ply to them a new predicate, for you say that all pleasant 
things are good ; now although no one can argue that pleasure 
is not pleasure, he may argue, as we are doing, that pleas- 
ures are oftener bad than good ; but you call them all good (he 
would say), and at the same time are compelled, if you are 
pressed, to acknowledge that they are unlike. And he will 
want to know what is that identical quality existing alike in 
good and bad pleasures, which makes you designate all of them 
as good. 

Pro, What do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that any 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 133 

one who asserts pleasure to be the good, will even tolerate the 
notion that some pleasures are good and some bad ? 

Soc. And yet you will acknowledge that they are different 
from one another, and even opposite to one another ? 

Pro. Not in so far as they are pleasures. 

Soc. That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so 
we are to say (are we) that there is no difference in pleasures, 
but that they are all alike ; and the examples which have just 
been cited do not pierce our dull minds, but we go on argu- 
ing all the same, like the weakest and most inexperienced rea- 
soners ? 

Pro. What do you mean ? ' 

Soc. Why, I mean to say, that in self-defense I may, if I like, 
follow your example, and assert boldly that the two things 
most unlike are most absolutely alike, and the result will be 
that you and I will prove ourselves to be very tyros in the art 
of disputing ; and the argument will be blown away and lost. 
— Philehus, iii. 146. 
Divination, the work of. 

Furthermore all sacrifices and the whole province of 

divination, which is the art of communion between Gods and 
men, — these, I say, are concerned only with the preservation 
of the good and the cure of the evil love. For all impiety is 
likely to ensue if, instead of accepting and honoring and rever- 
encing the harmonious love in all his actions, a man honors the 
other love, whether in his feelings towards Gods or parents, 
towards the living or the dead. Wherefore the business of di- 
vination is to see to these loves and to heal them, and divination 
is the peacemaker of Gods and men working by a knowledge 
of the religious or irreligious tendencies which exist in human 
loves. — The Symposium, i. 482, 
Divine power of the poet. 

I am conscious in my own self and the general opinion is 

that I do not speak better and have more to say about Homer 
than any other man. But I do not speak equally well about 
others — tell me the reason of this ? 

Soc. I perceive, Ion ; and I will proceed to explain to you 
what I imagine to be the reason of this. The gift which you 
possess of speaking excellently about Homer is not an art, 
but, as I was just saying, an inspiration ; there is a divinity 
moving you, like that in the stone which Euripides calls a mag- 
net, but which is commonly known as the stone of Heraclea. 



134 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

For that stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to 
them a similar power of attracting other rings ; and sometimes 
you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended 
from one another so as to form quite a long chain ; and all of 
them derive their power of suspension from the original stone. 
Now this is like the Muse, who first of all inspires men her- 
self ; and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons 
is suspended, who take the inspiration from them. For all 
good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems 
not as works of art, but because they are inspired and pos- 
sessed. And as the Corybantian revelers when they dance are 
not in their right mind, so the lyric poets are not in their right 
mind when they are composing their beautifnl strains ; but 
when falling under the power of music and metre they are in- 
spired and possessed ; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk 
and honey from the rivers, when they are under the influence 
of Dionysus, but not when they are in their right mind. And 
the soul of the lyric poet does the same, as they themselves 
tell us ; for they tell us that they bring songs from honeyed 
fountains, culling them out of the gardens and dells of the 
Muses ; whither, like the bees, they wing their way. And 
this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, 
and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and 
is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him ; when he 
has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to 
utter his oracles. Many are the noble words in which poets 
speak of the actions which they record, like your own words 
about Homer ; but they do not speak of them by any rules of 
art ; they are inspired to utter that to which the Muse impels 
them, and that only ; and when inspired, one of them will make 
dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another choral strains, 
another epic or iambic verses — and he who is good at one is 
not good at any other kind of verse ; for not by art does the poet 
sing, but by power divine. Had he learned by rules of art, he 
would have known how to speak, not of one theme only, but of 
all ; and therefore God takes away the minds of poets, and uses 
them as his ministers, as he also uses diviners and holy prophets, 
in order that we who hear them may know that they speak not 
of themselves who utter these priceless words in a state of un- 
consciousness, but that God is the speaker, and that through 
them he is conversing with us. And Tynnichus the Chalcidian 
affords a striking instance of what I am saying; he wrote 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 135 

nothing that any one would care to remember but the famous 
paean which is in every one's mouth, and is one of the finest 
poems ever written, and truly an invention of the Muses, as he 
himself says. For in this way the God would seem to indi- 
cate to us and not allow us to doubt that these beautiful poems 
are not human or the work of man, but divine and the work of 
God; and that the poets are only the interpreters of the Gods 
by whom they are severally possessed. Was not this the les- 
son which the God intended to teach when by the mouth of 
the worst of poets he sang the best of songs? Am I not 
right, Ion ? 

Ion. Yes, indeed, Socrates, I feel that you are ; for your 
words touch my soul, and I am persuaded somehow that good 
poets are the inspired interpreters of the Gods. — Ion, i. 223. 
Divine mind, good in the. See Mind. 
Divine, the soul resembling the. 

When the soul and the body are united, then nature or- 
ders the soul to rule and govern, and the body to obey and 
serve. Now which of these two functions is akin to the di- 
vine ? and which to the mortal ? Does not the divine appear 
to you to be that which naturally orders and rules, and the 
mortal to be that which is subject and servant ? 

True. 

And which does the soul resemble ? 

The soul resembles the divine, and the body the mortal, — 
there can be no doubt of that, Socrates. 

Then reflect, Cebes : of all that has been said is not this 
the conclusion, — that the soul is in the very likeness of the 
divine and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indis- 
soluble, and unchangeable ; and that the body is in the very 
likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual and mul- 
tiform, and dissoluble, and changeable. — Pkaedo, i. 408. 
Divine nature of generation and conception. See Conception, 
Divine madness. See Madness, etc.* 
Divine, Statesman called. See Statesman. 
Divine things only unchangeable. 

Only the most divine things of all are unchangeable, and 

body is not included in this class. Heaven and the universe, 
as we have termed them, although they have been endowed by 
the Creator with many glories, partake of a bodily nature, and 
therefore cannot be entirely free from perturbations. But the 
heavenly motion is, as far as possible, single and in the same 



136 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 

place, and in relation to the same ; and is therefore only sub- 
ject to a reversal, which is the least alteration possible. For 
the lord of all moving things is alone able to move of himself; 
and to think that he can go at one time in one direction and at 
another time in another, is unlawful. Hence we must not say 
that the world is either self- moved always, or all made to go 
round by God in two opposite courses ; or that two Gods, hav- 
ing opposite purposes, make it move round. But as I have al- 
ready said (and this is the only remaining alternative) the 
world is governed by an accompanying divine power, and re- 
ceives life and immortality by the appointment of the Creator, 
and then, when let go again, moves spontaneously, being let go 
at such a time as to have, during infinite cycles of years, a re- 
verse movement : this is due to exquisite perfection of balance, 
and the size of the universe, which is the greatest of bodies, 
and turns on the smallest pivot. — Statesman, iii. 554. 
Divine bonds in the State. 

Str. Can we say that such a connection as this will last- 
ingly unite the evil with one another or with the good, or 
that there is any science which would seriously think of using 
a bond of this kind to join such materials ? 

Y. Soc. Impossible. 

Str. But in those which were originally noble natures, and 
have been trained accordingly, in those only may we not say 
that the bond of union is implanted by law, and that this is 
the medicine which art prescribes for them, and the divine 
bond, which, as I was saying, heals and unites dissimilar and 
contrary parts of virtue ? 

Y. Soc. Very true. 

Str. Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in 
imagining, or when you have imagined, in creating the other 
human bonds. 

Y. Soc. How is that, and of what bonds do you speak ? 

Str. Those of intermarriage, and those which are formed 
between States by giving and taking children in marriage, as 
well as by private betrothals and espousals. For many per- 
sons form unions of an improper kind, with a view to the pro- 
creation of children. 

Y. Soc. In what way ? 

Str. They seek after wealth and power, which in matrimony 
are objects not worthy even of a serious censure. 

Y. Soc. There is no need to consider them at all 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 137 

Str. It was of these bonds I said that there would be no dif- 
ficulty in creating them, if only both classes originally held the 
same opinion about the honorable and the good ; indeed, in this 
single word, the whole process of royal weaving is comprised — 
never to allow temperate natures to be separated from the 
brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and the woof, 
by common sentiments and honors and opinions, and by the giv- 
ing of pledges to one another ; and out of them forming one 
smooth and even web, to intrust them to the offices of state. — 
Statesman, iii. 597. 

Divining of truth instinctive. See Instinctive. 
Doctors and patients. 

Ath. Of doctors, as you doubtless know, there are two 

kinds, a gentler and a ruder, and two modes of cure ; and as 
children ask the doctor to be gentle with them, so we will ask 
the legislator to cure our disorders with the gentlest remedies. 
What I mean to say is, that besides doctors, there are their 
assistants,, who are also styled doctors. 

Cle. Very true. 

Ath. And whether they are slaves or freemen makes no dif- 
ference ; they acquire their knowledge of medicine by obeying 
and observing their masters, empirically and not rationally, 
as the manner of freemen is, who have learned scientifically 
themselves the art which they impart to their pupils. You are 
aware that there are these two classes of doctors ? 

Cle. To be sure. 

Ath. And did you ever observe that there are two classes 
of patients in States, slaves and freemen ; and the slave doctors 
run about and cure the slaves, and wait for them in the dispen- 
saries — practitioners of this sort never talk to their patients 
individually, or let them talk about their own individual com- 
plaints ? The doctor prescribes what he thinks good, out of 
th.e abundance of his experience, as if he had no manner of 
doubt ; and when he has given his orders, like a tyrant, he 
rushes off with equal assurance to some other servant who is 
ill ; and so he relieves the master of the house of the care of 
his invalid slaves. But the other doctor, who is a freeman, at- 
tends and practices upon freemen ; and he carries his inquiries 
far back, and goes into the nature of the disorder ; he enters 
into discourse with the patient and with his friends, and is at 
once getting information from the sick man, and also instruct- 
ing him as far as he is able, and he will not prescribe for him 



138 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

until he has first convinced him ; at last, when he has brought 
the patient more and more under his persuasive influences and 
set him on the road to health, he attempts to effect a cure. 
Now, which is the better way of proceeding in a physician and 
in a trainer ? Is he the better who accomplishes his ends in a 
double way, or he who works in one way, and that the ruder 
and inferior ? 

Cle. I should say, Stranger, that the double way is far bet- 
ter. — Laws, iv. 247. 
Dog, — a true philosopher. 

The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also 

seen in the dog, and is remarkable in an animal. 

What trait ? 

Why a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry ; when an 
acquaintance, he welcomes him, although the one has never 
done him any harm, nor the other any good. Did this never 
strike you as curious ? 

I never before thought of it, though I quite recognize the 
truth of your remark. 

And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming, — ■ 
your dog is a true philosopher. 

Why? 

Why, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of 
an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. 
And must not the creature be fond of learning who deter- 
mines what is friendly and what is unfriendly by the test of 
knowledge and ignorance ? — The Republic, ii. 198. 
Dorian kings, the cause of their ruin. 

I remember, and you will remember what I said at first, 

that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain laws with a 
view to wisdom ; whereas you were arguing that the good law- 
giver ought to order all with a view to war. And to this I 
replied that there were four virtues, whereas your regards were 
fixed on one of the four only ; but that you ought to regard 
all virtue, and especially that which comes first, and is the guide 
of all the rest — I mean wisdom and mind and opinion, united 
with the affection and desire which waits upon them. And 
now the argument returns to the same point, and I say once 
more, in jest if you like, or in earnest if you like, that the 
prayer of a fool is full of danger, being likely to end in the 
opposite of what he desires. And if you would rather receive 
my words in earnest, I am willing that you should ; and you 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 139 

will find, as I have said already, that not cowardice was the 
cause of the ruin of the Dorian kings and of their whole de- 
sign, nor ignorance of military matters, either on the part of 
the rulers or of their subjects ; but the cause was the corrupt- 
ing influence of the other vices, and especially their ignorance 
of the most important human affairs. — Laws, iv. 217. 
Dreams, sleep free from fanciful. 

■ Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites are 

deemed to be unlawful ; every one appears to have them, but 
in some persons they are controlled by the laws and by rea- 
son, and the better desires prevail over them, — either they are 
wholly banished or they are few and weak ; while in the case 
of others they are stronger, and there are more of them. 

Which appetites do you mean ? 

I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and hu- 
man and ruling power is asleep ; when the wild beast in our 
nature, gorged with meat or drink, starts up and leaps about, 
and seeks to go and satisfy his desires, there is no conceivable 
folly or crime, however shameless or unnatural — not except- 
ing incest or parricide, or the eating of forbidden food — of 
which at such a time, you know, a man may not believe him- 
self to be capable. 

Most true, he said. 

But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when 
before going to sleep he has awakened his rational powers and 
fed them on noble thoughts and inquiries, collecting himself in 
meditation after having first indulged his appetites neither too 
much nor too little, but just enough to lay them to sleep, and 
prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from interfering 
with the higher principle — which he leaves in the solitude of 
pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the knowl- 
edge of the unknown, whether in past, present, or future : 
when again he has allayed the passionate element, if he has 
a quarrel against any one — I say, when, after pacifying the 
two irrational principles, he rouses up the third, which is reason, 
before he takes his rest, then, as you know, he attains truth 
most nearly, and is least likely to be the sport of fanciful and 
lawless visions. — The Republic, ii. 400. 
Drinking wine condemned. See Wine forbidden. 
Drunkenness condemned in Sparta. 

Meg. The laws of Sparta, in as far as they relate to pleasure, 

appear to me to be the best in the world ; for that which leads 



140 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

mankind in general into the wildest pleasure and license, and 
every other folly, the law has clean driven out ; and neither in 
the country nor in towns which are under the control of Sparta, 
will you find revelries and the many incitements of every kind 
of pleasure which accompany them, and any one who meets a 
drunken and disorderly person will immediately have him 
most severely punished, and will not let him off on any pre- 
tense, not even at the time of a Dionysiac festival ; although I 
have remarked that this may happen at your performances " on 
the cart/' as they are called ; and among our Tarentine colo- 
nists I have seen the whole city drunk at a Dionysiac festival ; 
but nothing of that sort happens among us. 

Ath. Lacedaemonian Stranger, these festivities are praise- 
worthy where there is a spirit of endurance, but are very 
senseless when they are under no regulations. In order to re- 
taliate, an Athenian has only to point out the license which 
exists among your women. To all such accusations, whether 
they are brought against the Tarentines, or us, or you, there is 
one answer which exonerates the practice in question from im- 
propriety. When a stranger expresses wonder at the singular- 
ity of what he sees, any inhabitant will naturally answer him : 
Wonder not, O stranger ; this is our custom, and you may very 
likely have some other custom about the same things. Now 
we are speaking, my friends, not about men in general, but 
about the merits and defects of the lawgivers themselves. Let 
us then discourse a little more at length about them, and about 
the nature of intoxication at large, which is a very important 
matter, and will seriously task the discrimination of the legis- 
lator. I am not talking of the mere practice of drinking or 
not drinking wine in general, but about downright intoxica- 
tion : are we to follow the custom of the Scythians, and Per- 
sians, and Carthaginians, and Celts, and Iberians, who are all 
warlike nations, or that of your countrymen who, as you say, 
wholly abstain ? Whereas the Scythians and Thracians, both 
men and women, drink unmixed wine, which they also jDOur on 
their garments, and this they think a happy and glorious insti- 
tution. The Persians, again, are much given to other practices 
of luxury which you reject, but they have more moderation in 
them than the Thracians and Scythians. — Laws, iv. 167. 
Dualism. 

You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling 

powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 141 

the other over the visible. I do not say heaven, lest you 
should fancy that I am playing upon the name (ovpavo^ oparos). 
May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and 
intelligible fixed in your mind ? 

I have. 

Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, 
and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and sup- 
pose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and 
the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions 
as to their relative clearness and want of clearness, and you 
will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible con- 
sists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, 
shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in 
solid, smooth, and polished bodies, and the like : do you under- 
stand ? 

Yes, I understand. 

Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the 
resemblance, to include ourselves and the animals, and every- 
thing in nature and everything in art. 

Yery good. 

Would you not admit that this latter section has a different 
degree of truth, and that the copy is to the object which is 
copied as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge ? 

Most undoubtedly. 

Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of 
the intellectual is to be divided. 

In what manner ? 

As thus : there are two subdivisions, in the lower of which 
the soul uses the figures given by the former divisions as im- 
ages ; the inquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of go- 
ing upwards to a principle, descends to the other end ; in the 
higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes 
up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of 
images, as in the former case, but proceeding only in and by 
the ideas themselves. — The Republic, ii. 337. 
Duty, questions of. 

Soc. Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do 

wrong, or that in one way we ought and in another way we 
ought not to do wrong, or is doing wrong always evil and dis- 
honorable, as I was just now saying, and as has been already 
acknowledged by us ? Are all our former admissions which 
were made within a few days to be thrown away ? And have 



142 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

we, at our age, been earnestly discoursing with one another all 
our life long only to discover that we are no better than chil- 
dren ? Or, in spite of the opinion of the many, and in spite of 
consequences, whether better or worse, shall we insist on the 
truth of what was then said, that injustice is always an evil 
and dishonor to him who acts unjustly ? Shall we say so or 
not? 

Or. Yes. 

Soc. Then we must do no wrong? 

Or. Certainly not. 

Soc. Nor when injured injure in return, as the many imag- 
ine ; for we must injure no one at all ? 

Or. Clearly not. 

Soc. Again, Crito, may we do evil ? 

Or. Surely not, Socrates. 

Soc. And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the 
morality of the many — is that just or not ? 

Or. Not just. 

Soc. For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him ? 

Or. Very true. 

Soc. Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil 
to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. 
But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you really 
mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been 
held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of 
persons ; and those who are agreed and those who are not 
agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only 
despise one another when they see how widely they differ. 
Tell me, then, whether you agree with and assent to my first 
principle, that neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off 
evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premise of 
our argument ? Or do you decline and dissent from this ? 
For thus have I ever thought and still think ; but, if .you are of 
another opinion, let me hear what you have you to say. — 
Crito, i. 353. 

Earth, the rotundity of the. 

I may describe to you, however, the form and regions of 

the earth according to my conception of them. 

That, said Simmias, will be enough. 

Well then, he said, my conviction is, that the earth is a 
round body in the centre of the heavens, and therefore has no 
need of air or any similar force as a support, but is kept there 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 143 

and hindered from falling or inclining any way by the equabil- 
ity of the surrounding heaven and by her own equipoise. For 
that which, being in equipoise, is in the centre of that which is 
equably diffused, will not incline any way in any degree, but 
will always remain in the same state and not deviate. 1 — 
Phaedo, i. 439. 

Earth, likeness of the. See Animals , etc. 
Earth, heavenly idea of. 

For I should say that in all parts of the earth there are 

hollows of various forms and sizes, into which the water and 
the mist and the lower air collect ; and that the true earth is 
pure and in the pure heaven, in which also are the stars — that 
is the heaven which is commonly spoken of as the ether, of 
which this is but the sediment gathering in the hollows of the 
earth. But we who live in these hollows are deceived into the 
notion that we are dwelling above on the surface of the earth ; 
which is just as if a creature who was at the bottom of the sea 
were to fancy that he was on the surface of the water, and 
that the sea was the heaven through which he saw the sun and 
the other stars, — he having never come to the surface by 
reason of his feebleness and sluggishness, and having never 
lifted up his head and seen, nor ever heard from one who had 
seen, how much purer and fairer the world above is than his own. 
And such is exactly our case ; for we are dwelling in a hollow 
of the earth, and fancy that we are on the surface ; and the air 
we call the heaven, wherein we imagine that the stars move. 
But this again is owing to our feebleness and sluggishness, 
which prevent our reaching the surface of * the air ; for if any 
man could arrive at the exterior limit, or take the wings of a 
a bird and fly upward, then like a fish who puts his head out 
and sees this world, he would see a world beyond ; and, if the 
nature of man could sustain the sight, he would acknowledge 
that this other world was the place of the true heaven and the 
true light and the true earth. For our earth, and the stones, and 
the entire region which surrounds us, are spoilt and corroded, 
as in the sea all things are corroded by the brine ; for in the 
sea too there is hardly any noble or perfect growth, but clefts 
only, and sand, and an endless slough of mud : and even the 
shore is not to be compared to the fairer sights of this world. 
— Phaedo, i. 439. 

1 Plato's cosmogonic ideas are largely given in the Dialogues of " Phaedo " and 
« Timaeus." 



144 PLATO'S BEST THOUGH! S. 

Earthly and sensual soul. 

But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at 

the time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of 
the body always, and is in love with and fascinated by the body 
and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led 
to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a 
man may touch and see and taste and use for the purposes of 
his lusts, — the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and 
avoid the intellectual principle, w T hich to the bodily eye is dark 
and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy ; — do 
you suppose that such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed ? 

That is impossible, he replied. 

She is held fast by the corporeal, which the continual asso- 
ciation and constant care of the body have wrought into her 
nature. 

Very true. 

And this corporeal element, my friend, is heavy and weighty 
and earthy, and is that element of sight by which such a soul 
is depressed and dragged down again into the visible world, 
because she is afraid of the invisible and of the world below — 
prowling about tombs and sepulchres, in the neighborhood of 
which, as they tell us, are seen certain ghostly apparitions of 
souls which have net departed pure, but are cloyed with sight 
and therefore visible. 

That is very likely, Socrates. 

Yes, that is very likely, Cebes ; and these must be the souls, 
not of the good, but of the evil, who are compelled to wander 
about such places in payment of the penalty of their former 
evil way of life ; and they continue to wander until through 
the craving after the corporeal which never leaves them, they 
are imprisoned finally in another body. And they may be 
supposed to find their prisons in the same natures which they 
have had in their former lives. 

What do you mean, Socrates ? 

I mean to say that men who have followed after gluttony, 
and wantonness, and drunkenness, and have had no thought of 
avoiding them, would pass into asses and animals of that sort. 
— Phaedo, i. 409. 
Education, compulsion m. 

Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man as 

he is growing older may learn many things, — for he can no 
more learn than he can run ; youth is the time of toil. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 145 

Very true. 

And, therefore, calculation and geometry, and all the other 
elements of instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, 
should be presented to the mind in childhood ; not, however, 
under any notion of forcing them. 

Why not ? 

Because a freeman ought to be a freeman in the acquisition 
of knowledge. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no 
harm ; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion has 
no hold on the mind. 

Very true. 

Then my good friend, I said/ do not use compulsion, but let 
early education be a sort of amusement ; you will then be bet- 
ter able to find out the natural bent. 

You are right there. — The Republic, ii. 364 
Education, sign of a liberal. 

Soc. Theaetetus, I take another view of the subject : you 

answered that knowledge is perception ? 

Theaet. I did. 

Soc. And if any one were to ask you : With what does a 
man see black and white colors ? and with what does he hear 
sharp and flat sounds ? — you would say, if I am not mistaken, 
" With the eyes and with the ears." 

Theaet. I should. 

Soc. The free use of words and phrases, rather than minute 
precision, is generally characteristic of a liberal education, and 
the opposite is pedantic; but sometimes precision is necessary, 
and I believe that the answer which you have just given is 
open to the charge of incorrectness ; for which is more cor- 
rect, to say that we see or hear with the eyes and with the ears, 
or through the eyes and through the ears ? 

Theaet. I should say, Socrates, "through," rather than 
« with." 

Soc. Yes, my boy ; for no one can suppose that we are Tro- 
jan horses, in whom are perched several unconnected senses, not 
meeting in some one nature, of which they are the instruments, 
whether you term this soul or not, with which through these we 
perceive objects of sense. — Theaetetus, iii. 387. 
Education; early. 

Ath. According to my view, he who would bo good at any 

thing must practice that thing from his youth upwards, both in 
sport and earnest, in the particular manner which the work re- 
10 



146 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

quires ; for example, he who is to be a good builder, should 
play at building children's houses ; and he who is to be a good 
husbandman, at tilling the ground ; those who have the care of 
their education should provide them when young with mimic 
tools. And they should learn beforehand the knowledge which 
they will afterwards require for their art. For example, the 
future carpenter should learn to measure or apply the line in 
play ; and the future warrior should learn riding, or some other 
exercise for amusement, and the teacher should endeavor to 
direct the children's inclinations and pleasures by the help of 
amusements, to their final aim in life. The most important 
part of education is right training in the nursery. The soul of 
the child in his play should be trained to that sort of excel- 
lence in which, when he grows up to manhood, he will have to 
be perfected. Do you agree with me thus far ? 

Cle. Certainly. 

Ath. Then let us not leave the meaning of education ambig- 
uous or ill-defined. At present, when we speak in terms of 
praise or blame about the bringing-up of each person, we call 
one man educated and another uneducated, although the unedu- 
cated man may be sometimes very well educated for the calling 
of a retail trader, or of a captain of a ship, and the like. For 
we are not speaking of education in this narrower sense, but 
of that other education in virtue from youth upwards, which 
makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, 
and teaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey. This is 
the only education which, upon our view, deserves the name ; 
that other sort of training, which aims at the acquisition of 
wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intel- 
ligence and justice, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to 
be called education at all. But let us not quarrel with one 
another about a word, provided that the proposition which has 
just been granted hold good ; to wit, that those who are rightly 
educated generally become good men. Neither must we cast a 
slight upon education, Which is the first and fairest thing that 
the best of men can ever have, and which, though liable to take 
a wrong direction, is capable of reformation. And this work 
of reformation is the great business of every man while he lives. 
— Laws, iv. 173. 

Education of youth and children. See Youth, etc. 
Education, the benefit of, to the State. 
If you mean to ask what great good accrues to the State 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 147 

from the right training of a single youth, or of a single chorus, 
— when the question is put in that form, we cannot deny that 
the good is not very great in any particular instance. But if 
you ask what is the good of education in general, the answer 
is easy — that education makes good men, and that good men 
act nobly, and conquer their enemies in battle, because they are 
good. * Education certainly gives victory, although victory 
sometimes produces forgetfulness of education ; for many have 
grown insolent from victory in war, and this insolence has en- 
gendered in them innumerable evils ; and many a victory has 
been and will be suicidal to the victors ; but education is never 
suicidal. — Laws, iv. 172. 
Elevation of self. 

Do you see any way in which the philosopher can be 

preserved in his calling to the end ? and remember what we 
were saying of him, that he was to have knowledge and .mem- 
ory and courage and magnanimity — these were admitted by us 
to be the true philosopher's gifts. 

Yes. 

Now, will not such an one be, from the first, in all things 
first among all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his 
mental ones ? 

Certainly, he said. 

And his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as 
he gets older for their own purposes ? 

No question. 

Falling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do 
him honor and flatter him, because they want to get into their 
hands now, the power which he will one day possess. 

That often happens, he said. 

And what will he do under such circumstances, especially if 
he be a citizen of a great city, rich and noble, and a tall, proper 
youth ? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations, and fancy 
himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes and of barbarians, 
and therefore will he not dilate and elevate himself in the full- 
ness of vain pomp and senseless pride ? 

To be sure he will. 

Now, when he is in this state of mind, if some one gently 
comes to him and tells him that he is without sense, which he 
must have, but can only get it by slaving for it, do you think 
that, under such adverse circumstances, he will be easily in- 
duced to listen ? 



i48 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

He would be very unlikely to listen. 

But suppose further that there is one person who has feeling, 
and who, either from some excellence of disposition or natural 
affinity, is inclined or drawn towards philosophy, and his friends 
think that they are likely to lose the. advantages which they 
were going to reap from his friendship, what will be the effect 
upon them ? Will they not do and say anything to prevent his 
learning and to make the teacher powerless, using to this end 
private intrigues as well as public prosecutions ? 

There can be no doubt of it. 

And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a 
philosopher ? 

Impossible. 

Then, were we not right in saying that even the very quali- 
ties which make a man a philosopher may, if he be ill-educated, 
serve to divert him from philosophy, no less than riches and 
their accompaniments and the other so-called goods of life? 

We were quite right. 

Thus, my excellent friend, is brought about the ruin and 
failure of the natures best adapted to the best of all pursuits, 
who, as we assert, are rare at any time ; and this is the class 
out of whom come those who are the authors of the greatest 
evil to States and individuals ; and also of the greatest good 
when the tide carries them in the direction of good ; but a 
small man never was the doer of any great thing either to in- 
dividuals or States. 

That is most true, he said. 

They fall away, and philosophy is left desolate, with her 
marriage rite incomplete : for her own have forsaken her, and 
while they are leading a false and unbecoming life, other un- 
worthy persons, seeing that she has no protector, enter in and 
dishonor her ; and fasten upon her the reproaches which her re- 
provers utter; who say of her votaries that some of them are 
good for nothing, and the greater number deserving of every- 
thing that is bad. 

That is certainly said. 

Yes ; and what else would you expect, I said, when you 
think of the puny creatures who, seeing this land open to them 
j — a land well stocked with fair names and showy titles — like 
prisoners who run away out of prison into a sanctuary, take a 
leap out of the arts into philosophy ; those who do so being 
probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 149 

For, although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains 
a dignity about her which is not found in the other arts. And 
many are thus attracted by her whose natures are imperfect 
and whose souls are marred and disfigured by their meanness, 
as their bodies are by their arts and crafts. Is not that true ? 

Yes. — The Republic, ii. 321. 
Eloquence, its force of truth. 

How you, O Athenians, have been affected by my accu- 
sers, I cannot tell ; but I know that they almost made me for- 
get myself — so persuasively did they speak ; and yet they have 
hardly uttered a word of truth. But many as their falsehoods 
were, there was one of them which quite amazed me : — I mean 
when they told you to be upon your guard, and not allow your- 
selves be deceived by the force of my eloquence. To use such 
language, when they were sure to be detected as soon as I 
opened my lips and displayed my deficiency, did certainly ap- 
pear to me most shameless, — unless by the force of eloquence 
they mean the force of truth ; for if this is their meaning, I 
admit that I am eloquent. But in how different a way from 
theirs ! Well, as I was saying, they have hardly uttered a 
word, or not more than a word, of truth ; but you shall hear 
from me the whole truth : not, however, delivered after their 
manner, in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. 
No, by heaven ! but I shall use the words and arguments which 
occur to me at the moment ; for I am certain that I am right in 
this ; and that at my time of life I ought not to be appearing 
before you, men of Athens, in the character of a juvenile 
orator : let no one expect it of me. — Apology, i. 315. 
Eloquence, power of. See Battle* 
Endurance. See Courage. 
Enemies and friends, treatment of. 

Well, there is another question : Are friends to be in- 
terpreted as real or seeming, enemies as real or seeming ? 

Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom 
he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil. 

Yes, but do not persons often err in their judgment of good 
and evil ; many who are not good appear to them to be good, 
and conversely ? 

That is true. 

Then to them the good will be enemies, and the evil will be 
their friends ? 

True. 



150 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil 
and evil to the good ? 

Apparently. 

But the good are just and would not do an injustice ? 

True. 

Then according to your argument it is just to injure those 
who do no wrong ? 

Nay, Socrates ; the doctrine is immoral. 

Then I suppose that they ought to do good to the just and 
harm to the unjust ? 

I like that better. 

But see the consequence : Many a man who is ignorant of 
the world has friends who are friends, and then he ought to do 
harm to them ; and he has good enemies whom he ought to 
benefit ; but if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of 
that which we affirm to be the meaning of Simonides. 

That is true, he said ; and I think that we had better cor- 
rect an error into which we have fallen in the use of the words 
" friend " and " enemy." 

What was the error, Polemarchus ? I replied. 

The error lay in the assumption that he is a friend who 
seems or is thought good. 

And how is the error to be corrected ? 

We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as 
seems, good ; and that he who seems only, and is not good, 
only seems to be and is not a friend ; and of an enemy the 
same may be said. 

You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad 
our enemies? 

Yes. 

And instead of saying simply, as we did at first, that it is 
just to do good to your friends and harm to your enemies, you 
would now say, it is just to do good to your friends when they 
are good, and harm to your enemies when they are evil ? 

Yes, that appears to me to be the truth. 

But then ought the just to injure any one at all ? 

Undoubtedly he ought to injure the wicked who are his 
enemies. 

And when horses are injured, are they improved or de- 
teriorated ? 

The latter. 

Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, 
not of dogs ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 151 

Yes, of horses. 

And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and 
not of horses ? 

Of course. 

And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that 
which is the proper virtue of man ? 

Certainly. 

And that human virtue is justice ? 

To be sure. 

Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust ? 

That is the result. 

But can the musician by his art make men unmusical ? 

Certainly not. 

Or the horseman by his art make bad horsemen ? 

Impossible. 

And can the just by justice make men unjust, or, speaking 
generally, can the good by virtue make them bad ? 

Assuredly not. 

Nor can heat produce cold ? 

No. 

Nor drought moisture ? 

Never. 

Nor can the good harm any one ? 

Clearly not. 

And the just is the good ? 

Certainly. 

Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a 
just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust ? 

I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates. 

Then if a man says that justice consists in repaying a debt, 
meaning that a just man ought to do good to his friends and 
injure his enemies, he is not really wise ; for he says what is 
not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another 
can be in no case just. 

I agree with you, said Polemarchus. 

Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any 
one who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pitta- 
cus, or any other wise man or seer ? 

I am quite ready to join with you, he said. 

Shall I whisper in your ear whose I believe the saying to 
be? 

Whose ? 



152 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

I believe that Periander, or Perdiccas, or ' Xerxes, or Isme- 
nias, the Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had 
a great opinion of his own power, first said that justice is doing 
good to your friends and harm to your enemies. 

Most true, he said. 

Yes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks 
down, what other can be offered ? 

Several times in the middle of our discourse Thrasymachus 
had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands 
by interrupting us, and had been put down by the rest of the 
company, who wanted to hear the end. But when I had done 
speaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his 
peace ; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild 
beast seeking to devour us. Polemarchus and I cowered in fear. 
— The Republic, ii. 155. 
Enemies, all men are. 

Ath. Are we to conceive each man as warring against 

himself : or how is that to be ? 

Cle. O Athenian Stranger, inhabitant of Attica I will not 
call you, who seem to me worthy to be named after the god- 
dess Athene, because you go back to first principles; you, 
from the light which you have thrown upon the argument, 
will more readily recognize the truth of my assertion, when I 
said just now that all men are the enemies of all other men, 
both in public and private, and every individual of himself. 

Ath. My good sir, what do you mean ? 

Cle. I mean what I say ; and, further, that there is a victory 
and defeat, — the first and best of victories, the lowest and 
worst of defeats, — which each man gains or sustains at the 
hands, not of another, but of himself ; this shows that there is 
a war against ourselves going on in every one of us. — Laws, 
iv. 157. 
Enslaving power of money. 

Come, now, and let us reason with the unjust, who is not 

intentionally in error. " Sweet Sir," we will say to him, 
" what think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble ? Is 
not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or 
rather to the god in man ; and the ignoble that which subjects 
the man to the beast ? " He can hardly avoid saying Yes, — 
can he now? 

Not if he has any regard for my opinion. 

But, if he admit this, we may ask him another question : 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 153 

How would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the 
condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the 
worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or 
daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them 
into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, 
however large might be the sum which he received ? And 
will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who sells his 
own divine being to that which is most atheistical and detest- 
able, and has no pity ? Eriphyle took the necklace as the 
price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to 
compass a worse ruin. — The Republic, ii. 421. 
Envy causing the death of good men. 

— I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus : 

any elaborate defense is unnecessary ; but as I was saying be- 
fore, I certainly have many enemies, and this is what will be 
my destruction if I am destroyed ; of that I am certain ; not 
Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction of the 
.world, which has been the death of many good men, and will 
probably be the death of many more ; there is no danger of 
my being the last of them. — Apology, i. 326. 
Envy, a pain of the soul. 

Soc. Do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, 

emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the 
soul only? 

Pro. Yes. 

Soc. And shall we not find them also full of the most won- 
derful pleasures ? need I remind you of the anger 

" Which stirs even a wise man to violence, 
And sweeter is than honey and the honeycomb? " 

And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamen- 
tation and bereavement ? 

Pro. Yes, there is a natural connection between them. 

Soc. And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies 
the spectators smile through their tears ? 

Pro. Certainly, I do. 

Soc. And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul ex- 
periences a mixed feeling of pain and pleasure ? 

Pro. I do not understand you. 

Soc. I admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in rec 
ognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy. 

Pro. There is, I think. 



154 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Soc. And the greater the difficulty the more desirable is the 
examination of the case, because the difficulty of examining 
other cases of mixed pleasures and pains will be less. 

Pro. Proceed. 

Soc. I have just mentioned envy ; would you not call that 
a pain of the soul ? 

Pro. Yes. 

Soc. And yet the envious man finds something in the mis- 
fortunes of his neighbors at which he is pleased ? 
. Pro. Certainly. — Philebus, iii. 187. 
Envy and injustice. 

— — Worthy of honor, too, is he who does no injustice, and of 
more than twofold honor if he not only does no injustice him- 
self, but hinders others from doing any ; the first may count as 
one man, the second is worth many men, because he informs 
the rulers of the injustice of others. And yet more highly 
to be esteemed is he who cooperates with the rulers in correct- 
ing the citizens as far as he can — he shall • be proclaimed the 
great and perfect citizen, and bear away the palm of virtue. 
The same praise may be given about temperance and wisdom, 
and all other goods which may be imparted to others, as well 
as acquired by a man for himself ; he who imparts them shall 
be honored as the man of men, and he who is willing yet is 
not able, may be allowed the second place ; but he who is 
jealous and will not, if he can help, allow others to partake in 
a friendly way of any good, is deserving of blame : the good, 
however, which he has, is not to be undervalued because pos- 
sessed by him, but to be acquired by us to the utmost of our 
power. Let every man, then, freely strive for the prize of 
virtue, and let there no envy. For the unenvious nature in- 
creases the greatness of States — he himself contends in the 
race and defames no man ; but the envious, who thinks that 
he ought to get the better by defaming others, is less energetic 
himself in the pursuit of true virtue, and reduces his rivals to 
despair by his unjust slanders of them. And thus he deprives 
the whole city of the proper training for the contest of virtue, 
and diminishes her glory as far as in him lies. — Laws, iv. 
256. 
Equality not the same as impartiality. 

When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one — Critias, 

I believe — went on to say : Prodicus and Hippias, Callias 
appears to me to be a partisan of Protagoras. And this led 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 155 

Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the other side. But 
we should not be partisans either of Socrates or Protagoras ; 
let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up 
the discussion. 

Prodicus added : That, Critias, seems to me to be well said, 
for those who are present at such discussions ought to be im- 
partial hearers of both the speakers ; remembering, however, 
that impartiality is not the same as equality, for both sides 
should be impartially heard, and yet an equal meed should not 
be assigned to both of them ; but to. the wiser a higher meed 
should be given, and a lower to the less wise. And I as well 
as Critias would beg you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant 
our request, which is, that you will argue with one another 
and not wrangle; for friends argue with friends out of good- 
will, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle. — Protagoras, 
i. 137. 
Equality and unequality. 

Shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is 

such a thing as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with 
another, but that, over and above this, there is equality in the 
abstract ? Shall we say so ? 

Say so, yes, replied Simmias, and swear to it, with all the 
confidence in life. 

And do we know the nature of this abstract essence ? 

To be sure, he said. 

And whence did we obtain our knowledge ? Did we not 
see equalities of material things, such as pieces of wood and 
stones, and gather from them the idea of an equality which is 
different from them ? for you will acknowledge that there is a 
difference. Or look at the matter in another way : — Do not 
the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, 
and at another time unequal ? 

That is certain. 

But are real equals ever unequal ? or is the idea of equality 
the same as that of inequality ? 

Impossible, Socrates. 

Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea 
of equality? 

I should say, clearly not, Socrates. 

And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea 
of equality, you conceived and attained that idea ? 

Very true, he said. 



156 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Which might be like, or might be unlike them ? 

Yes. 

But that makes no difference : whenever from seeing one 
thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike, there 
must surely have been an act of recollection ? 

Yery true. 

But what would you say of equal portions of wood and 
stone, or other material equals ? and what is the impression 
produced by them ? Are they equals in the same sense in 
which absolute equality i^ equal ? or do they fall short of this 
equality in a measure ? 

Yes, he said, in a very great measure too. — Phaedo, i. 401. 
Equality of anarchy. 

When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has 

evil cup-bearers presiding over the feast, and has drunk too 
deeply of the strong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers 
are very amenable and give a plentiful draught, she calls them 
to account and punishes them, and says that they are cursed 
oligarchs. 

Yes, he replied, a very common thing. 

Yes, I said ; and loyal citizens are insulted by her as lovers 
of slavery and men of naught ; she would have subjects who 
are like rulers, and rulers who are like subjects : these are men 
after her own heart, whom she praises and honors both in pri- 
vate and public. Now, in such a State, can liberty have any 
limit ? 

Certainly not. 

By degrees, the anarchy finds a way into private houses, 
and ends by getting among the animals and infecting them. 

How do you mean ? 

I mean that the father gets accustomed to descend to the 
level of his sons and to fear them, and the son to be on a level 
with his father, he having no shame or fear of either of his 
parents ; and this is his freedom, and the metic is equal with 
the citizen and the citizen with the metic, and the stranger on 
a level with either. 

Yes, he said, that is true. 

That is true ; and, there are other light evils such as the 
.'olio wing : the master fears and flatters his scholars, and the 
scholars despise their masters and tutors ; and, in general, 
young and old are alike, and the young man is on a level with 
the old, and is ready to compete with him in word or deed ; 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 157 

and old men condescend to the young, and are full of pleasantry 
and gayety ; they do not like to be thought morose and au- 
thoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the young. 
— The Republic, ii. 391. 
Essence, individual. 

— — Now God did not make the soul after the body, although 
we have spoken of them in this order ; for when he put them 
together he would never have allowed that the elder should 
serve the younger, but this is a random manner of speaking, 
because we ourselves too are very largely affected by chance. 
Whereas he made the soul in origin and excellence prior to 
and older than the body, to be the ruler and mistress, of whom 
the body was to be the subject. And he made her out of the 
following elements and on this manner : of the unchangeable 
and indivisible, and also of the divisible and corporeal, he 
made a third sort of intermediate essence, partaking of the 
same and of the other or diverse, and this compounded in like 
manner he placed in a mean between the indivisible and the 
divisible or corporeal. He took these three elements of the 
same, the other and the essence, and mingled them all to- 
gether, compressing the reluctant and unsociable nature of the 
other into the same. And when he had mixed them, and out 
of all the three made one, he again divided this whole into as 
many portions as was fitting, each of them containing an ad- 
mixture of all three. — Timaeus, ii. 528. 
Essence, war about. 

Str. There appears to be a sort of war of Giants and 

Gods going on amongst them ; they are fighting about the nat- 
ure of essence. 

Theaet. How is that ? 

Str. Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven 
and from the unseen to earth, and seem determined to grasp in 
their hands rocks and oaks ; of these they lay hold, and are 
obstinate in maintaining, that the things only which can be 
touched or handled have being or essence, because they define 
being and body as one, and if any one else says that what is 
not a body exists they altogether despise him, and will hear of 
nothing but body. 

Theaet. I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows 
they are. 

Str. And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously 
defend themselves from above, out of an unseen world, mightily 



158 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

contending that true essence consists of certain intelligible and 
incorporeal ideas ; the bodies of the materialists, which by them 
are maintained to be the very truth, they break up into little 
bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be generation and 
not essence. O Theaetetus, there is an endless war upon this 
theme which is always being waged between the two armies. 
— Sophist, iii. 483. 
Essence, nature of. 

Str. If they will admit that any, even the smallest particle of 

being is incorporeal, that is enough ; they must then say what 
that nature is which is common to both the corporeal and in- 
corporeal, which they have in their mind's eye when they say 
of both of them that they " are." Perhaps they may be in a 
difficulty ; and if this is the case, there is a possibility that they 
may accept a notion of ours respecting the nature of essence, 
having nothing of their own to offer. 

Theaet. What is the notion ? Tell us, and we shall see. 

Str. My notion would be, that anything which possesses any 
sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another 
even for a moment, however trifling the cause and however 
slight and momentary the effect, has real existence ; and I hold 
that the definition- of being is simply power. 

Theaet. They accept your suggestion, having nothing better 
of their own to offer. 

Str. Very good ; perhaps we, as well as they, may one day 
change our mind ; but, for the present, this may be regarded as 
the understanding which is established with them. 

Theaet. Agreed. — Sophist, iii. 485. 
Esteem and praise distinguished. 

Then our meeting will be delightful ; for in this way you, 

who are the speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and 
not praise only, among us who are your audience ; for es- 
teem is a sincere conviction of the hearers' souls, but praise is 
often an insincere expression of men uttering falsehoods con- 
trary to their conviction. And thus we who are the hearers 
will be gratified and not pleased ; for gratification is of the 
mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of 
the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight. 
Thus spoke Prodicus, and many of the company applauded his 
words. — Protagoras, i. 137. 
Eternal, space is. 
There is a third nature, which is space, and is eternal, and 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 159 

admits not of destruction, and provides a home for all created 
things, and is perceived without the help of sense, by a kind of 
spurious reason, and is hardly matter of belief, which we, be- 
holding as in a dream, say, of all existence, that it must of 
necessity be in some place and occupy a space, but that what is 
neither in heaven nor in earth has no existence. — Timaeus, ii. 
544. 
Evil and good, the presence of. 

Now I want to know whether in all cases a substance is 

assimilated by the presence of another substance ; or must the 
presence be after a peculiar sort ? 

The latter, he said. 

Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the pres- 
ence of evil, but not as yet evil, and that has happened before 
now ? 

True. 

And when anything is in the presence of evil, not being as 
yet evil, the presence of good arouses the desire of good in that 
thing ; but the presence of evil, which makes a thing evil, takes 
away the desire and friendship of the good ; for that which was 
once both good and evil has now become evil only, and the 
good had no friendship with the evil ? 

None. 

And therefore we say that those who are already wise, 
whether Gods or men, are no longer lovers of wisdom ; nor 
can they be lovers of wisdom, who are ignorant to the extent 
of being evil, for no evil or ignorant person is a lover of wis- 
dom. There remain those who have the misfortune to be ig- 
norant, but are not yet hardened in their ignorance, or void of 
understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they know what 
they do not know ; and therefore those who are the lovers of 
wisdom are as yet neither good nor bad. But the bad do not 
love wisdom any more than the good ; for, as we have already 
seen, neither unlike is the friend of unlike, nor like of like. 
You remember that ? 

Yes, they both said. — Lysis, i. 58. 
Evil, concealment of. See Concealment, etc. 
Evil, God not the author of. See God. 

Let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, 

the tale of Theseus son of Poseidon, or of Peirithous son of 
Zeus, going forth to perpetrate such a horrid rape ; or of any 
other hero or son of a God daring to do such impious and hor- 



160 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

rible things as they falsely ascribe to them in our day : and let 
us compel the poets to declare either that these acts were not 
done by them, or that they were not the sons of Gods : — both 
in the same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm. "We 
will not have them teaching our youth that the gods are the 
authors of evil, and that heroes are no better than men ; un- 
doubtedly, these sentiments, as we were saying, are neither 
pious nor true, for they are at variance with our demonstration 
that evil cannot come from God. Undoubtedly. 

And further they are likely to have a bad effect on those 
who hear them ; for everybody will begin to excuse his own 
vices when he is convinced that similar wickednesses are always 
being perpetrated by the kindred of the Gods, — 

« The relatives of Zeus, whose paternal altar is in the heavens and on the mount 
of Ida," 

and who have — 

" The blood of deity yet flowing in their veins." 

And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engen- 
der laxity of morals among the young. — The Republic, ii. 214. 
Evil, suffering less than doing. See Injustice. 
Evil-doers, justice among. See Honor among theives. 
Evil-doers, effect of punishment on. See Punishment, etc. 
Evil; the greatest in the State. See Injustice, penalty of. 

Shall we begin by asking of ourselves what we conceive 

to be the greatest good, and what ought to be the chief aim of 
the legislator in the organization of a State, and what is the 
greatest evil, and then consider whether our previous description 
has the stamp of the good or of the evil. 

By all means. 

Can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction 
and plurality where unity ought to reign ? or any greater good 
than the bond of unity ? 

There cannot. 

And there is unity where there is community of pleasures 
and pains — where all the citizens are glad of sorry on the 
same occasions? 

No doubt. 

Yes ; and where there is no common but only private feeling, 
a State is disorganized — when you have one half of the world 
triumphing and the other sorrowing at the same events hap- 
pening to the city and the citizens ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 161 

Certainly. 

Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about 
the use of the terms " meum " and " tuum," mine and thine. 

Exactly. 

And is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest 
number of persons apply the terms " mine " and " not mine " 
in the same way to the same thing ? 

True, very true. 

Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition 
of the individual — as in the body, when but a finger is hurt, 
the whole frame, drawn towards the soul and forming one realm 
under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes 
all together with the part affected, and we say that the man 
has a pain in his finger ; and the same expression is used about 
any other part, which has a sensation of pain at suffering or 
of pleasure at the alleviation of suffering. 

Yery true, he replied; and I agree with you that in the 
best-ordered State there is the nearest approach to this com- 
mon feeling which you describe. 

Then when any one of the citizens experiences any good or 
evil, the whole State will make his case their own, and either 
rejoice or sorrow with him ? 

Yes, he said, that is what will happen in a well-ordered 
State. — The Republic, ii. 287. 
Evil and good, power for. See Good, etc. 
Evil and good, when they are such. 
Soc. And punishment is an evil ? 

Pol. Certainly. 

Soc. And you would admit once more, my good sir, that 
great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his 
advantage, and that this is the meaning of great power ; and 
if not, then his power is an evil and is no power. But let us 
look at the matter in another way : — do we not acknowledge 
that the things of which we were speaking, the infliction of 
death, and exile, and the deprivation of property, are some- 
times a good and sometimes not a good ? 

Pol. Certainly. 

Soc. About that you and I may be supposed to agree ? 

Pol. Yes. 

Soc. Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good 
and when that they are evil: what principle do you lay 
down? 

11 



162 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Pol. I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as 
well as ask that question. 

Soc. Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer 
from me, I say that they are good when they are just, and 
evil when they are unjust. — Gorgias, iii. 56. 
Evils imperishable. 

Soc. Evils, Theodorus, can never pass away; for there 

must always remain something which is antagonistic to good. 
Having no place among the Gods in heaven, of necessity they 
hover around the earthly nature and this mortal sphere. 
Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as 
quickly as we can ; and to fly away is to become like God, 
as far as this is possible ; and to become like him, is to become 
holy and just and wise. But, my friend, you cannot easily 
convince mankind that they should pursue virtue or avoid vice, 
not in order that a man may seem to be good, which is the 
reason given by the world, and in my judgment is only a rep- 
etition of an old wives' fable, whereas, the truth is that God 
is never unrighteous at all — he is perfect righteousness ; and 
he of us who is the most righteous is most like him. Herein is 
seen the true cleverness of a man, and also his nothingness and 
want of manhood. — Theaetetus, iii. 378. 
Excess in pleasures. 

Soc. Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures 

as a class, we should not look at the most diluted pleasures, but 
at the most extreme and most vehement ? 

Pro. In that every one will be ready to agree. 

Soc. And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasure, as 
we have often said, are pleasures of the body ? 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when 
we are sick or when we are in health ? And here we must be 
careful in our answer, and not make a mistake. 

Pro. How are we likely to mistake ? 

Soc. Why, because we might be tempted to answer rashly, 
" when we are in health." 

Pro. Yes, that is the natural answer. 

Soc. Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which 
mankind have the greatest desires ? 

Pro. True. 

Soc. And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar 
illness, feel cold or thirst or other bodily affection more in- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 163 

tensely ? Am I not right in saying that they have a deeper 
want and great pleasure in the satisfaction of their want ? 

Pro. That is clear when you say so. 

Soc. Well, then, shall we not be right in saying, that if a 
person would wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go 
and look, not at health, but at disease ? And here you must 
distinguish : do not imagine that I am asking whether those 
who are very ill have more pleasure than those who are well, 
but understand that I am speaking of the intensity of pleasure ; 
I want to know where pleasures are found to be most in ex- 
cess. For, as I say, we have to discover what is pleasure, and 
what nature they attribute to her who deny her very exist- 
ence. 

Pro. I believe that I follow you. 

Soc. We shall soon see whether you do or not, Protarchus, 
for you shall answer me ; tell me, then, whether you see, I will 
not say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in wan- 
tonness than in temperance ? and please to think before you 
speak. 

Pro. I understand you, and see that there is a great differ- 
ence between them ; the temperate are restrained by the wise 
man's aphorisms of " never too much," which is their rule, but 
excess of pleasure possessing the minds of fools and wantons 
quite maddens and infuriates them. — Philebus, iii. 183. 
Exchange, art of. 

Str. Take another branch of his (the Sophist's) geneal- 
ogy ; for he is a professor of a great and many-sided art ; and 
if we look back at what has preceded, we see that he presents 
another aspect, besides that of which we are speaking. 

Theaet. In what respect ? 

Str. There were two sorts of acquisitive art ; the one con- 
cerned with hunting, the other with exchange. 

Theaet. There were. 

Str. And of the art of exchange there are two divisions, 
the one of giving, and the other of selling. 

Theaet. Let us assume that. 

Str. Further, we will suppose that the art of selling is di- 
vided into two parts. 

Theaet. How? 

Str. There is one part which is distinguished as the sale of 
a man's own productions ; another, which is the exchange of 
the works of others. 



164 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Theaet. Certainly. 

Str. And is not that part of exchange which takes place in 
the city, being about half of the whole, termed retailing ? 

Theaet. Yes. 

Str. And that which exchanges the goods of one city for 
those of another by selling and buying is the exchange of the 
merchant ? 

Theaet To be sure. 

Str. And this exchange of the merchant is partly an ex- 
change of food for the use of the body, and partly of the food 
of the soul which is bartered and received in exchange for 
money. 

Theaet. What do you mean ? 

Str. You want to know what is the meaning of food for the 
soul ; the other kind you understand. 

Theaet. Yes. 

Str. Take music in general and painting and marionette 
playing and many other things, which are purchased in one 
city, and carried away and sold in another — wares of the soul 
which are hawked about either for the sake of instruction or 
amusement ; — may not he who takes them about and sells 
them be quite as truly called a merchant as he who sells meats 
and drinks ? 

Theaet. To be sure he may. 

Str. And would you not call by the same name him who 
goes about from city to city, buying knowledge from all quar- 
ters and exchanging his wares for money ? 

Theaet. Certainly I should. 

Str. Of this merchandise of the soul, may not one part be 
fairly termed the art of display ? And there is another which 
is certainly not less ridiculous, but being a trade in learning 
must be called by some name germane to the matter ? 

Theaet. Certainly. 

Str. There should be two names for them, one descriptive 
of the sale of the knowledge of virtue, and the other of the 
sale of other kinds of knowledge. 

Theaet. Of course. 

Str. The name of art seller corresponds well enough to 
the one ; and I hope that you will tell me the name of the 
other. 

Theaet. He must be the Sophist, whom we are seeking ; no 
other name can possibly be right. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 165 

Str. No other ; and so this trader in virtue again turns out 
to be our friend the Sophist, whose art may now be traced a 
second time, through the art of acquisition — exchange — buy- 
ing and selling, — by the merchant, not forgetting that there is 
a merchandise of the soul which is concerned with speech and 
knowledge. 

Theaet. Certainly. 

Str. And there may be a third reappearance of him; for 
he may have settled down in a city, and partly fabricate as 
well as buy these same wares, intending to live by selling them, 
and he would still be called a Sophist ? 

Theaet. Certainly. 

Str. Then that part of the acquisitive art which exchanges, 
and of exchange which either sells a man's own productions or 
retails those of others, as the case may be, and in either way 
sells knowledge, you would again term Sophistry ? 

Theaet. I must if I am to keep up with the argument. — 
Sophist, iii. 457. 
Existence, recollection a proof of previous. 

— Yes, he said, Cebes, I entirely think so too ; nor is this a 

delusion in which we are agreeing ; but I am confident in the 
belief that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that 
the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead 
are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion 
than the evil. 

Cebes added : Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowl- 
edge is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a 
previous time in which we learned that which we now recol- 
lect. But this would be impossible unless our soul was in 
some place before existing in the human form ; here then is 
another argument of the soul's immortality. 

But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias interposing, what proofs 
are given of this doctrine of recollection ? I am not very sure 
at this moment that I remember them. 

One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If 
you put a question to a person in a right way, he will give a 
true answer of himself, but how could he do this unless there 
were knowledge and right reason already in him ? And this 
is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram or to any- 
thing of that sort. 

But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I 
would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you 



166 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

look at the matter in another way ; I mean, if you are still in- 
credulous as to whether knowledge is recollection ? 

Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have 
this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection, 
and, from what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect 
and be convinced ; but I should still like to hear what you 
were going to say. 

This is what I should say, he replied : — We should agree, if 
I am not mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have 
known at some previous time. 

Very true. 

'And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection ? 
I mean to ask, whether when a person has already seen or 
heard, or in any way perceived anything, and he knows not 
only that, but something else of which he has not the same but 
another knowledge, we may not fairly say that he recollects 
that which comes into his mind. Are we agreed about that ? 
— Phaedo, i. 399. 
Existence, pure and real. 

Which classes of things have a greater share of pure ex- 
istence in your judgment, — those of which food and drink 
and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or 
the class which contains true opinion and mind, and, in general, 
all virtue ? Put the question in this way : Which has a more 
pure being, — that which is concerned with the invariable, the 
immortal, and the true, and is found in the invariable, immortal, 
true ; or that which is concerned with the variable and mor- 
tal, and is found in the variable and mortal ? 

Far purer, he replied, is the being of that which is con- 
cerned with the invariable. 

And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowl- 
edge in the same degree as of essence ? 

Yes, of knowledge in the same degree. 

And of truth in the same degree ? 

Yes. 

And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have 
less of essence ? 

Necessarily. 

Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the -ser- 
vice of the body have less of truth and essence than those 
which are in the service of the soul ? 

Far less. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 167 

And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than 
the soul ? 

Yes. 

What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a 
more real existence, is more really filled than that which is 
filled with less real existence and is less real ? 

Of course. 

And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which 
is according to nature, that which is more really filled with 
more real being will have more real and true joy and pleasure ; 
whereas that which participates in less real being will be less 
truly and surely satisfied, and will participate in a less true and 
real pleasure ? 

Unquestionably. — The Republic, ii. 416. 

Str. Let us push the question ; for if they will admit that 
any, even the smallest particle of being, is incorporeal, that is 
enough ; they must then say what that nature is which is com- 
mon to both the corporeal and incorporeal, and which they have 
in their mind's eye when they say of both of them that they 
" are." Perhaps they may be in a difficulty ; and if this is 
the case, there is a possibility that they may accept a notion of 
ours respecting the nature of essence, having nothing of their 
own to offer. 

Theaet. What is the notion ? Tell us, and we shall see. 

Str. My notion would be, that anything which possesses any 
sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another 
even for a moment, however trifling the cause and however 
slight and momentary the effect, has real existence ; and I hold 
that the definition of being is simply power. — Sophist, iii. 
485. 
Existences, separation of. 

Str. But to show that somehow and in some sense the 

same is other, or the other same, or the great small, or the like 
unlike ; and to delight in always thus bringing forward oppo- 
sitions in argument, is no true refutation, but only proves that 
he who uses such arguments is a neophyte who has got but a 
little way in the investigation of truth. 

Theaet. To be sure. 

Str. For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate all 
existences from one another is not only tasteless but also illit- 
erate and unphilosophical. 

Theaet. Why so? 



168 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Str. The attempt at universal separation is the final annihi- 
lation of all reason ; for only by the union of conceptions with 
one another do we attain to discourse of reason. 

Theaet. True. 

Str. And observe that we were only just in time in making a 
resistance to such separatists, and compelling them to make the 
admission that other did mingle with other. — Sophist, iii. 499. 

Faculties ; what are they ? 

Do we admit the existence of opinion ? 

Undoubtedly. 

As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty ? 

Another faculty. 

Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds 
of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties ? 

Yes. 

And knowledge is relative to being, and knows being ; but 
before I proceed, I will first make a division. 

What division ? 

I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves ; 
they are powers in us and in all other things by which we do 
as we do. Sight and hearing, for example, ■& should call fac- 
ulties. Have I clearly explained the class which I mean ? 

Yes, I quite understand. 

Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not see 
them, and therefore the distinctions of figure, color, and the 
like, which enable me to discern the differences of some things, 
do not apply to them. In speaking of a faculty I think only 
of the end and the operation ; and that which has the same 
end and the same operation I call the same faculty, but that 
which has another end and another operation I call different. 
Would that be your way of speaking? 

Yes. 

To return. Would you place knowledge among faculties, or 
in some other class ? 

Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the most powerful of 
all faculties. 

And is opinion also a faculty ? 

Certainly, he said ; for opinion is that with which we are 
able to form an opinion. 

And yet you were surely admitting a little while ago that 
knowledge is not the same as opinion ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 169 

"Why, yes, said he : for how can any reasonable being ever 
identify that which is infallible with that which errs ? 

That is very good, I said, and clearly shows that we are 
conscious of a distinction between them ? 

Yes. 

Then knowledge and opinion, having distinct powers, have 
also distinct ends or subject-matters ? 

That is certain. — The Republic, ii. 305. 
False oaths. See Oaths. 
False opinion and true. See Heterodoxy. 

What do you mean, Dionysodorus ? I have often heard, 

and have been amazed/to hear this thesis of yours, which is 
maintained and employed by the disciples of Protagoras, and 
others before them, and which to me appears to be quite won- 
derful and suicidal, as well as destructive, and I think that I 
am most likely to hear the truth of this from you. The dictum 
is that there is no such thing as falsehood ; a man must either 
say what is true or say nothing. Is not that your position ? 

He assented. 

But if he cannot speak falsely, may he not think falsely ? 

No, he cannot, he said. 

Then there is no such thing as false opinion ? 

No, he said. — Euthedymus, i. 189. 

Soc. Let us then put into more precise terms the question 
which has arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a 
thing as opinion ? 

Pro. Yes. 

Soc. And such a thing as pleasure ? 

Pro. Yes. 

Soc. And there must be something about which a man has 
an opinion ? 

Pro. True. 

Soc. And something which gives pleasure ? 

Pro. Quite correct. 

Soc. And whether his opinion is right or wrong, makes no 
difference ; he will still always have an opinion ? 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or 
not, will always have a real feeling of pleasure ? 

Pro. Yes : that is also quite true. 

Soc. Then, how can opinion be true and false, and pleasure 
only true ; and yet the state of being pleased, or holding an 
opinion may be both real ? 



170 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Pro. Yes ; that is the question. 

Soc. You mean that opinion has the attributes of true and 
false, and hence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a 
certain quality ; and this is what you think should be exam- 
ined ? 

Pro. Yes. — Pkilebus, iii. 174. 
Falsehood, when committed. See Fiction, etc. 
Falsehood, God incapable of. See Deception. 
Falsehood for the State. See Lies, etc. 
Fame, immortality of fame. See Immortality, etc. 
Family ties in the State. 

■ Did you ever know an example in other States of a ruler 

who would speak of one of his colleagues as a friend and of 
another as not a friend to him ? 

Yes, very often. 

And the friend he describes and regards as one in whom he 
has an interest, and the other as one in whom he has no in- 
terest ? 

Exactly. 

But would any of your guardians speak of one of their fel- 
lows as a friend and of another as not a friend to him ? 

Certainly not ; for every one whom they meet will be re- 
garded by them either as a brother or sister, or father or 
mother, or son or daughter, or as the child or parent of those 
who are thus connected with him. 

Capital, I said ; but let me ask you once more : Shall they 
be a family in name only, or shall they always act as if they 
were a family ? For example, in the use of the word "father," 
would the care of a father be implied and the filial reverence 
and duty and obedience to him which the law commands ; and 
is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an impious and 
unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good 
either from the hands of God or man ? Are these to be the 
strains which the children will hear repeated in their ears by 
all the citizens about their parents and kindred when they are 
pointed out to them ? 

These, he said, and none other ; for what can be more ridic- 
ulous than for them to utter the names of family ties with the 
lips only, and not to act upon them ? 

Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will 
be more often heard than in any other. As I was describing 
before, when any one is well or ill, the universal word will be, 
" mine is well " or " mine is ill." 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 171 

Most true. 

And agreeably to this mode of thinking or speaking, were 
we not saying also that they will have their pleasures and 
pains in common ? 

Yes, and so they will. 

And thev will have a common interest in the same which 
they will call " my own," and having this common interest they 
will have a common feeling of pleasure and pain ? 

Yes, they will have a far greater community of feeling. — 
The Republic, ii. 289. 
Fancies of people. 

But first I must tell you that I am one who from my 

childhood upward have set my heart upon a certain thing. All 
people have their fancies ; some desire horses, and others dogs ; 
and some are fond of gold and others of honor. Now, I have 
no violent desire for any of these things ; but I have a passion 
for friends ; and I would rather have a good friend than the 
best cock or quail in the world: I would even go further, and 
say than a horse or dog. Yea, by the dog of Egypt, I should 
greatly prefer a real friend to all the gold of Darius, or even 
to Darius himself ; I am such a lover of friends as that. And 
when I see you and Lysis, at your early age, so easily possessed 
of this treasure, and so soon, he of you, and you of him, I am 
amazed and delighted, seeing that I myself, although I am now 
advanced in years, am so far from having made a similar acqui- 
sition, that I do not even know in what way a friend is acquired. 
But I want to ask you a question about this, for you have ex- 
perience : tell me then, when one loves another, is the lover or 
the beloved the friend ; or may either be the friend ? 

I think that either may be the friend. 

Do you mean, I said, that if only one of them loves the 
other, they are mutual friends? 

Yes, he said ; that is my meaning. 

But what if the lover is not loved in return ? That is a 
possible case. 

Yes. 

Or is, perhaps, even hated ? for that is a fancy which lovers 
sometimes have, Nothing can exceed their love ; and yet they 
imagine either that they are not loved in return, or that they 
are hated. Is not that true ? 

Yes, he said, quite true. — Lysis, i. 50. 



172 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Fancies of hope. 

Soc. All men, as we were saying just now, are always 

filled with hopes ? 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions 
which exist in the minds of each of us ? 

Pro. Yes. 

Soc. And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us ; a man 
may often have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensu- 
ing, and in the picture there may be a likeness of himself 
mightily rejoicing over his good fortune. 

Pro. True. 

Soc. And may we not say that the good, being friends of 
the Gods, have generally true pictures presented to them, and 
the bad false pictures ? 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. And yet the bad have pleasures painted in their fancy 
as well as the good ; but I presume that they are false pleas- 
ures ? 

Pro. They are. — Philehus, iii. 178. 
Fathers, brave sons of brave. See State, heroes, etc. 
Fathers, sons of good, why they turn out ill. 

But why do the sons of good fathers often turn out 

ill? Let me explain that, — which is far from being wonder- 
ful, if, as I have been saying, the very existence of the State 
implies that virtue is not any man's private possession. If 
this be true — and nothing can be truer — then I will ask you 
to imagine, as an illustration, some other pursuit or branch of 
knowledge which may be assumed equally to be the condition 
of the existence of a State. Suppose that there could be no 
State unless we were all flute-players, as far as each had the 
capacity, and everybody was freely teaching everybody the art, 
both in private and public, and reproving the bad player as 
freely and openly as every man now teaches justice and the 
laws, not concealing them as he would conceal the other arts, 
but imparting them — for all of us have a mutual interest in 
the justice and virtue of one another, and this is the reason 
why every one is ready to teach justice and the laws ; suppose, 
I say, that there were the same readiness and liberality among 
us in teaching one another flute-playing, do you imagine, Soc- 
rates, that the sons of good flute-players would be more likely 
to be good than the sons of bad ones ? I think not. Would 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 173 

not their sons grow up to be distinguished or undistinguished 
according to their own natural capacities as flute-players, and 
the son of a good player would often turn out to be a bad one, 
and the son of a bad player to be a good one, and all flute- 
players would be good enough in comparison of those who 
were ignorant and unacquainted with the art of flute-playing? 
In like manner I would have you consider that he who ap- 
pears to you to be the worst of those who have been brought 
up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a just man and 
a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who 
had no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints 
upon them which compelled them to practice virtue — with the 
savages, for example, whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on 
the stage at the last year's Lenaean festival. If you were liv- 
ing among men such as the man-haters in his Chorus, you 
would be only too glad to meet with Eurybates and Phrynon- 
das, and you would sorrowfully long to revisit the rascality of 
this part of the world. And you, Socrates, are discontented, 
and why ? Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one 
according to his ability, and you say that there is no teacher. 
You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek ? For of that too 
there will not be any teachers found. Or you might ask, Who 
is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which they 
have learned of their fathers ? He and his fellow- workmen 
have taught them to the best of their ability, — but who will 
carry them further in their arts ? And you would certainly 
have a difficulty, Socrates, in finding a teacher of them ; but 
there would be no difficulty in finding a teacher of those who 
are wholly ignorant. And this is true of virtue or of any- 
thing ; and if a man is better able than we are to promote 
virtue ever so little, that is as much as we can expect. A 
teacher of this sort I believe myself to be, and above all other 
men to have the knowledge which makes a man noble and 
good ; and I give my pupils their money's-worth, and even 
more, as they themselves confess. And therefore I have in- 
troduced the following mode of payment : When a man has 
been my pupil, if he likes he pays my price, but there is no 
compulsion ; and if he does not like, he has only to go into a 
temple and take an oath of the value of the instructions, and 
he pays no more than he declares to be their value. 

Such is my Apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by 
which I endeavor to show that virtue may be taught, and that 



174 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

this is the opinion of the Athenians. And I have also at- 
tempted to show that you are not to wonder at good sons hav- 
ing bad fathers, or at good fathers having bad sons, of which the 
sons of Polycleitus afford an example, who are the companions 
of our friends here, Paralus and Xanthippus, but are nothing 
in comparison with their father ; and this is true of the sons of 
many other artists. — Protagoras, i. 126. 
Faultless man not to be found. 

All this relates to Pittacus, as is further proved by the 

sequel. For he adds : " Therefore I will not throw away my 
life in searching after the impossible, hoping in vain to find a 
perfectly faultless man among those who partake of the fruit 
of the broad-bosomed earth ; and when I have found him to 
tell you of him " (this is the vehement way in which he pur- 
sues his attack upon Pittacus throughout the whole poem) : 
" but him who does no evil, voluntarily I praise and love ; not 
even the Gods war against necessity." All this has a similar 
drift, for Simonides was not so ignorant as to say that he 
praised those who did no evil voluntarily, as though there were 
some who did evil voluntarily. For no wise man, as I believe, 
will allow that any human being errs voluntarily, or volunta- 
rily does evil and dishonorable actions ; but they are very well 
aware that all who do evil and dishonorable things do them 
against their will. And Simonides never says that he praises 
him who does no evil voluntarily; the word " voluntarily " ap- 
plies to himself. For he was under the impression that a 
good man might often compel himself to love and praise an- 
other, and to be the friend and approver of another ; and that 
there might be an involuntary love, such as a man might feel 
to an unnatural father or mother, or his country, or the like. 
Now bad men, when their parents or country have any defects, 
rejoice at the sight of them and find fault with them and ex- 
pose and denounce them to others under the idea that the rest 
of mankind will be less likely to take themselves to task and 
accuse them of neglect ; and they blame their defects far more 
than they deserve in order that the odium which is necessarily 
incurred by them may be increased: but the good man dissem- 
bles his feelings, and constrains himself to praise them ; and if 
they have wronged him and he is angry, he pacifies his anger 
and is reconciled, and compels himself to love and praise his 
own flesh and blood. And Simonides, as is probable, consid- 
ered that he himself had often had to praise and magnify a ty- 



PLATO* S BEST THOUGHTS. 175 

rant or the like, much against his will, and he also wishes to 
imply to Pittacus that he is not censorious and does not cen- 
sure him. "For I am satisfied," he says,- "when a man is 
neither bad nor very stupid, and when he knows justice (which 
is the health of States), and is of sound mind, I will find no fault 
with him, for I am not given to finding fault, and there are in- 
numerable fools " (implying that if he delighted in censure he 
might have abundant opportunity of finding fault). " All 
things are good with which evil is unmingled." In these lat- 
ter words he does not mean to say that all things are good 
which have no evil in them, as you might say " All things are 
white which have no black in them," for that would be ridicu- 
lous ; but he means to say that he accepts and finds no fault 
with the moderate or intermediate state. " I do not hope," he 
says, " to find a perfectly blameless man among those who par- 
take of the fruits of the broad-bosomed earth, and when I have 
found him to tell you of him ; in this sense I praise no man. 
But he who is moderately good, and does no evil, is good 
enough for me, who love and approve every one " (and here 
observe that he uses a Lesbian word liraivy}^ because he is ad- 
dressing Pittacus, — " who love and approve every one volun- 
tarily, who does no evil : " and that the stop should be put 
after " voluntarily ") ; " but there are some whom I involun- 
tarily praise and love. And you, Pittacus, I would never 
have blamed, if you had spoken what was moderately good and 
true ; but I do blame you because, wearing the appearance of 
truth, you are speaking falsely about the greatest matters." 
And this, I said, Prodicus and Protagoras, I take to be the 
true meaning of Simonides in this poem. — Protagoras, i. 145. 
Fear, its object. See Courage, Bravery. 

— — Soc. Now, let us proceed a step, and see whether we are 
equally agreed about the fearful and the hopeful. Let me tell 
you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set me right ; 
in my opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things which 
do or do not create fear, and fear is not of the present, nor 
of the past, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not 
agree to that, Laches ? 

La. Yes, Socrates, entirely. 

Soc. That is my view, Nicias ; the terrible things, as I should 
say, are the evils which are future ; and the hopeful are the 
good or not evil things which are future. Do you or do you 
not agree with me ? — Laches, i. 92. 



176 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Fear, its source and influence. 

Ath. Fear springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And 

when some one applies external agitation to affections of this 
sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the ter- 
rible and violent internal one, and produces a peace and calm in 
the soul, and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart, which 
is a thing much to be desired, sending some to sleep, and mak- 
ing others who are awake to dance to the pipe, with the help 
of the Gods, to whom they offer acceptable sacrifices, and pro- 
ducing in them a sound mind, which takes the place of their 
former agitations. And in this, as I would shortly say, there 
is a considerable amount of sense. 

Cle. Certainly. 

Ath. But if fear has such a power we ought to consider fur- 
ther, that every soul which from youth upward has been famil- 
iar with fears, will be made more liable to fear, and every one 
will admit that this is the way to form a habit of cowardice and 
not of courage. 

Cle. Certainly. 

Ath. And, on the other hand, the habit of overcoming, from 
our youth upwards, the fears and terrors which beset us, may 
be said to be an exercise of courage ? 

Cle. True. — Laws, iv. 309. 
Few, the government of the, only true. 

Str. The several forms of government cannot be defined 

by the words few or many, voluntary or compulsory, poverty 
or riches ; but some notion of science must enter in, if we are 
to be consistent with what has preceded. 

T. Soc. And we must be consistent. 

Str. Well, then, in which of these various forms of States 
may the science of government, which is among the greatest 
and most difficult of all sciences, be supposed to reside ? That 
•we must discover, and then we shall see who are the false poli- 
ticians who win popularity and pretend to be politicians and are 
not, and separate them from the wise king. 

T. Soc. That, as the argument has already intimated, is our 
duty. 

Str. Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain 
political science? 

T. Soc. Impossible. 

Str. But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would 
be a hundred, or say fifty, who could ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 177 

T. Soc. In that case political science would certainly be the 
easiest of all sciences ; there could not be found in a city of that 
number as many really first-rate draught-players, if judged by 
the standard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly 
not be as many kings. For kings we may truly call those who 
possess royal science, whether they rule or not, as was shown 
in the previous argument. 

Str. Thank you for reminding me ; and the consequence is 
that any true form of government can only be supposed to be 
the government of one, two, or, at any rate, of a few. 

T. Soc. Certainly. — Statesman, iii. 578. 
Fickleness of youth. See Chang eableness. 
Fiction, censorship of. 

You know also that the beginning is the chief est part of 

any work, especially in a young and tender thing ; for that is 
the time at which the character is formed and most readily re- 
ceives the desired impression. 

Quite true. 

And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any cas- 
ual tales which may be framed by casual persons, and to receive 
into their minds notions which are the very opposite of those 
which are to be held by them when they are grown up ? 

"We cannot. 

Then the first thing will be to have a censorship of the 
writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction 
which is good, and reject the bad ; and we will desire mothers 
and nurses to tell their children the authorized ones only. Let 
them fashion the mind with these tales, even more fondly than 
they form the body with their hands. And most of those which 
are now in use must be discarded. 

Of what tales are you speaking ? he said. 

You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said ; for 
they are necessarily cast in the same mould, and there is the 
same spirit in both of them. 

That may be very true, he replied ; but I do not as yet know 
what you would term the greater. 

Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and 
the rest of the poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers 
of mankind. 

But which stories do you mean, he said ; and what fault do 
you find with them? 
12 



178 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

A fault which is most serious, I said ; the fault of telling a 
lie, and what is more, a bad lie. 

But when is this fault committed ? 

Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature 
of gods and heroes, — like the drawing of a limner which has 
not the shadow of a likeness to the truth. 

Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable. 
— The Republic, ii. 200. 
Figure and melody. 

I may observe, however, in passing, that in music there 

certainly are figures and there are melodies ; and music is con- 
cerned with harmony and rhythm, so that you may speak of a 
melody or figure having rhythm or harmony ; the term is cor- 
rect enough, but you cannot speak correctly, as the masters of 
choruses have a way of talking metaphorically of the " color " 
of a melody or figure, although you can speak of the melodies 
or figures of the brave and the coward, praising the one and 
censuring the other. And not to be tedious, the figures and 
melodies which are expressive of virtue of soul or body, or of 
images of virtue, are without exception good, and those which 
are expressive of vice are the reverse of good. — Laws, iv. 184. 
Filial monsters. 

But we are digressing. Let us therefore return and in- 
quire how the tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and 
various and ever -changing army of his. 

If, he said, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will 
confiscate them and spend the proceeds ; that is obvious. And 
in so far as they suffice, he will be able to diminish the taxes 
which he would otherwise have to impose. 

And when these fail ? 

Why, clearly, he said, then he and his boon companions, 
whether male or female, will be maintained out of his father's 
estate. 

I see your meaning, I said. You mean that the people from 
whom he has derived his being, will maintain him and his com- 
panions ? 

Yes, he said ; he must be maintained by them. 

But what if the people go into a passion, and aver that a 
grown-up son ought not to be supported by his father, but that 
the father should be supported by the son ? He did not bring 
his son into the world in order that when he was grown up he 
himself should be the servant of his own servants, and should 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 179 

support him and his rabble of slaves and companions ; but 
that, having such a protector, he might be emancipated from 
the government of the rich and aristocratic, as they are termed. 
And so, bids him and his companions depart, just as any other 
father might drive out of his house a riotous son and his party 
of revelers. 

By heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a 
monster he has been fostering in his bosom ; and when he 
wants to drive him out, he will find that he is weak and his son 
strong. 

Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use vio- 
lence ? "What ! beat his father if he opposes him? 

Yes, he will ; and he will begin by taking away his arms. 

Then he is a parricide, and a cruel, unnatural son to an aged 
parent whom he ought to cherish ; and this is real tyranny, 
about which there is no mistake ; as the saying is, the people 
who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, 
have fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus 
liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the 
harshest and bitterest form of slavery. — The Republic, ii. 398. 

But, O heavens ! Adeimantus, on account of some new-fan- 
gled love of a harlot, who is anything but a necessary con- 
nection, can you believe that he would strike the mother who 
is his ancient friend and necessary to his very existence, and 
would place her under the authority of the other, when she is 
brought under the same roof with her ; or that, under like 
circumstances, he would do the same to his withered old father, 
first and most indispensable of friends, for the sake of some 
newly-found, blooming youth who is the reverse of indispen- 
sable ? — The Republic , ii. 403. 

Filial regards and duties. See Children, what they owe to their par' 

ents. See Parents, etc. 
Finite and infinite. 

Soc. Were we not saying that God revealed a finite ele- 
ment of existence, and also an infinite ? 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, 
which is compounded out of them ; but I fear that I am very 
clumsy at these processes of division and enumeration. 

Pro. What are you saying, my good friend ? 

Soc. I say that still a fourth class is wanted. 

Pro. And what will that be? 



180 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Soc. Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this 
as a fourth class to the three others. 

Pro. And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of 
resolution, as well as a cause of composition ? 

Soc. Not, I think, at present ; but if I want a fifth at somo 
future time you shall allow me to have one. 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. Let us begin with the three first ; and as we find two 
out of the three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavor 
to reunite them, and see how in each of them there is a one 
and many. 

Pro. If you would explain to me a little more about them, 
perhaps I might be able to follow you. 

Soc. Well, the two classes are the same, which I mentioned 
before ; one the finite, and the other the infinite, and I will first 
show that the infinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite 
may be hereafter discussed. 

Pro. I agree. 

Soc. And now consider well ; for the question to which I 
invite your attention is difficult and controverted. When you 
speak of hotter and colder, can you conceive -any limit in those 
qualities ? Does not the more and less, which dwells in their 
very nature, prevent their having any end ? for if they had an 
end, the more and less would themselves have an end. 

Pro. That is most true. 

Soc. Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there 
enters a more and a less. 

Pro. True. 

Soc. Then, says the argument, they have never any end, 
and being endless must also be infinite. — Philebus, iii. 158. 
Fire in the Universe. 

Soc. We see the elements which enter into the nature of 

the bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm- 
tossed sailor cries, u Land ahead," in the constitution of the 
world. 

Pro. The proverb may be applied to us ; for truly the 
storm gathers us and we are at our wit's end. 

Soc. Consider now that each of the elements, as they exist 
in us, is but a small fraction of any one of them, and of a 
mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power 
worthy of its nature. One instance will prove this of all of 
them ; there is a fire within us, and in the universe. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 181 

Pro. True. 

Soc. And is not our fire small and weak and mean, but the 
fire in the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in 
every power that fire has ? 

Pro. Most true. 

Soc. And is that universal element nourished and generated 
and ruled by our fire, or is the fire in you and me, and in other 
animals, dependent on the universal fire ? 

Pro. That is a question which does not deserve an an- 
swer. 

Soc. Right ; and you would say the same, if I am not mis- 
taken, of the earth which is in animals and the earth which is 
in the universe, and you would give a similar reply about all 
the other elements? 

Pro. Why, how could any man who gave any other be 
deemed in his senses ? 

Soc. I do not think that he could, — but now go a step 
further ; when we see those elements of which we have been 
speaking gathered up in one, do we not call them a body ? 

Pro. Very true. 

Soc. And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for 
the same reason may be considered as a body, because made 
up of the same elements. 

Pro. Very true. — Philebus, iii. 164. 
Fire and friction. 

Soc. There are plenty of other proofs which will show that 

motion is the source of that which is said to be and become, 
and rest of not-being and destruction ; for fire and warmth, 
which are supposed to be the parent and nurse of all other 
things, are born of friction, which is a kind of motion ; is not 
this the origin of fire ? 

Theaet. Yes. — Theaetetus, iii. 353. 
Flattery and shams. See Cookery. 
Flattery in rhetoric. 

Soc. In my opinion, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric 

is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready 
wit, which knows how to manage mankind : this habit I sum 
up under the word " flattery ; " and it appears to me to have 
many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may seem to 
be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine, 
and not an art : another part is rhetoric, and the art of dressing 
up and sophistry are two others : thus there are four branches, 



182 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

and four different things answering to them. And Polus may 
ask, if be likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part 
of flattery is rhetoric : he did not see that I had not yet an- 
swered him when he proceeded to ask a further question: — 
Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing ? But I shall not 
tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have 
first answered, " What is rhetoric ? " For that would not be 
right, Polus ; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask 
me, What part of flattery is rhetoric ? 

Pol. I will ask, and do you answer; what part of flattery is 
rhetoric ? 

Soc. Will you understand my answer ? Rhetoric, according 
to my view, is the shadow of a part of politics. — Gorgias, 
iii. 48. 

Flesh rejected as food. 

Ath. The practice of men sacrificing one another still ex- 
ists among many nations : and, on the other hand, we hear 
of other human beings who do not even venture to taste the 
flesh of a cow and had no animal sacrifices, but only cakes and 
fruits swimming in honey, and similar pure offerings, but no 
flesh or animals ; from these they abstained under the idea 
that they ought not to eat them, and might not stain the altars 
of the Gods with blood. In former days men are said to have 
lived a sort of Orphic life, having the use of all lifeless things, 
but abstaining from all living things. — Laws, iv. 303. 
Flux and change. 

Soc. We may leave the rest of their theory unexam- 
ined, but we must not forget to ask them the only question with 
which we are concerned : Are all things in motion and flux ? 

Theod. Yes, they will reply. 

Soc. And they are moved in both those ways which we dis- 
tinguished; that is to say, they move and are also changed? 

Theod. Of course, if the motion is to be perfect. 

Soc. If they only moved, and were not changed, we should 
be able to say what are the kinds of things which are in mo- 
tion and flux? 

Theod. Exactly. 

Soc. But now, since not even white continues to flow white, 
and the very whiteness is a flux or change which is passing 
into another color, and will not remain white, can the name 
of any color be rightly used at all ? 

Theod. How is that possible, Socrates, either in the case of 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 183 

this or of any other quality, if while we are using the word 
the object is escaping in the flux ? — Theaetetus, iii. 385. 
Food, flesh rejected as. See Flesh. 

Force and persuasion in legislation. See Legislation, etc. 
Ff>rgetfulness and memory. 

Soc. The other class of pleasures, which, as we were say- 
ing is purely mental, is entirely derived from memory. 

Pro. What do you mean ? 

Soc. I must first of all analyze memory or rather percep- 
tion which is prior to memory if the nature of these mental 
states is ever to be properly cleared up. 

Pro. How will you proceed. 

Soc. Let us imagine affections of the body that are extin- 
guished before they reach the soul, which remains unaffected 
by them ; and again, other affections which vibrate through 
both soul and body, and impart a shock to both of them. 

Pro. Granted. 

Soc. And the soul may be said to be oblivious of the first 
but not of the second? 

Pro. Quite true. 

Soc. When I say oblivious do not suppose that I mean for- 
getfulness in a literal sense ; for forgetfulness is the exit of 
memory, which in this case has not yet entered ; and to speak 
of the loss of that which is not yet in existence, and never has 
been, is a contradiction ; do you see ? 

Pro. Yes. 

Soc. Then just be so good as change the terms. 

Pro. To what shall I change them ? 

Soc. Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are de- 
scribing the state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of 
the body, say unconsciousness. — Philebus, iii. 169. 
Form, harmony of soul and. 

I maintain that neither we nor our guardians, whom we 

have to educate, can ever become musical until we and they 
know the essential forms of temperance, courage, liberality, 
magnificence, and then kindred as well as the contrary forms, 
in all their combinations, and can recognize them and their im- 
ages wherever they are found, not slighting them either in 
small things or great, but believing them all to be within the 
sphere of one art and study. 

Most assuredly. 

And when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, 



184 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

and the two are cast in one mould, that will be the fairest of 
sights to him who has an eye to contemplate the vision ? 
The fairest indeed. 

And the fairest is also the loveliest ? 

That may be assumed. 

And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in 
love with the loveliest ; but he will not love him who is of an 
inharmonious soul ? 

That is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul, but 
any merely personal defect he will not mind, and will love all 
the same. — The Republic, ii. 226. 
Forms of government unessential. 

We seem to have reached a height from which a man 

may look down and see that virtue is one but that the forms 
of vice are innumerable ; there being four special ones which 
are deserving of note. 

What do you mean ? he said. 

I mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of 
the soul as there are forms of the State. 

How many ? 

There are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said. 

What are they? 

The first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and 
which may be said to have two names, monarchy and aristoc- 
racy, accordingly as rule is exercised by one or many. 

True, he replied. 

But I regard the two names as describing' one form only ; 
for whether the government is in the hands of one or many, if 
the governors have been trained in the manner which we have 
described, the fundamental laws of the State will be main- 
tained. 

That is true, he replied. — The Republic, ii. 272. 
Forms of government, four. 

I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four con- 
stitutions of which you were speaking. 

That, I said, is easily answered : the four governments of 
which I spoke, so far as they have distinct names, are, first, the 
Cretan and Spartan, which are generally applauded : next, 
there is oligarchy ; this is not equally approved, and is a form 
of government which has many evils : thirdly, democracy, 
which naturally follows oligarchy, although different ; and 
lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which is different from 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 185 

them all, and is the fourth and worst disorder of a State. I 

do not know of any other constitution which can be said to 

have a distinct form. There are lordships and principalities 

which are bought and sold, and some other intermediate forms 

of government. But these nondescripts are oftener found 

among barbarians than among Hellenes. — The Republic, ii. 

371. 

Fortunate unjust, the. See Clever. 

Free use of words and phrases. See Education, the sign of a liberal. 

Freedom, artificers of. 

If then we would retain the notion with which we began, 

that our guardians are to be released from every other art, and 
to be the special artificers of freedom, and to minister to this 
and have no other end, they ought not to practice or imitate 
anything else ; and, if they imitate at all, they should imitate 
from youth upward the characters which are suitable to their 
profession — the temperate, holy, free, courageous, and the like ; 
but they should not depict or be skillful at imitating any kind 
of illiberality or other baseness, lest from imitation they should 
come to be what they imitate. Did you never observe how im- 
itations, beginning in early youth, at last sink into the constitu- 
tion and become a second nature of body, voice, and mind ? — 
The Republic, ii. 218. 

Freedom, anarchy, resulting from. See Anarchy. 
Freedom unknown to the tyrant, 

The people are such fools, and this noxious class and their 

followers grow numerous and become aware of their numbers, 
and then they choose him who has most of the tyrant in his 
soul, and make him their leader. 

Yes, he said, they will choose him because he will be the 
most fit to be a tyrant. 

If the people yield, well and good ; but if they resist him, as 
he began by beating his own father and mother, so now, if he 
has the power, he beats them, and will maintain his dear old 
fatherland and motherland, as the Cretans say, in subjection to 
his young retainer whom he has introduced to be their rulers 
and masters. Such is the end of his passions and desires. 

Exactly. 

Even in early days and before they get power, this is their 
character ; they associate only with their own flatterers or 
ready tools ; or, if they want anything from anybody, they in 
their turn are equally ready to fall down before them ; there is 



186 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

no attitude of kindness which they will not assume, but when 
they have gained their point they know them no more. 

Yes, truly. 

They are always either the masters or servants and never 
the friends of anybody ; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom 
or true friendship. 

Certainly not. — The Republic, ii. 404. 
Freedom of Philosophy 

Soc. Those who have been trained in philosophy and liberal 

pursuits compared with those who from their youth upwards 
have been knocking about in the courts and such like places, 
are in their way of life as freemen are to slaves. 

Theod. In what is the difference seen ? 

Soc. In the leisure spoken of by you, which a freeman can 
always command ; he has his talk out in peace, and, like our- 
selves, wanders at will from one subject to another, and from a 
second to a third if his fancy prefers a new one, caring not 
whether his words are many or few ; his only aim is to attain 
the truth. But the lawyer is always in a hurry ; there is the 
water of the clepsydra driving him on, and not allowing him to 
expatiate at will ; and there is his adversary standing over him, 
enforcing his rights; the affidavit, which in their phraseology 
is termed the brief, is recited ; and from this he must not de- 
viate. He is a servant, and is disputing about a fellow-servant 
before his master, who is seated, and has the cause in his hands ; 
the trial is never about some indifferent matter, but always con- 
cerns himself ; and often the race is for his life. The conse- 
quence has been, that he has become keen and shrewd ; he has 
learned how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in 
deed ; but his soul is small and unrighteous. His slavish con- 
dition has deprived him of growth and uprightness and inde- 
pendence ; dangers and fears, which were too much for his 
truth and honesty, came upon him in early years, when the ten- 
derness of youth was unequal to them, and he has been driven 
into crooked ways ; from the first he has practiced deception 
and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped. And so 
he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no soundness 
in him ; and is now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is 
the lawyer, Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture of 
the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood ; or shall we return 
to the argument ? Do not let us abuse the freedom of digres- 
sion which we claim. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 187 

Tkeod. Nay, Socrates, let us finish what we are about; for 
you truly said that we belong to a brotherhood which is free, 
and are not the servants of the argument ; but the argument is 
our servant, and must wait our leisure. Who is our judge? Or 
where is the spectator having any right to censure or control 
us, as he might the poets ? — Theaetetus, iii. 375. 
Freedom in the Persian State. 

Ath. The State which has become exclusively and exces- 
sively attached to monarchy or to freedom has neither of them 
in moderation ; but your States, the Laconian and Cretan, have 
a certain moderation ; and the Athenians and Persians having 
had more at first, have now less. Shall I tell you why ? 

Cle. By all means, if it will tend to the elucidation of our 
subject. 

Ath. Hear, then : — There was a time when the Persians 
had more of the state which is a mean between slavery and 
freedom. In the reign of Cyrus they were freemen and also 
lords of many others ; the rulers gave a share of freedom to 
the subjects, and being treated as equals, the soldiers were on 
better terms with their generals, and showed themselves more 
ready in the hour of danger. And if there was any wise 
councilor among them, he imparted his wisdom to the public ; 
for the king was not jealous, but allowed him full liberty of 
speech and gave honor to those who were able to be his coun- 
selors in anything, and allowed all men equally to participate 
in wisdom. And the nation waxed in all respects, because 
there was freedom and friendship and communion of soul 
among them. — Laivs, iv. 223. 
Freedom growing to license. 

Ath. As time went on, the poets themselves introduced the 

reign of ignorance and misrule. They were men of genius, 
but they had no knowledge of what is just and lawful in music ; 
raging like Bacchanals and possessed with inordinate delights 
— mingling lamentations with hymns, and paeans with dithy- 
rambs ; imitating the sounds of the flute on the lyre, and 
making one general confusion ; ignorantly affirming that music 
has no truth, and whether good or bad, can only be judged of 
rightly by the pleasure of the hearer. And by composing such 
licentious poems, and adding to them words as licentious, they 
have inspired the multitude with lawlessness and boldness, and 
made them fancy that they can judge for themselves about 
melody and song. And in this way, the theatres from being 



188 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

mute have become vocal, as though they had understanding of 
good and bad in music and poetry ; and instead of an aristoc- 
racy, an evil sort of theatrocracy has grown up. For if the 
democracy which judged had only consisted of freemen, there 
would have been no fatal harm done ; but in music there first 
arose, the universal conceit of omniscience and general lawless- 
ness ; freedom came following afterwards, and men fancying 
that they knew what they did not know, had no longer any fear, 
and the absence of fear begets shamelessness. For what is 
shamelessness but the insolent refusal to regard the opinion of 
the better by reason of an overdaring sort of liberty ? 

Meg. That is most true. 

Ath. Consequent upon this freedom comes the other free- 
dom of disobedience to rulers ; and then the attempt to escape 
the control and exhortation of father, mother, elders, and when 
near the end, the control of the laws also ; and at the very 
end there is the contempt of oaths and pledges, and no regard 
at all for the Gods, — herein they exhibit and imitate the old Ti- 
tanic nature ; and thus they return again to the old, and lead a 
life of evils which have no end. Why do I say so ? Because 
I think that the argument ought to be pulled up from time to 
time, and not be allowed to run away, but held with bit and 
bridle, and then we shall not, as the proverb says, fall off our 
ass. — Laws, iv. 230. 

Friends and enemies, — treatment of. See Enemies. 
Friendship dearer than money. See Fancies, etc. 

Oh ! my beloved Socrates, let me entreat you once more 

to take my advice and escape. For if you die I shall not only 
lose a friend who can never be replaced, but there is another 
evil ; people who do not know you and me will believe that I 
might have saved you if I had been willing to give money, but 
that I did not care. Now, can there be a worse disgrace than 
this — that I should be thought to value money more than the 
life of a friend? For the many will not be persuaded that I 
wanted you to escape, and that you refused. — Grito, i. 348. 
Friendship, the principle of. 

Ath. He who would rightly consider these matters must see 

the nature of friendship and desire, and of these so-called 
loves, for they are of two kinds, and out of the two arises a 
third kind, having the same name ; and this similarity of name 
causes all the difficulty and obscurity. . 

Cle. How is that? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 189 

Ath. Dear is the like in virtue to the like, and the equal to 
the equal; dear also, though after another fashion, is he who 
has abundance to him who is in want. And when either of 
these friendships becomes excessive, we term the excess love. 

Cle. Very true. 

Ath. The friendship which arises from contraries is horrible 
and coarse, and has often no tie of communion ; but that which 
arises from likeness is gentle, and has a tie of communion, 
which lasts through life. As to the mixed sort, which is made 
up of them both, there is, first of all, a difficulty in determin- 
ing what he who is possessed by this third love desires ; more- 
over, he is drawn different ways, and is in doubt between the 
two principles ; the one exhorting him to enjoy the beauty of 
youth, and the other forbidding him. For the one is a lover 
of the body, and hungers after beauty, like ripe fruit, and 
would feign satisfy himself without any regard to the charac- 
ter of the beloved ; the other holds the desire of the body to 
be a secondary matter, and looking rather than loving with his 
soul, and desiring the soul of the other in a becoming manner, 
regards the satisfaction of the bodily love as wantonness ; he 
reverences and respects temperance, and courage, and magnan- 
imity, and wisdom, and wishes to live chastely with the chaste 
object of his affection. Now the sort of love which is made 
up of the other two is that which we have described as the 
third. Seeing then that there are these three sorts of love, 
ought the law to prohibit and forbid them all to exist among 
us ? Is it not rather clear that we should wish to have in the 
State the love which is of virtue and which desires the beloved 
youth to be the best possible ; and the other two, if possible, 
we should hinder ? What do you say, friend Megillus ? 

Meg. I think, Stranger, you are altogether right in what you 
have been now saying. — Laws, iv. 352. 
Funerals, three kinds of. 

Of three kinds of funerals, there is one which is too ex- 
travagant, another is too niggardly, the third in a mean ; and 
you choose and approve and order the last without qualifica- 
tion. But if I had an extremely rich wife, and she bade me 
bury her, and I were to describe her burial in poetry, I should 
praise the extravagant sort ; and a poor miserly man, who had 
not much to spend, would approve of the niggardly; and the 
man of moderate means, who was himself moderate, would 
praise a moderate funeral. Now you in the capacity of legis* 



190 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

lator must not barely say " a moderate funeral," but you must 
define what moderation is, and how much ; unless you are defi- 
nite, you must not suppose that you are speaking a language 
that can become law. — Laws, iv. 247. 
Funeral orations. See Battle, death in. 
Future state and world. 

Such is the nature of the other world ; and when the 

dead arrive at the place to which the genius of each severally 
conveys them, first of all, they have sentence passed upon 
them, as they have lived well and piously or not. And those 
who appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the river 
Acheron, and using such means of conveyance as they have, 
are carried in them to the lake, and there they dwell and are 
purified of their evil deeds, and suffer the penalty of the 
wrongs which they have done to others, and are absolved, and 
receive the rewards of their good deeds according to their de- 
serts. But those who appear to be incurable by reason of the 
greatness of their crimes — who have committed many and 
terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or the 
like — such are hurled into Tartarus which is their suitable 
destiny, and they never come out. Those again who have com- 
mitted crimes, which, although great, are not irremediable — 
who in a moment of anger, for example, have done violence to 
a father or a mother, and have repented for the remainder of 
their lives, or who have taken the life of another under the 
like extenuating circumstances — these are plunged into Tar- 
tarus, the pains of which they are compelled to undergo for a 
year, but at the end of the year the wave casts them forth — 
mere homicides by way of Cocytus, parricides and matricides 
by Pyriphlegethon — and they are borne to the Acherusian 
lake, and there they lift up their voices and call upon the vic- 
tims whom they have slain or wronged, to have pity on them, 
and to be kind to them, and to let them come out into the lake. 
And if they prevail, then they come forth and cease from their 
troubles ; but if not, they are carried back again into Tartarus 
and from thence into the rivers unceasingly, until they obtain 
mercy from those whom they have wronged ; for that is the 
sentence inflicted upon them by their judges. Those too who 
have been preeminent for holiness of life, are released from 
this earthly prison, and go to their pure home which is above, 
and dwell in the purer earth ; and those who have duly puri- 
fied themselves with philosophy, live henceforth altogether 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 191 

without the body, in mansions fairer far than these, which may 
not be described, and of which the time would fail me to tell. 

Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not 
we to do in order to obtain virtue and wisdom in this life ? 
Fair is the prize, and the hope great. 

A man of sense ought not to say, nor will I be too confident, 
that the description which I have given of the soul and her 
mansions is exactly true. But I do say that, inasmuch as the 
soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to think, not im- 
properly or unworthily, that something of the kind is true. 
The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself 
with words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen out 
the tale. Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about 
his soul, who has cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the 
body as alien to him, and hurtful rather in their effects, and 
has followed after the pleasures of knowledge in this life ; who 
has arrayed the soul in her own proper jewels, which are 
temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility, and truth — 
thus adorned, she is ready to go on her journey to the world 
below, when her hour comes. — Phaedo, i. 443. 

Gain, the lover of. 

Has the lover of gain greater experience of the pleasure 

of knowledge which is imparted by the truth than the philoso- 
pher has of the pleasure of gain ? 

The philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage ; for 
he has always known the taste of the other pleasures from his 
youth upwards : but the lover of gain in all his experience has 
not of necessity tasted — or, I should rather say, even if he de- 
sired could hardly have tasted by any process of learning truth 
— the sweetness of intellectual pleasures. 

Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the 
lover of gain, for he has a double experience ? 

Very great indeed. — The Republic, ii. 412. 
Generation and conception, divine nature of. See Conception. 
Generation of opposites. 

Are not all things which have opposites generated out of 

their opposites ? I mean such things as good and evil, just 
and unjust — and there are innumerable other opposites which 
are generated out of opposites. And I want to show that in 
all opposites there is a similar alternative ; I mean to say, for 
example, that anything which becomes greater must become 
greater after being less. 



192 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

True. 

And that which becomes less must have been once greater 
and then have become less. 
Yes. 

And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the 
swifter from the slower. 

Very true. 

And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from 
the more unjust ? 

Of course. 

And is this true of all opposites ? and are we convinced that 
all of them are generated out of opposites ? 

Yes. 

And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not 
also two intermediate processes which are ever going on, from 
one to the other, and back again ; where there is a greater and 
a less there is also an intermediate process of increase and dimi- 
nution, and that which grows is said to wax, and that which 
decays to wane ? 

Yes, he said. 

And there are many other processes, such as division and 
composition, cooling and heating, which equally involve a pas- 
sage into and out of one another. And this holds of all oppo- 
sites, even though not always expressed in words — they are 
generated out of one another, and there is a passing or process 
from one to the other of them ? 

Very true, he replied. 

Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the 
opposite of waking ? 

True, he said. 

And what is that ? 

Death, he answered. 

And these then are generated, if they are opposites, the one 
from the other, and have there their two intermediate processes 
also ? 

Of course. 

Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of 
opposites which I have mentioned to you, and also its interme- 
diate processes, and you shall analyze the other to me. The 
state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out of sleep- 
ing waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping ; and the 
process of generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in 
the other waking up. Are you agreed about that ? 



PLATO* S BEST THOUGHTS. 193 

Quite agreed. 

Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the 
same manner. Is not death opposed to life ? 

Yes. 

And they are generated one from the other ? 

Yes. 

What is generated from the living ? 

The dead. 

And what from the dead ? 

I can only say in answer — the living. 

Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are gen- 
erated from the dead ? 

That is clear, he replied. 

Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below ? 

That is true. 

And one of the two processes or generations is visible — for 
surely the act of dying is visible ? 

Surely, he said. — Phaedo, i. 397. 
Generation, spontaneous. See Life, spontaneous. 
Generation of all things. 
Soc. Here are two new principles. 

Pro. What are they ? 

Soc. One is the generation of all things, and another is 
essence. 

Pro. I readily accept both generation and essence at your 
hands. 

Soc. Very right ; and would you say that generation is for 
the sake of essence, or essence for the sake of generation ? 

Pro. You want to know whether that which is called essence 
is, properly speaking, for the sake of generation ? 

Soc. Yes. 

Pro. By the Gods, I wish that you would repeat your ques- 
tion. 

Soc. I mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would 
tell me that ship-building is for the sake of ships, or are ships 
for the sake of ship-building ? and in all similar cases I should 
ask the same question. 

Pro. Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates ? 

Soc. I have no objection, but you must take your part. 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. My answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial, 

material, are always used with a view to generation, and that 
13 



194 PLATO 9 S BEST THOUGHTS. 

each generation is relative to, or for the sake of, some being or 
essence, and the whole of generation relative to the whole of 
essence. 

Pro. Assuredly. 

Soc. Then pleasure, being a generation, will surely be for the 
sake of some essence ? 

Pro. True. 

Soc. And that for the sake of which something is done must 
be placed in the class of good, and that which is done for the 
sake of another thing, in some other class, my good friend. 

Pro. Most certainly. 

Soc. Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed 
in some other class than that of good ? 

Pro. Quite right. 

Soc. Then, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to 
him who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, 
and had no true being ; for he is clearly one who laughs at the 
notion of pleasure being a good. 

Pro. Assuredly. 

Soc. And he would surely laugh also at those who make 
generation their highest end. 

Pro. Of whom are you speaking and what do you mean ? 

Soc. I am speaking of those who when they cure hunger or 
thirst or any other defect, by some process of generation, are as 
much delighted as if the generation were itself pleasure ; and 
they say that they would not wish to live without these and the 
like feelings. 

Pro. That is certainly what they appear to think. 

Soc. And is not destruction universally admitted to be the 
opposite of generation ? 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. Then he who chooses thus, would choose generation 
and destruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as 
we were saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the 
purest possible thought. — Philebus, iii. 194. 
Genius, a youthful. 

Socrates, I have become acquainted with one very re- 
markable Athenian youth whom I commend to you as well 
worthy of your attention. If he had been a beauty I should 
have been afraid to praise him, lest you should suppose that I 
was in love with him ; but he is no beauty, and you must not 
be offended if I say that he is very like you ; for he has a 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 195 

snub nose and projecting eyes, although these features are less 
marked in him than in you. Seeing, then, that he has no per- 
sonal attractions, I may freely say, that in all my acquaintance, 
which is very large, I never knew any one who was his equal 
in natural gifts : for he has a quickness of apprehension which 
is almost unrivaled, and he is exceedingly gentle, and also the 
most courageous of men ; there is a union of qualities in him 
such as I have never seen in any other, and should scarcely 
have thought possible ; for those who, like him, have quick and 
ready and retentive wits, have generally also quick tempers ; 
they are ships without ballast, which go darting about, and 
grow mad rather than courageous ; and the steadier sort, when 
they have to face study, are stupid and cannot remember. 
Whereas he moves surely and smoothly and successfully in the 
path of knowledge and inquiry ; he is full of gentleness, and 
flows on silently like a river of oil ; at his age, it i& wonderful. 
— TheaetetuSj iii. 343. 

Gentleness and greatness seemingly inconsistent. 
■ — — We shall have to select natures which are suited to their 
task of guarding the city ? 

We shall. 

And the selection will be no easy task I said ; but still we 
must endeavor to do our best as far as we can ? 

We must. 

The dog is a watcher, I said, and the guardian is also a 
watcher ; and in this point of view, is not the noble youth very 
like a well-bred dog ? 

How do you mean ? 

I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and 
swift to overtake the enemy ; and strong too, if, when they 
have caught him, they have to fight with him. 

All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required. 

Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight 
well? 

Certainly. 

And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether 
horse or dog or any other animal ? Have you never observed 
how the presence of spirit makes the soul of any creature ab- 
solutely fearless and invincible ? 

I have. 

Then now we have a clear idea of the bodily qualities which 
are required in the guardian. 



196 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

True, 

And also of the mental ones ; his soul is to be full of spirit ? 

Yes. 

But then, Glaucon, those spirited natures are apt to be furi- 
ous with one another, and with everybody else. 

There is a difficulty, he replied. 

Whereas, I said, they ought to be gentle to their friends, 
and dangerous to their enemies ; or, instead of their enemies 
destroying them, they will destroy themselves. 

True, he said. 

What is to be done then, I said ; how shall we find a gentle 
nature which has also a great spirit, for they seem to be incon- 
sistent with one another ? 

True. 

And yet he will not be a good guardian who is wanting in 
either of these two qualities ; and, as the combination of them 
appears to be impossible, this is equivalent to saying that to be 
a good guardian is also impossible. — The Republic, ii. 197. 
Gentleness of warriors and rulers. 

Soc. We spoke of those who were intended to be our 

warriors, and said that they were to be guardians of the city 
against the attacks of enemies internal as well as external, and 
to have no other employment; they were to be merciful in 
judging their subjects, of whom they were by nature friends, 
but when they came in the way of their enemies in battle they 
were to be fierce with them. 

Tim, Exactly. 

Soc. We said, if -I am not mistaken, that the guardians 
should be doubly gifted with a passionate and also with a phi- 
losophical temper, and that then they would be as they ought 
to be, gentle to their friends and fierce to their enemies. — 
Timaeus, ii. 514. 
Geometry, its study and uses, 

■ Shall we inquire whether the kindred science also concerns 

us ? 

You mean geometry? 

Yes. 

Certainly, he said ; that part of geometry which relates to 
war is clearly our concern ; for in pitching a camp, or taking 
up a position, or closing or extending the lines of an army, or 
any other military manoeuvre, whether in actual battle or on a 
march, there will be a great difference in a general, according 
as he is or is not a geometrician. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 197 

Yes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geom- 
etry or calculation will be enough ; the question is rather of 
the higher and greater part of geometry, whether that tends 
towards the great end — I mean towards the vision of the idea 
of good ; and thither, as I was saying, all things tend which 
compel the soul to turn her gaze towards that place, where is 
the full perfection of being, of which she ought, by all means, 
to attain the vision. 

True, he said. 

Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us ; 
if becoming only, it does not concern us ? 

Yes, that is what we assert. 

Nevertheless, such a conception of the science is in flat con- 
tradiction to the ordinary language of geometricians, as will 
hardly be denied by those who have any acquaintance with their 
study : for they speak of squaring and applying and adding, 
having in view use only, and absurdly confuse the necessities 
of geometry with those of daily life ; whereas knowledge is the 
real object of the whole science. 

Certainly, he said. 

Then must not a further admission be made ? 

What admission ? 

The admission that this knowledge at which geometry aims 
is of the eternal, and not of the perishing and transient. 

That, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true. 

Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards 
truth, and create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that 
which is now unhappily allowed to fall down. 

Nothing will be more effectual. 

Then nothing should be more effectually enacted, than that 
the inhabitants of your fair city should learn geometry. — The 
Republic, ii. 354. 

Giants and Gods. See Essence, war about. 
Gifted minds, ill-educated, become the worst. 

There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, 

when under alien conditions, receive more injury than the in- 
ferior, because the contrast is greater. 

Very true. 

And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted 
minds, when they are ill-educated, become the worst ? Do not 
great crimes and the spirit of pure evil spring out of a full- 
ness of nature ruined by education rather than from any infe- 



198' PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

riority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very 
great good or very great evil ? 

There I think that you are right. 

And our philosopher follows the same analogy — he is like a 
plant which, having proper nurture, grows and matures into all 
virtue, but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the 
most noxious of all weeds, unless saved by some divine help. 
— The Republic, ii. 318. 
Gifts of the pure and impure. See Impure. 
Gifts, natural. See Talents, etc. 
Globe, the world, a. See Earth, rotundity of the. 
Gluttony and sensuality. 

Those then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are 

always busy with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up 
again as far as the mean; and in this region they move at ran- 
dom throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper 
world ; thither they neither look, nor do they ever find their 
way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they 
taste of true and abiding pleasure. Like cattle with their 
eyes looking down and their heads stooping, not indeed to the 
earth, but to the dining-table, they fatten and feed and breed, 
and, in their excessive love of these delights, they kick, and 
butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of 
iron ; and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable 
lust. For they fill themselves with that which is not substan- 
tial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsub- 
stantial and incontinent. 

Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the 
many like an oracle. 

Their pleasures are mixed with pains. How can they be 
otherwise ? For they are mere images and pictures of the 
true, and are colored only by contrast, which exaggerates both 
light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools in- 
sane desires of themselves ; and they are fought about as 
Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of 
Helen at Troy in ignorance of the truth. — The Republic, ii. 417. 
God, not the author of evil. See Evil, concealment of. 

Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, 

as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, 
and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the 
goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good 
only is to be attributed to God alone ; of the evils the cause 
is to be sought elsewhere and not in him. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 199 

That appears to me to be most true, he said. 
Then we must not listen to Homer or any other poet who 
is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks 

" Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil lots; " 
and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two, 
" Sometimes meets with evil fortune at other times with good," 

but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill, 

"Him wild hunger drives over the divine earth." 
And again 

" Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us." 

And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties 
of which Pandarus was the real author, was brought about by 
Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and conflict of the Gods 
was instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall not have our ap- 
proval ; neither will we allow our young men to hear the 
words of Aeschylus, that 

" God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house." 

And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe, which is the sub- 
ject of the tragedy in which these iambic verses occur, or of 
the house of Pelops, or of the Trojan War, or any similar 
theme, either we must not permit him to say that these are the 
works of God, or, if they are of God, he must devise some such 
explanation of them* as we are seeking : he must say that God 
did what was just and right, and they were the better for being 
punished ; but that those who are punished are miserable, and 
God is the author of their misery, — the poet is not to be per- 
mitted to say, though he may say that the wicked are misera- 
ble because they require to be punished, and are benefited by 
receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is 
the author of evil to any one, that is to be strenuously denied, 
and not allowed to be sung or said in any well-ordered com- 
monwealth by old or young. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, 
impious. — The Republic, ii. 202. 
God unchangeable. 

What do you think of another principle ? Shall I ask 

you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear in- 
sidiously now in one shape, and now in another — sometimes 
himself changing and becoming different in form, sometimes 
deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations : or 
is he one and the same, immutably fixed in his own proper 
image ? 



200 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

I cannot answer you without more thought. 

Well, I said ; but if we suppose a change in anything that 
change must be effected either by the thing itself, or by some 
other thing ? 

That is most certain. 

And things which are at their best are also least liable to be 
altered or discomposed ; for example, when healthiest and 
strongest, the human frame is least liable to be affected by 
meats and drinks and labors, and the plant which is in the 
fullest vigor also suffers least from heat or wind, or other simi- 
lar accidents. 

Of course. 

And this is true of the soul as well as of the body ; the 
bravest and wisest soul will be least confused or deranged by 
any external influence. 

True. 

And further, as I should suppose, the same principle applies 
to all works of art — vessels, houses, garments ; and that when 
well made and in good condition, they are least altered by time 
and circumstances. 

Very true. 

Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nat- 
ure, or both, is liable to receive the least change at the hands 
of others ? 

True. 

But surely God and the things of God are absolutely per- 
fect ? 

Of course they are. 

He is therefore least likely to take many forms. 

He is. 

But suppose again that he changes and transforms himself ? 

Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at 
all. 

And will he then change himself for the better, or for the 
worse ? 

If he change at all he must change for the worse, for we 
cannot suppose that he is deficient in virtue or beauty. 

Very true, Adeimantus ; but then, would any one, whether 
God or man, desire to change for the worse ? 

Impossible. 

Then God too cannot be willing to change ; being, as is sup- 
posed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God re- 
mains absolutely and forever in his own form. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 201 

That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment. — Tlie 
Republic, ii. 203. 

God incapable of falsehood. See Deception. 
God, absolute knowledge in. See Absolute knowledge, etc. 
Gods, impassiveness of the. 

Soc. Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the disso- 
lution, and pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us 
now ask what will be the condition of animated beings who are 
neither in process of restoration nor of dissolution. And mind 
what you are going to say : I ask whether any animal who 
is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or 
pain, great or small? 

Pro. Certainly not. 

Soc. Then here we have a third state, over and above that 
of pleasure and of pain ? 

Pro. Very true. 

Soc. And do not forget that there is such a state of which 
the recognition will very considerably affect our judgment of 
pleasure, and I should like to say a word or two about it. 

Pro. What have you to say ? 

Soc. Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wis- 
dom, there is no reason why he should not live in this neutral 
state. 

Pro. You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sor- 
rowing ? 

Soc. Yes ; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were 
compared, no degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was 
thought to be necessary to him who chose the life of thought 
and wisdom. 

Pro. Yes certainly, that was said. 

Soc. Then he may live without pleasure ; and who knows 
whether this may not be the most divine of all lives ? 

Pro. At any rate, the Gods cannot be supposed to have 
either joy or sorrow. 

Soc. Certainly not. There would be great impropriety in 
their having either. — Philebus, iii. 169. 
Gods, war of Giants and. See Essence, war about. 
Gods, existence of the. 

Aih. They will make some provoking speech* of this sort : 

O inhabitants of Athens, and Sparta, and Cnosus, they will re- 
ply, in that, you speak truly ; for some of us deny the very ex- 
istence of the Gods, while others, as you say, are of opinion 



202 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

that chey do not care about us ; and others that they are turned 
from their course by gifts. Now we have a right to claim, as 
you yourself allowed, in the matter of the laws, that before you 
are hard upon us and threaten us, you should argue with us and 
convince us — you should first attempt to teach and persuade us 
that there are Gods by reasonable evidences — and also that 
they are too good to be unrighteous, or to. be propitiated, or 
turned from their course by gifts. For when we hear these 
and the like things said of them by those who are esteemed to 
be the best of poets, and orators, and prophets, and priests, and 
innumerable others, the thoughts of most of us are not set upon 
abstaining from unrighteous acts, but upon doing them and 
making atonement for them. When lawgivers profess that 
they are gentle and not stern, we think that they should first of 
all use persuasion to us, and show us the existence of Gods, 
if not in a better manner than other men, at any rate in a truer ; 
and who knows but that we shall hearken to them ? — Laws, 
iv. 397. 

Good and evil, the presence of. See Evil and good, etc. 
Good, all men desire the. 

" When a man loves the beautiful, what does he desire ? " 

I answered her, " That the beautiful may be his." " Still," she 
said, " the answer suggests a further question : " What is given 
by the possession of beauty ? " " To what you have asked," I 
replied, " I have no answer ready." " Then," she said, " let 
me put the word * good ' in the place of the beautiful, and re- 
peat the question once more : He who loves the good loves, 
what does he love?" "The possession of the good," I said. 
" And what does he gain who possesses the good ? " " Happi- 
ness," I replied ; " there is no difficulty in answering that." 
" Yes," she said, " the happy are made happy by the acquisition 
of good things. Nor is there any need to ask why a man de- 
sires happiness ; the answer is already final." " You are right" 
I said. " And is this wish and this desire common to all ? and 
do all men always desire their own good, or only some men ? 

— what say you? " " All men," I replied ; " the desire is com- 
mon to all." — The Symposium, i. 497. 

Good, sufficiency of the. See Sufficiency, etc. 

Good, the idea of, the highest knowledge. 

What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than these 

— higher than justice and the other virtues ? 

Yes, I said, there is. And of these too we must behold not 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 203 

the outline merely, as at present — nothing short of the most 
finished work should satisfy us. When little things are elabo- 
rated with an infinity of pains, in order that they may appear 
in full clearness and precision, how ridiculous that the highest 
truths should not be held worthy of the greatest exactness ! 

A right noble thought ; but do you suppose that we shall re- 
frain from asking you which are the highest ? 

Nay, I said, ask if you will ; but I am certain that you have 
often heard the answer, and now you either do not understand 
or you mean to be troublesome ; I incline to think the latter, 
for you have been often told that the idea of good is the high- 
est knowledge, and that all other things become useful and ad- 
vantageous only by their use of this. You must have already 
guessed that of this I am about to speak, concerning which, as 
you have often heard me say, we know so little ; and, without 
which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will 
profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of the 
whole world is of any value without the good ? or of all knowl- 
edge, without the beautiful and good ? 

Assuredly not. 

You are doubtless aware that most people call pleasure good, 
and the finer sort of wits say knowledge ? And are you aware 
that the latter cannot explain the nature of knowledge, but are 
obliged after all to say that knowledge is of the good ? 

How ridiculous. 

Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with 
our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of 
it — for good, they say, is the knowledge of the good, which 
implies that we understand them when they use the term "good," 
— is certainly ridiculous. — The Republic, ii. 332. 
Good, beautiful and true, the. See Beautiful. 
Good counsel. 

The law would say that to be patient under suffering is 

best, and that we should not give way to impatience, as there 
is no knowing whether such things are good or evil ; and noth- 
ing is gained by impatience ; also, because no human thing is 
of serious importance; and grief stands in the way of that 
which at the moment is most required. 

What is most required ? he asked. 

That we should take counsel about the past, and when the 
dice has been thrown, order our affairs accordingly by the advice 
of reason ; not like children who have had a fall, keeping hold 



204 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl, but 
accustoming the soul forthwith to apply a remedy, raising up 
that which is sickly and fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by 
a real cure. 

Yes, he said, that is the best way of meeting the attacks of 
fortune. — The Republic, ii. 43.5. 
Good, the greatest. See Evil, the greatest, etc. 

Soc. I am still in the dark ; for which are the greatest and 

best of human things ? I dare say that you have heard men 
singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers 
enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, 
as the writer of the song says, wealth honestly obtained. 

Gov. Yes, I know the song ; but what is your drift ? 

Soc. I mean to say, that the producers of those things which 
the author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, 
the trainer, the money-maker, will at once come to you, and 
first the physician will say, "O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving 
you, for my art is concerned with the greatest good of men, 
and not his." And when I ask, Who are you ? he will reply, 
" I am a physician.'* "What do you mean ? I shall say. Do 
you mean that your art produces the greatest good ? " Cer- 
tainly," he will answer, " for is not health the greatest good ? 
What greater good can men have, Socrates ? " And after him 
the trainer will come and say, " I, too, Socrates, shall be greatly 
surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I can 
show of mine." To him I shall say, Who are you, my friend, 
and what is your business ? "I am a trainer," he will reply, 
" and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in 
body." When I have done with the trainer, there arrives the 
money-maker, and he, as I expect, will utterly despise them all. 
" Consider, Socrates," he will say, " whether Gorgias or any 
one else can produce any greater good than wealth." Well, 
you and I say to him, And are you a creator of wealth ? 
" Yes," he replies. And who are you ? "A money-maker." 
And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man ? 
" Yes," he will reply, " of course." And we shall rejoin : 
Yes; but our friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a 
greater good than yours ; and then he will be sure to go on 
and ask, " What good ? Let Gorgias answer." Now I want 
you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you by 
them and by me : What is that which, as you say, is the great- 
est good of man, and of which you are the creator ? Answer 
as. 



PLATO* S BEST THOUGHTS. 205 

Gor. That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being 
that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to 
rulers the power of ruling over others in their several States. 
— Gorgias, iii. 36. 

Good and evil; when they are such. See Evil, and good; when, etc. 
Good or evil, power for. 

Of those fearful examples, most, as I believe, are taken 

from the class of tyrants, and kings, and potentates, and public 
men, for they are the authors of the greatest and most impi- 
ous crimes, because they have the power. And Homer wit- 
nesses to the truth of this; for they are always kings and 
potentates, whom he has described as suffering everlasting pun- 
ishment in the world below; such were Tantalus and Sisy- 
phus and Tityus. But no one ever described Thersites, or 
any private person who was a villain, as suffering everlasting 
punishment or as incurable. For to commit the worst crimes, 
as I am inclined to think, was not in his power, and he was 
happier than those who had the power. Yes, Callicles, the 
very bad men come from the class of those who have power. 
And yet in that very class there may arise good men, and 
worthy of all admiration they are, for where there is great 
power to do wrong, to live and die justly is a hard thing, and 
greatly to be praised, and few there are who attain this. Such 
good and true men, however, there have been, and will be 
again, at Athens, and in other States, who have fulfilled their 
trust righteously. — Gorgias, iii. 117. 
Good, highest in the State. See Evil, the greatest, etc. 
Good, in the divine mind. 

Soc. And now have I not sufficiently shown that Phile- 

bus' goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good? 

Phi. Neither is your " mind " the good, Socrates, for that 
will be open to the same objections. 

Soc. Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying of so my 
" mind," but of the true, which is also the divine mind — far 
otherwise. However, I will not at present claim the first place 
for mind as against the mixed life, but we must come to some 
understanding about the second place. For you might affirm 
pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life, and 
that case, although neither of them would be good, one of them 
might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might 
proceed further to argue ki opposition to Philebus that the 
element which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more 



206 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

akin and more similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this 
is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the first 
or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own mind, 
attain even to the third. — Philebus, in. 157. 
Good and pleasant, a unity in nature. 

Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living 

beings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover, that it is 
the chief good of all, and that the two names " good " and 
" pleasant," are correctly given to one thing and one nature ; 
Socrates, on the other hand, begins by denying this, and further 
says, that in nature as in name, they are two, and that wis- 
dom partakes more than pleasure of the good. — Philebus, iii. 
200. 
Good, truth, the beginning of every. 

Truth is the beginning of every good thing, both in 

heaven and on earth ; and he who would be blessed and happy, 
should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may 
live a true man as long as possible, for then he can be trusted ; 
but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and 
he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. Neither condi- 
tion is to be desired, for the untrustworthy and ignorant has 
no friend, and as time advances he becomes known, and lays 
up in store for himself isolation in crabbed age when life is on 
the wane ; so that, whether his children or friends are alive 
or not, he is equally solitary. — Laws,iv. 255. 
Good men, simplicity of. 

I should like to put a question to you. Ought there not 

to be good physicians in a State, and are not the best those 
who have treated the greatest number of constitutions good and 
bad, just as good judges are those who are acquainted with all 
sorts of moral natures ? 

Yes, I said, I quite agree about the necessity of having good 
judges and good physicians. But do you know whom I think 
good ? 

Will you inform me ? 

Yes, if I can. Let me however note that in the same ques- 
tion you join two things which are not the same. 

How so ? he asked. 

Why, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now skillful 
physicians are those who, from their youth upwards, have com- 
bined with the knowledge of their art, the greatest experience 
of disease ; they had better not be robust in health, and should 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 207 

have had all manner of diseases in their own persons. For 
the body, as I conceive, is not the instrument with which they 
cure the body ; in that case we would not allow them ever to 
be sickly ; but they cure the body with the mind, and the 
mind which is or has become sick can cure nothing. 

That is very true, he said. 

But with the judge the case is different ; he governs mind 
by mind, and he ought not therefore to have been reared 
among vicious minds, and to have associated with them from 
youth upwards, in order that, having gone through the whole 
calendar of crime, he may infer the crimes of others like their 
diseases from the knowledge of himself ; but the honorable 
mind which is to form a healthy judgment ought rather to 
have had no experience or contamination of evil habits when 
young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often 
appear to be simple, and are easily practiced upon by the evil, 
because they have no examples of what evil is in their own 
souls. — The Republic, ii. 233. 
Goods of life. 

Now goods are of two kinds : there are human and there 

are divine goods, and the human hang upon the divine ; and 
the State which attains the greater, at the same time acquires 
the less, or not having the greater loses both. Of the lesser 
goods the first is health, the second beauty, the third strength, 
including swiftness in running and bodily agility generally, 
and the fourth is wealth, not the blind god [Pluto], but one 
who is keen of sight, because he has wisdom for a companion. 
For wisdom is chief and leader of the divine class of goods, 
and next follows temperance ; and from the union of these two 
with courage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of virtue 
is courage. The four naturally take precedence of the other 
goods, and this is the order in which the legislator must place 
them ; and after these he will enjoin the rest of his ordinances 
on the citizens with a view to these, the human looking to 

the divine, and the divine looking to their leader mind 

For the goods of which the many speak are not really good : 
first in the catalogue is placed health, beauty next, wealth 
third, and then innumerable others, as for example to have a 
keen eye, or a quick ear and in general to have all the senses 
perfect ; or, again, to be a tyrant and do as you like ; and the 
final consummation of happiness is to have acquired all these 
things, and as soon as you are possessed of them to be immor- 



208 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

tal. But you and I say, that while to the just and holy all these 
things are the best of possessions, to the unjust they are all, 
including even health, the greatest of evils. For in truth to have 
sight, and hearing, and the use of the senses, or to live at all, 
without justice and virtue, even though a man be rich in all 
the so-called goods of fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life 
be immortal ; but not so great, if the bad man lives a very 
short time. These are the truths of which you must persuade 
or if they will not be persuaded, must compel your poets, to 
sing with suitable accompaniments of harmony and rhythm, 
and in these they must train up your youth. Am I not right ? 
For I plainly declare that evils, as they are termed, are goods to 
the unjust, and only evils to the just, and that goods Are truly 
good to the good, but evil to the evil. — Laws, iv. 162, 190. 
Government, forms of, unessential. See Forms, 
Government, four kinds of. See Forms. 
Government, property in. 
■ What manner of government do you term oligarchy ? 

A government resting on a valuation of property, in which 
the rich have power and the poor are deprived of power. 

I understand, he replied. 

Ought I not to describe, first of all, how the change from 
timocracy to oligarchy arises ? 

Yes. ' 

Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the 
one passes into the other. 

How? 

The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individ- 
uals is the ruin of timocracy : they invent illegal modes of ex- 
penditure, but what do they or their wives care about the law ? 

Very true. 

And then one seeing another prepares to rival him, and thus 
the whole body of the citizens acquires a similar character. 

Likely enough. 

After that they get on in trade, and the more they think of 
making a fortune the less they think of virtue ; for when 
riches and virtue are placed together in the scales of the bal- 
ance, the one always rises as the other falls. 

True. 

And in proportion as riches and rich men are honored in the 
State, virtue and the virtuous are dishonored. — The Republic, 
ii. 377. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 209 

Government, the beginning of. See Legislation, beginning of. 
Government, science of. 

Sir. The several forms of government cannot be denned 

by the words few or many, voluntary or compulsory, poverty 
or riches ; but some notion of science must enter in, if we are 
to be consistent with what has preceded. 

Y. Soc. And we must be consistent. 

Str. Well, then, in which of these various forms of States 
may the science of government, which is among the greatest 
and most difficult of all sciences, be supposed to reside ? That 
we must discover, and then we shall see who are the false poli- 
tician's who win popularity and pretend to be politicians and 
are not, and separate them from the wise king. 

Y. Soc. That, as the argument has already intimated, is our 
duty. 

Str. Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain 
political science ? 

Y. Soc. Impossible. 

Str. But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would 
be a hundred, or say fifty, who could ? 

Y. Soc. In that case political science would certainly be the 
easiest of all sciences ; there could not be found in a city of 
that number as many really good draught-players, if judged by 
the standard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly 
not be as many kings. For kings we may truly call those 
who possess royal science, whether they rule or not, as was 
shown in the previous argument. — Statesman, iii. 578. 
Government of the few, only true. See Few. 
Government, with or without laws. 

Str. That can be the only true form of government in 

which the governors are found to possess true science, and are 
not mere pretenders, whether they rule according to law, or 
without law, over willing or unwilling subjects, and are rich or 
poor themselves, — none of these things can properly be in- 
cluded in the notion of the ruler. 

Y Soc. True. 

Str. And whether with a view to the public good they purge 
the State by killing some, or exiling some; whether they lower 
or increase the body corporate, by sending out or receiving 
into the hive swarms of citizens, while they act according to 
the rules of wisdom and justice, whether with or without laws, 
if they use their power with a view to the general security 
U 



210 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

and improvement, then the city over which they rule, and 
which has these characteristics, may be described as the only 
true State. All other governments are not genuine or real, 
but only imitations of this, and some of them are better and 
some of them are worse ; the better are said to be well gov- 
erned, but they are mere imitations like the others. 

Y. Soc. I agree, Stranger, in the greater part of what you 
say ; but as to their ruling without laws — the expression has 
a harsh sound. 

Str. I was just going to ask, Socrates, whether you objected 
to any of my statements ; and now I see that this notion of 
there being good government without laws will require some 
further consideration. 

Y. Soc. Certainly. 

Str. There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner 
the business of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that 
the law should rule, but that a man should rule, supposing him 
to have wisdom and royal power. Do you see why this is ? 

Y. Soc. Why ? 

Str. Because the law in aiming at what is noblest or most 
just cannot at once comprise what is best for all. The differ- 
ences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements 
of human things, do not admit of any universal and simple 
rule. No art can lay down a rule which will last for all time. 

Y. Soc. Of course not. 

Str. But this the law is always striving to make one ; like 
an obstinate and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything 
to be done contrary to his appointment, or any question to be 
asked — not even in sudden changes of circumstances, when 
something happens to be better than what he commanded for 
some one. 

Y. Soc. True ; such is the manner in which the law treats 
us. 

Sir. A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a 
state of things which is the reverse of simple. 

Y. Soc. True. 

Str. Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are 
we compelled to make laws at all ? — Statesman, iii. 579. - 
Government of Sparta, doubtful 

Meg. Stranger, I perceive that I cannot say, without more 

thought, what I should call the government of Lacedaemon, 
for it seems to me to be like a tyranny ; the power of our 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 211 

Ephors is marvelously tyrannical ; and sometimes it appears to 
me to be of all cities the most democratical ; and who can rea- 
sonably deny that it is an aristocracy ? We have also a mon- 
archy which is held for life, and is said by all mankind, and 
not by ourselves only, to be the most ancient of all mon- 
archies ; and, therefore, when asked on a sudden, I cannot pre- 
cisely say which form of government the Spartan is. 

Cle. I am in the same difficulty, Megillus, for I do not feel 
confident that the polity of Cnosus is any of these. 

Ath. The reason is, my excellent friends, that you really 
have polities, but the cities of which we were speaking are 
mere aggregations of citizens who are the subjects and servants 
of parts of their own State ; they are named after their several 
ruling powers, and are not polities at all. But if States are to 
be named after their rulers, the true State ought to be called 
by the name of the God who rules over wise men. — Laws, iv. 
240. 
Government, necessity for. 

Mankind must have laws, and conform to them, or their 

life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast. And 
the reason of this is, that no man's nature is able to know 
what is best for the social state of man ; or knowing, always 
able to do what is best. In the first place, there is a difficulty 
in apprehending that the true art of politics is concerned, not 
with private but with public good; — for public good binds to- 
gether States, but private only distracts them, — nor do men 
always see that the gain is greater both to the individual and 
the State, when the State and not the individual is first consid- 
ered. In the second place, even if a person know as a matter 
of science that this is the truth, but is possessed of absolute 
and irresponsible power, he will never be able to abide in this 
principle or to persist in regarding the public good as primary 
in the State, and the private good as secondary. Human nat- 
ure will be always drawing him into avarice and selfishness, 
avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and 
will bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and better ; 
and so, working darkness in his soul, will at last fill with evils 
both him and the whole city. For if a man were born so di- 
vinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth, he 
would have no need of laws to rule over him ; for there is no 
law or order which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without 
impiety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man, but rather 
the lord of all. — Laws, iv. 388. 



212 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Governors. See Kings, Rulers, Legislators. 

Greatness and gentleness seemingly inconsistent. See Gentleness, 

etc. 
Greatness, the idea of. 

' You see a number of great objects, and when you look at 

them together, there seems to you to be one and the same idea 
(or nature) in them all; hence you conceive of a greatness 
as one. 

Yery true, said Socrates. 

And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to 
embrace in one view the idea of greatness and of great things 
which are not the idea, and to compare them, will not another 
greatness arise, which will appear to be the source of all these ? 

That is true. 

Then another kind of greatness now comes into view over 
and above absolute greatness, and the individuals which par- 
take of it; and then another over and above all these, by virtue 
of which they will all be great, and so each idea, instead of be- 
ing one, will be infinitely subdivided. — Parmenides, iii. 249. 
Grief, manifestations of. 

Shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings 

of famous men ? 

They will go with the others. 

But shall we be right in getting rid of them ? Reflect : our 
principle is that the good man will not consider death terrible 
to a good man. 

Yes ; that is our principle. 

And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as 
though he had suffered anything terrible ? 

He will not. 

Such an one, as we further maintain, is enough for himself and 
his own happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men. 

True, he said. 

And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the 
deprivation of fortune, is to him of all men least terrible. 

Assuredly. 

And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will 
bear with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort 
which may befall him. 

Yes, he will feel such a misfortune less than another. 

Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of 
famous men, and making them over to women (and not even 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 213 

to women who are good for anything), or to men of a baser 
sort, that those who are being educated by us to be the de- 
fenders of their country may scorn to do the like. 

That will be very right. 

Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets 
not to depict Achilles, who is the son of a goddess, first lying 
on his side, then on his back, and then on his face ; then start- 
ing up and sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the barren 
sea ; now taking the dusky ashes in both his hands and pouring 
them over his head, or bewailing and sorrowing in the various 
modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe 
Priam, the kinsman of the Gods, as praying and beseeching — 
" Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name." 

Still more earnestly will we beg of him not to introduce the 
Gods lamenting and saying, — 

"Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow." 

But if he must introduce the Gods, at any rate let him not dare 

so completely to represent the greatest of the Gods as to make 

him say — 

" O heavens ! with my eyes I behold a dear friend of mine driven round and 
round the city, and my heart is sorrowful." 

Or again : — 

" Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, subdued at 
the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius." 

For if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously believe in 
such unworthy representations of the Gods, instead of laughing 
at them as they ought, hardly will any of them deem that he 
himself, being but a man, can be dishonored by similar actions ; 
neither will he rebuke any inclination that may arise in his 
mind to say and do the like. And instead of having any shame 
or self-control, he will be always whining and lamenting on 
slight occasions. — The Republic, ii. 209. 
Gyges, story of. 

Now that justice is only the inability to do injustice will 

best appear if we imagine something of this kind ; suppose we 
give both the just and the unjust entire liberty to do what they 
will, and let us attend and see whither desire will lead them ; 
then we shall detect the just man in the very act ; the just and 
unjust will be found going the same way, — following their in- 
terest, which all natures follow as a good, and are only diverted 
into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty 



214 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

which we are supposing may be most conveniently given to 
them in the form of such a power as is said to have been pos- 
sessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. Accord- 
ing to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the 
king of Lydia, and, while he was in the field, there was a storm 
and earthquake, which made an opening in the earth at the 
place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he 
descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he be- 
held a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he stooping 
and looking in saw a dead body, of stature, as appeared to him, 
more than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring ; this 
he took from the finder of the dead and reascended. Now the 
shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might 
send their monthly report concerning the flock to the king; 
and into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, 
and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet 
of the ring towards the inner side of the hand, when instantly 
he became invisible, and the others began to speak of him as 
if he were no longer there. He was astonished at this, and 
again touching the ring he turned the collet outwards and re- 
appeared ; thereupon he made trials of the ring, and always 
with the same result ; when he turned the collet inwards he be- 
came invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Perceiving this, 
he immediately contrived to be chosen one of the messengers 
sent to the court, where he no sooner arrived than he seduced 
the queen, and with her help conspired against the king and 
slew him and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were 
two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and 
the unjust the other ; no man they say is of such an iron nat- 
ure that he would stand fast in justice. — The Republic, ii. 181. 
Gymnastics and music. 

In speaking of education, the law means to speak of 

those who have the care of order and instruction in gymnasia 
and schools, and of the going to school and lodging of boys and 
girls ; and in speaking of contests, the law refers to the judges 
of gymnastics and of music ; these again are divided into two 
classes, the one having to do with music, the other with gym- 
nastic. — Laws, iv. 286. 

After music comes gymnastic, in which our youth are next 
to be trained. 

Certainly. 

And gymnastic as well as music should receive careful atten- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 215 

tion in childhood, and continue through life. Now my belief is, 
— and this is a matter upon which I should like to have your 
opinion, but my own belief is, — not that the good body im- 
proves the soul, but that the good soul improves the body. 
What do you say ? 

Yes, I agree. 

Then if we have educated the mind, the minuter care of the 
body may properly be committed to the mind, and we need only 
describe the outlines of the subject for brevity's sake. 

Very good. 

That they must abstain from intoxication has been already 
remarked by us, for of all persons a guardian should be the last 
to get drunk and not know where in the world he is. 

Yes, he said ; that a guardian should require another to 
guard him is ridiculous indeed. 

But next, what shall we say of their food ; for the men are 
athletes in the great contest of all, are they not ? 

Yes, he said. 

And will the usual gymnastic exercises be suited to them ? 

I cannot say. 

I am afraid, I said, that such exercise is but a sleepy sort of 
thing, and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe that 
athletes sleep away their lives, and are liable to most dangerous 
illnesses if they depart, in ever so slight a degree, from their 
customary regimen ? 

Yes, I do. 

Then, I said, a finer sort of training will be required for our 
warrior athletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see 
and hear with the utmost keenness ; in the many changes of 
water and also of food, of summer heat and winter cold, which 
they will have to endure, they must not be liable to break down 
in health. 

That is quite my view, he said. 

The really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple 
music which we were just now describing. 

How so. 

Why, I conceive that there is a gymnastic also which is sim- 
ple and good ; and that such ought to be the military gymnastic. 

What do you mean? 

My meaning may be learned from Homer ; he, you know, 
feeds his heroes, when they are campaigning, on soldiers' fare ; 
they have no fish, although they are on the shores of the Hel- 



216 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

lespontj and they are allowed nothing but roast meat — which 
only requires a fire, and is therefore the most convenient diet 
for soldiers — and not boiled, as this would involve a carrying 
about of pots and pans. 

True. 

And I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces 
are not even mentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, how- 
ever, he is not singular, as all professional athletes know that 
a man who is to be in good condition should take nothing of 
the kind. — ■ The Republic, ii. 227. 

Habit, mental and bodily. See Mental, etc. 
Happiness gained by Wisdom. 

Let us consider this further point, I said : Seeing that all 

men desire happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is 
gained by a use, and aright use,. of the things of life, and the 
right use of them, and good fortune in the use of them, is 
given by knowledge, the inference is that every man ought by 
all means to try and make himself as wise as he can ? 

Yes, he said. 

And the desire to obtain this treasure, which is far more 
precious than money, from a father or a guardian or a friend 
or a suitor, whether citizen or stranger — the eager desire and 
prayer to them that they would impart wisdom to you, is not 
at all dishonorable, Cleinias ; nor is any one to be blamed for 
doing any honorable service or ministration to any man, 
whether a loyer or not, if his aim is to get wisdom. Do you 
agree to that ? I said. 

Yes, he said, I quite agree, and think that you are right. 

Yes, I said, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does 
not come to man spontaneously; for that is a point which 
has still to be considered, and is not yet agreed upon by you 
and me. 

But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said. 

Best of men, I said, I am delighted to hear you say that; 
and I am also grateful to you for having saved me from a long 
and tiresome speculation as to whether wisdom can be taught 
or not. But now, as you think that wisdom can be taught, 
and that wisdom only can make a man happy and fortunate, 
will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to love wisdom, 
and you individually will trv to love her ? 

Certainly, Socrates, he said ; and I will do my best. — 
Euthydemus, i. 184. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 217 

Harmony. 

Might not a person say that harmony is a thing invisible, 

incorporeal, perfect, divine, existing in the lyre which is har- 
monized, but that the lyre and the strings are matter and ma- 
terial, composite, earthy, and akin to mortality ? And when 
some one breaks the lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then 
he who takes this view would argue as you do, and on the same 
analogy, that the harmony survives and has not perished ; for 
you cannot imagine, as he would say, that the lyre without the 
strings, and the broken strings themselves which are mortal, re- 
main, and yet that the harmony, which is of heavenly and im- 
mortal nature and kindred, has perished — and perished too 
before the mortal. That harmony, he would say, must still 
exist somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay before 

that decays Now there is an absurdity in saying that 

harmony is discord, or is composed of elements which are 
still in a state of discord. But perhaps what he really meant 
to say was that harmony is composed of differing notes of 
higher or lower pitch which disagreed once, but are now recon- 
ciled by the art of music ; for if the higher and lower notes 
still disagreed, there could be no harmony, as is indeed evident. 
For harmony is a symphony, and symphony is an agreement ; 
but an agreement of disagreements while they disagree, there 
cannot be ; you cannot harmonize that which disagrees. This 
may be illustrated by rhythm, which is composed of elements 
short and long, once differing and now in accord ; which ac- 
cordance, as in the former instance, medicine, so in this, music 
implants, making love and unison to grow up among them ; and 
thus music, too, is concerned with the principles of love in 
their application to harmony and rhythm. Again, in the essen- 
tial nature of harmony and rhythm there is no difficulty in dis- 
cerning love which has not yet become double. But when 
you want to use them in actual life, either in the composition 
of music or in the correct performance of airs or metres com- 
posed already, which latter is called education, then the diffi- 
culty begins, and the good artist is needed. Then the old tale 
has to be repeated of fair and heavenly love — the love of 
Urania the fair and heavenly muse, and of the duty of accept- 
ing the temperate, and those who are as yet intemperate only 
that they may become temperate, and of preserving their love ; 
and again, of the vulgar Polyhymnia, who must be used with 
circumspection that the pleasure may not generate licentious- 
ness. — Phaedo, i. 414, 481 



218 PLATO* S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Harmony of soul and form. See Form. 
Harmony of temperance. 

Do you observe that we were pretty right in our antici- 
pation that temperance was a sort of harmony ? 

Why so ? 

Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, 
each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State 
wise and the other valiant ; but that is not the way with tem- 
perance, which extends to the whole, and runs through the 
notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and 
the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them 
to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or strength or numbers or 
wealth, or whatever else may be the measure of them. Most 
truly then do we describe temperance as the natural agreement 
of superior and inferior, both in States and individuals, about 
which of the two elements shall rule. — The Republic, ii. 257. 
Harmony civilizing. 

And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and 

has the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or 
spirited principle to be the subject and ally ? 

Certainly. 

And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and 
gymnastic will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining 
the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating, 
and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony 
and rhythm? 

Quite true, he said. — The Republic, ii. 268. 
Harmony of the inner man. 

As we were saying at the beginning of our work of 

construction, some divine power must have conducted us to a 
primary form of justice — that suspicion of ours has been now 
verified ? 

Yes, certainly 

And justice was the reality, and was concerned not with the 
outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and 
concernment of man ; for the just man does not permit the , 
several elements within him to interfere with one another, or 
any of them to do the work of others, but he sets in order 
his own inner life, and is his own master, and at peace with 
himself ; and when he has bound together the three principles 
within him, 'which may be compared to the higher, lower, and 
middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals — 



PLATO* S BEST THOUGHTS. 219 

when he has bound together all these, and is no longer many, 
but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted 
nature, then he will begin to act, if he has to act, whether in a 
matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or some 
affair of politics or private business ; in all which cases he will 
think and call that which preserves and cooperates with this 
harmonious condition, just and good action ; and the knowledge 
which presides over it, wisdom ; and that which at any time de- 
stroys this condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion 
which presides over it, ignorance. — The Republic, ii. 270. 
Harmony of health and wealth. 

On this higher end the man of understanding will con- 
centrate the energies of his life. And in the first place, he 
will honor studies which impress these qualities on his soul, 
and will disregard others ? 

Clearly, he said. 

In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit, and so 
far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, 
that he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter; 
his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or 
well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but he 
will be always desirous of preserving the harmony of the 
body for the sake of the concord of the soul ? 

Certainly he will, he replied, if he has true music in him. 

And there is a principle of order and harmony in the acqui- 
sition of wealth ; this also he will observe, and will not allow 
himself to be dazzled by the opinion of the world, and heap 
up riches to his own infinite harm ? 

I should think not, he said. 

He will look at the city which is within him, and take care 
to avoid any change of his own institutions, such as might 
arise either from superfluity or from want ; and with a view 
to this only gain or spend in so far as he is able ? 

Very true. 

And, for the same reason, he will accept such honors as he 
deems likely to make him a better man ; but those which are 
likely to disorder his constitution, whether private or public 
honors, he will avoid. — The Republic, ii. 423. 
Harmony in the soul. 

Soc. What would you say of the soul ? Will the good 

soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which 
there is harmony and order ? 



220 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Gal. The latter follows from our previous admissions. 

Soc. What is the name which is given to the effect of har"* 
monj and order in the body ? 

Gal. I suppose that you mean health and strength ? 

Soc. Yes, I do ; and what is the name which you would 
give to the effect of harmony and order in the soul ? Try and 
discover a name for this as well as for the other. 

Gal. Why do you not give the name yourself, Socrates ? 

Soc. Well, if you would rather, I will ; and you shall say 
whether you agree with me, and if not you shall refute and 
answer me. Healthy, as I conceive, is the name which is 
given to the regular order of the body, and from this comes 
health and every other bodily excellence : is that true or not ? 

GaL True. 

Soc. And " lawful " and " law " are the names which are 
given to the regular order and action of the soul, and these 
make men lawful and orderly : and so we have temperance 
and justice ? have we not ? 

Gal. Yes. — Gorgias, iii. 95. 

Harmony, counterparts and antagonisms in the soul, making. See 

Antagonisms. 
Harmony dissolved, a generation of pain. 

Soc. I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, 

there is also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain. 

Pro. That is very probable. 

Soc. And the restoration of harmony and return to nat- 
ure is the source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in 
the fewest and shortest words about matters of the greatest 
moment. — Philebus, iii. 167. 
Harmony in choral song. See Choral. 
Harmonies and consonances. See Consonances. 
Harmonies of divers kinds. 

■ We were saying, as you may remember, in speaking of the 

words, that we had no need of lamentation and strains of sorrow ? 

True. 

And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? As 
you are a musician, I wish that you would tell me. 

The harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor 
Lydian, and the full-toned or bass Lydian, and others which 
sire like them. 

These then, I said, must be banished ; even to women of 
virtue and character they are of no use, and much less to men. 

Certainly. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 221 

In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence 
are utterly at variance with the character of our guardians. 

Of course. 

Then I must ask you again, which are the soft or drinking 
harmonies ? 

The Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian ; they are termed 
"solute." 

Well, and are these of any military use ? 

Quite the reverse, he replied ; but then the Dorian and the 
Phrygian appear to be the only ones which remain. 

I answered : Of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want 
to have one warlike, which will sound the word or note which 
a brave man utters in the hour of danger and stern resolve, or 
when his cause is failing and he is going to wounds or death 
or is overtaken by some other evil, and at every such crisis 
meets fortune with calmness and endurance ; and another to be 
used by him in times of peace and freedom of action, when 
there is no pressure of necessity ; and he is seeking to per- 
suade God by prayer or man by instruction and advice ; or on the 
other hand, which expresses his willingness to listen to persua- 
sion or entreaty and advice ; and which represents him when 
he has accomplished his aim, not carried away by success, but 
acting moderately and wisely, and acquiescing in the event. 
These two harmonies I ask you to leave ; the strain of neces- 
sity and the strain of freedom, the strain of the unfortunate 
and the strain of the fortunate, the strain of courage, and the 
strain of temperance ; these, I say, leave. 

And these, he replied, are the very ones of which I was 
speaking. 

Then, I said, if only the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies 
are used in our songs and melodies, we shall not want multiplic- 
ity of notes or a panharmonic scale ? 

I suppose not. — The Republic, ii. 222. 
" Having " and " possessing," distinction between. 

Soc. You have heard the common explanation of the 

verb " to know ? " 

Theaet. I do not know that I remember at the moment. 

Soc. They explain the word " to know " as meaning " to 
have knowledge." 

Theaet. True. 

Soc. I should like to make a slight change, and say " to pos- 
sess " knowledge. 



222 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Theaet How do the two expressions differ ? 

Soc. Perhaps there may be no difference ; but still I should 
like you to hear and help to test my view. 

Theaet. I will, if I can. 

Soc. I should distinguish " having " from " possessing : " for 
example, a man may buy and keep under his control a garment 
which he does not wear ; and then we should say, not that he 
has, but that he possesses the garment. 

Theaet. That would be the correct expression. 

Soc. Well, may not a man " possess " and yet not " have " 
knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking ? As you 
may suppose a man to have caught wild birds — doves or any 
other birds — and to be keeping them in an aviary which he 
has constructed at home ; and then we might say, in one sense, 
that he always has them because he possesses them, might we 
not? 

Theaet. Yes. 

Soc. And yet, in another sense, he has none of tbem ; but 
he has power over them, and has them under his hand in an 
inclosure of his own, and can take and have them whenever 
he likes ; he can catch any which he likes, and again let them 
go, and he may do so as often as he pleases. 

Theaet. True. 

Soc. Once more, then, as in what preceded, we made a sort 
of waxen figment in the mind, so let us now suppose that in 
the mind of each man there is an aviary of all sorts of birds 
— some flocking together apart from the rest, others in small 
groups, others solitary, flying anywhere and everywhere. 

Theaet. Let us imagine such an aviary ; and what is to fol- 
low ? 

Soc. We may suppose this receptacle to be empty while we 
are young, and that the birds are kinds of knowledge ; when a 
man has gotten and detained in the inclosure any of those dif- 
ferent kinds of knowledge, then he may be said to have learned 
or discovered the thing of which that knowledge is : and this is 
to know. — Theaetetus, iii. 403. 
Health, harmony of wealth and. See Harmony, etc. 
Health of body and soul. See Body, etc. 
Heavenly idea of the Earth. See Earth, etc. 

Heavenly bodies, beheld as symbols of truths and means of educa- 
tion. 

Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar manner in which I 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS 223 

praised astronomy before, my praise shall be more worthy of 
your spirit. For every one, as I think, must feel that astron- 
omy compels the soul to look upwards, and leads us from this 
world to another. 

I am an exception then, for I should rather say that those 
who elevate astronomy into philosophy make us look downwards 
and not upwards. 

What do you mean ? he asked. 

You, I replied, have in your mind a sublime conception of 
how we know the things above. And I dare say that if a per- 
son were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, 
you would still think that his mind was the percipient, and not 
his eyes. And you are very likely right, and I may be a sim- 
pleton : but, in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of 
being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, and 
whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, 
seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he 
can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul 
is looking, not upwards, but downwards, whether his way to 
knowledge is by water or by land, and in whichever element he 
may lie on his back and float. 

I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I 
should like to know how astronomy can be learned in any other 
way more conducive to that knowledge of which we speak ? 

I answered ; the starry heaven which we behold is wrought 
upon a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and 
most perfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed in- 
ferior far to the true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute 
slowness, which are relative to each other, and carry with them 
that which is contained in them, in the true number and in 
every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended by rea- 
son and intelligence, but not by sight. 

True, he replied. 

The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and 
with a view to that higher knowledge ; their beauty is like the 
fceauty of figures or pictures wrought by the hand of Daedalus, 
or some other great artist, which we may chance to behold ; 
any geometrician who saw them would appreciate the exquisite- 
ness of their workmanship, but he would never dream of think- 
ing that in them he could find the true equal or the true double, 
or the truth of any other proportion. 

No, he said, to think so would be ridiculous. 



224 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when 
he looks at the movements of the stars ? "Will he not think 
that heaven and the things in heaven are framed by the Creator 
in the most perfect manner ? But when he reflects that the 
proportions of night and day, or of both to .the month, or of the 
month to the year, or of the other stars to these and to one an- 
other, are of the visible and material, he will never fall into the 
error of supposing that they are eternal and liable to no devia- 
tion — that would be monstrous ; he will rather seek in every 
possible way to discover the truth of them. 

I quite agree now that you tell me so. 

Then, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should use 
problems and let the heavens alone — if we desire to have a 
real knowledge of the science and to train the reasoning faculty 
by the aid of it. — The Republic, ii. 356. 
Heirships of wealth, an evil. See Inheritances. 
Heracles and Iolaus. 

I am no Heracles ; and even Heracles could not fight 

against the Hydra, who was a she-Sophist, and had the wit to 
shoot up many new heads when one of. them was cut off ; espe- 
cially when he saw a second monster of a sea-crab, who was 
also a Sophist, and appeared to have newly arrived from a sea 
voyage, bearing down upon him from the left, opening his 
mouth and biting. Then he called Iolaus, his nephew, to his 
help, and he ably succored him ; but if my Iolaus, who is Pa- 
trocles the statuary, were to come, he would make a bad busi- 
ness worse. 

And now that you have delivered yourself of this strain, said 
Dionysodorus, will you inform me whether Iolaus was the 
nephew of Heracles any more than he is yours ? 

I suppose that I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said, 
for you will insist on asking — that I pretty well know — out 
of envy, in order to prevent me from learning the wisdom of 
Euthydemus. 

Then answer me, he said. 

Well then, I said, I can only reply, that Iolaus was not my 
nephew at all, but the nephew of Heracles ; and his father was 
not my brother Patrocles, but Iphicles, who has a name rather 
like his, and was the brother of Heracles. — Euthydemus, i. 201. 
Heroic sons of heroic fathers. See State, heroes. 
Heroic men to be kissed and honored by all. See Brave, honor to the. 
But the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 225 

done to him ? In the first place, he shall receive honor in the 
army from his youthful comrades ; every one of them in suc- 
cession shall crown him. What do you say to that ? 

I approve. 

And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of 
fellowship ? 

To that too, I agree. 

But you will hardly agree to my next proposal. 

What is your proposal? 

That he should kiss and be kissed by them. 

Most certainly, and I should be disposed to go further and 
say : Let no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be 
kissed by him while the expedition lasts. So that if there be 
a lover in the army, whether his love be youth or maiden, he 
may be more eager to win the prize of valor. 

That is good, I said. That the brave man is to have more 
wives than others has been already determined ; and he is to 
have first choices in such matters more than others, in order 
that he may have as many children as possible. 

Agreed. — The Republic, ii. 295. 
Heterodoxy and false opinion. See False opinion. 
Soc. If thinking is speaking to one's self, no one speak- 
ing and thinking of two objects, and apprehending them both 
in his soul, will say and think that the one is the other of 
them, and I must add, that you will have to let the word 
"other" alone [i. e. not insist that "one" and "other" are 
both in Greek called " other," erepov']. I mean to say, that no 
one thinks the noble to be base, or anything of the kind. 

Theaet. I will give up the word " other," Socrates ; and I 
agree in what you say. 

Soc. If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he cannot 
think that the one of them is the other ? 

Theaet. True. 

Soc. Neither, if he has one of them in his mind and not the 
other, can he think that one is the other ? 

Theaet. True ; for we should have to suppose that he appre- 
hends that which is not in his thoughts at all. 

Soc. Then no one who knows either both or only one of the 
two objects in his mind can think that the one is the other. And 
therefore, he who maintains that false " doxy " is heterodoxy is 
talking nonsense ; for neither in this, any more than in the pre- 
vious way, can false opinion exist in us The only pos- 

15 



226 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

sibility of erroneous opinion is, when knowing you and Theo- 
dorus, and having the seal or impression of both of you in the 
wax block, but seeing you both imperfectly and at a distance, I 
try to assign the right impression of memory visual to the right 
impression, and fit this into the proper mould ; if I succeed, 
recognition will take place ; but if I fail and transpose them, 
putting the foot into the wrong shoe, — that is to say, putting 
the vision of either of you on to the wrong seal, or seeing you 
as in a mirror when the sight flows from right to left — then 
"heterodoxy" and false opinion ensues. — Theaetetus, iii. 395- 
398. 

Highest good in the State. See Evil, etc. 
Hippias, self-assertion of. See Self-assertion, etc. 
Holiness, resembling Justice. 

Suppose that he went on to say : Well now, is there such 

a thing as holiness ? — we should answer, Yes, if I am not 
mistaken ? 

Yes, he said. 

And that you acknowledge to be a thing — should we admit 
that? 

He assented. 

And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the 
holy, or of the nature of the unholy ? I should be angry at 
his putting such a question, and should say, Peace, man ; noth- 
ing can be holy if holiness is not holy. What do you say to 
that ? Would you not answer in the same way ? 

Certainly, he said. 

And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, 
What were you saying just now ? Perhaps I may not have 
heard you rightly, but you seemed to me to be saying thaf the 
parts of virtue were not the same as one another. I should 
reply, You certainly heard that said, but not, as you imagine, 
said by me ; for Protagoras gave the answer, and I only asked 
the question. And suppose that he turned to you and said, Is 
this true, Protagoras ? and do you maintain that one part of 
virtue is unlike another, and is this your position ? how would 
you answer him ? 

I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, 
Socrates. • 

Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this ; and now sup- 
posing that he proceeded to say further, Then holiness is not 
of the nature of justice, nor justice of the nature of holiness, 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 227 

but of the nature of unholiness ; and holiness is of the nature 
of the not just, and therefore of the unjust, and the unjust is 
unholy ; — how shall we answer him ? I should certainly an- 
swer him on my own behalf that justice is holy, and that holi- 
ness is just ; and I would say in like manner on your behalf 
also, if you would allow me, that justice is either the same with 
holiness, or very nearly the same ; and above all I would as- 
sert that justice is like holiness and holiness is like justice ; and 
I wish that you would tell me whether I may be permitted to 
give this answer on your behalf, and whether you would agree 
with me. 

He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposi- 
tion that justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there 
appears to me to be a difference between them. But what 
matter ? if you please I please ; and let us assume, if you will, 
that justice is holy, and that holiness is just. 

Pardon me, I said ; I do not want this " if you wish "or " if 
you will " sort of argument to be proven, but I want you and 
me to be proven ; I mean to say that the argument will be 
best proven if there be no " if." 

Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to 
holiness, for there is always some point of view in which every- 
thing is like every other thing ; white is in a certain way like 
black, and hard is like soft, and the most extreme opposites 
have some qualities in common ; even the parts of the face 
which, as we were saying before, are distinct and have different 
functions, are still in a certain point of view similar, and one of 
them is like another of them. And you may prove that they 
are like one another on the same principle that all things are 
like one another ; and yet things which are alike in some par- 
ticular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are un- 
like in some particular, however slight, unlike. 

And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice 
and holiness have but a small degree of likeness ? 

Certainly not, he said ; but I do not agree with what I un- 
derstand to be your view. — Protagoras, i. 130. 
Holiness ; the essence of. 

Soc. What do you say of piety, Euthyphro : is not piety, 

according to your definition, loved by all the Gods ? 

Euth. Yes. 

Soc. Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason ? 

Euth. No, that is the reason. 



228 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Soc. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is 
loved ? 

Euth. Yes. 

Soc. And that which is in a state to be loved of the Gods, 
and is dear to them, is in a state to be loved of them because 
it is loved of them ? 

Euth. Certainly. 

Soc. Then that which is loved of God, Euthyphro, is not 
holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm ; 
but they are two different things. 

Euth. How do you mean, Socrates? 

Soc. I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by 
us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy be- 
cause it is loved. 

Euth. Yes. 

Soc. But that which is dear to the Gods is dear to them be- 
cause it is loved by them, not loved by them because it is 
dear to them. 

Euth. True. 

Soc. But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the 
same as that which is dear to God, and that which is holy is 
loved as being holy, then that which is dear to God would 
have been loved as being dear to God ; but if that which is 
dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that 
which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. 
But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are 
quite different from one another. For one (^eo^tXes) is of a 
kind to be loved because it is loved, and the other (oa-iov) is 
loved because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to 
ine, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, 
to offer an attribute only, and not the essence — the attribute 
of being loved by all the Gods. But you still refuse to explain 
to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you please, I 
will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once 
more what piety or holiness really is, whether dear to the Gods 
or not (for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel). 
And what is impiety ? 

Euth. I really do not know, Socrates, how to say what I 
mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever 
ground we rest them, seem to turn round and walk away. — 
Euthyphro, i. 294. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 229 

Homer, the best of poets. See Imitative poetry, 

$oc. I often envy the profession of a rhapsode, Ion ; for 

you have always to wear fine clothes, and to look as beautiful 
as you can is a part of your art. Then, again, you are obliged 
to be continually in the company of many good poets ; and 
especially of Homer, who is the best and most divine of them ; 
and to understand him, and not merely learn his words by rote, 
is a thing greatly to be envied. And no man can be a rhapsode 
who does not understand the meaning of the poet. For the 
rhapsode ought to interpret the mind of the poet to his hear- 
ers, but how can he interpret him well unless he knows what 
he means ? All this is greatly to be envied. 

Ion. That is true, Socrates ; interpretation has certainly been 
the most laborious of my art ; and I believe myself able to 
speak about Homer better than any man 

Soc. But how did you come to have this skill about 
Homer, and not about Hesiod or the other poets ? Does not 
Homer speak of the same themes which all other poets handle ? 
Is not war his great argument ? and does he not speak of hu- 
man society and of intercourse of men, good and bad, skilled 
and unskilled, and of the Gods conversing with one another 
and with mankind, and about what happens in heaven and in 
the world below, and the generations of Gods and heroes ? 
Are not these the themes of which Homer sings ? 

Ion. Very true, Socrates. 

Soc. And do not the other poets sing of the same ? 

Ion. Yes, Socrates ; but not in the same way as Homer. 

Soc. What ! in a worse way ? 

Ion. Yes, in a far worse. 

Soc. And Homer is better ? 

Ion. He is incomparably better. — Ion, i. 219. 
Homer, not a legislator. See Legislator. 

Homicide, less criminal than deception. See Deceiver as to truth. 
Honesty professed. 

That you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in 

thinking that all men regard every man as having a share of 
justice and of every other political virtue, let me give you a 
further proof, which is this. In other cases, as you are aware, 
if a man says that he is a good flute-player, or skillful in any 
other art in which he has no skill, people either laugh at him 
or are angry with him, and his relations think that he is mad 
and go and admonish him ; but when honesty is in question,, or 



230 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

some other political virtue, even if they know that he is dis- 
honest, yet, if the man comes publicly forward and tells the 
truth about his dishonesty, in this case they deem that to be 
madness which in the other case was held by them to be good 
sense. They say that men ought to profess honesty whether 
they are honest or not, and that a man is mad who does not 
make such a profession. Their notion is, that a man must have 
some degree of honesty ; and that if he has none at all he 
ought not to be in the world. — Protagoras, i. 123. 
Honor due to parents. See Children, etc., and Parents. 
Honor and justice among thieves. 

We have already shown that the just are clearly wiser 

and better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are 
incapable of common action ; nay more, that to speak as we 
did of evil-doers, ever acting vigorously together, is not strictly 
true, for if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid 
hands upon one another ; but there must evidently have been 
some remnant of justice in them, or they would have injured 
one another as well as their victims, and then they would have 
been unable to act together ; they were but semi-villainous, 
for had they been whole villains, wholly unjust, they would 
have been wholly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is 
the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But 
whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust 
is a further question which we also proposed to consider. I 
think that they have, and for the reasons which I have given ; 
but still I should like to examine further, for this is no light 
matter, concerning nothing less than the true rule of life. — - 
The Republic, ii. 175. 

Honor and dishonor in love. See Love, Honor, etc. 
Honor to the brave. See Death in battle, and Heroic, 
Hope, fancies of. See Fancies. 
Human life, in what consists the salvation of. 

■ Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on 

the choice of odd and even, and on the knowledge of when 
men ought to choose the greater or less, either in reference to 
themselves or to each other, whether near or at a distance ; 
what would be the saving principle of our lives ? Would not 
knowledge ? — a knowledge of measuring, when the question 
is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, 
when the question is of odd and even ? The world will ac- 
knowledge that, will they not ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 231 

Protagoras himself thought that they would. 

Well, then, my friends, I say to them, seeing that the salva- 
tion of human life has been found to consist in the right 
choice of pleasures and pains, — in the choice of the more 
and the fewer and the greater and the less, and the nearer and 
remoter, must not this measuring be a consideration of excess 
and defect, and equality in relation to each other ? 

That is undeniably true. — Protagoras, i. 156. 
Hypotheses, used by reason. 

Of this kind I still spoke as intelligible, although in in- 
quiring into it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses ; not 
proceeding to a first principle because she is unable to ascend 
above hypotheses, but employing the objects of which the shad- 
ows below are resemblances in their turn as images, they hav- 
ing in relation to the shadows a greater distinctness and there- 
fore a higher value. 

I understand, he said, that you are speaking of geometry and 
the sister arts. 

And when I speak of the other division of the intellectual, 
you will also understand me to speak of that knowledge, which 
reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the 
hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses — that 
is to say, as steps and points of departure into a region which 
is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to 
the first principle of the whole ; and clinging to this and then 
to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends 
again without the aid of any sensible object, beginning and 
ending in ideas. 

I understand you, he replied; not perfectly, for you seem to 
me to be describing a task far from easy ; but, at any rate, I un- 
derstand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science 
of dialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the 
arts, as they are termed, which proceed from hypotheses only : 
these are also contemplated by the understanding, and not by 
the senses : yet, because they start from hypotheses and do not 
ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them appear to 
you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when 
a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the 
higher reason. And the habit' which is concerned with geome- 
try and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term un- 
derstanding and not reason, as being intermediate between 
opinion and reason. — The Republic, ii. 339. 
Human life, progression of. See Progression of, etc. 



232 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Ibycus, his love in old age. 

I feel like Ibycus who, when in his old age, against his 

will, he fell in love, compared himself to an old race-horse, who 
was about to run in a chariot race, shaking with fear at the 
course he knew so well — this was his simile of himself. — Par- 
menides, iii. 254. 

Ideal State, Philosophers to be kings in the. See Rulers in the 

State, who should be. 
Ideas, abstract. 

Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards 

philosophy ; tell me now, was this your own distinction between 
ideas in themselves and the things which partake of them? 
and do you think that there is an idea of likeness apart from 
the likeness which we possess, or of the one and many, and of 
the other notions of which Zeno has been speaking ? 

I think that there are such ideas, said Socrates. 

Parmenides proceeded. And would you also make ideas of 
the just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class ? 

Yes, he said, I should. 

And would you make an idea of man apart from us and 
from all other human creatures, or of fire and water ? 

I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to 
include them or not. 

And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things 
of which the mention may provoke a smile ? — I mean such 
things as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else that is foul and 
base ; would you suppose that each of these has an idea dis- 
tinct from the actual objects with which we come into contact, 
or not ? 

Certainly not, said Socrates ; visible things like these are 
such as they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be 
an absurdity in assuming any idea of them, although I sometimes 
get disturbed, and begin to think that there is nothing without 
an idea ; but then again, when I have taken up this position, I 
run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottom- 
less pit of nonsense, and perish ; and so I return to the ideas 
of which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with 
them. 

Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides ; that is because you are still 
young ; the time will come when philosophy will have a firmer 
grasp of you, if I am not mistaken, and then you will not de- 
spise even the meanest things : at your age, you are too much 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 233 

disposed to regard the opinions of men. But I should like to 
know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which 
all other things partake, and from which they are therefore 
named ; that similars for example, become similar, because they 
partake of similarity ; and great things become great, because 
they partake of greatness ; and that just and beautiful things 
become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and 
beauty ? 

Yes, certainly, said Socrates, that is my meaning. — Parmen- 
zdes, iii. 246. 

Ideas that are cognitions. See Cognitions. 
Idle talking. 
I certainly do not see my .way at present. 

Yes, said Parmenides ; and I think that this arises, Socrates, 
out of your attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, 
and the ideas generally, without sufficient previous training. I 
noticed your deficiency, when I heard you talking here with 
your friend Aristoteles, the day before yesterday. The impulse 
that carries you towards philosophy is assuredly noble and 
divine ; but still there fa an art which often seems to be use- 
less, and is called by the vulgar idle talking and is often imag- 
ined to be useless ; in that you must train and exercise yourself, 
now that you are young, or truth will elude your grasp. — Par- 
menides, iii. 253. 
Ignoble, the. 

Come, now and let us reason with the unjust, who is not 

intentionally in error. " Sweet Sir," we will say to him, " what 
think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble ? Is not the 
noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the 
God in man ; and the ignoble that which subjects the man to 
the beast ? " He can hardly avoid saying yes — - can he now ? 

Not if he has any regard for my opinion. 

But, if he admit this, we may ask him another question ; 
How would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the 
condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the 
worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or 
daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them 
into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, 
however large might be the sum which he received ? And 
will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff: who sells his 
own divine being to that which is most atheistical and detest- 
able, and has no pity ? Eriphyle took the necklace as the 



234 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to 
compass a worse ruin. 

Yes, said Glaucon, far worse, I will answer for him. 

Has not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him 
that huge multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large ? 

Clearly. 

And men are blamed for pride and sullenness, as when the 
growth and increase of the lion and serpent are out of propor- 
tion ? 

Yes. 

And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and 
weaken this same creature, and make a coward of him ? 

Very true. 

And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who 
subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for 
the sake of money, of which he can never have enough, ha- 
bituates himself in the days of his youth to be trampled in the 
mud, and from being a lion to become a monkey ? 

True, he said. 

And why are mean employments and handicraft arts a re- 
proach ? Only because they imply a natural weakness of the 
higher principle, and the individual is unable to control the 
creatures within him, but has to court them, and his only study 
is how to flatter them ? 

Such appears to be the reason. — The Republic, ii. 421. 
Ignorance, legislative, destroying States. See States, destroyed by 
ignorance. 

Sir. When the foundation of politics is in the letter 

only and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can 
we wonder, Socrates, at the miseries that there are, and always 
will be, in States ? Any other art, built on such a foundation, 
would be utterly undermined, — there can be no doubt of that. 
Ought we not rather to wonder at the strength of the political 
bond ? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, 
and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, 
though many of them, like ships foundering at sea, are perish- 
ing and have perished, and will hereafter perish, through the in- 
capacity of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of 
ignorance of the highest truths — I mean to say? that they are 
wholly unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sci- 
ences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect 
knowledge. — Statesman, iii. 588. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 235 

Ignorance the cause of crimes. 

A man may truly say that ignorance is a third cause of 

crimes. Ignorance, however, may be conveniently divided by 
the legislator into two sorts : There is simple ignorance, which 
is the source of lighter offenses, and double ignorance which 
is accompanied by conceit of wisdom ; and he who is under 
the influence of the latter, fancies that he knows all about 
matters of which he knows nothing. This second kind of ig- 
norance, when possessed of power and strength, will be held 
by the legislator to be the source of great and monstrous crimes, 
but when attended with weakness will only result in the errors 
of children and old men ; and these he will treat as errors, 
and will make laws accordingly for those who commit them, 
which will be the mildest and most merciful of all laws. — 
Laws, iv. 376. 
Images, sensible, some truths have not. 

But people seem to forget that some things have sensible 

images, which may be easily shown, when any one desires to 
exhibit any of them or explain them to an inquirer, without 
any trouble or argument ; while the greatest and noblest truths 
have no outward image of themselves visible to man, which he 
who wishes to satisfy the longing soul of the inquirer can 
adapt to the eye of sense, and therefore we ought to practice 
reasoning ; for immaterial things, which are the highest and 
greatest, are shown only in thought and idea, and in no other 
way, and all that we are saying is said for the sake of them. 
Moreover, there is always less difficulty in fixing the mind on 
small matters than on great. — Statesman, iii. 571. 
Imitation, a form of jest. 

Str. Is there any more graceful or artistic form of jest 

than imitation ? 

Theaet. Certainly not ; and imitation is a very comprehen- 
sive term, which includes under one class the most diverse 
sorts of things. 

Str. We know, of course, that he who professes by one art 
to make all things is really a painter, and by the painter's art 
makes resemblance of them which have the same name with 
them ; and he can deceive the less intelligent sort of young 
children, to whom he shows his pictures at a distance, into the be- 
lief that he has the absolute power of making whatever he likes. 

Theaet. Certainly. 

Str. And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art 



236 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

of reasoning ? Is there any impossibility in stealing the hearts 
of youths through their ears, when they are still at a distance 
from the truth, by showing them fictitious arguments, and mak- 
ing them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the 
wisest of men in all things ? 

Theaet. Yes ; why should there not be another similar art ? 

Str. But as time goes on, and they advance in years, and 
come more into contact with realities, and have learnt by sad 
experience to see and feel the truth of things, are they not 
compelled to change many opinions which they had so that the 
great appears small to them, and the easy difficult, and all their 
seeming speculations are overturned by the facts of life ? 

Theaet. That is my view, as far as I can judge, although, 
at my age, I may be one of those who see things at a distance 
only. 

Str. And the wish of all of us, who are your friends, is and 
always will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can 
without the sad reality. And now I should like you to tell me 
whether the Sophist is not visibly a magician and imitator of 
true being ; or are we still disposed to think that he may have 
a true knowledge of the various matters about which he dis- 
putes ? 

Theaet But how is that possible, Stranger ? Is there any 
doubt, after what has been said, that he is to be located in one 
of the divisions of children's play ? 

Str. Then we must place him in the class of magicians and 
mimics. 

Theaet. Certainly we must. 

Str. And now our business is not to let the animal out, for 
we have got him in a sort of dialectical net, and there is one 
thing which he certainly will not escape. 

Theaet. What is that ? 

Str. The inference that he is a juggler. 

Theaet. Precisely my own opinion of him. 

Str. Then, clearly, we ought as soon as possible to divide the 
image-making art, and go down into the net, and, if the Soph- 
ist does not run away from us, to seize him and deliver him 
over to reason, who is the lord of the hunt, and announce the 
capture of him ; and if he creeps into the recesses of the imita- 
tive art, and secretes himself in one of them, to divide again 
and follow him up, until in some subsection of imitation he 
is caught. For our method of tackling each and all is one 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 237 

which neither he nor any other creature will ever escape in 
triumph. 

Theaet. That is good, and let us do as you say. — Sophist, 
iii. 469. 
Imitation in painting. 

All that is said by any of us can only be imitation and 

comparison. For if we consider how the works of the painter 
represent bodies divine and heavenly, and the different degrees 
of gratification with which the eye of the spectator receives 
them, we shall see that we are satisfied with the artist who is 
able in any degree to imitate the earth and its mountains, and 
the rivers, and the woods, and the universe, and the things that 
are and move therein, and further, that knowing nothing pre- 
cise about such matters, we do not examine or analyze the 
painting ; all that is required is a sort of indistinct and decep- 
tive mode of shadowing them forth. But when a person en- 
deavors to paint the human form we are quick at finding out 
defects, and our familiar knowledge makes us severe judges of 
any one who does not render every point of similarity ; and 
we may observe the same thing to happen in discourse ; we 
are satisfied with a picture of divine and heavenly things which 
has very little likeness to them ; but we are more precise in 
our criticism of mortal and human things. — Oritias, ii. 594. 

Aih. And can he who does not know what the exact object 
is which is imitated, ever know whether the resemblance is 
truthfully executed ? I mean, for example, whether a statue 
has the proportions of a body, and the true situation of the 
parts, what fhose proportions are, and how the parts fit into 
one another in due order ; also their colors and conformations, 
or whether this is all confused in the execution ? Do you 
think that any one can know about this, who does not know 
what the animal is which has been imitated ? 

Cle. Impossible. 

Aih. But even if we know that the thing pictured or sculpt- 
ured is a man, who has received at the hand of the artist al] 
his proper parts and forms and colors, must we not also know 
whether the work is beautiful or in any respect deficient in 
beauty ? 

Cle. If this were not required, Stranger, we should all of us 
be judges of beauty. — Laws, iv. 198. 
Imitations becoming a second nature. See Freedom, etc. 
Imitative art. See Likeness-making, 



238 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Imitative poetry. 

Of the many excellences which I perceive in the order of 

our State, there is none which upon reflection pleases me bet- 
ter than the rule about poetry. 

What rule ? 

The rule about rejecting imitative poetry, which certainly 
ought not to be received ; as I see far more clearly now that 
the parts of the soul have been distinguished. 

What do you mean ? 

Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my 
words repeated to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative 
tribe — but I do not mind saying to you that all poetical imi- 
tations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers, and 
that the knowledge of what they are is the only antidote to 
them. 

Explain the purport of your remark. 

Well, I will tell you : although I have always from my earli- 
est youth had an awe and love of Homer, which even now 
makes the words falter on my lips, for he is the great captain 
and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic company ; 
but a man is not to be reverenced before the truth, and there- 
fore I will speak out. — The Republic, ii. 425. 
Imitators, Poets are. 

It remains narrative both in the speeches which the poet 

recites and the passages between ? 

Quite true. 

But when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we 
not say that he assimilates his style to that of the person who, 
as he informs you, is going to speak ? 

Certainly. 

And this assimilation of himself to another either by the use 
of voice or gesture, is the imitation of the person whose char- 
acter he assumes? 

Of course. 

Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to 
proceed by way of imitation ? 

Very true. — The Republic, ii. 216. 

To me the wonder is rather that the poets, present as well as 
past, are no better — not that I mean to depreciate them, but 
every one can see that they are a tribe of imitators, and will 
imitate best and most easily the ways of life amid which they 
have been brought up ; whereas that which is beyond the range 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 239 

of a man's education can hardly be imitated by him in action, 
and with still more difficulty in speech. — Timaeus, ii. 515. 
Immortal, the world made. 

In the fullness of time, when the change was to take 

place, and the earth-born race had all perished, and every soul 
had fallen into the earth and been sown her appointed number 
of times, the governor of the universe let the helm go, and re- 
tired to his place of view ; and then Fate and innate desire re- 
versed the motion of the world. Then, also, all the inferior 
deities who share the rule of the supreme power, being in- 
formed of what was happening, let go the parts of the world 
of which they were severally the guardians. And the world 
turning round with a sudden shock, having received an oppo- 
site impulse at both ends, was shaken by a mighty earthquake, 
producing a new destruction of all manner of animals. After 
a while the tumult and confusion and earthquake ceased, and 
the universal creature, once more at peace, attained to a calm, 
and settled down into his own orderly and accustomed course, 
having the charge and rule of himself and of all other creat- 
ures, and remembering and executing the instructions of the 
Father and Creator of the world, more particularly at first, 
but afterwards with less exactness. The reason of the falling 
off was the admixture of matter in the world ; this was inher- 
ent in the primal nature, which was full of disorder, until at- 
taining to the present cosmos or order. From God, the con- 
structor, the world indeed received every good, but from a 
previous state came elements of violence and injustice, which, 
thence derived, first of all passed into the world and were trans- 
mitted to the animals. While the world was producing ani- 
mals in unison with God, the evil was small, and great the 
good which worked within, but in the process of separation 
from him, when the world was let go, at first all proceeded 
well enough ; but, as time went on, there was more and more 
forgetting, and the old discord again entered in and got the 
better, and burst forth ; and at last small was the good, and 
great was the admixture of the elements of evil, and there was 
a danger of universal ruin of the world and the things in the 
world. Wherefore God, the orderer of all, in his tender care, 
seeing that the world was in great straits, and fearing that all 
might be dissolved in the storm, and go to the place of chaos 
and infinity, again seated himself at the helm ; and reversing 
the elements which had fallen into dissolution and disorder 



240 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

when left to themselves in the previous cycle, he set them in 
order and restored them, and made the world imperishable and 
immortal. — Statesman, iii. 557. 
Immortality of fame desired by men. 

Marvel not then at the love which all men have of their 

offspring ; for that universal love and interest is for the sake 
of immortality — I was astonished at her words and said : " Is 
this really true, O thou wise Diotima ? " And she answered 
with all the authority of a Sophist : " Of that, Socrates, you 
may be assured ; think only of the ambition of men, and you 
will wonder at the senselessness of their ways, unless you con- 
sider how they are stirred by the love of an immortality of 
fame. They are ready to run risks greater far than they would 
have run for their children, and to spend money and undergo 
any amount of toil, and even to die for the sake of leaving be- 
hind them a name which shall be eternal. Do you imagine 
that Alcestis would have died to save Admetus, or Achilles to 
avenge Patroclus, or your own Codrus in order to preserve the 
kingdom for his sons, if they had not imagined that the memory 
of their virtues, which is still retained among us, would be im- 
mortal ? Nay," she said, " I am persuaded that all men do all 
things and the better they are the more they do them, in hope 
of the glorious fame of immortal virtue ; for they desire the 
immortal." — The Symposium, i. 500. 
Immortality in time. 

■ The human race naturally partakes of immortality, of 

which all men have the greatest desire implanted in them ; for 
the desire of every man that he may become famous, and not 
lie in the grave without a name, is only the love of continu- 
ance. Now, mankind are coeval with all time, and are ever 
following, and will ever follow, the course of time ; and so 
they are immortal, inasmuch as they leave children behind 
them, and partake of immortality in the unity of generation. 
And for a man voluntarily to deprive himself of this gift, as 
he deliberately does who will not have a wife or children, is 
impiety. — Laws, iv. 249. 
Immortality of the soul. See Soul. 
Immortality of God. See God unchangeable. m 

Impartiality not the same as equality. See Equality not the same, 
etc. 

Impassiveness of the Gods. See Gods, impassiveness of the. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 241 

Impiety, punishment of. 

■ Now, men fall into impiety from three causes, which have 

been already mentioned, and from each of these causes arise 
two sorts of impiety, in all six, requiring judicial decision, but 
differing greatly in their degrees of guilt. For he who does 
not believe in the Gods, and yet has a righteous nature, hates 
the wicked and dislikes and refuses to do injustice, and avoids 
unrighteous men, and loves the righteous. But they who, be- 
sides believing that the world is devoid of Gods, are intemper- 
ate, and have at the same time good memories and quick wits, 
are worse ; although both of them are unbelievers, much less 
injury is done by the one than by the other. The one may 
talk loosely about the Gods and about sacrifices and oaths, and 
perhaps by laughing at other men he may make them like him- 
self, if he be not punished. But the other unbeliever, who 
has ability, is full of stratagem and deceit — men of this class 
are prophets and jugglers of all kinds, and out of their ranks 
sometimes come tyrants, and demagogues, and generals, and 
hierophants of private mysteries and the ingenuities of so- 
called Sophists. There are many kinds of unbelievers, but 
two only for whom legislation is required ; one the hypocrit- 
ical sort, whose crime is deserving of death many times over, 
while the others need only bonds and admonition. — Laws, 
iv. 421. 
Impure and pure soul. 

Are we to suppose that the soul, which is invisible, in 

passing to the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, 
and noble, and on her way to the good and wise God, whither, 
if God will, my soul is also soon to go, — that the soul, I re- 
peat, if this be her nature and origin, is blown away and per- 
ishes immediately on quitting the body, as the many say? 
That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth 
rather is, that the soul which is pure at departing draws after 
her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily had connection 
with the body, which she is ever avoiding, herself gathered into 
herself; (for such abstraction has been the study of her life). 
And what does this mean but that she has been a true disciple 
of philosophy, and has practiced how to die cheerfully ? And 
is not philosophy the practice of death ? 

Certainly. 

That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible 
world, — to the divine and immortal and rational ; thither ar 
16 



242 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

riving, she is secure of bliss and is released from the error and 
folly of men, their fears and wild passions and all other human 
ills, and forever dwells, as they say of the initiated, in com- 
pany with the Gods. Is not this true, Cebes ? 

Yes, said Cebes, beyond a doubt. 

But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the 
time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of 
the body always, and is in love with and fascinated by the body 
and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led 
to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a 
man may touch and see and taste and use for the purposes of 
his lusts, — the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and 
avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark 
and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy ; do you 
suppose that such a soul as this will depart pure and unal- 
loyed ? 

That is impossible, he replied. 

She is held fast by the corporeal, which the continual asso- 
ciation and constant care of the body have wrought in her 
nature. 

Very true. 

And this corporeal element, my friend, is heavy and weighty, 
and earthy, and is that element of sight by which such a soul 
is depressed and dragged down again into the visible world, 
because she is afraid of the invisible and of the world below. 
— Phaedo, i. 409. 
Impure and pure, gifts of the. 

Ath. What life is agreeable to God, and becoming in his 

followers ? One only according to an old saying, that " like 
agrees with like, with measure measure," but things which 
have no measure agree neither with themselves nor with the 
things which have measure. Now, God is the measure of all 
things, in a sense far higher than any man, as they say, can ever 
hope to be. And he who would be dear to God must, as far 
as is possible, be like him and such as he is. Wherefore the 
temperate man is the friend of God, for he is like him ; and 
the intemperate man is unlike him ; and different from him, 
and unjust. And the same holds of other things, and this is 
the conclusion, which is also the noblest and truest of all say- 
ings : that for the good man to offer sacrifice to the Gods, and 
hold converse with them by means of prayers and offerings and 
every kind of service, is the noblest and best of all things, and 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 243 

also the most conducive to a happy life, and very fit and meet. 
But with the bad man, the opposite of this holds ; for the bad 
man has an impure soul, whereas the good is pure ; and from 
one who is polluted, neither a good man nor God is right in 
receiving gifts. And therefore the unholy waste their much 
service upon the Gods, which, when offered by any holy man, 
is always accepted of them. — Laws, iv. 244. 
Individual; the State more to be valued than the. See Citizen, ob- 
ligation of the. 
Individual, the State greater than the. 

Justice, which is the subject of our inquiry, is, as you 

know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and 
sometimes as the virtue of a State. 

True, he replied. 

And is not a State larger than an individual ? 

It is. 

Then in the larger the quantity of justice will be larger and 
more easily discernible. I propose, therefore, that we inquire 
into the nature of justice and injustice as appearing in the State 
first, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater 
to the lesser and comparing them. 

That, he said, is an excellent proposal. 

And suppose we imagine the State as in a process of crea- 
tion, and then we shall see the justice and injustice of the State 
in process of creation also. 

Very likely. 

When the State is completed there may be a hope that the 
object of our search will be more easily discovered. 

Yes, more easily. 

And shall we make the attempt ? I said ; although I cannot 
promise you that the task will be a light one. Reflect, there- 
fore. 

I have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you 
should proceed. 

A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of 
mankind ; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many 
wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined ? 

There can be no other. 

Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed 
to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another 
for another : and when these helpers and partners are gathered 
together in one habitation, the body of inhabitants is termed a 
State. 



244 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

True, he said. 

And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and an* 
other receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for 
their good. 

Very true. 

Then, I said, let us begin and create a State; and yet the 
true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention. — 
The Republic, ii. 190. 
Individuality and unity. 

Pro. Do you mean when a person says that I, Protar- 

chus, am by nature one and also many, dividing the single 
" me " in many " me's," which he distinguishes and opposes as 
great and small, light and heavy, and in ten thousand other 
ways ? 

Soc. Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged 
paradoxes about the one and many, which I may say that every- 
body has by this time agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious 
and detrimental to the true course of thought ; and no more fa- 
vor is shown to that other puzzle, in which a person proves the 
members and parts of anything to be divided, and then confess- 
ing that they are all one, says laughingly in disproof of his own 
words, — why, here is a miracle, the one is many and infinite, 
and the many are only one. 

Pro. But what, Socrates, are those other marvels which, as 
you imply, have not yet become common and acknowledged, 
relating to the same principle ? 

Soc. When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of 
things that are born and perish, as in the instances which we 
were giving, for in those cases, and when unity is of this con- 
crete nature, there is, as I was saying, a universal consent that 
no refutation is needed ; but when the assertion is made that 
man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one, or the good one, then 
the interest which attaches to these and similar unities, and the 
attempt which is made to divide them, — gives birth to a con- 
troversy. 

Pro. Of what nature ? 

Soc. In the first place, as to whether these unities have a 
real existence ; and then how each individual unity, being always 
the same, and incapable either of generation or of destruction, 
but retaining a permanent individuality, can be conceived either 
as dispersed and multiplied in the infinity of the world of gen- 
eration, or as still entire and yet derived from itself, which latter 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 245 

would seem to be the greatest impossibility of all, for how can 
one and the same thing be at the same time in one and in many 
things ? These, Protarchus, are the real difficulties, and this is 
the one and many to which they relate ; they are the source of 
great perplexity if ill decided, and the right determination of 
them is very helpful. — Philebus, iii. 149. 
Indivisible essence. See Essence. 
Inequality and Equality. See Equality. 
Infinite and finite. See Finite. 
Inheritances and heirships. 

I would not have any one fond of heaping up riches for 

the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as 
rich as possible. For the possession of great wealth is of no 
use, either to them or to the State. The condition of youth 
vhich is free from flattery, and at the same time not in need of 
the necessaries of life, is the best and most harmonious of all, 
being in accord and agreement with our nature, and making 
life to be most entirely free from sorrow. Let parents, then, 
bequeath to their children, not riches, but the spirit of rever- 
ence. We, indeed, fancy that they will inherit reverence from 
us, if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. 
But this quality is not really imparted to them by the present 
style of admonition, which ofily tells them that the young ought 
always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather ex- 
hort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take 
heed that no young man sees or hears him doing or saying any- 
thing base ; for where old men have no shame, there young 
men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. — Laws, iv. 254. 
Iniquity, concealment of. See Concealment. 
Injustice. 

Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is 

always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in 
private contracts : wherever the unjust is the partner of the 
just you will find the unjust man has always more and the just 
less. Next, in their dealings with the State : when there is an 
income-tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on 
the same amount of income ; and when there is anything to be 
received the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe 
also that when they come into office, there is the just man neg- 
lecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, but he will 
not compensate himself out of the public purse because he is 
just : moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for 



246 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. Now all this is re- 
versed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as before, 
of injustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust 
is most apparent, and my meaning will be most clearly seen if 
we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal 
is the happiest of men, as the sufferers or those who refuse to 
do injustice are the most miserable — I mean tyranny, which by 
fraud and force takes away the property of others, not retail 
but wholesale ; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as 
profane, private and public ; for any one of which acts of wrong, 
if he were detected perpetrating them singly, he would be pun- 
ished and incur great dishonor ; since they who are guilty of 
any of these crimes in single instances are called robbers of 
temples, and man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. 
But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens 
has made slaves of them, then, instead of these dishonorable 
names, he is called happy and blessed, not only by the citizens 
but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation 
of injustice. For injustice is censured because the censurers 
are afraid of suffering, and not from any fear which they have 
of doing injustice. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, in- 
justice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and free- 
dom and mastery than justice ; and, as I said at first, justice is 
the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own 
profit and interest. — The Republic, ii. 165. 
Injustice, doing and suffering. 

Pol. At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly 

put to death is wretched, and to be pitied ? 

Soc. Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so 
much as he who is justly killed. 

Pol. How can that be, Socrates ? 

Soc. That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is 
the greatest of evils. 

Pol. But is that the greatest ? Is not suffering injustice a 
greater evil ? 

Soc. Certainly not. 

Pol. Then would you rather suffer than do injustice ? 

Soc. I should not like either, but if I must choose between 
them, I would rather suffer than do. — Gorgias, iii. 55. 
Injustice, penalty of. 

Soc. The unrighteous man, or the sayer and doer of unholy 

things, had far better not yield to the illusion that his roguery 



PLATO* S BEST THOUGHTS. 247 

is clever ; for men glory in their shame — they fancy that 
they hear others saying of them, " These are not mere good- 
for-nothing persons, burdens of the earth, but such as men 
should be who mean to dwell safely in a State." Let us tell 
them that they are all the more truly what they do not know 
that they are ; for they do not know the penalty of injustice, 
which above all things they ought to know — not stripes and 
death, as they suppose, which evil-doers often escape, but a 
penalty which cannot be escaped. 

Theod. What is that ? 

Soc. There are two patterns eternally set before them in 
nature : the one blessed and divine, the other godless and 
wretched ; and they do not see, in their utter folly and infatu- 
ation, that they are growing like the one and unlike the other, 
by reason of their evil deeds ; and the penalty is, that they 
lead a life answering to the pattern which they resemble. 
And if we tell them that unless they depart from their cun- 
ning, the place of innocence will not receive them after death ; 
and that here on earth they will live ever in the likeness of 
their own evil selves, and with evil friends — when they hear 
this, they in their superior cunning will seem to be listening to 
fools. 

Theod. Very true, Socrates. — Theaetetus, iii. 379. 
Injustice and envy. See Envy. 
Injustice, what is called. 

I can define to you clearly, and without ambiguity, what 

I mean by the just and unjust, according to my notion of 
them : When anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and jeal- 
ousies and desires, tyrannize over the soul, whether they do 
any harm or not — I call them all injustice. But when the 
opinion of the best, whatever States or individuals may suppose 
that to be, has dominion in the soul and orders the life of every 
man, even if it be sometimes mistaken, yet what is done in 
accordance therewith, and the principle in individuals which 
obeys this rule, and is best for the whole life of man, is to be 
called just ; although the action, done in error, is thought by 
the multitude to be involuntary injustice. — Laws, iv. 377. 
Injustice. See Wrong-doing. 
.Inner voice, the. 

Soc. This is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in 

my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic ; 
that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me 



248 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

from hearing any other. And I know that anything more 
which you may say will be vain. Yet speak, if you have any- 
thing to say. 

Cr. I have nothing to say, Socrates. 

Soc. Leave me then to follow whithersoever God leads. — 
Onto, i. 359. 

Inner life, harmony of the. See Harmony of the inner man. 
Innovations, jests no bar to. 

I should rather expect, I said, that several of our propos- 
als, if they are carried out, being unusual, may appear ridicu- 
lous. 

No doubt of it. 

Yes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of 
women naked in the palaestra, exercising with the men, espe- 
cially when they get old ; they certainly will not be a vision of 
beauty any more than the wrinkled old men, who have any- 
thing but an agreeable appearance when they take to gymnas- 
tics ; this, however, does not deter them. 

Yes, indeed, he said : according to present notions the pro- 
posal would appear ridiculous. 

But then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, 
we must not fear the jests of the wits which will be directed 
against this sort of innovation ; how they will talk of women's 
attainments in music as well as in gymnastic, and above all 
about their wearing armor and riding upon horseback ! 

Very true, he replied. 

Yet having begun, we must go on and attack the difficulty ; 
at the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their 
life to be serious. Not long ago, as we shall remind them, the 
Greeks were of the opinion, which is still generally received 
among the barbarians, that the sight of a naked man was ridic- 
ulous and improper ; and when first the Cretans and then the 
Lacedaemonians introduced naked exercises, the wits of that 
day might have ridiculed them equally. 

No doubt. 

But when experience showed that to let all things be uncov- 
ered was far better than to cover them up, and the ludicrous 
effect to the outward eye vanished before the approval of rea- 
fcxm, then the man was seen to be a fool who laughs or directs 
the shafts of his ridicule at any other sight but that of folly 
and vice, or seriously inclines to measure the beautiful by any 
other standard but that of the good. 

Very true, he replied. — The Republic, ii. 276. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 249 

Innovations forbidden in Egypt. 

Cle. And what are the laws about music and dancing ? 

Jdh. You will wonder when I tell you : Long ago they ap- 
peared to have recognized the very principle of which we are 
now speaking — that their young citizens must be habituated to 
forms and strains of virtue. These they fixed and exhibited 
the patterns of them in their temples ; and no painter or artist 
is allowed to innovate upon them, or to leave the traditional 
forms and invent new ones. To this day, no alteration is al- 
lowed either in these arts, or in music at all. And you will 
find that their works of art are painted or moulded in the same 
forms which they had ten thousand years ago ; this is literally 
true and no exaggeration, — their ancient paintings and sculpt- 
ures are not a whit better or worse than the work of to-day, 
but are made with just the same skill. 

Cle. How extraordinary ! 

Ath. I should rather say, how wise and worthy of a great 
legislator ! I know that other things in Egypt are not so good. 
But what I am telling you about music is true and deserving 
of consideration, because showing that a lawgiver may institute 
melodies which have a natural truth and correctness without 
any fear of failure. To do this, however, must be the work of 
God, or of a divine person ; in Egypt they have a tradition 
that their ancient chants are the composition of the Goddess 
Isis. And therefore, as I was saying, if a person can only find 
in any way the natural melodies, he might confidently embody 
them in a fixed and legal form. For the love of novelty which 
arises out of pleasure in the new, and weariness of the old, has 
not strength enough to vitiate the consecrated song and dance, 
under the plea that they have become antiquated. At any rate 
they are far from being antiquated in Egypt. — Laws, iv. 186. 
Inordinate ambition. ' 

My love, Alcibiades, which I hardly like to confess, would 

long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself, if I saw you 
loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to live in 
the enjoyment of them. But I know that you entertain other 
thoughts ; and I will prove to you that I have always had my 
eye on you by declaring them. Suppose that at this moment 
some God came to you and said : Alcibiades, will you live as 
you are, or die in an instant if you are forbidden to make any 
further acquisition ? — I verily believe that you would choose 
death. And I will tell you the hope in which you are at pres- 



250 PLATO* S BEST THOUGHTS. 

ent living : Before many days have elapsed, you think that you 
will come before the Athenian assembly, and will try to prove 
to them that you are more worthy of honor than Pericles, 
or any other man that ever lived, and having proved this, you 
will have the greatest power in the State ; and when you have 
got the greatest power among us, you will go on to other 
Hellenic states, and not only to Hellenes, but to all the bar- 
barians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if the 
God were then to say to you again : Here in Europe is to 
be your seat of empire, and you must not cross over into Asia 
or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I do not believe that you would 
choose to live upon these terms ; but the world, as I may 
say, must be filled with your power and name — no man less 
than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account with you. — Alcibi- 
ades I. iv. 516. 
Inquiry, the spirit of. 

Soc. Some things I have said of which I am not alto- 
gether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and 
less helpless if we think ' that we ought to inquire, than we 
should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there 
was no knowing and no use in searching after what we do not 
know : — that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in 
word and deed, to the utmost of my power. 

Men. That again, Socrates, appears to me to be well said. 
Meno, i. 262. 

Inquiry forbidden as ruinous to Arts. See Arts, inquiry ruinous to. 
Insane, two kinds of the. 

Soc. There were two kinds of madness ; one produced 

by human infirmity, the other by a divine release from the 
ordinary ways of men. 

Phaedr. True. 

Soc. The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds, 
prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic, having four Gods presiding 
over them ; the first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second 
that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that 
of Aphrodite and Eros. In the description of the last kind of 
madness, which was also the best, being a sort of figure of 
love, we introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true, 
though partly erring myth, which was also a hymn in honor of 
Eros, who is your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guar- 
dian of fair children, and to him we sung the hymn in meas- 
ured and solemn strain. — Phaedrus, i. 570. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 251 

Inspiration of the poet. See Divine power. 
Inspiration of the Statesman. See Statesman, called divine. 
Instability of youth. See Chang eableness. 
Instinctive divining of truth. 

Soc. They say that what the school of Philebus calls 

pleasures are all of them only avoidances of pain. 

Pro. And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them ? 

Soc. Why, no, I would rather use them as a sort of diviners, 
who are enabled to divine the truth, not by any rules of art, 
but by an instinctive repugnance aud extreme detestation which 
a noble nature has of the power of pleasure, in which they 
think that there is nothing sound, and whose seductive influ- 
ence is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not pleasure. 
This is the use which you may make of them ; you shall con- 
sider the various grounds of their dislike, and then you shall 
hear from me what I deem to be true pleasures ; and when the 
nature of pleasures has been examined from both points of view, 
we will bring her up for judgment. 

Pro. True. — Philebus, iii. 183. 
Intelligence and knowledge. 

When reason, which works with equal truth both in the 

circle of the diverse, and of the same, — in the sphere of the 
self-moved in voiceless silence moving, — when reason, I say, 
is hovering around the sensible world, and the circle of the di- 
verse also moving truly imparts the imitations of- sense to the 
whole soul, then arise fixed and true opinions and beliefs. But 
when reason is dwelling in the rational, and the circle of the 
same moving smoothly indicates this, then intelligence and 
knowledge are of necessity perfected. And if any one affirms 
that in which these are found to be other than the soul, he will 
say the very opposite of the truth. — Timaeus, ii. 530. 
Intelligence, pleasures of the. 

But since experience and wisdom and reason are the 

judges, the inference of course is, that the truest pleasures are 
those which are approved by the lover of wisdom and reason. 
And so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intel- 
ligent part of the soul is the pleasantest of the three, and that 
he of us in whom this is the ruling principle has the pleasant- 
est life ? 

Unquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority 
when he approves of his own life. — The Republic, ii. 413. 



252 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Intemperance and temperance. 

Soc. I wish, my good friend, that you would tell rne, once 

for all, whom you affirm to be the better and superior, and in 
what they are better ? 

Gal. 1 have already told you that I mean those who are 
wise and courageous in the administration of a State ; they 
ought to be the rulers of their States, and justice consists in 
their having more than their subjects. 

Soc. But whether rulers or subjects, will they or will they 
not have more than themselves, my friend ? 

Gal. How do you mean ? 

Soc. I mean that every man is his own ruler ; but perhaps 
you think that there is no necessity for him to rule himself ; 
he is only required to rule others ? 

Gal. What do you mean by his " ruling over himself " ? 

Soc. A simple thing enough ; just what is commonly said, 
that a man should be temperate and master of himself, and 
ruler. of his own pleasures and passions. 

Gal. What innocence ! you mean those fools, — the tem- 
perate ? 

Soc. Certainly : any one may know that to be my meaning. 

Gal. Quite so, Socrates ; and they are really fools — for how 
can a man be happy who is the servant of anything ? On the 
contrary, I plainly assert, that he who would truly live ought 
to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chas- 
tise them ; but when they have grown to their greatest he 
should have courage and intelligence to minister to them and 
to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural 
justice and nobility. To this the many cannot attain, and they 
blame the strong man, because they are ashamed of their own 
weakness, which they desire to conceal, and hence they say 
that intemperance is base. As I was saying before, they en- 
slave the nobler natures, and being unable to satisfy their 
pleasures, they praise temperance and justice out of cowardice. 
For if a man had been originally the son of a king, or had a 
nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or exclu- 
sive power, what could be more truly base or evil than tem- 
perance — to a man like him, I say, who might freely be en- 
joying every good, and has no one to hinder him, and yet has 
admitted custom and reason and the opinion of other men to be 
lord over him ? — must not he be in a miserable plight whom 
the reputation of justice and temperance hinders from giving 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 253 

more to his friends than to his enemies, even though he be a 
ruler in his city ? Nay, Socrates, for you profess to be a 
votary of the truth, and the truth is that luxury and intem- 
perance and license, if they are duly supported, are happiness 
and virtue ; all the rest is a mere bauble, custom contrary to 
nature, fond inventions of men nothing worth. — Gorgias, iii. 
80. 

Intemperate and temperate life. See Temperate, etc. 
Intermediate state of pleasure and pain. 

Soc. Let me make a further observation ; the argument 

appears to me to imply that there is a kind of life which con- 
sists in these affections. 

Pro. Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you 
speaking ? 

Soc. I am speaking of emptiness and replenishment, and all 
that relates to the preservation and destruction of living be- 
ings, and of the alternations of pain and joy which accompany 
them in their transitions. 

Pro. True. 

Soc. And what would you say of the kind of life which is 
intermediate between them ? 

Pro. What do you mean by " intermediate ? " 

Soc. I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet re- 
members the pleasures which, if they would only come, would 
relieve him ; but as yet he has them not. May we not say of 
him that he is in an intermediate state ? 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. Would you say that he was in pain or in pleasure ? 

Pro. Nay I should say that he has two pains ; in his body 
there is the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing 
and expectation. 

Soc. What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains ? 
May not a man who is empty have at one time a sure hope of 
being filled, and at other times be quite in despair ? 

Pro. Very true. 

Soc. And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is 
hoping to be filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at 
the same time in pain ? 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. Then man and the other animals have at one time both 
pleasure and pain ? 

Pro. I suppose so. — Philebus, iii. 172. 



254 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Intoxication. See Drunkenness. 
Inventors, not good judges. 

O most ingenious Theuth, he who has the gift of inven- 
tion is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of 
his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance 
a paternal love of your own child has led you to say what is 
not the fact ; for this invention of yours will create forge tf ill- 
ness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their mem- 
ories ; they will trust to the external written characters and 
not remember of themselves. You have found a specific, not 
for memory but for reminiscence, and you give your disciples 
only the pretense of wisdom ; they will be hearers of many 
things and will have learned nothing ; they will appear to be 
omniscient and will generally know nothing ; they will be tire- 
some company, having the show of wisdom without the reality. 
— PhaedruSy i. 580. 
Iolaus. See Heracles. 
Irritability of musicians. 

Did you never observe, I said, the effect on the mind of 

exclusive devotion to gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an 
exclusive devotion to music ? 

In what way shown ? he said. 

In producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, or again of 
softness and effeminacy, I replied. 

Yes, he said, I am quite aware that your mere athlete be- 
comes too much of a savage, and that the musician is melted 
and softened beyond what is good for him 

And, when a man allows music to play and pour over his 
soul through the funnel of his ears, those sweet and soft and 
melancholy airs of which we were just now speaking, and his 
whole life is passed in warbling and the delights of song ; in 
the first stage of the process the passion or spirit which is in 
him is tempered like iron, and made useful, instead of brittle 
and useless. But, if he carries on the softening process, in the 
next stage he begins to melt and waste, until he has wasted away 
his spirit and cut out the sinews of his soul ; and he makes a 
feeble warrior. 

Very true. 

If the element of spirit is naturally weak in him this is soon 
accomplished, but if he have a good deal, then the power of 
music weakening the spirit renders him excitable ; he soon 
flames up, and is speedily extinguished; instead of having 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 255 

spirit he becomes irritable and violent and very discontented. 
— The Republic, ii. 235. 

Jest, imitation a form of. See Imitation. 
Jests, no bar to innovations. See Innovations. 
Judge, the virtuous. 

But with the judge the case is different ; he governs mind 

by mind, and he ought not therefore to have been reared 
ampng vicious minds, and to have associated with them from 
youth upwards, in order that, having gone through the whole 
calendar of crime, he may quickly infer the crimes of others, 
like their diseases, from the knowledge of himself ; but the 
honorable mind which is to form a healthy judgment ought 
rather to have had no experience or contamination of evil hab- 
its when young. And this is the reason why in youth good 
men often appear to be simple, and are easily practiced upon 
by the evil, because they have no examples of what evil is in 
their own souls. 

Yes, he said, that very often happens with them. 

Therefore, I said, the judge should not be young ; he should 
have learned to know evil, not from his own soul, but from 
late and long observation of the nature of evil in others ; 
knowledge, and not his own experience, should be his guide. 

Yes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge. 

Yes, I replied, and he will be a good man (which is my an- 
swer) ; for he is good whose soul is good. Whereas your cun- 
ning and suspicious character, who has committed many crimes, 
and fancies himself to be a master in wickedness, when he is 
among men who are like himself, is wonderful in his precautions 
against others, because he judges of them by himself ; but 
when he gets into the company of men of virtue, who have 
the experience of age, he appears to be a fool again, owing to 
his unseasonable suspicion ; he cannot recognize an honest 
man, because he has nothing in himself which will tell him 
what an honest man is like ; at the same time, as the bad are 
more numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener, 
he thinks himself, and others think him, rather wise than 
foolish. 

Most true, he said. 

Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not 
this man ; the other is better suited to us ; for vice cannot 
know virtue, but a virtuous nature, educated by time, will ac- 



256 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

quire a knowledge both of virtue and vice ; the virtuous, and 
not the vicious man, has wisdom, in my opinion. 

And in mine also. — The Republic, ii. 233. 
Judge, the reconciling. See Reconciling. 
Judge, the righteous. 

Str. Once more let us consider the nature of the right- 
eous judge. 

T. Soc. Very good. 

Str. Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men 
with one another to be just or unjust in accordance with the 
standard which he receives from the king and legislator, — 
showing his own peculiar virtue only in this, that he is not per- 
verted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or any sort of love or hatred, 
into deciding the suits of men with one another contrary to 
the appointment of the legislator ? 

Y. Soc. No ; his office is such as you describe. 

Str. Then the inference is that the power of the judge is 
not royal, but only the power of a guardian of the law which 
ministers to the royal power ? 

Y. Soc. True. — Statesman, iii. 591. 
Judges, true. 

The judges will require virtue — they must possess wis- 
dom and also courage; for the true judge ought not to learn 
from the theatre, nor ought he to be panic-stricken at the 
clamor of the many and his own incapacity ; nor again, know- 
ing the truth, ought he through cowardice and unmanliness care- 
lessly to deliver a lying judgment, out of the very same lips 
which have just appealed to the Gods before he judged. He 
is sitting, not as the disciple of the theatre, but, in his proper 
place, as their instructor, and he ought to be the enemy of all 
pandering to the pleasure of the spectators. — Laws, iv. 1 88. 
Judges and true opinion. 

Soc. When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about 

matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in 
any other way, and when thus judging of them from report 
they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without 
knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged 
well. 

Theaet. Certainly. 

Soc. And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts 
and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have 
judged rightly without knowledge ; and therefore I must infer 
that they are not the same. — Theaetetus, iii. 408. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 257 

Judges, three kinds of. 

Ath. Now, which would be the better judge, — one who 

destroyed the bad, and let the good govern themselves; or one 
who, while allowing the good to govern, let the bad live, and 
made them voluntarily submit ? Or, lastly, there might be a 
third excellent judge, who, finding the family distracted, not 
only did not destroy any one, but reconciled them to one an- 
other forever after, and gave them laws which they mutually 
observed, and was able to keep them friends. 

Ok. The last would be by far the best sort of judge and 
legislator. — Laws, iv. 158. 

Just man, Christ unconsciously described as the, in contrast with 
the unjust. 

I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume 

the most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, and we 
must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have 
gained the greatest reputation for justice. If he has taken 
a false step he must be able to retrieve himself, being one 
who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, 
and force his way where force is required, and having gifts 
of courage and strength, and command of money and friends. 
And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness 
and simplicity, being, as Aeschylus says, and not seeming. 
There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he 
will be honored and rewarded, and then we shall not know 
whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of 
honors and rewards ; therefore, let him be clothed in justice 
only, and have no other covering ; and he must be imagined in 
a state of life very different from that of the last. Let him 
be the best of men, and be esteemed to be the worst ; then let 
us see whether his virtue is proof against infamy and its con- 
sequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death ; 
being just, and seeming to be unjust. Then when both have 
reached the uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the 
other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the 
happier of the two. — Th$ Republic, ii. 183. 
Just man, the. 

Justice was the reality and was concerned not with the 

outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and 
concernment of man ; for the just man does not permit the 
several elements within him to interfere with one another, or 
any of them to do the work of others, but he sets in order his 
17 



258 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

own inner life, and is his own master, and at peace with, him- 
self ; and when he has bound together the three principles 
within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and 
middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals — when 
he has bound together all these, and is no longer many, but has 
become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, 
then he will begin to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter 
of property, or in the treatment of the body, or some affair of 
politics or private business ; in all which cases he will think 
and call that which preserves and cooperates with this har- 
monious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge 
which presides over it wisdom ; and that which at any time 
destroys this condition, he will call unjust action, and the 
opinion which presides over it ignorance. 

You have said the precise truth, Socrates. 

Very good ; and if we were to affirm that we had discov- 
ered the just man and the just State, and the place of justice 
in each of them, we should not be telling a falsehood ? 

Most certainly not. — The Republic, ii. 270. 
Just and wise soul, the. 

Str. Do they not say that one soul is just, and another 

unjust, and that one soul is wise, and another foolish ? 

Theaet. Certainly. 

Str. And that the just and wise soul becomes just and wise 
by the possession and presence of justice, and the opposite by 
the opposite ? 

Theaet. Yes, they do. 

Str. But surely that which may be present or may be ab- 
sent will be admitted by them to exist? 

Theaet. Certainly. 

Str. And allowing that these qualities of virtue, justice, ana 
the like all exist, as well as the soul in which they inhere, do 
they affirm any of them to be visible and tangible, or are they 
all invisible ? 

Theaet. None of them surely are invisible. 

Str. And would they say that they tire corporeal ? 

Theaet. They would distinguish ; the soul would be said by 
them to have a body ; but as to the other qualities of justice, 
wisdom, and the like, about which you asked, they would not 
venture either to deny their existence, or to maintain that they 
were all corporeal. — Sophist, iii. 484. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 259 

Just judge. See Judge, righteous . 

Ath. The view which identifies the pleasant and the just 

and the good and the noble has an excellent moral and relig- 
ious tendency. And the opposite view is most at variance 
with the designs of the legislator, and, in his opinion, infa- 
mous ; for no one, if he can help, will be persuaded to do that 
which gives him more pain than pleasure. But as distant 
prospects are apt to be dim]y seen, especially in childhood, the 
legislator will try to purge away the darkness and exhibit the 
truth ; he will persuade the citizens, in some way or other, by 
customs and praises and words, that just and unjust are opposed 
to one another as shadow and light, and that, seen from the 
point of view of a man's own evil and injustice, the unjust ap- 
pears pleasant and the just unpleasant ; but that, seen from the 
just man's point of view, the very opposite is the appearance 
which they wear. — Laws, iv. 192. 
Justice resembling holiness. See. Holiness. 
Justice among thieves. See Honor among, etc. 
Justice and temperance in the State. 

Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State, — first, 

temperance, and then justice, which is the great object of our 
search. 

Yery true. 

Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about 
temperance ? 

I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor 
do I desire that justice should be brought to light and tem- 
perance lost sight of ; and therefore I wish that you would do 
me the favor of considering temperance first. 

Certainly, I replied, I cannot be wrong in granting you a 
favor. 

Then do as I ask, he said. 

Yes, I replied, I will ; — and as far as I can at present see, 
the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of symphony 
and harmony than the preceding. 

How so? he asked. 

Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of 
certain pleasures and desires ; this is implied in the saying of 
" a man being his own master ; " and there are other traces of 
the same notion. 

No doubt, he said. — The Republic, ii. 255. 



260 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Justice conducing to the excellence of the State. See State, what 

most conduces, etc. 
Justice, what is it. 

I said, when we first began, ages ago, there was justice 

tumbling about our feet, and we, fools that we were, failed to 
see her, like people who go about looking for what they have 
in their hands: and that was the way with us; we looked/ 
away into the far distance, and this I suspect was the reason 
why we never saw her. 

What do you mean ? 

I mean to say that we, having been long speaking and hear- 
ing of her, failed to recognize her. 

I get impatient at the length of your exordium. 

Well, then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not ; you 
remember the original principle of which we spoke at the 
foundation of the State, that every man, as we often insisted, 
should practice one thing only, that being the thing to which 
his nature was most perfectly adapted ; now justice is this 
principle or a part of it. 

Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing 
only. 

Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own busi- 
ness, and not being a busybody ; we said so again and again, 
and many others have said the same. 

Yes, we said so. 

Then this doing in a certain way one's own business may be 
assumed to be justice. Do you know why ? 

I do not, and should like to be told. 

Because I think that this alone remains in the State when 
the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are 
abstracted ; and this is the ultimate cause and condition of the 
existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also 
their preservative ; and we were saying that if the three were 
discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one. 

That follows of necessity. — The Republic, ii. 258. 
Justice, approximate. 

Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way 

hither in the search after justice and injustice. 

True, he replied ; but what of this ? 

I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered 
them, we are to require that the just man should in nothing 
fail of absolute justice ; or may we be satisfied with an ap- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 261 

proximation, and the attainment of a higher degree of justice 
than is to be found in other men ? 

The approximation will be enough. 

And we inquired into the nature of absolute justice and into 
the character of the perfectly just, and the possibility of his ex- 
istence, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, only that we 
might have an ideal. We were to look at them in order that 
we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according 
to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in which 
we resembled them, not with any view of showing that they 
could exist in fact. 

True, he said. — The Republic, ii. 299. 
Justice, natural. 

Soc. Tell me what you and Pindar mean by natural jus- 
tice : do you not mean that the superior should take the prop- 
erty of the inferior by force ; that the better should rule the 
worse, the noble have more than the mean ? Am I not right 
in my recollection ? 

Gal. Yes ; that is what I was saying, and what I still main- 
tain. 

Soc. And do you mean by the better the same as the supe- 
rior ? for I could not make out what you were saying at the 
time — whether you meant by the superior the stronger, and 
that the weaker must obey the stronger, as you seemed to im- 
ply when you said that great cities attack small ones in accord- 
ance with natural right, because they are superior and stronger, 
as though the superior and stronger and better were the same ; 
or whether the better may be also the inferior and weaker, and 
the superior the worse, or whether better is to be defined in 
the same way as superior : — this is the point which I want to 
have clearly explained. Are the superior and better and 
stronger the same or different ? 

Gal. Well ; I say unequivocally that they are the same. — 
Gorgias, iii. 76. 
Justice and Virtue, rewards of. 

We have fulfilled our obligations to the argument, putting 

aside the rewards and glories of justice, such as you were say- 
ing that Homer and Hesiod introduced ; and justice in her own 
nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her nature : let 
her do what is just, whether she have the ring of Gyges or not, 
and besides the ring of Gyges, the helmet of Hades. 

Very true. 



262 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumer- 
ating, how many and how great are the rewards which justice 
and the other virtues procure to the soul from Gods and men, 
both in life and after death. 

Certainly not, he said. 

Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argu- 
ment ? 

What did I borrow ? 

The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and 
the unjust just : for you were of opinion that even if the true 
state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of Gods and 
men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the 
argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against 
pure injustice. Do you remember? 

You would have reason to complain of me if I had forgotten. 

Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice 
that the glory which she receives from Gods and men be also 
allowed to her by you ; having been shown to have reality, and 
not to deceive those who truly possess her, she may now have 
appearance restored to her, and thus obtain the other crown of 
victory which is hers also. 

The demand, he said, is just. — The Republic, ii. 444. 
Justice, Courts of, establishment of. See Courts, etc. 

King, the, a Priest. 

Str. There are also priests who, as the law declares, know 

how to give the Gods gifts from men in the form of sacrifices, 
which are acceptable to them, and to ask for us a return of 
blessings from them. Now both these are branches of the 
servile or ministerial art. 

T. Soc. Yes, clearly. 

Str. And here I think that we seem to be getting on the 
right track ; for the priest and the diviner also are full of pride 
and prerogative — this is due to the greatness of their employ- 
ments ; and in Egypt, the king himself is not allowed to reign, 
unless he have priestly powers ; and if he should be of another 
class, and has thrust himself in, he must get enrolled in the 
priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the 
most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest 
magistracies, and here, at Athens, the most solemn and national 
of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by the 
King Archon of the year. — Statesman, iii. 576. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 263 

King and tyrant distinguished. 

Str. When an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, 

his name will surely be the same — he will be called a king ; 
and thus the five names of governments, as they are now reck- 
oned, become one. 

T. Soc. That is true. 

Str. And when an individual ruler governs neither by law 
nor by custom, but following in the steps of the true man of 
science, pretends that he can only act for the best by violating 
the laws, while in reality appetite and ignorance direct the 
imitation, may not such an one be called a tyrant ? 

T. Soc. Certainly. 

Str. And this, we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and 
the king, of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies ; be- 
cause men are offended at the one monarch, and can never be 
made to believe that ariy one can be worthy of such authority, 
or can unite the will and the power in the spirit of virtue and 
knowledge to do justly and holily to all ; they fancy that he 
will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom he 
pleases of us ; for if there could be such a despot as we describe, 
they would acknowledge that we ought to be too glad to have 
him, and that he alone would be the happy ruler of a true and 
perfect State. 

T. Soc. Certainly. — Statesman, iii. 587. 
Kingly art, the. 

Soc. At last we came to the kingly art, and inquired 

whether that gave and caused happiness, and then we got into 
a labyrinth, and when we thought we were at the end, came out 
again at the beginning, having still to seek as much as ever. 

Ori. How did that happen, Socrates ? 

Soc. I will tell you; the kingly art was identified by us with 
the political. 

Ori. Well, and what came of that ? 

Soc. To this royal or political art all the arts, including that 
of the general, seemed to render up the supremacy, as to the 
only one which knew how to use that which they created. 
Here obviously was the very art which we were seeking — the 
art which is the source of good government, and which may be 
described, in the language of Aeschylus, as alone sitting at the 
helm of the vessel of state, piloting and governing all things, 
and utilizing them. 



264 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Cri. And were you not right, Socrates ? 

Soc. You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what 
followed ; for we resumed the inquiry, and a question of tins' 
sort was asked : Does this kingly art, having this supreme 
authority, do anything for us ? To be sure, was the answer. 
And would not you, Crito, say the same ? 

Cri. Yes, I should. 

Soc. And what would you say that the kingly art does ? If 
medicine were supposed to have supreme authority over the 
subordinate arts, and I were to ask you a similar question 
about that, you would say that it produces health ? 

Cri. I should. 

Soc. And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing 
that to have supreme authority over the subject arts — what 
does that do ? Does it not supply us with the fruits of the 
earth ? 

Cri. Yes. 

Soc. And what does the kingly art do when invested with 
supreme power? Perhaps you may not be ready with an 
answer ? 

Cri. Indeed I am not, Socrates. 

Soc. No more were we, Crito. But at any rate you know 
that if this is the art which we were seeking, it ought to be 
useful. 

Cri. Certainly. — Euthydemus, i. 194. 
Kings. See Rulers, Legislators. 
Kings, Dorian, their ruin. See Dorian. 
Kissing of the hero by all. See Heroic men. 
Knowledge, on buying. • 

Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or 

retail in the food of the soul ? To me that appears to be the 
sort of man. ^ 

And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul ? 

Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul ; and we 
must take care, my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us 
when he praises what he sells, like the dealers, wholesale or re- 
tail, who sell the food of the body ; for they praise indiscrimi- 
nately all their goods, without knowing what are really bene- 
ficial or hurtful : neither do their customers know, with the 
exception of any trainer or physician who may happen to buy 
of them. In like manner those who carry about the wares of 
knowledge, and make the round of the cities, and sell or retail 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 265 

them to any customer who is in want of them, praise them all 
alike"; though I should not wonder, O my friend, if many of 
them were really ignorant of their effect upon the soul ; and 
their customers equally ignorant, unless he who buys of them 
happens to be a physician of the soul. If, therefore, you have 
understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy 
knowledge of Protagoras or of any one ; but if not, then, O 
my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a 
game of chance. For there is far greater peril in buying 
knowledge than in buying meat and drink : the one you pur- 
chase of the wholesale or retail dealer, and carry them away 
in other vessels, and before you receive them into the body as 
food, you may deposit them at home and call in any ex- 
perienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or 
drunken, and what not, and how much and when ; and hence 
the danger of purchasing them is not so great. But when you 
buy the wares of knowledge you cannot carry them away in 
another vessel ; they have been sold to you, and you must take 
them into the soul and go your way, either greatly harmed or 
greatly benefited by the lesson ; and therefore we should de- 
liberate and take counsel with our elders ; for we are still 
young — too young to determine such a matter. — Protag- 
oras, i. 114. 

Knowledge, certain, Science necessary to. See Science. 
Knowledge and opinion. 

We seem to have discovered that the many things which 

are esteemed beautiful or good by the multitude, are tossing 
about in some region which is half-way between pure being 
and pure non-being. 

We have: 

Yes ; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind 
which we might find was to be described as matter of opinion, 
and not as matter of knowledge ; being the intermediate flux 
which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty. 

Granted. 

Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither 
see, nor can be taught to see, absolute beauty ; who see the 
many just, and not absolute justice, and the like, — such per- 
sons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge ? 

That is certain. 

But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable 
may be said to know, and not to have opinion only ? 



266 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Neither can that be denied. 

The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the 
other those of opinion? The latter are the same, as I dare 
say you will remember, who listened to sweet sounds and gazed 
upon fair colors, but would not tolerate the existence of ab- 
solute beauty. 

Yes, I remember. 

Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them 
lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they 
be very angry with us for thus describing them ? 

I shall tell them that they ought not to be angry at a de- 
scription of themselves which is true. 

But those who love the truth of each thing are to be called 
lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion ? 

Assuredly. — The Republican. 308. 
Knowledge, the highest, the idea of good. See Good, the idea of, etc. 
Knowledge and Intellect. See Intellect, etc. 
Knowledge, pleasures of. 

Soc. To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, 

if they appear to us to have no hunger of knowledge or pains 
of hunger attaching to them. 

Pro. And they have not. 

Soc. Well, but are there not pains of forgetfulness, if a man 
is full of knowledge and his knowledge is lost ? 

Pro. They are not natural or necessary, but there may be 
times of reflection, when he feels grief at the loss of his knowl- 
edge. 

Soc. Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating 
only the natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with re- 
flections. 

Pro. In that case you are right in saying that the loss of 
knowledge is not attended with pain. 

Soc. These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with 
pain ; and they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very 
few. — Philebus, iii. 191. 
Knowledge, the truest. 

1 am sure that all men who have a grain of intelligence 

will admit that the knowledge which has to do with being and 

reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far the 

truest of all. — Philebus, iii. 198. 

Knowledge, superhuman. 

Soc. Let us suppose a man who understands justice, and 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 267 

has reason as well as understanding about the true nature of 
this and of all other things. 

Pro. Let that be supposed. 

Soc. Will such an one have enough of knowledge if he is 
acquainted only with the divine circle and sphere, and knows 
nothing of our human spheres and circles, and with a like igno- 
rance uses these or any other figures or rules in the building of 
a house ? 

Pro. The knowledge which is only superhuman, Socrates, is 
ridiculous in man. 

Soc. What do you mean ? Do you mean that you are to 
throw into the cup and mingle the impure and uncertain art 
iVhich uses the false rule and the false circle ? 

Pro. Yes, that must be done, if any of us is ever to find his 
way home. — Philebus, iii. 203. 
Knowledge, absolute in God. See Absolute. 
Knowledge, definition needed for. See Definition. 

Lacedaemon, government of, doubtful. See Government of Sparta, 

etc. 
Landmarks, removal of. 

Let us first of all, then, have a class of laws which shall 

be called the laws of husbandmen. And let the first of them 
be the law of Zeus, the God of boundaries. Let no one shift 
the boundary line either of a fellow-citizen who is a neighbor, 
or, if he dwells at the extremity of the land, of any stranger 
who is contiguous to him, considering that this is truly " to 
move the immovable," and every one should be more willing 
to move the largest rock, which is not a landmark, than the 
least stone which is the sworn arbiter of friendship and hatred 
between neighbors ; for Zeus, the God of kindred, is the wit- 
ness of the citizen and Zeus, the God of strangers, of the stran- 
ger, and when aroused, terrible is their wrath. He who obeys 
the law will never know the fatal consequences of disobedience, 
but he who despises the law shall be liable to a double penalty, 
the first coming from the Gods, and the second from the law. 
For let no one voluntarily remove the boundaries of his neigh- 
bor's land, and if any one does, let him who will, inform the 
landowners, and let them bring him into court, and if he be 
convicted of redividing the land by stealth or by force, let the 
court determine what he ought to suffer or pay. In the next 
place, many small injuries done by neighbors to one another 



268 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

through their multiplication, may cause a weight of enmity, 
and make neighborhood a very disagreeable and bitter thing. 
Wherefore a man ought to be very careful of committing any 
offense against his neighbor, and especially of encroaching on 
his neighbor's land ; for any man may easily do harm, but not 
every man can do good to another. He who encroaches on 
his neighbor's land, and transgresses his boundaries, shall make 
good the damage, and, to cure him of his impudence and also 
of his meanness, he shall pay a double penalty to the injured 
party. — Laws, iv. 357. 
Laughter condemned. 

Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. 

For a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess almost 
always produces a violent reaction. 

So I believe. 

Then persons of worth, even if only mortal, must not be 
represented as .overcome by laughter, and still less must such a 
representation of the Gods be allowed. 

Still less of the Gods, as you say, he replied. 

Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about 
the Gods as that in which Homer describes how — 

" Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed Gods, when they saw He- 
phaestus bustling about the mansion." 

On your views, we must not admit them. 

On my views, if you like to father them on me ; that we 
must not admit them is certain. — The Republic, ii. 211. 
Laughter at self-conceit. 

■ Soc. The vain conceits of our friends about their beauty, 

wisdom, wealth, of which we made three divisions, are ridicu- 
lous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful : 
May we not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who 
are in this state of mind, when harmless to others, are simply 
ridiculous ? 

Pro. They are ridiculous. 

Soc. And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to 
be a misfortune ? 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. Arid do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it? , 

Pro. Clearly we feel pleasure. 

Soc. And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we 
feel at the misfortunes of friends ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 269 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the 
folly of our friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles 
with pain, for envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental 
pain, and laughter is pleasant, and we envy and laugh at the 
same instant. — Philehus, iii. 189. 

Law, preamble to, distinguished from the matter of. See Preamble, 

etc. 
Laws, makers of. 

Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries philoso- 
phy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those things 
which a gentleman and a person of honor ought to know ; for 
he is inexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the lan- 
guage which ought to be used in the dealings of man with man, 
whether private or public, and altogether ignorant of the pleas- 
ures and desires of mankind and of human character in general. 
And people of this sort, when they betake themselves to politics 
or business, are as ridiculous as I imagine the politicians to be, 
when they make their appearance in the arena of philosophy. 
For, as Euripides says, — 

" Every man shines in that and pursues that and devotes the greatest portion of 
the day to that in which he thinks himself to excel most." 

And anything in which he is inferior he avoids and depreciates, 
and praises the opposite from partiality to himself, and because 
he thinks that he will thus praise himself. — Gorgias, iii. 73. 
Laws answering to virtue. 

Cle. What ought we to say, then ? 

Ath. What truth and what justice require of us, if I am 
not mistaken, when speaking in behalf of divine excellence ; 
that the legislator when making his laws, had in view not a 
part only, and this the lowest part of virtue, but all virtue, 
and that he devised classes of laws answering to the kinds of 
virtue ; not in the way in which modern inventors of laws 
make the classes, for they only investigate and offer laws of 
which the want is being felt, and one man has a class of laws 
about inheritances in part or sole, another about assault ; oth- 
ers about ten thousand other matters of a similar nature. But 
we say that the right way of inquiry is to proceed as we have 
now done, and I admired the spirit of your exposition ; for you 
are quite right in beginning with virtue, and saying that this 
was the aim of the giver of the law, but I thought that you 



270 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

went wrong when you added that he referred all to a part, and 
a most inferior part of virtue, and my subsequent observations 
had a bearing on this. — Laws, iv. 161. 
Laws and music. See Music, different kinds of. 
Laws, three classes of. 

Ath. The general division of laws according to their im- 
portance into a first, a second, and a third class, we who are 
lovers of laws may make ourselves. 

Meg. Very good. 

Ath. We maintain, then, that a State which would be safe 
and happy, as far as the nature of man allows, must and ought 
to distribute honor and dishonor in the right way. And the 
right way is to place the goods of the soul first and highest in 
the scale, always assuming temperance as a condition of them ; 
and in the second place, the goods of the body ; and in the 
third place, those of money and property. And if any legis- 
lator or State departs from this rule by giving money the place 
of honor, or in any way preferring that which is really last, 
may we not say, that he or the State is doing an unholy and 
unpatriotic thing ? 

Meg. Yes; let that be plainly asserted. — Laws, iv. 226. 
Laws annulled by unsuitable officers. 

Ath. In the government of a State there are two parts : 

First, the number of the magistrates, and the mode of appoint- 
ing them ; and secondly, when they have been appointed, laws 
will have to be provided for each of them, in nature and num- 
ber suitable" to them. But before electing the magistrates, let 
us stop a little and say a word in season. 

Cle. What have you got to say ? 

Ath. This is what I have to say ; every one can see, that 
although the work of legislation is a most important matter, yet 
if a well ordered city superadd to good laws unsuitable officers, 
there will be no use in having the good laws ; not only are 
they ridiculous and useless, but the greatest political injury and 
evil accrues from them. 

Cle. Of course. — Laws, iv. 273. 
Laws not received when first imposed. 

■ Ath. I had in my mind the free and easy manner in which 

we are ordaining that the inexperienced colonists shall receive 
our laws. Now a man need not be very wise, Cleinias, in or- 
der to see that no one can easily receive laws at their first im- 
position. But if we could anyhow wait until those who have 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 271 

been imbued with them from childhood, and have been nurtured 
in them, and become habituated to them, take their part in the 
public elections ; I say, if this could be accomplished, and rightly 
accomplished by any way or contrivance, — then, I think that 
there would be very little danger, at the end of the time, of a 
State thus trained not being permanent. — -Laws, iv. 274. 
Laws against sensual love. 

Was I not just now saying that I had a way to make men 

use natural love and abstain from unnatural, not intentionally 
destroying the seeds of human increase, or sowing them in 
stony places, in which they will take no root ; and that I would 
command them to abstain, too, from any female field of increase 
in which that which is sown is not likely to grow ? Now, if a 
law to this effect could only be made perpetual, and gain an au- 
thority such as already prevents intercourse of parents and 
children — such a law extending to other sensual desires, and 
conquering them, would be the source of ten thousand blessings. 
For, in the first place, moderation is the appointment of nature, 
and deters men from all frenzy and madness of love, and from 
all adulteries and immoderate use of meats and drinks, and 
makes them good friends to their own wives. And innumera- 
ble other benefits would result if such a law could only be en- 
forced. I can imagine some lusty youth who is standing by, 
and who, on hearing this enactment, declares in scurrilous terms, 
that we are making foolish and impossible laws, and fills the 
world with his outcry. Therefore I said that I knew a way of 
enacting and perpetuating such a law, which was very easy in 
one respect, but in another most difficult. There is no difficulty 
in seeing that such a law is possible, and in what way ; for as I 
was saying, the ordinance once consecrated would master the 
soul of every man, and terrify him into obedience. But mat- 
ters have now come to such a pass that the enactment of the 
law seems to be impossible and never likely to take place just 
as the continuance of an entire state in the practice of com- 
mon meals is also deemed impossible. And although this lat- 
ter is partly disproven by the fact of their existence among you, 
still even in your cities the common meals of women would be' 
regarded as unnatural and impossible. I was thinking of the re- 
belliousness of the human heart when I said that the permanent 
establishment of these things is very difficult. — Laws, iv. 354. 
Laws, necessity for. 
Mankind must have laws and conform to them, or their 



272 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast. And 
the reason of this is, that no man's nature is able to know 
what is best for the social state of man ; or knowing, always 
able to do what is best. In the first place, there is a difficulty 
in apprehending that the true art of politics is concerned, not 
with private but with public good; for public good binds to- 
gether States, but private only distracts them, — nor do men 
always see that the gain is greater both to the individual and 
the State, when the State and not the individual is first consid- 
ered. In the second place, even if a person know as a matter 
of science that this is the truth, but is possessed of absolute and 
irresponsible power, he will never be able to abide in this prin- 
ciple or to persist in regarding the public good as primary in the 
State, and the private good as secondary. Human nature will 
be always drawing him into avarice and selfishness, avoiding 
pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and will bring 
these to the front, obscuring the juster and better ; and so 
working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him 
and the whole city. For if a man were born so divinely 
gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth he would 
have no need of laws to rule over him ; for there is no law or 
order which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without im- 
piety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man, but rather 
the lord of all. I speak of mind, true and free and in harmony 
with nature. But then there is no such mind anywhere, or at 
least not much ; and therefore we must choose law and order, 
which are the second best. — Laws, iv. 388. 
Laws framed for whom. 

Laws are partly framed for the sake of good men, in 

order to instruct them how they may live on friendly terms 
with one another, and partly for the sake of those who refuse 
to be instructed, whose spirit cannot be subdued, or softened, 
or hindered from plunging into evil. These are the persons 
who cause the word to be spoken which I am about to utter ; 
for them the legislator legislates of necessity, and in the hope 
that there may be no need of his laws. — Laws, iv. 394. 
Lawyer, the, a slavish man. See Freedom of Philosophy . 
Lawyers — and courts of law. See Courts, etc. 
Lawyers not teachers. 

Soc. The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profea* 

tfion is against us. 

Theaet. How is that, and what profession do you mean ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 273 

Soc. The profession of the great wise ones who are called 
orators and lawyers ; for these persuade men by their art and 
do not teach them, but make them think whatever they like. 
Do you imagine that there are any teachers in the world so 
clever as to be able to convey to others the truth about acts of 
robbery or violence, of which they were not eye-witnesses, 
while a little water is flowing? 

Theaet. Certainly not, they can only persuade them. 

Soc. And would you not say that persuading them is mak- 
ing them have an opinion ? 

Theaet To be sure. 

Soc. When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about 
matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in 
any other way, and when thus judging of them from report 
they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without 
knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged 
well. 

Theaet. Certainly. 

Soc. And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts 
and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have 
judged rightly without knowledge ; and therefore I must infer 
that they are not the same. — Theaetetus, iii. 407. 

Lawyers, as advocates corrupting the State. See State, corrupting 

the, etc. 
Learning, the word as used. 

Imagine then that you have gone through the first part 

of the sophistical ritual, which, as Prodicus says, begins with 
initiation into the correct use of terms. The two strange 
gentlemen wanted to explain to you, as you do not know, that 
the word " to learn " has two meanings, and is used, first, in 
the sense of acquiring knowledge of some matter of which 
you previously have no knowledge, and also, when you have 
the knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this "same matter done 
or spoken by the light of this knowledge ; this last is gener- 
ally called "knowing" rather than "learning;" but the word 
" learning " is also used, and you did not see that the term is 
employed of two opposite sorts of men, of those who know, and 
of those who do not know, as they explained. — Euthydemus, i 
180. 

Learning, a process of recollection. 
The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born 

again many times, and having seen all things that there are, 
18 



274 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of 
them all ; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call 
to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about 
everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned 
all things, there is no difficulty in her eliciting, or as men say 
learning, all out of a single recollection, if a man is strenuous 
and does not faint; for all inquiry and all learning is but rec- 
ollection. — Meno, i. 255. 
Learning, the lover of, must be truthful. 

Let us assume that philosophical minds always love 

knowledge of a sort which shows them the eternal nature in 
which is no varying from generation and corruption. 

Agreed. 

And further, I said, let us admit that they are lovers of all 
true being ; there is no part, whether greater or less, or more 
or less honorable, which they are willing to renounce ; as we 
said before of the lover and the man of ambition. 

True. 

There is another quality which they will also need if they 
are to be what we were saying. 

What quality ? 

Truthfulness ; they will never intentionally receive false- 
hood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth. 

Yes, he said, that may be affirmed of them. 

" May be," my friend, I replied, is not the word ; say rather, 
" must be affirmed ; " for he whose nature is amorous of any- 
thing cannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the ob- 
ject of his affections. 

Bight, he said. 

And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth ? 

How can there be ? 

Or can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of 
falsehood ? 

Never. 

The true lover of learning, then, must from his earliest 
youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth. — The Republic, ii. 
311. 
Learning and belief. 

Soc. Let me raise this question; you would say that 

there is such a thing as " having learned ? " 

Gor. Yes. 

Soc. And there is also " having believed ? " 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 275 

Gor. Yes. 

Soc. And is the " having learned " the same as " having be- 
lieved," and are learning and belief the same things ? 

Gor. In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same. 

Soc. And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in 
this way : if a person were to say to you, " Is there, Gorgias, 
a false belief as well as a true ? " you would reply, if I am not 
mistaksn, that there is. 

Gov. Yes. 

Soc. Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true ? 

Gor. No. 

Soc. No, indeed ; and this again proves that knowledge and 
belief differ. 

Gor. That is true. 

Soc. And yet those who have learned as well as those who 
have believed are persuaded ? 

Gor. That is so. 

Soc. Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion, — one 
which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other 
is of knowledge ? 

Gor. By all means. 

Soc. And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in 
courts of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, 
the sort of persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, 
or that which gives knowledge ? 

Gor. Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief. 

Soc. Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a 
persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but 
gives no instruction about them ? 

Gor. True. — Gorgias, iii. 39. 
Learning, facility in. 

Which, I said, is better — facility in learning, or difficulty 

in learning ? 

Facility. 

Yes, I said ; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and 
difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly ? 

True. 

And is it not better to teach one another quickly and ener~ 
getically, rather than quietly and slowly ? 

Yes. 

And to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and readily 
— that is also better than to remember quietly and slowly ? 



276 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Yes. 

And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, 
and not a quietness ? 

True. 

And is it not best to understand what is said, whether at the 
writing-master's or the music-master's, or anywhere else, not as 
quietly as possible, but as quickly as possible ? 

Yes. 

And when the soul inquires, and in deliberations, not the 
quietest, as I imagine, and he who with difficulty deliberates 
and discovers, is thought worthy of praise, but he who does this 
most easily and quickly? 

That is true, he said. 

And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and 
activity are clearly better than slowness and quietness ? 

That, he said, is the inference. — Charmides, i. 14. 

Legacies of wealth to children an evil. See Children, riches an 

evil left to. 
Legislation, the true aim of. 

Soc. Whatever name he gives to the thing, he would 

allow that the good or expedient is the aim of legislation, and 
that the State as far as possible imposes all laws with a view 
to the greatest expediency ; can legislation have any other aim ? 

Theod. Certainly not. 

Soc. But is the aim attained always? may not mistakes 
often happen ? 

Theod. Yes, I think that there are mistakes. 

Soc. The possibility of error will be more distinctly recog- 
nized, if we put the question in reference to the whole class 
under which the good or expedient falls. That whole class has 
to do with the future, and laws are passed under the idea that 
they will be useful in after time ; which, in other words, is the 
future. 

Theod. Very true. — Theaetetus, iii. 380. 
Legislation cannot be particular. 

Str. Let us consider, further, that the legislator who has 

to preside over the herd, and to enforce justice in their deal- 
ings with one another, will not be able, in enacting for the 
general good, to provide exactly what is suitable for each par- 
ticular case. 

T. Soc. He cannot be expected to do this. 

Str. He will lay down laws in a general form for the major- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 277 

:ty, roughly meeting the cases of individuals ; and some of them 
he will deliver in writing, and others will be unwritten ; and 
these last will be traditional customs of the country. 

T. Soc. That will be right. 

Str. Yes, that will be right ; for how can he sit at every 
man's side all through his life, and prescribe for him the exact 
particulars of his duty ? Who, Socrates, would be sufficient for 
such a task ? No one who really had the royal science, if he 
had been able to do this, would have imposed upon himself the 
restriction of having a written code of laws. — Statesman, lii. 
580. 

Legislation, comprehensive. See Laws answering to virtue. 
Legislation, the beginning of. 

Ath. There is another thing which would- probably 

happen. 

Gle. What is that ? 

Ath. When these larger habitations grew up out of the 
lesser original ones, each of the lesser ones would survive in 
the larger ; every family would be under the rule of the eld- 
est, and, owing to their separation from one another, would 
have peculiar customs in things divine and human, which they 
would have received from their several parents who had edu- 
cated them ; and these customs would incline them to order, 
when the parents had the element of order in them ; and to 
courage, when they had the element of courage in them. And 
they would naturally stamp upon their children, and upon their 
children's children, their own institutions ; and, as we are -say- 
ing, they would find their way into the larger society, having 
already their own peculiar laws. 

Gle. Certainly. 

Ath. And every man surely likes his own laws best, and the 
laws of others not so well. 

Gle. True. 

Ath. Then now we seem to have stumbled upon the begin- 
nings of legislation ? 

Gle. Exactly. 

Ath. The next step will be that these persons, who meet to- 
gether, must choose some arbiters, who will inspect the laws of 
all of them, and will publicly present such of them as they 
approve to the chiefs who lead the tribes, and are in a manner 
their kings, and will give them the choice of them. These 
will themselves be called legislators, and will appoint the mag- 



278 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

istrates, framing some sort of aristocracy, or perhaps monarchy, 
out of the dynasties or lordships, and in this altered state of 
the government they will live. 

Cle. Yes, they would be appointed in the order which you 
mention. — Laws, iv. 210. 
Legislation, chance in. 

Ath. I was going to say that man never legislates, but 

that accidents of all sorts legislate for us in all sorts of ways. 
The violence of war and the hard necessity of poverty are 
constantly overturning governments and changing laws. And 
the power of disease has often caused innovations in the State, 
when there have been pestilences, and bad seasons continuing 
during many years. Any one who sees all this, naturally 
rushes to tl^e conclusion of which I was speaking, that no mor- 
tal legislates in anything, but that in human affairs chance is 
almost everything. — Laws, iv. 236. 
Legislation, force and persuasion in. See Persuasion. 

Legislators never appear to have considered that whereas 

they have two instruments which they might use in legislation, 
— persuasion and force, in so far as a rude and uneducated 
multitude are capable of being affected by them, they use one 
only ; for they do not mingle persuasion with antagonism, but 
employ force pure and simple. — Laws, iv. 249. 
Legislative ignorance destroying States. See Ignorance, etc. 
Legislative purification. 

Take, for example, the purification of a city — there are 

many kinds of purification, some easier and others more diffi- 
cult; and some of them, and the best and most difficult of 
them, the legislator, if he be also a despot, may be able to 
effect ; but he who without a despotism sets up a new govern- 
ment and laws, even if he attempt the mildest of purgations, 
may think himself happy if he can complete his work. When 
best the purification is painful, like similar cures in medicine, 
involving righteous punishment and inflicting death or exile in 
the last resort. For in this way we commonly dispose of 
great sinners who are incurable, and are* the greatest injury of 
the whole State. But the milder form of purification is as fol- 
lows : When men who have nothing, and are in want of food, 
show a disposition to follow their leaders in an attack on the 
property of the rich — these, who are the natural plague of 
the State, are sent away by the legislator in a friendly spirit as 
far as he is able ; and this dismissal of them is euphemistically 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 279 

termed a colony And every legislator should contrive to do 
this at once. Oar present case, however, is peculiar. For 
there is no need to devise any colony or purifying separation 
under the circumstances in which we are placed. But, as 
when many streams flow together from springs and mountain 
torrents into a single lake, we ought to attend and take care 
that the confluence of water should be perfectly clear ; and in 
order to effect this, should pump and draw off and divert im- 
purities, so in every political arrangement there may be trouble 
and danger. But, seeing that we are discoursing and not act- 
ing, let our selection be supposed to be completed, and the de- 
sired purity attained. Touching evil men, who want to join 
and be citizens of our State, we will not allow them to come 
until we have tested them by persuasion and time ; but the 
good we will to the utmost of our ability receive as friends 
with open arms. — Laws, iv. 260. 
Legisla tor Homer not a. 

I think that we must put a question to Homer ; not 

about medicine, or any of the arts to which his poems only in- 
cidentally refer ; we are not going to ask him, or any other 
poet, whether he has cured patients like Asclepius, or left be- 
hind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads were, or 
whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at second- 
hand, but we have a right to know respecting military tactics, 
politics, education, which are the chiefest and noblest subjects 
of his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. " Friend 
Homer," then we say, " if you are only in the second remove 
from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third — 
not an image-maker or imitator — and if you are able to dis- 
cern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or 
public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your 
help ? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, 
and many other cities great and small have been similarly ben- 
efited by others ; but who says that you have been a good 
legislator to them and have done them any good ? Italy and 
Sicily can tell of Charondas, and -there is Solon who is re- 
nowned among us ; but what city has anything to say about 
you ? " Is there any city which he might name ? 

I think not, said Glaucon ; not even the Homeridae them- 
selves pretend that he was a legislator. 

Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on 
successfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was 
alive ? 



280 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

There is not. 

Or is there any invention of his applicable to the arts, or 
to human life, such as Thales the Milesian, or Anacharsis the 
Scythian, and other ingenious men have made, which is at- 
tributed to him ? 

There is nothing at all of the kind. 

But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately 
a guide or teacher of any ? Had he in his life-time friends 
and associates who loved him, and handed down to posterity an 
Homeric way of life, as Pythagoras was beloved and his suc- 
cessors, who at this day call their way of life by his name, and 
do appear to have a certain distinction above other men ? 

Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Soc- 
rates, Creophylus, the companion of Homer, that child of 
flesh, whose name always makes us laugh, might be more 
justly ridiculed for his want of education, if, as is said, Homer 
was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when 
he was alive ? 

Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, 
Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate and 
improve mankind, if he had possessed knowledge and not been 
a mere imitator — can you imagine, I say, that he would not 
have had many followers, and been honored and loved by 
them ? Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a 
host of others, have only to suggest to their contemporaries 
that they will never be able, to manage either their own house 
or their State unless they are made by them presidents of edu- 
cation ; and for this wisdom of theirs they are so much be- 
loved that their companions all but carry them about on their 
heads. And are we to believe that the contemporaries of 
Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them 
to beg their way as rhapsodists, if they had really been able to 
improve mankind? Would they not have been as unwilling to 
part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay at 
home with them ? Or, if the master would not stay, then the 
disciples would have followed him about everywhere until they 
had got education enough ? 

Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true. — The Republic, 
ii. 430. 
Legislator, compared to a physician. See Rulers, compared to, etc. 

Str. Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician, or 

trainer, who is about to go into a far country, and is expecting 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 281 

to be a long time away from his patients ; he leaves written in- 
structions for the patients or pupils, under the idea that they 
will not be remembered unless they are written down. 

Y..Soc. True. 

Str. But what would you say, if he came back sooner than he 
intended, and, owing to an unexpected change of the winds or 
other celestial influences, some other remedies happened to be 
better for them, — would he not venture to suggest those other 
remedies, although differing from his former prescription ? 
Would he persist in observing the original law, neither himself 
giving any new commandments, nor the patient daring to do 
otherwise than was prescribed, under the idea that this course 
only was healthy and medicinal, all others noxious and hetero- 
dox ? Viewed in the light of science and true art, would not 
all such regulations be utterly ridiculous ? 

Y. Soc. Quite true. 

Str. And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten, deter- 
mining what was good or bad, honorable or dishonorable, just 
or unjust to the tribes of men who herd in their several cities, 
and are governed in accordance with them ; if, I say, the wise 
legislator were suddenly to come again, or another like to him, 
is he to be prohibited from changing them; would not this 
prohibition be in reality quite as ridiculous as the other ? 

Y. Soc. Certainly. — Statesman, iii. 581. 

Legislators not always to obey their constituency. See Constitu- 
ency. 

Leveling of anarchy. See Anarchy. 

Liberal education, a sign of. See Education, sign of a, etc. 

Liberty allowed the lover. 

Consider, how great is the encouragement which all the 

world gives to the lover ; neither is he supposed to be doing 
anything dishonorable ; but if he succeeds he is praised, and if 
he fail he is blamed. And in the pursuit of his love the cus- 
tom of mankind allows him to do many strange things, which 
philosophy would bitterly censure if they were done from any 
motive of interest, or wish for office or power. He may pray, 
and entreat, and supplicate, and swear, and be a servant of ser- 
vants, and lie on a mat at the door ; in any other case friends 
and enemies would be equally ready to prevent him, but now 
there is no friend who will be ashamed of him and admonish 
him, and no enemy will charge him with meanness or flattery ; 
the actions of a lover have a grace which ennobles them ; and 



282 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

custom has decided that they are highly commendable and that 
there is no loss of character in them ; and what is strangest of 
all he only may swear and forswear himself (this is what the 
world says), and the Gods will forgive his transgression, for 
there is no such thing as a lover's oath. Such is the entire 
liberty which Gods and men have allowed the lover, according 
to the custom which prevails in our part of the world. — The 
Symposium, i. 477. 
Liberty, popular. See Democracy. 
Liberty and license. See Anarchy. 
License, spirit of. 

Damon tells me, and I can quite believe him; he says 

that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the 
State always change with them. 

Yes, said Adeimantus ; and you may add my suffrage to 
Damon's and your own. 

Then, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their 
fortress in music ? 

Yes, he said ; and the license of which you speak very 
easily creeps in. 

Yes, I replied, in the form of amusement ; and at first sight 
appears harmless. 

Why, yes, he said, and there is no harm ; were it not that lit- 
tle by little, the spirit of license, finding a home, penetrates into 
manners and customs ; whence, issuing with greater force, it in- 
vades agreements between man and man, and from agreements 
goes on to laws and constitutions, in utter recklessness, and 
ends, Socrates, by an overthrow of all things, private as well 
as public. 

Is that true ? I said. 

That is my belief, he replied. 

Then, as I was saying, our youth should be educated in a 
stricter rule from the first, for if education becomes lawless, 
and the youths themselves become lawless, they can never grow 
up into well-conducted and meritorious citizens. 

Very true, he said. — The Republic, ii. 248. 
License, freedom growing to. See Freedom growing to, etc. 
Lie, a, when committed. See Fiction. 
Lie, God cannot utter a. See Deception. 
Lies for the good of the State. 

Truth should be highly valued ; if, as we were saying, 

a lie is useless to the Gods, and useful only as a medicine to 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 283 

men, then the use of such medicines will have to be restricted 
to physicians ; private individuals have no business with them. 

Clearly not, he said. 

Then if any persons are to have the privilege of lying, 
either at home or abroad, they will be the rulers of the State ; 
they may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody 
else is to meddle with anything of the kind ; and for a private 
man to lie in return to the rulers is to be deemed a more 
heinous fault than for a patient or the pupil of a gymnasium 
not to speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the 
physician or trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain 
truly how matters are going on in a ship. 

Most true, he said. 

If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in 
the State, — 

" Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or carpenter r " 

he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally 
subversive of ship or State. 

Yes, he said, if our theory is carried into execution. — The 
Republic, ii. 211. 
Life a valued good. 

Soc. If, acting under the advice of men who have no un- 
derstanding, we destroy that which is improved by health and 
deteriorated by disease — would life be worth having ? And 
that which has been destroyed is the body ? 

Or. Yes. 

Soc. Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body ? 

Or. Certainly not. 

Soc. And will life be worth having, if that higher part of 
man be destroyed, which is improved by justice and deteriorated 
by injustice ? Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may 
be in man, which has to do with justice and injustice, to be in- 
ferior to the body ? 

Or. Certainly not. 

Soc. More honored, then ? 

Or. Far more honored. 

Soc. Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many 
say of us : but what he, the one man who has understanding of 
just and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And 
therefore you begin in error when you advise that we should 
regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and 



284 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

evil, honorable and dishonorable. Well, some one will say, 
" But the many can kill us." 

Or. Yes, Socrates ; that will clearly be the answer. 

Soc. That is true : but still I find with surprise that the old 
argument is, as I conceive, unshaken as ever. And I should 
like to know whether I may say the same of another proposi- 
tion — that not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued ? 

Or. Yes, that also remains. 

Soc. And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable 
one — that holds also ? 

Or. Yes, that holds. — Orito, i. 352. 
Life of the body, the soul the. See Soul giving life. 
Life and death not to be considered in questions of duty. See 
Death and life, etc. 

Life, when unendurable. 

In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become 

ridiculous. If, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no 
longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats 
and drinks, and having all wealth and all power, shall we be 
told that, when the very essence of the vital principle is un- 
dermined and corrupted, even though* a man be allowed to do 
whatever he pleases, life is still worth having to him, if he be 
forbidden to escape from vice and injustice, or attain justice 
and virtue, seeing that we now know the true nature of each ? 

Yes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still, as 
we are near the spot at which we may see the truth with 
our own eyes, let us not faint by the way. — The JRepublic, 
ii. 272. 
Life a fearful thing. 

Soc. There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of 

approaching the argument ; for what you say is what the rest 
of the world think, but are unwilling to say. And I must beg 
of you to persevere that the true rule of human life may be- 
come manifest. Tell me, then : you say, do you not, that in 
the rightly developed man the passions ought not to be con- 
trolled, but that we should let them grow to the utmost and 
somehow or other satisfy them, and that this is virtue ? 

Gal. Yes ; that is what I say. 

Soc. Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be 
happy ? 

Oal. No, indeed, for then stones and dead men would be 
the happiest of all. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 285 

Soc. But surely according to you life is an awful thing ; and 
I think that Euripides may have been right in saying, — 

"Who knows if life be not death and death life; " 

for I think that we are very likely dead ; and I have heard a 
wise man say that at this very moment we are dead, and that 
the body(o-6j/xa) is a tomb (cnj/xa), and that the part of the soul 
which is the seat of the desires is liable to be blown and tossed 
about. — Gorgias, iii. 81. 
Life, protracted, not to be desired. 

O my friend ! I want you to see that the noble and the 

good may possibly be something different from saving and be- 
ing saved, and that he who is truly a man ought not to care 
about living a certain time : he knows, as women say, that we 
must all die, and therefore he is not fond of life ; he leaves all 
that with God, and considers in what way he can best spend 
his appointed term. — Gorgias, iii. 104. 
Life, spontaneous. 

Str. It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing 

in the then order of nature as the procreation of animals from 
one another ; what we have heard of as the earth-born race 
was the one which existed in that second cycle — they sprang 
out of the ground in which they were sown ; and of this tradi- 
tion, which is nowadays often unduly discredited, our ances- 
tors, who came into being immediately after the end of the last 
period and at the beginning of this, are the heralds to us. For 
mark how consistent the sequel of the tale is ; after the return 
of age to youth, follows the. return of the dead, who are lying 
in the earth, to life ; the wheel of their existence has been 
turned back, and they come together and rise and live in the 
opposite order, unless God has carried any of them away to 
some other lot. Such is the tradition of the so-called earth- 
born men and so of necessity they came into being. — States- 
man, iii. 555. 

Life, goods of. See Goods, etc. 
Life, progression of. See* Progression, etc. 
Life, reason the rule of. 

May we not regard every living being as a puppet of the 

Gods, either their plaything only, or created with a pur- 
pose which of the two we cannot certainly know ? But 
this we know, that these affections in us are like cords and 
strings, which pull us different and opposite ways, and to oppo- 



286 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 

site actions ; and herein lies the difference between virtue and 
vice. According to the argument there is one among these 
cords which every man ought to grasp and never let go, but 
to pull with it against all the rest ; and this is the sacred and 
golden cord of reason, called by us the common law of the 
State ; there are others which are hard and of iron, but this is 
soft because golden ; and there are several other kinds. Now 
we ought always to cooperate with the lead of the best, which 
is law. For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle, and 
not violent, her rule must needs have ministers in order to help 
the golden principle in vanquishing the other principles. And 
thus the moral tale about our being puppets will not be lost, 
and the meaning of the expression " superior or inferior to a 
man's self" will become clearer ; as also that in this matter of 
pulling the strings of the puppet, cities as well as individuals 
should live according to reason ; which the individual attains 
in himself, and the city receives from some God, or from the 
legislator and makes it her law in her dealings with herself and 
with other States. In this way virtue and vice will be more 
clearly distinguished by us. And when they have become 
clearer, education and other institutions will in like manner be- 
come clearer ; and in particular that question of convivial en- 
tertainment, which may seem, perhaps, to have been a very 
trifling matter, and to have taken a great many more words 
than were necessary. — Laws, iv. 175. 
Life, the nobler. 

Enough has now been said of divine matters, both as 

touching the practices which men ought to follow, and the 
several characters which they ought to cultivate. But of 
human things we have not as yet spoken, and we must ; for to 
men we are discoursing and not to Gods. Pleasures and pains 
and desires are a part of human nature, and on them every 
mortal being must of necessity hang and depend with the most 
eager interest. And therefore we must praise the noblest life, 
not only as the fairest in appearance, but if a man will only 
taste, and not as in the days of youth run away to another, he 
will find that this nobler life surpasses also in the very thing 
which we all of us desire, — I mean in having the greatest 
pleasure and the least pain during the whole of life. And this 
will be plain, and will be quickly and clearly seen, if a man 
has a true taste of them. But what is a true taste ? That we 
have to learn from the argument, — the point being what is 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 287 

according to nature, and what is not according to nature. One 
life must be compared with another ; the more pleasurable 
with the more painful, after this manner : We desire to have 
pleasure, but we neither desire nor choose pain ; and the neu- 
tral state we are ready to take in exchange, not for pleasure, 
but for pain ; and we also choose less pain and greater 
pleasure', but less pleasure and greater pain we do not choose ; 
and an equal balance of either we cannot venture to assert 
that we should desire. And all these differ or do not differ 
severally in number and magnitude and intensity and equality, 
and in the opposites of these when regarded as objects of 
choice, in relation to the will. And such being the necessary 
order of things, we choose that life in which there are many 
great and intense elements of pleasure and pain, and in which 
the pleasures are in excess, and do not choose that in which 
the opposites exceed ; nor, again, do we choose that in which 
the elements of either are small and few and feeble, and the 
pains exceed. And when, as I said before, there is a balance 
of pleasure and pain in life, this is to be regarded by us as the 
balanced life ; while other lives are preferred by us because 
they exceed in what we like, or are rejected by us because 
they exceed in what we dislike. All the lives of men may be 
regarded by us as bound up in these, and we must also consider 
what sort of lives we by nature choose. And if we wish for 
any others, I say that we choose them only through some 
ignorance and inexperience of the lives which actually exist. 

Now, what lives are they, and how many in which, having 
searched out and beheld the objects of will and desire and their 
opposites, and making of them a law, choosing, I say, the dear 
and the pleasant and the best and noblest, a man may live in 
the happiest way possible? Let us say that the temperate life 
is one kind of life, and the rational another, and the courageous 
another, and the healthful another ; and to these four let us 
oppose four other lives, — the foolish, the cowardly, the intem- 
perate, the diseased. He who knows the temperate life will 
describe it as in all things gentle, having gentle pains and 
gentle pleasures, and placid desires and loves not insane ; 
whereas the intemperate life is impetuous in all things, and has 
violent pains and pleasures, and vehement and stinging desires, 
and loves utterly insane ; and in the temperate life the pleas- 
ures exceed the pains, but in the intemperate life the pains ex- 
ceed the pleasures in greatness and number and intensity. 



288 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Hence one of the two lives is naturally and necessarily more 
pleasant and the other more painful, and he who would live 
pleasantly cannot possibly choose to live intemperately. -— 
Laws, iv. 258. 

Likeness of the world. See Animal, etc. 
Likeness-making. 

Str. I think that I can discern two divisions o£ the imi- 
tative art, but I am not as yet able to see in which of them the 
desired form is to be found. 

Theaet. Will you tell me first what are the two divisions of 
which you are speaking ? 

Str. One is the art of likeness-making ; generally a likeness 
is made by produciug a copy which is executed according to 
the proportions of the original, similar in length and breadth 
and depth, and also having colors answering to the several 
parts. 

Theaet But is not this always the case in imitation ? 

Str. Not always ; in works either of sculpture or of paint- 
ing, which are of any magnitude, there is a certain degree of 
deception ; for if the true proportions were given, the upper 
part, which is farther off, would appear to be out of proportion 
in comparison with the lower, which is nearer ; and so our 
artists give up the truth in their images and make only the 
proportions which appear to be beautiful, disregarding the real 
ones. 

Theaet. Quite true. 

Str. And that which being other is also like, may we not 
fairly call a likeness or image ? 

Theaet. Yes. 

Str. And may we not, as I did just now, call that part of 
the imitative art which is concerned with making such images 
the art of likeness-making ? 

Theaet. Let that be the name. 

Str. And what shall we call that resemblance of the beauti- 
ful, which is due to the unfavorable position of the spectator, 
but if a person had the power of seeing the great works of 
which I was speaking as they truly are, would appear not 
even like that to which it professes to be like ? May we not 
call this an appearance, since it appears only and is not really 
like? 

Theaet. Certainly. 

Str. There is a great deal of this in painting, and in all im- 
itation ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 289 

Theaet. Of course. 

Str. And may we not fairly call the sort of art which pro- 
duces an appearance and not an image, phantastic art ? 
Theaet. That is very fair. 

Str. Then there are two kinds of image-making — the art 
of making likenesses and phantastic, or the art of making ap- 
pearances ? 

Theaet. True. — Sophist, iii. 470. 
Limit and cause in the universe. 

Soc. Should we not be wise in maintaining that there is 

in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit of 
which we have often spoken, as well as a cause of no mean 
power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and 
months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind ? 

Pro. Most justly. 

Soc. And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul ? 

Pro. Certainly not. 

Soc. And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say 
that there is the soul and mind of a king, because there is in 
him the power of the cause ? And other Gods have other 
noble attributes, whereby they love severally to be called. 

Pro. Very true. 

Soc. Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken 
by us, Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the tes- 
timony of those who said of old time that mind rules the uni- 
verse. 

Pro. True. — Philebus, iii. 166. 
Limitation of law and order. See Order and Law. 
Little things, God attends to. 

Ath. Let us not deem God inferior to human workmen, 

who, in proportion to their skill, finish and perfect their works, 
small as well as great, by one and the same art ; or that God, 
the wisest of beings, who is willing and able to extend his 
care to all things, like a lazy good-for-nothing, wants a holi- 
day, and takes no thought of smaller and easier matters, but 
of the greater only. — Laws, iv. 415. 

Love the eldest of the Gods and the source of the greatest bene- 
fits. 

Phaedrus began by affirming that Love is a mighty God, 

and wonderful among Gods and men, but especially wonderful 
in his birth. For that he is the eldest of the Gods is an 
honor to him ; and a proof of this is, that of his parents there 
19 



290 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

is no memorial ; neither poet nor prose-writer has ever af* 
firmed that he had any. As Hesiod says : — 

" First Chaos came, and then broad-bosomed Earth, 
The everlasting seat of all that is, 
And Love." 

In other words, after Chaos, the Earth and Love, these two 
came into being. Also Parmenides sings of the generation of 
the Gods : — 

" First in the train of Gods, he fashioned Love." 

And Acusilaus agrees with Hesiod. Thus numerous are the 
witnesses which acknowledge Love to be the eldest of the 
Gods. And not only is he the eldest, he is also the source of 
the greatest benefits to us. For I know not any greater bless- 
ing to a young man beginning life than a virtuous lover, or to 
the lover than a beloved youth. For the principle which ought 
to be the guide of men who would nobly live — that principle, 
I say, neither kindred, nor honor, nor wealth, nor any other 
motive is able to implant so well as love. Of what am I 
speaking ? Of the sense of honor and dishonor, without 
which neither States nor individuals ever do any good or great 
work. — The Symposium, i. 473. 
Love, courage increased by. See Courage. 
Love, honor and dishonor in. 

There is dishonor in yielding to the evil, or in an evil 

manner ; but there is honor in yielding to the good, or in an 
honorable manner. Evil is the vulgar lover who loves the 
body rather than the soul, and who is inconstant because he is 
a lover of the inconstant ; and therefore when the bloom of 
youth which he was desiring is over, he takes wing and flies 
away, in spite of all his words and promises ; whereas the 
love of the noble mind, which is one with the unchanging, is 
life-long. The custom of our country would have them both 
proven well and truly, and would have us yield to the one sort 
of lover and avoid the other, and therefore encourages some to 
pursue and others to fly ; testing both the lover and the be- 
loved in contests and trials, which will show to which of the 
two classes they respectively belong. — The Symposium, i. 
478. 

Love, virtue the basis of. 

There remains, then, only one way of honorable attach- 
ment which custom allows in the beloved, and this is the way 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 291 

of virtue ; for as we admitted that any service which the lover 
does to him is not to be accounted flattery or dishonor, so the 
beloved has also one way of voluntary service which is not 
dishonorable, and this is virtuous service. 

For we have a custom, and according to our custom, any 
one who does service to another under the idea that he will be 
improved by him either in wisdom, or in some other particular 
of virtue — such a voluntary service, I say, is not regarded as 
a dishonor, and is not open to the charge of flattery. And 
these two customs, one the love of youth, and the other the 
practice of philosophy and virtue in general, ought to meet in 
one, and then the beloved may honorably indulge the lover. 
For when the lover and beloved come together, having each of 
them a law, and the lover thinks that he is right in doing any 
service which he can to his gracious loving one ; and the other 
that he is right in showing any kindness which he can to him 
who is making him wise and good ; the one capable of com- 
municating wisdom and virtue, the other seeking to acquire 
them with a view to education and wisdom ; when the two 
laws of love are fulfilled and meet in one — then, and then 
only, may the beloved yield with honor to the lover. Nor 
when love is of this disinterested sort is there any disgrace in 
being deceived, but in every other case there is equal disgrace 
in being or not being deceived. For he who is gracious to 
his lover under the impression that he is rich, and is disap- 
pointed of his gains because he turns out to be poor, is dis- 
graced all the same ; for he has done his best to show that he 
would turn himself to any one's base uses for the sake of 
money, and this is not honorable. But on the same principle 
he who lives for the sake of virtue, and in the hope that he 
will be improved by his lover's company, shows himself to be 
virtuous, even though the object of his affection be proved to 
be a villain, and to have no virtue ; and if he is deceived he 
has committed a noble error. For he has proved that for his 
part he will do anything for anybody for the sake of virtue 
and improvement, than which there can be nothing nobler. 
Thus noble in every case is the acceptance of another for the 
sake of virtue. This is that love which is the love of the 
heavenly goddess, and is heavenly, and of great price to indi- 
viduals and cities, making the lover and the beloved alike eager 
in the work of their own improvement. But all other loves 
are the offspring of the other who is a common goddess. — 
The Symposium, i. 478. 



292 PLATO'S BEST fHOOGSTS. 

Love, double in all things. 

Eryximachus spoke as follows : Seeing that Pausanias 

made a fair beginning, and but a lame ending, I must endeavor 
to supply his deficiency. I think that he has rightly distin- 
guished two kinds of love. But my art further informs me 
^hat a double love is to be found in all animals and plants, and 
I may say in all that is ; and is not merely an affection of the 
soul of man towards the fair, or towards anything ; that, I say, 
is a view of the subject which I seem to have gathered from 
my own art of medicine, which shows me how great and won- 
derful and universal is the deity of love whose empire extends 
over all that is, divine as well as human. And from medicine 
I will begin that I may do honor to my art. For there are in 
the human body two loves, which are confessedly different and 
unlike, and being unlike, have loves and desires which are un- 
like ; and the desire of the healthy is one, and the desire of the 
diseased is another ; and, as Pausanias says, to indulge good 
men is honorable and bad men dishonorable ; and so too in the 
body the good and healthy elements are to be indulged, and the 
bad elements and the elements of desire are not to be indulged, 
but discouraged. And this is what the physician has to do, and 
in this the art of medicine consists : for medicine may be regarded 
generally as the knowledge of the loves and desires of the body, 
and how to satisfy them or not ; and the good physician is he 
who is able to separate fair love from foul, or to convert one 
into the other; and he who knows how to eradicate and how 
to implant love, whichever is required, and can reconcile the 
most hostile elements in the constitution, and make them friends, 
is a skillful practitioner. — The Symposium, i. 480. 
Love, divination as to. See Divination. 
Love, the youngest. 

I would rather praise the God first, and then speak of his 

gifts ; this is always the right way of praising everything. May 
I say without impiety or offense, that of all the blessed Gods 
he is the blessedest because he is the fairest and best ? And 
he is the fairest, because, in the first place, Phaedrus, he is the 
youngest, and of his youth he is himself the witness, fleeing out 
of the way of age, who is swift enough surely, swifter than 
most of us like : love hates him and will not come near him, 
but youth and love live and move together, — like to like, as 
the proverb says. There are many things which Phaedrus said 
about Love in which I agree with him ; but I cannot agree that 



ZATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 293 

he is older than Iapetus and Kronos — that is not the truth ; 
as I maintain, he is the youngest of the Gods, and youthful 
ever. The ancient things of which Hesiod and Parmenides 
speak, if they were done at all, were done of Necessity and not 
of Love ; had Love been in those days, there would have been 
no chaining or mutilation of the Gods, or other violence, but 
peace and sweetness, as there is now in heaven, since the rule 
of Love began. — The Symposium, i. 488. 
Love, tenderness and flexibility of. 

Love is young and also tender ; he ought to have a poet 

like Homer to describe his tenderness, as Homer says of Ate, 
that she is a goddess and tender : — 

" Her feet are tender, for she sets her steps 
Not on the ground but on the heads of men: " 

which is an excellent proof of her tenderness, because she walks 
not upon the hard but upon the soft. Let us adduce a similar 
proof of the tenderness of Love ; for he walks not upon the 
earth, nor yet upon the skulls of men, which are not so very 
soft, but in the hearts and souls of men : in them he walks and 
dwells and has his home. Not in every soul without excep- 
tion, for where there is hardness he departs, where there is 
softness there he dwells ; and nestling always with his feet and 
in all manner of ways in the softest of soft places, how can he 
be other than the softest of all things ? And therefore he is 
the tenderest as well as the youngest, and also he is of flexile 
form ; for if he were hard and without flexure he could not en- 
fold all things, or wind his way into and out of every soul of 
man undiscovered. And a proof of his flexibility and symme- 
try of form is his grace, which is universally admitted to be in 
an especial manner the attribute of Love ; ungrace and love 
are always at war with one another. The fairness of his com- 
plexion is revealed by his habitation among the flowers ; for he 
dwells not amid bloomless or fading beauties, whether of body 
or soul or aught else, but in the place of flowers and scents, 
there he sits and abides. Enough of his beauty, — of which, 
however, there is more to tell. But I must now speak of his 
virtue : his greatest glory is that he can neither do nor suffer 
wrong to or from any God or any man ; for he suffers not by 
force if he suffers ; force comes not near him, neither does he 
act by force. For all men in all things serve him of their 
own free-will, and where there is voluntary agreement, there, 
as the laws which are the lords of the city say, is justice. And 



294 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

not only is he just but exceedingly temperate, for Temperance 
is the acknowledged ruler of the pleasures and desires, and no 
pleasure ever masters Love ; he is their master and they are 
his servants ; and if he conquers them he must be temperate 
indeed. As to courage, even the God of War is no match for 
him ; he is the captive and Love is the lord, for love, the love 
of Aphrodite, masters him, as the tale runs ; and the master is 
stronger than the servant. And if he conquers the bravest of 
all others he must be himself the bravest. Of his courage and 
justice and temperance I have spoken ; but I have yet to speak 
of his wisdom, and I must try to do my best, according to the 
measure of my ability. For in the first place he is a poet (and 
here, like Eryximachus, I magnify my art), and he is also the 
source of poesy in others, which he could not be if he were not 
himself a poet. And at the touch of him every one becomes a 
poet, even though he had no music in him before ; this also is 
a proof that Love is a good poet and accomplished in all the 
fine arts ; for no one can give to another that which he has 
not himself, or teach that of which he has no knowledge. Who 
will deny that the creation of the animals is his doing? Are 
they not all the works of his wisdom, born and begotten of him ? 
And as to the artists, do we not know that he only of them 
whom love inspires has the light of fame ? — he whom love 
' ( touches not walks in darkness. — The Symposium, i. 488. 
Love a spiritual power. 

" What then is Love ? " I asked ; " Is he mortal ? " " No." 

"What then?" "As in the former instance, he is neither 
mortal nor immortal, but in a mean between the two." " What 
is he then, Diotima ? " " He is a great spirit (Sat/xwv), and 
( like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the 
/ mortal." "And what," I said, "is his power?" "He inter- 
prets," she replied, " between Gods and men, conveying to the 
Gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the com- 
mands and replies of the Gods ; he is the mediator who spans 
the chasm which divides them, and in him all is bound together, 
and through him the arts of the prophet and the priest, their 
sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all prophecy and in- 
cantation, find their way. For God mingles not with man ; 
but through Love all the intercourse and speech of God with 
man, whether awake or asleep, is carried on. The wisdom 
which understands this is spiritual ; all other wisdom, such as 
that of arts or handicrafts, is mean and vulgar. Now these 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 295 

spirits or intermediate powers are many and diverse, and one cf 

them is Love." — The Symposium, i. 495. 1 

Love escaped from in age. See Age. 

Love sensual, laws against, impossible. See Laws against sensual 

love. 
Love, a madness. See Madness. 
Loves, the two. 

The old tale has to be repeated of fair and heavenly love 

— the love of Urania the fair and heavenly muse, and of the 
duty of accepting the temperate, and those who are as yet in- 
temperate only that they may become temperate, and of pre- 
serving their love ; and again, of the vulgar Polyhymnia, who 
must be used with circumspection that the pleasure may not 
generate licentiousness; just as in my own art it is a great 
matter to regulate the desires of the epicure that he may grat- 
ify his tastes without the attendant evil of* disease. The con- 
clusion is, that in music, in medicine, in all other things human 
as well as divine, both loves ought to be noted as far as may 
be, for they are both present. — The Symposium, i. 481. 
Lover, liberty allowed the. See Liberty allowed. 
Lover, madness of the. See Madness of the prophet. 
Lover, wise and unwise, the. 

O Hippothales, thou son of Hieronymus ! do not say that 

you are, or that you are not in love ; the confession is too late ; 
for I see not only that you are in love, but that you are already 
far gone in your love. , Simple and foolish as I am, the Gods 
have given me the power of understanding this sort of affections. 

At this he blushed more and more. 

Ctesippus said : I like to see you blushing, Hippothales, and 
hesitating to tell Socrates the name ; when, if he were with 
you but for a very short time, he would be plagued to death 
by hearing of nothing else. Indeed, Socrates, he has literally 
deafened us, and stopped our ears with the praises of Lysis ; 
and if he is a little intoxicated, there is every likelihood that 
we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of Lysis. His 
performances in prose are bad enough, but nothing at all in 
comparison with his verse ; and when he drenches us with his 
poems and other compositions, that is really too bad ; and 
what is even worse, is his manner of singing them to his love ; 
this he does in a voice which is truly appalling, and we cannot 

1 In order to appreciate the full beauty and force of Plato's discourse upon Love, 
his " Symposium" should be read throughout. Only a few passages could here 
be given. 



296 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 

help hearing him ; and now he has a question put to him by 
you, and lo ! he is blushing. 

Who is Lysis ? I said : I suppose that he must be young, 
for the name does not recall any one to me. 

Why, he said, his father being a very well-known man, he 
retains his patronymic, and is not as yet commonly called by 
his own name ; but, although you do not know his name, I am 
sure that you must know his face, for that is quite enough to 
distinguish him. 

But tell me whose son he is, I said. 

He is the eldest son of Democrates, of the deme of Aexone. 

Ah, Hippothales, I said ; what a noble and really perfect 
love you have found ! I wish that you would favor me with 
the exhibition which you have been making to the rest of the 
company, and then I shall be able to judge whether you know 
what a lover ought to say about his love, either to the youth 
himself, or to others. 

Nay, Socrates, he said ; you surely do not attach any weight 
to what he is saying. 

Do you mean, I said, that you disown the love of the person 
whom he says ihat you love ? 

No ; but I deny that I make verses or address compositions 
to him. 

He is not in his right mind, said Ctesippus ; he is talking 
nonsense, and is stark mad. 

O Hippothales, I said, if you have ever made any verses or 
songs in honor of your favorite, I do not want to hear them ; 
but I want to know the purport of them, that I may be able 
to judge of your mode of approaching your fair one. 

Ctesippus will be able to . tell you, he said ; for if, as he 
avers, I talk to him of nothing else, he must have a very ac- 
curate knowledge and recollection of that. 

Yes, indeed, said Ctesippus; I know only *too well; and 
very ridiculous the tale is : for although he is a lover, and very 
devotedly in love, he has nothing particular to talk about to his 
beloved which a child might not say. Now is not that ridicu- 
lous ? He can only speak of the wealth of Democrates, which 
the whole city celebrates, and grandfather Lysis, and the other 
ancestors of the youth, and their stud of horses, and their vic- 
tory at the Pythian games, and at the Isthmus, and at Nemea 
with four horses and single horses ; and these he sings and 
says, and greater twaddle still. For the day before yesterday 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 297 

he made a poem in which he described how Heracles, who was 
a connection of the family, was entertained by an ancestor of 
Lysis as his relation ; this ancestor was himself the son of 
Zeus and the daughter of the founder of the deme. And these 
are the sort of old wives' tales which he sings and recites to 
us, and we are obliged to listen to him. 

When I heard this, I said : O ridiculous Hippothales ! how 
can you be making and singing hymns in honor of yourself be- 
fore you have won ? 

But my songs and verses, he said, are not in honor of my- 
self, Socrates. 

You think not, I said. 

But what are they, then ? he replied. 

Most assuredly, I said, those songs are all in your own 
honor ; for if you win your beautiful love, your discourses and 
songs will be a glory to you, and may be truly regarded as 
hymns of praise composed in honor of you who have con- 
quered and won such a love ; but if he slips away from you, 
the more you have praised him, the more ridiculous you will 
look at having lost this fairest and best of blessings ; and this 
is the reason why the wise lover does not praise his beloved 
until he has won him, because he is afraid of accidents. There 
is also another danger ; the fair, when any one praises or mag- 
nifies them, are filled with the spirit of pride and vainglory. 
Is not that true ? 

Yes, he said. 

And the more vain-glorious they are, the more difficult is the 
capture of them? 

I believe that. 

What should you say of a hunter who frightened away his 
prey, and made the capture of the animals which he is hunting 
more difficult ? 

He would be a bad hunter, that is clear. 

Yes ; and if, instead of soothing them, he were to infuriate 
them with words and songs, that would show a great want of 
wit : do you not agree with me ? 

Yes. 

And now reflect, Hippothales, and see whether you are not 
guilty of all these errors in writing poetry. For I can hardly 
suppose that you will affirm a man to be a good poet who in- 
jures himself by his poetry. 

Assuredly not, he said : I should be a fool if I said that ; 



298 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

and this makes me desirous, Socrates, of taking you into my 
counsels, and I shall be glad of any further advice which you 
may have to offer. Will you tell me by what words or actions 
I may become endeared to my love? 

That is not easy to determine, I said ; but if you will bring 
your love to me, and will let me talk with him, I may perhaps 
be able to show you how to converse with him, instead of sing 
ing and reciting in the fashion of which you are accused. — 
Lysis j i. 42. 
Lovers universal. 

1 dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not 

remind you, that a lover, if he is worthy of the name, ought 
to show his love, not to some one part of that which he loves, 
but to the whole. 

I believe that I must ask you to explain, for I really do not 
understand. 

Another, I replied, might fairly answer thus ; but a man of 
pleasure like you ought to know that all who are in the flower 
of their youth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in 
a lover's breast, and are thought by him to be worthy of his af- 
fectionate regards. Is not this a way which you have with the 
fair : one has a snub nose, and you praise his pleasant face, 
another's beak, as you say, has a royal look ; while he who is 
neither snub or hooked has the grace of regularity : the dark 
visage is manly, the fair are angels : and as to the sweet, 
" honey pale," as they are called, what is the very name but the 
invention of a lover who uses these pet names, and is not averse 
to paleness on the cheek of youth ? In a word, there is no ex- 
cuse which you will not make, and nothing which you will not 
say, in order to preserve for your use every flower that has the 
bloom of youth. 

If you are determined to make me an authority in matters 
of love, for the sake of the argument, I assent. — The Republic, 
ii. 302. 
Loyalty to the State. See Obligation, individual. 

Madness, two kinds of. 

Sue. I said, " love is a madness." 

Phaedr. Yes. 

Soc. And there were two kinds of madness ; one produced 
by human infirmity, the other by a divine release from the or 
dinary ways of men. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 299 

Phaedr. True. 

Soc. The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds, 
prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic, having four Gods presiding 
over them ; the first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second 
that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that 
of Aphrodite and Eros. In the description of the last kind 
of madness, which was also the best, being a figure of love, we 
introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true, though partly 
erring myth, which was also a hymn in honor of Eros, who is 
your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guardian of fair 
children, and to him we sung the "hymn in measured and solemn 
strain. — Phaedrus, i. 570. 
Madness of the prophet, poet, and lover. 

That was a lie in which I said that the beloved ought to 

accept the non-lover and reject the lover, because the one is 
sane, and the other mad. For that might have been truly said 
if madness were simply an evil ; but there is also a madness 
which is the special gift of Heaven, and the source of the 
chiefest blessings among men. For prophecy is a madness, 
and the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona> 
when out of their senses have conferred great benefits on 
Hellas, both in public and private life, but when in their 
senses few or none. And I might also tell you how the Sibyl 
and other persons, who have had the gift of prophecy, have 
told the future of many an one and guided them aright ; but 
that is obvious, and would be tedious. 

There will be more reason in appealing to the ancient in- 
ventors of names, who, if they had thought madness a disgrace 
or dishonor, would never have called prophecy (/xai/rifa)), which 
is the noblest of arts, by the very same name as madness, 
(jjiavLKyj) thus inseparably connecting them ; but they must 
have thought that there was an inspired madness which was no 
disgrace ; for the two words, fxavTiKrj and /xavi/a), are really the 
same, and the letter r is only a modern and tasteless insertion. 
And this is confirmed by the name which they gave to the 
rational investigation of futurity, whether made by the help of 
birds or of other signs ; this because supplying from the reason- 
ing faculty insight (vou?) and information (lo-ropla) to human 
thought (onyo-is), they originally termed olovolcttlkyj, but the 
word has been lately altered and made sonorous by the modern 
introduction of the letter Omega (otovoio-rifo) and oiumo-riKr/), 
and in proportion as prophecy (jxavTiKyj) is higher and more 
perfect than divination both in name and reality, in the same 



300 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

proportion as the ancients testify, is madness superior to a sane 
mind (croxfrpocrvvrj) , for the one is only of human, but the other 
of divine origin. Again, where plagues and mightiest woes 
have bred in a race, owing to some ancient wrath, there mad- 
ness enters with holy prayers and rites, and by inspired utter- 
ances finds a way of deliverance for those who are in need ; 
and he who has part in this gift, and is truly possessed and 
duly out of his mind, is by the use of purifications and mys- 
teries made whole and exempt from evil, future as well as 
present, and has a release from the calamity which afflicts him. 
There is also a third kind of madness, which is a possession of 
the Muses ; which enters into a delicate and virgin soul, and 
there inspiring frenzy, awakens lyrical and all other numbers ; 
with these adorning the myriad actions of ancient heroes for 
the instruction of posterity. But he who, having no touch of 
the Muses' madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks 
that he will get into the temple by the help of art — he, I say, 
and his poetry are not admitted; the sane man is nowhere at 
all when he enters into rivalry with the madman. 

I might tell of many other noble deeds which have sprung 
from inspired madness. And therefore let no one frighten or 
flutter us by saying that temperate love is preferable to mad 
love, but let him further show, if he would carry off the palm, 
that love is not sent by the Gods for any good to lover or be- 
loved. And we, on our part, will prove in answer to him that 
the madness of love is the greatest of Heaven's blessings, and 
the proof shall be one which the wise will receive, and the 
witling disbelieve. — Phaedrus, i. 549. 
Magistrates and rulers, — qualities and choice of. See Rulers. 

Ath. Let us observe what will happen in the constitution 

of our intended State. In the first place, you will acknowl- 
edge that those who are duly appointed to magisterial power, 
and their families, should severally give satisfactory proof of 
what they are, from their youth upward until the time of their 
election ; in the next place, those who are to elect should be 
trained in habits of law, and be well educated, that they may 
have a right judgment, and may be able to select or reject 
men whom they approve or disapprove, as they are worthy of 
either. But how can we imagine that those who are brought 
together for the first time, and are strangers to one another, 
and also uneducated, can avoid making mistakes in the choice 
of magistrates ? 

Cle. Impossible. — Laws, iv. 273. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 301 

Man, absolute unity not in. 

— In the life of the same individual there is succession and 

not absolute unity ; a man is called the same ; and yet in the 
short interval which elapses between youth and age, and in 
which every animal is said to have life and identity, he is under- 
going a perpetual process of loss and reparation — hair, flesh, 
bones, blood, and the whole body are always changing. Which 
is true not only of the body, but also of the soul, whose habits, 
tempers, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, never remain 
the same in any one of us, but are always coming and going. 
And equally true of knowledge, which is still more surprising — 
for not only do the sciences in general come and go, so that in 
respect to them we are never the same ; but each of them 
individually experiences a like change. — The Symposium, i. 
500. 

Man, transformation of. 

He who lived well during his appointed time was to re- 
turn to the star which was his habitation, and there he would 
have a blessed and suitable existence. But if he failed in at- 
taining this, in the second generation he would pass into a 
woman, and should he not desist from evil in that condition, 
he would be changed into some brute who resembled him in 
his evil ways, and would not cease from his toils and transfor- 
mations until he followed the original principle of sameness 
and likeness within him, and overcame, by the help of reason, 
the later accretions of turbulent and irrational elements com- 
posed of fire and air and water and earth, and returned to the 
form of his first and better nature. Having given all these 
laws to his creatures, that he might be guiltless of their future 
evil, the creator sowed some of them in the earth, and some 
in the moon, and some in the other stars which are the vessels 
of time ; and when he had sown them he committed to the 
younger Gods the fashioning of their mortal bodies, and desired 
them to furnish what was still lacking to the human soul, and 
make all the suitable additions, and rule and pilot the mortal 
animal in the best and wisest manner which they could, and 
avert from him all but self-inflicted evils. — Timaeus, ii. 535. 
Man, his soul truly his own. 

Listen, all ye who have just now heard the laws about 

Gods, and about our dear forefathers : Of all the things which 
a man has, next to the Gods his soul is the most divine and 
most truly his own. — Laws, iv. 252, 



302 PLATO 9 S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Many — opinion of the. See Opinion. 

Many, the Science of Government not attained by the. See Govern- 
ment not attained. 
Marathon, the men and battle of. 

Darius had a quarrel against us and the Eretrians, be- 
cause, as he said, we had conspired against Sardis, and he sent 
500,000 men in transports and vessels of war, and 300 ships, 
and Datis as commander, telling him to bring the Eretrians 
and Athenians to the king, if he wished to keep his head on 
his shoulders. They sailed against the Eretrians, who were 
reputed to be amongst the noblest and most warlike of the 
Hellenes of that day, and they were numerous, but he con- 
quered them all in three days ; and when he had conquered 
them, in order that no one might escape, he searched the 
whole country after this manner : his soldiers, coming to the 
borders of Eretria and spreading from sea to sea, joined hands 
and passed through the whole country, in order that they 
might be able to tell the king that no one had escaped them. 
And from Eretria they went to Marathon, expecting to bind 
the Athenians in the same yoke of necessity in which they 
had bound the Eretrians. Having effected one half of their 
purpose, they were in the act of attempting the other, and none 
of the Hellenes dared to assist either the Eretrians or the 
Athenians, except the Lacedaemonians, and they only came the 
day after the battle ; but the rest were panic-stricken and re- 
mained quiet, happy that they had escaped for a time. He 
who has present to him that conflict, will know what manner 
of men they were who received the onset of the barbarians at 
Marathon, and chastened the pride of the whole of Asia, and 
by the victory which they gained over the barbarians first 
taught other men that the power of the Persians was not in- 
vincible, but that hosts of men and the multitude of riches 
alike yield to virtue. And I assert that those men are the 
fathers not only of ourselves, but of our liberties and of the 
liberties of all who are on the continent, for that was the 
action to which the Hellenes looked back when they ventured 
to fight for their own safety in the battles which followed : 
they became disciples of the men of Marathon. To them, 
therefore, I assign in my speech the first place, and the second 
to those who fought and conquered in the sea fights at Salamis 
and Artemisium, for of them, too, one might have many things 
to say ; of the assaults which they endured by sea and land, 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 303 

and how they repelled them. But I will mention only that 
act of theirs which appears to me to be the noblest, and which 
was next in order of succession to Marathon, for the men of 
Marathon only showed the Hellenes that it was possible to 
ward off the barbarians by land, the many by the few ; but 
there was no proof that they could be defeated by ships, and 
at sea the Persians retained the reputation of being invincible 
in numbers- and wealth and skill and strength. This is the 
glory of the men who fought at sea, that they dispelled the 
second fear which had hitherto possessed the Hellenes, and so 
made the fear of numbers, whether of men or ships, to cease 
among them. This was the effect, and thus the soldiers of 
Marathon and the sailors of Salamis became the schoolmasters 
of Hellas ; the one teaching and habituating the Hellenes not 
to fear the barbarians at sea, and the others not to fear them 
by land. — Me?iexenus, iv. 570. 
Marriage, law of. See Immortality in time. 
Marriage approved and regulated. 

O my son, he who is born of good parents ought to make 

such a marriage as wise men would approve. Now they would 
advise you neither to avoid a poor marriage, nor specially to 
desire a rich one ; but if other things are equal, always to 
honor inferiors, and with them to form connections ; this will 
be for the benefit of the city and of the families which are 
united ; for the equable and symmetrical tends infinitely more 
to virtue than the unmixed. And he who is conscious of be- 
ing too headstrong, and carried away more than is fitting in all 
his actions, ought to desire to become the relation of orderly 
parents ; and he who is of the opposite temper ought to seek 
the opposite alliance. Let there be one word concerning all 
marriages: Every man shall follow, not after the marriage 
which is most pleasing to himself, but after that which is most 
beneficial to the State. For somehow every one is by nature 
prone to that which is likest to himself, and in this way the 
whole <*ity becomes unequal in property and in disposition ; 
and hence there arise in most States results which we least de- 
sire to happen. Now, to add to the law an express provision, 
not only that the rich man shall not marry into the rich fam- 
ily, nor the powerful into the family of the powerful, but that 
the slower natures shall be compelled to enter into marriage 
with the quicker, and the quicker with the slower, may awaken 
anger as well as laughter in the minds of many ; for there is a 



304 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

difficulty in perceiving that the city ought to be well mingled 
like a cup, in which the maddening wine is hot and fiery ; but 
when chastened by a soberer God, receives a fair admixture 
and becomes an excellent and temperate drink. Yet in mar- 
riage no one is able to see the necessity of this. Wherefore 
also the law must leave such matters, and try to charm the 
spirits of men into believing the equability of their children's 
disposition of more importance than equality in excessive for- 
tune when they marry ; and him who is too desirous of form- 
ing a rich marriage they should endeavor to turn aside by re- 
proaches, not, however, by any compulsion of written law. 
Let this then be our exhortation concerning marriage, not for- 
getting what was said before — that man should cling to im- 
mortality — and leave behind him posterity who shall be ser- 
vants of the God in his place. All this and yet more may 
truly be said about the duty of marrying in the way of pre- 
lude. — Laivs, iv. 294. 

Masses swayed by rulers. See Rulers swaying, etc. 
Melody and figure, beauty of. See Figure. 
Memory and forgetfulness. See Forgetfulness. 
Memory, waxen tablet of. 

Soc. I would have you imagine, then, that there exists 

in the mind of man a block of wax, which is of different sizes 
in different men ; harder, moister, and having more or less of 
purity in one than another, and in some of an intermediate 
quality. 

Theaet. I see. 

Soc. Let us say that this tablet is a gift of Memory, the 
mother of the Muses ; and that when we wish to remember 
anything which we have seen, or heard, or thought in our own 
minds, we hold the wax to the perceptions and thoughts, and 
in that receive the impression of them as from the seal of a 
ring ; and that we remember and know what is imprinted as 
long as the image lasts ; but when the image is effaced, or can- 
not be taken, then we forget and do not know. — Theaetetus, 
iii. 396. 

Men, compulsory care of. See Compulsory. 
Mental and bodily habit. 

Soc. And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idle* 

ness, but preserved for a long time by motion and exercise ? 

Theaet. True. 

Soc. And what of the mental habit ? Is not the soul in- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 305 

formed, and improved, and preserved by thought and attention, 
which are motions ; but when at rest, which in the soul means 
only want of thought and attention, is uninformed, and speedily 
forgets whatever she has learned? 

Theaet. True. — Theaetetus, iii. 353. 
Metallic symbols of races. 

■ In the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed who 

have lost the guardian power of testing the metal of your dif- 
ferent races, which, like Hesiod's, are of gold, and silver, and 
brass, and iron. And so iron will be mingled with silver, and 
brass with gold, and hence there will arise inequality and ir- 
regularity, which always and in all places are causes of enmity 
and war. Such is the origin of discord, wherever arising ; anfl 
this is the answer of the Muses to us. 

Yes, and we may assume that they answer truly. 

Why, yes, I said, of course they answer truly ; the Muses 
cannot do otherwise. 

And what do the Muses say next ? 

When discord arose, then the two races were drawn different 
ways : the iron and brass fell to acquiring money and land and 
houses and gold and silver ; but the gold and silver races, hav- 
ing the true riches in their own nature, inclined towards virtue 
and the ancient order of things. There was a battle between 
them, and at last they agreed to distribute their land and 
houses among individual owners*: and they enslaved their 
friends and maintainers, whom they had formerly protected in 
the condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and ser- 
vants ; and they themselves were engaged in fighting and keep- 
ing watch against them. — The Republic, ii. 374. 
Might makes right. See Natural justice. 
Military art, youths instructed in. 

Lys. What say you of the matter of which we were 

beginning to speak — the art of fighting in armor ? Is that a 
practice in which the lads may be advantageously instructed ? 

Soc. I will endeavor to advise you, Lysimachus, as far as I 
can in this matter, and also in every way will comply with 
your wishes ; but as I am younger and not so experienced, I 
think that I ought certainly to hear first what my elders have 
to say, and to learn of them, and if I have anything to add, 
then I may venture to give my opinion to them as well as to 
you. Suppose, Nicias, that one of you speaks first. 

Nic. I have no objection, Socrates ; and my opinion is that 
20 



306 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

the acquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young 
men. There is an advantage in their being employed during 
their leisure hours in a way which tends to improve their 
bodily constitution, and not in the way in which young men 
are too apt to be employed. No gymnastics could be better or 
harder exercise ; and this, and the art of riding, are of all arts 
most befitting to a freeman ; for they only who are thus trained 
in the use of arms are the athletes of our military profession, 
trained in that on which the conflict turns. Moreover, in act- 
ual battle, when you have to fight in a line with a number of 
others, this sort of acquirement will be of some use ; and will 
be of the greatest, when the ranks are broken and you have to 
fight singly ; either in pursuit, when you are attacking some 
one who is defending himself, or in flight, when you have to 
defend yourself against an assailant. Certainly he who pos- 
sessed the art could not meet with any harm at the hands of 
a single person, or perhaps of several ; and in any case he 
would have a great advantage. Further, this sort of skill in- 
clines a man to other noble lessons ; for every man who has 
learned how to fight in arms will desire to learn the proper ar- 
rangement of an army, which is the sequel of the lesson ; and 
when he has learned this, and his ambition is once fired, he will 
go on to learn the complete art of the general. There is no 
difficulty in seeing that the knowledge and practice of other 
military arts will be useful and valuable to a man ; and this 
lesson may be the beginning of them. Let me add a further 
advantage, which is by no means a slight one, — that this sci- 
ence will make any man a great deal more valiant and self- 
possessed in the field. And I will not disdain to mention, 
what to some may appear to be a small matter, that he will 
make a better appearance at the right time ; that is to say, at 
the time when his appearance will strike terror into his ene- 
mies. My opinion then, Lysimachus, is, as I say, that the 
youths should be instructed in this art, and for the reasons 
which I have given. — Laches, i. 74. 
Mind, a cause. 

I heard some one who had a book of Anaxagoras, as he 

said, out of which he read that mind was the disposer and 
cause of all, and I was quite delighted at this notion, which ap- 
peared admirable, and I said to myself : If mind is the dis- 
poser, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particu- 
lar in the best place ; and I argued that if any one desired to 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 307 

iind out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence 
of anything, he must find out what state of being or suffering 
or doing was best for that thing, and therefore a man had only 
to consider the best for himself and others, and then he would 
also know the worse, for that the same science comprised both. 
And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a 
teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, and I im- 
agined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or 
round ; and then he would further explain the cause and the 
necessity of this, and would teach me the nature of the best 
and show that this was best ; and if he said that the earth was 
in the centre, he would explain that this position was the best, 
and I should be satisfied with the explanation given, and not 
want any other sort of cause. And I thought that I would 
then go on and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and 
that he would explain to me their comparative swiftness, and 
their returnings and various states, active and passive, and how 
all of them were for the best. For I could not imagine that 
when he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would 
give any other account of their being as they are, except that 
this was best ; and I thought that when he had explained to 
me in detail the cause of each and the cause of all, he would 
go on to explain to me what was best for each and what was 
best for all. I had hopes which I would not have sold for 
much, and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could 
in my eagerness to know the better and the worse. 

What hopes I had formed, and how grievously was I disap- 
pointed ! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether 
forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having re- 
course to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities. — 
Phaedo, i. 426. 
Mind, disorders of the. 

The disorders of the. soul which originate in the body are 

as follows : We must acknowledge disease of the mind to be a 
want of intelligence ; and of this there are two kinds ; to wit, 
madness and ignorance ; and whatever affection gives rise to 
either of them may be called disease. Excessive pains and 
pleasures are justly to be regarded as the greatest diseases of 
the soul, for a man who is in great joy or in great pain, in his 
irrational eagerness to attain the one and to avoid the other, is 
not truly able to see or to hear anything ; but he is mad, and 
is at the same time quite incapable of any participation in 



308 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

reason. He who has the seed about the spinal marrow too 
plentiful and overflowing, like a tree overladen with fruit, has 
many throes, and also obtains many pleasures in his desires and 
their gratifications, and is for the most part of his life mad, be- 
cause his pleasures and pains are so very great ; his soul is 
rendered foolish and disordered by his body ; and he is regarded 
not as one diseased, but as one who is voluntarily bad, which is 
a bad mistake. For the truth is that the intemperance of love 
for the most part grows into a disease of the soul, owing to the 
moisture and fluidity which is produced in one of the elements, 
by the loose consistency of the bones. And in general, all that 
which is termed the intemperance of pleasure is unjustly charged 
upon those who do wrong, as if they did wrong voluntarily. For 
no man is voluntarily bad ; but the bad become bad by reason 
of an ill disposition of the body and bad education, things 
which to every man are an involuntary evil ; and in like man- 
ner the soul is often hurt by bodily pain. For where the sharp 
and briny phlegm and other bitter and bilious humors wander 
over the body, and find no exit or escape, but are compressed 
within and mingle their own vapors with the motions of the 
soul, and are blended with them, they produce an infinite va- 
riety of diseases in all sorts of degrees, and being carried to 
the three places of the soul on which any of them may sev- 
erally chance to alight, they create infinite varieties of trouble 
and melancholy, of tempers rash and cowardly, and also of 
forgetfulness and stupidity. Further, when to this evil consti- 
tution of body evil forms of government are added, and evil 
discourses are uttered in private as well as in public, and no 
sort of instruction is given in youth which may heal these ills, 
here is another source of evil; and so the bad becomes bad, 
through two things which are wholly out of their power. In 
such cases the planters are to blame rather than the plants, the 
educators rather than the educated. Still we should endeavor 
as far as we can by education, and studies, and learning, to 
avoid vice and attain virtue. — Timaeus, ii. 577. 
Mind, the life of. 
— — Pro. And what is this life of mind ? 

Soc. I want to know whether any one of us would consent 
to live, having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory 
of all things, but having no fraction of a sense of pleasure 
or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like feel- 
ings? 



PLATO* S BEST THOUGHTS. 309 

Pro. Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, nor is 
likely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else. 

Soc. What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in 
one, or to one that was made out of the union of the two ? 

Pro. Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and 
wisdom ? 

Soc. Yes. — Philehus, iii. 156. 
Mind, good in the. See Good, in the mind, etc. 
Mind, depth and greatness of, reverenced. 

I have a kind of reverence ; not so much for Melissus 

and the others, who say that " all is one and at rest," as for 
the great leader himself, Parmenides, venerable and awful, as 
in Homeric language he may be called ; him I should be 
ashamed to approach in a spirit unworthy of him. I met him 
when he was an old man, and I was a mere youth, and he ap- 
peared to me to have a glorious depth of mind. — Theaetetus, 
iii. 387. 
Mind, movement of. 

Ath. And what is the definition of that which is named 

" soul ? " Can we conceive of any other than that which has 
been already given — the motion which is self -moved ? 

Ole. You mean to say that the essence which is defined as 
the self-moved is identical with that which we call soul ? 

Ath. Yes ; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there 
is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin 
and moving power of all that is, or has been, or will be, and 
their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the 
source of change and motion in all things ? 

Cle. Certainly not ; the soul as being the source of motion, 
has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all 
things. 

Ath. And is not that motion which takes place in another, 
or by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power 
at all, being in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be 
reckoned in the second degree, or in any lower degree which 
you may prefer ? 

Ole. Very true. 

Ath. Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and ab- 
solute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, 
and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born 
to obey the soul which is the ruler ? 

Ole. Nothing can be more true. — Laws, iv. 408. 



310 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Minority, the government of the. See Few, 
Minos, and naval warfare. 

I was saying that the imitation of enemies was a bad 

thing ; and I was thinking of a case in which a maritime people 
are harassed by enemies, as the Athenians were by Minos (I 
do not speak from any desire to recall past grievances) ; but he, 
as we know, was a great naval potentate, who compelled the 
inhabitants of Attica to pay him a cruel tribute ; and in those 
days they had no ships of war as they now have, nor was the 
country filled with ship timber, and therefore they could not 
readily build them. Hence neither could they learn how to 
imitate their enemy at sea, or become sailors themselves, and 
in this way directly repel their enemies. Better for them to 
have lost many times over the seven youths, than that heavy- 
armed and stationary troops should have been turned into 
sailors, and accustomed to leap quickly on shore, and again to 
hurry back to their ships ; or should have fancied that there 
was no disgrace in not awaiting the attack of an enemy and 
dying boldly ; and that there were good reasons, and plenty of 
them, for a man throwing away his arms, and betaking himself 
to flight ; which is not dishonorable as people say, at certain 
times. This is the language of naval warfare, and is anything 
but worthy of extraordinary praise. For we should not teach 
bad habits, least of all to the best part of the citizens. You 
may learn the evil of such a practice from Homer, by whom 
Odysseus is introduced, rebuking Agamemnon, because he de- 
sires to draw down the ships to the sea at a time when the 
Achaeans are hard pressed by the Trojans : he gets angry with 
him, and says : — 

" Who, at a time when the battle is in full cry, biddest to drag the 
well-oared ships into the sea, that the prayers of the Trojans may 
be accomplished yet more, and high ruin fall upon us ? For the 
Achaeans will not maintain the battle, when the ships are drawn 
into the sea, but they will look behind and will cease from strife ; 
in that the counsel which you give will prove injurious." 

You see that he quite knew triremes on the sea, in the neigh- 
borhood of fighting men, to be an evil ; lions might be trained 
in that way to fly from a herd of deer. Moreover, naval pow- 
ers which owe their safety to ships, do not honor that sort of 
warlike excellence which is most deserving of honor. For he 
who owes his safety to the pilot, and the captain, and the oars- 
man, and all sorts of rather good-for-nothing persons, cannot 
rightly give honor to whom honor is due. — Laws, iv. 233. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 811 

Mirth-giver to be rewarded. 

Ath. May not the true use of music and choral festivities 

be described as follows : we rejoice when we think that we 
prosper, and again we think that we prosper when we rejoice ? 

Cle. Exactly. 

Ath. And when rejoicing is our good fortune we are unable 
to be still ? 

Cle. True. 

Ath. Our young men break forth into dancing and singing, 
and we who are their elders deem that we are fulfilling our 
part in life when we look on at them. Having lost the agility 
of youth, we delight in their sports and merry-making ; because 
we love to think of our former selves, and gladly institute con- 
tests for those who are able to awaken in us the memory of 
what we once were. 

Cle. Very true. 

Ath. People say that we ought to regard him as the wisest 
of men, and the winner of the palm, who gives as the greatest 
amount of pleasure and mirth. For when mirth is to be the 
order of the day, he ought to be honored most, and, as I was 
saying, bear the palm, who gives most mirth to the greatest 
number. Now I want to know whether this is a true way of 
speaking or of acting ? 

Cle. Possibly. - — Laws, iv. 187. 
Misanthropists and Misologists. 
Let us take care that we avoid a danger. 

And what is that ? I said. 

The danger of becoming misologists, he replied, which is 
one of the very worst things that can happen to us. For as 
there are misanthropists or haters of men, there are also mis- 
ologists or haters of ideas, and both spring from the same cause, 
which is ignorance of the world. Misanthropy springs out of 
the too great confidence of inexperience ; you trust a man and 
think him altogether true and sound and faithful, and then in a 
little while he turns out to be false and knavish ; and then an- 
other and another, and when this has happened several times 
to a man, especially within the circle of his own most trusted 
friends, as he would deem them, and he has often quarreled 
with them, he at last hates all men, and believes that no one 
has any good in him at all. I dare say that you must have 
observed this. 

Yes, I said. 



312 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

And is not the feeling discreditable? Such an one having 
to deal with other men, had clearly no experience of them ; 
for experience would have taught him the true state of the 
case, that few are the good and few the evil, and that the great 
majority are in the interval between them. — Phaedo, i. 418. 
Miserly men and oligarchies. 

His fear has taught him to knock ambition and passion 

headforemost from his bosom's throne : humbled by poverty he 
takes to money-making, and by mean and miserly savings and 
hard work gets a fortune together. Is not this man likely to 
seat the concupiscent and covetous elements on that vacant 
throne ? They will play the great king within him, and he 
will array them with tiara and collar and scimitar. 

Most true, he replied. 

And when he has made the reason and spirit sit on the 
ground obediently on either side, and taught them to know 
their place, he compels the one to think only of the method by 
which lesser sums may be converted into larger ones, and 
schools the other into the worship and admiration of riches and 
rich men ; and to be ambitious only of wealth and of the 
means which lead to this. 

Of all conversions, he said, there is none so speedy or so 
sure as when the ambitious youth changes into the avaricious 
one. 

And the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth ? 

Yes, he said ; at any rate the individual out of whom he 
came is like the State out of which oligarchy came. 

Let us then consider whether there is any likeness between 
them. 

Very good. 

First, then, they resemble one another in the value which 
they set upon wealth ? 

Certainly. 

Also in their penurious, laborious character ; the individual 
only satisfies his necessary appetites, and confines his expendi- 
ture to them ; his other desires he subdues, under the idea that 
there is no use in them? 

True. 

He is a shabby fellow, I said, who saves something out of 
everything and makes a purse for himself ; and this is the sort 
of man whom the vulgar applaud. Is he not like the State 
which he represents ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 313 

That would be my view of him, he replied ; at any rate, 
money is highly valued by him as well as by the State. 

Why, he is not a man of cultivation, I said. . . . 

The man, then, will be at war with himself ; he will be two 
men, and not one ; but, in general, his better desires will be 
found to prevail over his inferior ones. 

True. 

For these reasons such an one will be more decent than 
many are ; yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious 
soul will be far out of his reach. 

I should expect so. 

And surely, the miser individually will be an ignoble com- 
petitor in a State for any prize of victory, or other object of 
honorable ambition ; he is so afraid of awakening his expen- 
sive appetites and inviting them to help and join in the strug- 
gle ; in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part 
only of his resources, and the result commonly is that he loses 
the prize and saves his money. 

Very true. 

Can we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and money- 
maker answers to the oligarchical State ? There can be no 
doubt. — Republic , ii. 381. 

Yes, I said ; and men of this stamp will be covetous of 
money, like those who live in oligarchies ; they will have a 
fierce secret longing after gold and silver, which they will 
hoard in dark places, having magazines and treasures of their 
own for the deposit and concealment of them ; also castles 
which are just nests for their eggs, and in which they will 
spend large sums on their wives, or on any others whom they 
please. 

That is most true, he said. 

And they are miserly because they have no means of openly 
acquiring the money which they prize ; they will spend that 
which is another man's in their lust ; stealing their pleasures 
and running away like children from the law, their father : 
they have been schooled not by gentle influences but by force ; 
caring nothing about the Muse, the companion of reason and 
philosophy, and honoring gymnastic before music. 

Undoubtedly, he said, the form of government which you 
describe is a mixture of good and evil. — The Republic, ii. 
375. 



314 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Misery of the unjust. 

Soc. The matters at issue between us are not trifling; to 

know or not to know happiness and misery — that is the sum of 
them. And what knowledge can be nobler than this? or what 
ignorance more disgraceful than this ? And therefore I will 
begin by asking you whether you do not think that a man who 
is unjust and doing injustice can be happy, seeing that you think 
Archelaus unjust and yet happy? Am I not right in supposing 
that to be your meaning? 

Pol. Quite right. 

Soc. And 1 say that this is an impossibility, and here is one 
point about which we are at issue : very good. But do you 
mean to say also that if he meets with retribution and punish- 
ment he will still be happy ? 

Pol. Certainly not ; in that case he will be most miserable. 

Soc. On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, 
according to you, he will be happy ? 

Pol. Yes. 

Soc. But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust 
actions is miserable in any case, — more miserable, however, if 
he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less 
miserable if he be punished and meets with retribution, at the 
hands of God and men. — Gorgias, iii. 59. 

Mixtures of pleasures and pains, of body and of soul. See Body 

and soul, etc. 
Modesty and temperance. 

Then once more, Charmides, I said, fix your attention, and 

look within ; consider the effect which temperance has upon 
yourself, and the nature of that which has the effect. Think 
over all this, and, like a brave youth, tell me — What is temper- 
ance. 

After a moment's pause, in which he made a real manly ef- 
fort to think, he said : My opinion is, Socrates, that temper- 
ance makes a man ashamed or modest, and that temperance is 
the same as modesty * 

Very good I said ; and did you not admit, just now, that 
temperance is noble. 

Yes, certainly, he said. 

And the temperate are also good ? 

Yes. 

And can that be good which does not make men good ? 

Certainly not. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS 8i5 

And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but 

also good ? 

That is my opinion. 

Well, I said ; and surely you would agree with Homer when 

he says, 

" Modesty is not good for a needy man " ? 

Yes, he said ; I agree to that. 

Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good ? 

That is plain. 

But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and 
not bad, is always good ? 

That appears to me to be as you say. 

And the inference is, that temperance cannot be modesty — 
if temperance is a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as 
a good? 

All that, Socrates, appears to me to be true. — Charmides, 
i. 15. 

Modesty promoted by refutation See Purification. 
Modesty and self-conceit. See Self-conceit. 
Modesty, excess of. See Courage untempered, etc. 
Money not to be valued above friendship. See Friendship* 
Money, making of. See Miserly men. 
Money, a ruler in the State. 
What manner of government do you term oligarchy ? 

A government resting on a valuation of property, in which 
the rich have power and the poor are deprived of power. 

I understand, he replied. 

Ought I not to describe, first of all, how the change from 
timocracy to oligarchy arises ? 

Yes. ' 

Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the 
one passes into the other. 

How ? 

The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individ- 
uals is the ruin of timocracy ; they invent illegal modes of ex- 
penditure, but what do they or their wives care about the law ? 

Very true. 

And then one seeing another prepares to rival him, and thus 
the whole body of the citizens acquires a similar character. 

Likely enough. 

After that they get on in trade, and the more they think of 
making a fortune, the less they think of virtue ; for when riches 



31$ PLATO'S BEST TBOTIGSTS. 

and virtue are placed together in the scales of the balance, the 
one always rises as the other falls. 

True. 

And in proportion as riches and rich men are honored in the 
State, virtue and the virtuous are dishonored. 

Clearly. 

And what is honored is cultivated, and that which has no 
honor is neglected. 

That is the case. 

And so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men 
become lovers of trade and money, and they honor and rever- 
ence the rich man, and make a ruler of him, and dishonor the 
poor man. 

They do so. 

Whereupon they proceed to make a law which fixes a sum 
of money as the qualification of citizenship ; the money is more 
or less accordingly as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive ; 
and any one whose property is below the amount fixed is not 
allow r ed to share in the government ; which changes in the con- 
stitution they effect by force of arms, if intimidation has not 
already done their work. 

Yery true. — The Republic, ii. 377. 
Money, enslaving power of. See Enslaving, etc. 
Money not to have the place of power in the State. 

Ath. We maintain, then, that a State which would be safe 

and happy, as far as the nature of man allows, must and ought 
to distribute honor and dishonor in the right way. And the 
right way is to place the goods of the soul first and highest in 
the scale, always assuming temperance as a condition of them ; 
and in the second place, the goods of the body ; and in the 
third place, those of money and property. And if any legis- 
lator or State departs from this rule by giving money the place 
of honor, or in any way preferring that which is really last, 
may we not say, that he or the State is doing an unholy and 
unpatriotic thing? 

Meg. Yes ; let that be plainly asserted. — Laws, iv. 226. 
Money. See Wealth, Riches, Property, Possession. 
Money -sting of business men. See Business men. 
Monsters, filial. See Filial, etc. 
Mother, ambitious. See Woman, etc. 
Motherhood of country. 
Their ancestors were not strangers, nor are these their 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 317 

descendants sojourners only, whose fathers have come from 
another country ; but they are the children of the soil, dwell- 
ing and living in their own land. And the country which 
brought them up is not like other countries, a step-mother to 
her children, but their own true mother ; she bore them and 
nourished them and received them, and in her bosom they now 
repose. It is meet and right, therefore, that we should begin 
by praising the land which is their mother, and that will be a 
way of praising their noble birth. 

The country is worthy to be praised, not only by us, but by 
all mankind ; first, and above all, as being dear to the Gods. 
This is proved by the strife and contention of the Gods respect- 
ing her. And ought not that country which the Gods praise to 
be praised by all mankind ? The second praise which may be 
fairly claimed by her, is that at the time when the whole earth 
was sending forth and creating diverse animals, tame and wild, 
she our mother was free and pure from savage monsters, and 
out of all animals selected and brought forth man, who is 
superior to the rest in understanding, and alone has justice and 
religion. And a great proof that she was the mother of us 
and of our ancestors, is that she provided the means of support 
for her offspring. For as a woman proves her motherhood by 
giving milk to her young ones (and she who has no fountain of 
milk is not a mother), so did this our land prove that she was 
going to be the mother of men, for in those days she alone and 
first of all brought forth wheat and barley for human food, 
which is the best and noblest sustenance for man, whom she 
regarded as her true offspring. And these are truer proofs of 
motherhood in a country than in a woman, for the woman in 
her conception and generation is but the imitation of the earth, 
and not the earth of the woman. And of the fruit of the earth 
she gave a plenteous supply, not only to her offspring, but to 
others also ; and after that she made the olive to spring up to 
be a boon to her children, and to help them in their toils. And 
when she had herself nursed them and brought them up to man- 
hood, she gave them Gods to be their rulers and teachers, whose 
names are well known, and need not now be repeated. They 
are the Gods who first ordered our lives, and gave us arts to 
supply our daily needs, and taught us the possession and use of 
arms for the guardianship of the country. — Menexenus, iv. 568. 
Motion and rest of things. See Rest. 
Multitude, the Science of Government not attained by the. See 

Government, Science of. 



318 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Music, enervating power of. See Irritability* 
Music, most celebrated. 

Music is more celebrated than any other kind of imitation, 

and therefore requires the greatest care of them all. For if a 
man makes a mistake here, he may do himself the greatest in- 
jury by welcoming evil dispositions, and the mistake may be 
very difficult to discern, because the poets are artists very infe- 
rior in character to the Muses themselves, who would never fall 
into the monstrous error of assigning to the words of men the 
gestures and songs of women ; nor combine the melodies and 
gestures of freemen with the rhythms of slaves and men of the 
baser sort ; or, beginning with the rhythms and gestures of free- 
men, assign to them a melody or words which are of an oppo- 
site character ; nor would they mix up the voices and sounds 
of animals and of men and instruments, and every other sort 
of noise, as if they were all one. But human poets are fond 
of introducing this sort of inconsistent mixture, and thus make 
themselves ridiculous in the eyes of those who, as Orpheus says, 
"are ripe for pleasure." The experienced see all this confusion, 
and yet the poets go on and make still further havoc by sepa- 
rating the rhythm and the figure of the dance from the melody, 
setting words to metre without music, and also separating the 
melody and rhythm from the words, using the lyre or the flute 
alone. For when there are no words, it is very difficult to 
recognize the meaning of the harmony and rhythm, or to see 
that any worthy object is imitated by them. And we must ac- 
knowledge that all this sort of thing, which aims only at swift- 
ness and smoothness and a brutish noise, and uses the flute and 
the lyre not as the mere accompaniments of the dance and song, 
is exceedingly rude and coarse. The use of either, when un- 
accompanied by the others, leads to every sort of irregularity 
and trickery. — Laws, iv. 199. 
Music, different kinds of. 

Ath. Let us speak of the laws about music ; that is to 

say, such music as then existed ; in order that we may trace the 
growth of the excess of freedom from the beginning ; for music 
was early divided among us into certain kinds and manners. 
One sort consisted of prayers to the Gods, which were called 
hymns ; and there was another and opposite sort called lamen- 
tations, and another termed paeans, and another called dithy- 
rambs ; of which latter the subject, if I am not mistaken, was 
the birth of Dionysus. And they used the actual word " laws," 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 319 

or vopoi, meaning " song," only adding such and such an instru- 
ment, of the harp for example, when they wanted to denote a 
particular strain. All these and others were duly distinguished, 
nor were they allowed to intermingle one sort of music with 
another. And the authority which determined and gave judg- 
ment, and punished the disobedient, was not expressed in a 
hiss, nor in the most unmusical " sweet voices " of the multi- 
tude, as in our days ; nor in applause and clappings of the 
hands. But the directors of public instruction insisted that 
the spectators should listen in silence to the end ; and boys and 
their tutors, and the multitude in general, were kept quiet by the 
touch of the wand. Such was the good order which the mul- 
titude were willing to observe ; they would not have dared to 
give judgment by noisy cries. And then, as time went on, the 
poets themselves introduced the reign of ignorance and misrule. 
They were men of genius, but they had no knowledge of what 
is just and lawful in music ; raging like Bacchanals and pos- 
sessed with inordinate delights — mingling lamentations with 
hymns, and paeans with dithyrambs ; imitating the sounds of the 
flute on the lyre, and making one general confusion ; igno- 
rantly affirming that music has no truth, and, whether good or 
bad, can only be judged of rightly by the pleasure of the 
Hearer. And by composing such licentious poems, and adding 
to them words as licentious, they have inspired the multitude 
with lawlessness and boldness, and made them fancy that they 
can judge for themselves about melody and song. And in this 
way, the theatres from being mute have become vocal, as 
though they had understanding of good and bad in music and 
poetry ; and instead of an aristocracy, an evil sort of theat- 
rocracy has grown up. — Laws, iv. 229. 
Musical training. 

Musical training is a more potent instrument than any 

other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the secret 
places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace 
and making the soul graceful of him who is rightly educated, 
or ungraceful of him who is ill-educated ; and also because he 
who has received this true education of the inner being will 
most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, 
and with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and 
receives into his soul the good, and becomes noble and good, 
he will justly blame and hate the bad, now in the days of his 
youth, even before he is able to know the reason why ; and 



820 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

when reason comes he will recognize and salute her as a friend 
with whom his education has made him long familiar. — The 
Republic, ii. 225. 
Musician, the true. 

When I hear a man discoursing of virtue, or of any sort 

of wisdom, who is a true man and worthy of his theme, I am 
delighted beyond measure ; and I compare the man and his 
words, and note the harmony and correspondence of them. 
And such an one I deem to be the true musician, attuned to a 
fairer harmony than that of the lyre, or any pleasant instru- 
ment of music ; for truly he has in his own life a harmony of 
words and deeds arranged, not in the Ionian, or in the Phry- 
gian mode, nor yet in the Lydian, but in the true Hellenic 
mode, which is the Dorian, and no other. Such an one makes 
me merry with the sound of his voice ; and when I hear him 
I am thought to be a lover of discourse ; so eager am I in drink- 
ing in his words. But a man whose actions do not agree with 
his words is an annoyance to me ; and the better he speaks the 
more I hate him, and then I seem to be a hater of discourse. 
— Laches , i. 81. 
Musician, becoming soft. See Irritability. 

National peace, degenerating. 

The orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, 

and do their own business ; this is their way of living with all 
men at home, and they are equally ready to keep the peace 
with foreign States. And on account of this fondness of 
theirs for peace, which is often out of season where their in- 
fluence prevails, they become by degrees unwarlike, and bring 
up their young men to be like themselves ; they are at the 
command of others ; and -hence in a few years they and their 
children and the whole city often pass imperceptibly from the 
condition of freemen into that of slaves. — Statesman, iii. 594 
Nations. See States destroyed, etc. 

Nature, counterparts and antagonisms in. See Antagonisms, etc. 
Nature, reversal of the order of. 

Str. The life of all animals first came to a stand, and the 

mortal nature ceased to be or look older, and was then reversed 
and grew young and delicate ; the white locks of the aged 
darkened again, and the cheeks of the bearded man became 
smooth, and he was restored to his original youth ; the bodies 
of the young grew finer and smaller, continually by day and 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 321 

night returning and becoming assimilated to the nature of a 
newly-born child in mind as well as body ; in the succeeding 
stage they wasted away and wholly disappeared. And the 
bodies of those who had died by violence quickly passed 
through the like changes, and in a few days were no more 
seen. — Statesman, iii. 555. 
Nature and chance. 

Aih. They say that the greatest and fairest things are 

done by nature and chance, and the lesser by art, which re- 
ceives from nature all the greater and primeval creations, and 
fashions them in detail ; and these lesser works are generally 
termed artificial. 

Cle. What do you and they mean ? 

Ath. You will understand their meaning better, if I take 
the elements as an example ; they mean to say that fire and 
water, and earth and air, all exist by nature and chance, and 
not by art ; and that as to the bodies which come next in 
order, — earth, and sun, and moon, and stars, — they are cre- 
ated by the help of these absolutely inanimate existences, and 
that they are severally moved by chance and some inherent in- 
fluence according to certain affinities of hot with cold, or of 
dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and other chance admixt- 
ures of opposites which have united of necessity, and that on 
this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is 
in the heaven, including animals and all plants, and that all the 
seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, 
as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, 
by nature and chance only ; and that art sprang up after these 
and out of them, mortal and of mortal birth, and produced in 
play certain images and very partial imitations of the truth, 
having an affinity to one another, such as music and painting 
create and their companion arts. And there are other arts 
which have a serious purpose, and these cooperate with nature, 
such, for example, as medicine, and husbandry, and gymnastic. 
And they say that politics cooperate with nature, but in a less 
degree, and have more of art; also that legislation is entirely 
a work of art, and is based on assumptions which are not 
true. 

Cle. How do you mean ? 

Ath. In the first place, my dear friend, they would say that 
the Gods exist neither by nature nor by art, but only by the 
laws of States, which are different in different places, according 
21 



322 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

to the agreement of those who make them ; and that the hon- 
orable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and 
that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, 
but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering 
them ; and that the alterations which are made by art and by 
law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the mo- 
ment and at the time at which they are made : these, my 
friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, 
which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told 
by them that the highest right is might, and in this way the 
young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not 
such as the law bids them imagine them ; and hence arise con- 
tentions — the philosophers inviting them to lead a true life 
according to nature, which is to live in real dominion over 
others, and not in legal subjection to them. — Laws, iv. 400. 
Natural gifts. See Talents, etc. 
Natural justice. See Justice, natural. 
Natural appetite. See Appetites. 
Naval warfare and potentate. See Minos. 
Noble and just, the. 

To him who maintains that it is profitable for the human 

creature to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply, 
that if he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the 
multitudinous monster and strengthen the lion and the lion-like 
qualities and to starve and weaken the man ; who is conse- 
quently at the mercy of either of the other two, and he is not 
to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with one another : 
he ought rather to suffer them to fight and bite and devour one 
another. 

Certainly, he said ; that is what the approver of injustice 
says. 

To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he ought 
rather to aim in all he says and does at strengthening the man 
within him, in order that he may be able to govern the many- 
headed monster. Like a good husbandman he should be 
watching and tending the gentle shoots, and preventing the 
wild ones from growing ; making a treaty with the lion-heart, 
and in common care of them all uniting the several parts with 
one another and with himself. 

Yes, he said, that is quite what the main tain er of justice will 
say. 

And from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honor, 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 323 

or advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the 
truth, and the disapprover is wrong, and false, and ignorant? 

Yes, from every point of view. — The Republic, ii. 420. 
Noble, man, the rich. 

From what point of view then, and on what ground, shall 

a man be profited by injustice or intemperance or other base- 
ness, even though he acquire money or power ? 

From no point of view at all. 

What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected ? for he 
who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected 
and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and 
humanized ; the gentler element in him is liberated, and his 
whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of 
justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever 
is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength, and health, in propor- 
tion as the soul is more honorable than the body. 

Certainly, he said. 

On this higher end, then, the man of understanding will con- 
centrate the energies of his life. And in the first place, he 
will honor studies which impress these qualities on his soul, 
and will disregard others ? 

Clearly, he said. 

In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit, and so 
far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, 
that he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter ; 
his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or 
well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but he 
will be always desirous of preserving the harmony of the body 
for the sake of the concord of the soul ? 

Certainly he will, he replied, if he has true music in him. 

And there is a principle of order and harmony in the acqui- 
sition of wealth ; this also he will observe, and will not allow 
himself to be dazzled by the opinion of the world, and heap up 
riches to his own infinite harm ? 

I think not, he said. 

He will look at the city which is within him, and take care 
to avoid any change of his own institutions, such as might arise 
either from superfluity or from want ; and with a view to this 
only he will gain or spend in so far as he is able ? 

Very true. 

And, for the same reason, he will accept such honors as he 
deems likely to make him a better man ; but those which are 



324 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

likely fco disorder his constitution, whether private or public 
honors, he will avoid? 

Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a politician ? 

By the dog of Egypt, he will ! in the city which is his own, 
though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless by some 
providential accident. — The Republic, ii. 422. 
Noble, no rhetorician is. 

Soc. I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is 

of two sorts ; one, which' is mere flattery, and disgraceful dec- 
lamation ; the other, which is noble and aims at the training 
and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to 
say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audi- 
ence ; but have you ever known such a rhetoric ; or if you 
have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, 
will you tell me who he is? 

CaL But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any 
such among the orators who are at present living. 

Soc. Well, then, can you mention any one of a former gen- 
eration, who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who 
found them worse and made them better, from the day that he 
began to make speeches ? for, indeed, I do not know of such a 
man. 

CaL What ! did you never hear that Themistocles was a 
good man, and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just 
lately dead, and whom you heard yourself ? 

Soc. Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at 
first, true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own 
desires and those of others ; but if not, and if, as we were af- 
terwards compelled to acknowledge, the satisfaction of some 
desires makes us better and of others worse, and we ought to 
gratify the one and not the other, and there is an art in dis- 
tinguishing them — can you tell me of any of these statesmen 
who did distinguish them. 

CaL No, indeed, I cannot. — Gorgias, iii. 94. 
Nobler life. See Life, the nobler. 
Novelty, the love of. See Innovations. 
Novelty, the world jealous of. 

JEuth. I understand, Socrates ; he means to attack you 

about the familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes 
to you. He thinks that you are a neologian, and he is going to 
have you up before the court for this. He knows that such a 
charge is readily received by the world. I can tell you that, 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 325 

for when I myself speak in the assembly about divine things, 
and foretell the future to them, they laugh at me as a mad- 
man ; and yet every word that I say is true. But they are 
jealous of all of us. I suppose that we must be brave and not 
mind them. 

Soc. Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of 
much consequence. For a man may be thought wise ; but 
the Athenians, I suspect, do not trouble themselves about him 
until he begins to impart his wisdom to others ; and then for 
some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy, they 
are angry. — Euthyphro, i. 286. 
Numbers no argument. 

Soc. Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, 

when my tribe were serving as Prytanes, and the lot fell upon 
me and I was made a senator, and had to take the votes, there 
was a laugh at me, because I was unable to take them. And 
as I failed then, you must not ask me to count the suffrages of 
the company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no better 
argument than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make 
trial of the sort of proof which, as I think, ought to be given ; 
for I shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words, 
and he is the person with whom I am arguing ; his suffrage I 
know how to take ; but with the many I have nothing to do, 
and do not even address myself to them. — Gorgias, iii. 60. 

Oaths, false. 

Every man should regard adulteration as a particular 

kind of falsehood, concerning which the many are too fond of 
saying, that at proper times, the practice may often be right. 
But they leave the time and place and occasion undefined and 
unregulated, and from this want of definiteness in their lan- 
guage they do a great deal of harm to themselves and to others. 
Now, a legislator ought not to leave the matter undefined ; he 
ought to prescribe some limit, either greater or less. Let this, 
then, be the limit prescribed : no one shall call the Gods to wit- 
ness, when he says or does anything false or deceitful or dis- 
honest, unless he would be the most hateful of mankind to them. 
And he is most hateful to them who takes a false oath, and never 
thinks of the Gods ; and in the second place, he who tells a 
falsehood in the presence of his superiors. Now, better men 
are the superiors of worse men, and in general elders are the 
superiors of the young ; wherefore, also, parents are the superiors 



326 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

of their children, and men of women and children, and rulers 
of their subjects ; for all men ought to reverence any one who 
is in any position of authority, and especially those who are in 
State offices. And this is the reason why I have spoken of 
these matters. For every one who is guilty of adulteration in 
the agora tells a falsehood, and deceives, and when he invokes 
the Gods, according to the customs and cautions of the wardens 
of the agora, he is perjured, and has no respect either for God 
or man. — Laws, iv. 428. 
Office-se eking disgraceful. 

Of course you know that ambition and avarice are said 

to be and are a disgrace ? 

Very true. 

And for this reason money and honor have no attraction for 
them ; they do not wish to be directly paid for governing and 
so get the name of hirelings, nor by indirectly helping them- 
selves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. 
And not being ambitious they do not care about honor ; and 
therefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be 
induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I 
imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, in- 
stead of waiting to be compelled, has been thought dishonora- 
ble. Now he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one 
who is worse than himself, than which no punishment can be 
greater. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good 
to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot 
help ; nor under the idea that they are going to have any ben- 
efit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because 
they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who 
is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For the proba- 
bility is that if a city were composed entirely of good men, 
then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention 
as to obtain office is at present ; then we should have plain 
proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his 
own interest, but that of his subjects ; and every wise man will 
therefore choose rather to receive a benefit from another than 
to have the trouble of conferring one. — The Republic, ii. 
169. 
Office-seekers. 

You must contrive for your future rulers another and a 

better life than that of a ruler, then you may have a well- 
ordered State ; for only in the State which offers this will they 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 327 

rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue 
and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if 
they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hun- 
gering after their own private advantage, thinking that hence 
they are to snatch away the good of life, order there can never 
be ; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and do- 
mestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers 
themselves and of the whole State. — The Republic, ii. 347. 
Oligarchy. See Miserly men ; Government, property in ; and Money. 
Opinion, true. 

Soc. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere else, 

and went to the place and led others thither, would he not 
be a right and good guide ? 

Men. Certainly. 

Soc. And a person who had a right opinion about the way, 
but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide 
also, might he not ? 

Men. Certainly. 

Soc. And while he has true opinion about that which the 
other knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the 
truth, as if he knows the truth ? 

Men. Exactly. 

Soc. Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action 
as wisdom ; and that was the point which we omitted in our 
speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that wis- 
dom only is the guide of right action ; whereas there is also 
right opinion. 

Men. True. 

Soc. Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge ? 

Men. The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has 
knowledge will always be right ; but he who has right opinion 
will sometimes be right, and sometimes not right. 

Soc. What do you mean ? Can he be wrong who has right 
opinion, as long as he has right opinion ? 

Men. I admit the cogency of that, and therefore, Socrates, 
I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion 
— or why they should ever differ. — Meno, i. 273. 
Opinion, right. 

" Is that which is not wise, ignorant ? do you not see that 

there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance ? " " And 
what may that be ? " I said. " Right opinion," she replied ; 
" which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not 



328 PLATO 9 S BEST THOUGHTS. 

knowledge (for how can knowledge be devoid of reason ? nor 
again, ignorance, for neither can ignorance attain the truth), 
but is clearly something which is a mean between ignorance 
and wisdom." — The Symposium, i. 494. 
Opinion, popular, not to be heeded. 

Soc. But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the 

opinion of the many ? Good men, and they are the only per- 
sons who are worth considering, will think of these things truly 
as they occurred. 

Cr. But you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the many 
must be regarded, for what is now happening shows that they 
can do the greatest evil to any one who has lost their good 
opinion. 

Soc. I only wish, Crito, that they could ; for then they could 
also do the greatest good, and that would be well. But in 
reality they can do neither : for they cannot either make a 
man wise or make him foolish ; and whatever they do is the 
result of chance. — Crito, i. 348. 
Opinion of the many and the wise. 

Soc. In questions of just and unjust, fair and foul, good 

and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation, 
ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them ; 
or the opinion of the one man who has understanding ? ought 
we not to fear and reverence him more than all the rest of the 
world : and if we desert him shall we not destroy and injure 
that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved 
by justice and deteriorated by injustice ; — there is such a 
principle ? 

Cr. Certainly there is, Socrates 

Soc. Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many 
say of us ; but what he, the one man who has understanding of 
just and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And 
therefore you begin in error when you suggest that we should 
regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good 
and evil, honorable and dishonorable. " Well/' some one will 
say, " but the many can kill us." 

Cr. Yes, Socrates ; that will clearly be the answer. 

Soc. That is true : but still I find with surprise that the old 
argument is, as I conceive, unshaken as ever. — Crito 9 i. 352. 
Opinion and knowledge. See Knowledge, etc. 
Opinion, public, compared to a great beast. 
Let me crave your assent, also, to a further observation. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 329 

All those mercenary individuals, whom the world calls Soph- 
ists and esteems rivals, do but teach the collective opinion 
of the many, which are the opinions of their assemblies ; and 
this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who 
should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast 
who is fed by him — he would learn how to approach and 
handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is 
dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his sev- 
eral cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is 
soothed or infuriated ; and you may suppose, further, that when, 
by constantly living with him, he has become perfect in all 
this he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes a system or 
art, which he proceeds to teach, not that he has any real notion 
of what he is teaching, but he names this honorable and that 
dishonorable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accord- 
ance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute, when he 
has learnt the meaning of his inarticulate grunts. Good he 
pronounces to be what pleases him, and evil what he dislikes ; 
and he can give no other account of them except that the just 
and noble are the necessary, having never himself seen, and 
having no power of explaining to others, the nature of either, 
or the immense difference between them. Would not he be a 
rare educator ? 

Indeed, he would. • 

And in what respects does he who thinks that wisdom is the 
discernment of the tastes and pleasures of the assembled multi- 
tude, whether in painting or music, or, finally, in politics, differ 
frpm such an one ? For I suppose you will agree that he who 
associates with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or 
other work of art, or the service which he has done the State, 
making them his judges, except under protest, will also experi- 
ence the fatal necessity of producing whatever they praise. 
And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in 
confirmation of their notions about the honorable and good 
Did you ever hear any of them which were not ? 

No, nor am I likely to hear. 

You recognize the truth of what has been said ? Ther? let 
me ask you to consider, further, whether the world will ever be 
induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty rather 
than of the many beautiful, or of the absolute in each kind 
rather than of the many in each kind ? 

Certainly not. 



330 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher ? 
Impossible. 

And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the 
censure of the world ? 

They must. — The Republic, ii. 319. 

Opinion, right, differences as to. See Differences. 

Opinion, false. See False and Heterodoxy. 

Opinions and beliefs, true. See Beliefs. 

Opposites, generation of. See Generation. 

Order and Harmony, wealth acquired according to. See Noble rich 

man. 
Order and harmony in the soul. See Harmony. 
Order and Law, limitation of. 

Soc. I omit to speak of ten thousand other things, such 

as beauty and health and strength, and of the many beauties 
and high perfections of the soul ; methinks, my fair Philebus, 
that the goddess saw the universal wantonness and wickedness 
of all things, having no limit of pleasure or satiety, and she de- 
vised the limit of law and order, tormenting, as you say, Phile- 
bus, or, as I affirm, saving the soul. — Philebus, iii. 161. 
Order of nature reversed. See Nature, etc. 

Pain and pleasure related. 

How singular is the thing called pleasure, and how curi- 
ously related to pain, which might be thought to be the oppo- 
site of it ; for they never will come to a man together, and yet 
he who pursues either of them is generally compelled to take 
the other. Their bodies are two and yet they are joined to a 
single head ; and I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had 
noticed them, he would have made a fable about God trying to 
reconcile their strife, and how, when he could not, he fastened 
their heads together ; and this is the reason why when one 
comes the other follows, as I find in my own case, pleasure 
conies following after the pain in my leg which was caused by 
the chain. — Phaedo, i. 386. 
Pain and pleasure simultaneous. 

Soc. Do you see the inference : — that pleasure and pain 

are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? 
For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the 
same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body ; 
which of them is affected, cannot be supposed to be of any 
consequence ? Is that true or not ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 331 

Cal. True 

Soc. I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated in the 
great mysteries before you were initiated into the little. I 
thought that was not allowable. But to return to our argu- 
ment : — does not a man cease from thirsting and from the 
pleasure of drinking at the same moment ? 

Cal. True. 

Soc. And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he 
not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment ? 

Cal. Very true. 

Soc. Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same 
moment ? 

Cal. Yes. 

Soc. But he does not cease from good and evil at the same 
moment, as you have admitted, — do you not still admit that ? 

Cal. Yes, I do ; but what is the inference ? 

Soc. Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not 
the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful, 
for there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment ; 
but not of good and evil. How then can pleasure be the same 
as good, or pain as evil ? And I would have you look at the 
matter in another point of view, which could hardly, I think, 
have been considered by you when you identified them : Are 
not the good good because they have good present with them, 
as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them ? 

Cal. Yes. — Gorgias, iii. 86. 
Pain and pleasure, qualities of. 

Soc. But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and 

pain as well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or 
small, and have various degrees of intensity ; as was indeed 
said long ago by us. 

Pro. Quite true. 

Soc. And if there is badness in any of them, Protarchus, then 
we should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure ? 

Pro. Quite true, Socrates. 

Soc. And if there is rightness in any of them, should we not 
speak of a right opinion or right pleasure ; and in like manner 
of the reverse of rightness ? 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say 
that the opinion is erroneous, and not rightly opined ? 

Pro. Certainly. 



332 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Soc. And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect 
of the object of pleasure or pain, shall we call that right or 
good, or by any honorable name ? 

Pro. Not if the pleasure is mistaken ; we could not. 

Soc. And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an 
opinion which is not true, but false ? 

Pro. That is quite correct ; and in that case, Socrates, we 
call the opinion false, but no one could call the actual pleasure 
false. 

Soc. How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defense of 
pleasure ! 

Pro. Nay, Socrates, I only say what I hear. 

Soc. And is there no difference, my friend, between that 
pleasure which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, 
and that which is often found in us associated with falsehood 
and ignorance ? 

Pro. There must be a very great difference between them. 

— Philebus, iii. 175. 

Painter, the Poet like the. See Poet, etc. 
Painting and writing. 

Soc. I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing is un- 
fortunately like painting ; for the creations of the painter have 
the attitude of life, and yet if you ask them a question they 
preserve a solemn silence. And the same may be said of 
speeches. You would imagine that they had intelligence, but 
if you want to know anything and put a question to one of 
them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And 
when they have been once written down they are tumbled about 
anywhere among those who do and among those who do not 
understand them. And they have no reticences or proprieties 
towards different classes of persons ; and, if they are unjustly 
assailed or abused, their parent is needed to protect his offspring, 
for they cannot protect or defend themselves. 

Phaedr. That again is most true. 

Soc. May we not imagine another kind of writing or speak- 
ing far better than this is, and having far greater power, — 
which is one of the same family, but lawfully begotten ? Let 
us see what his origin is. 

Phaedr. Who is he, and what do you mean about his origin ? 

Soc. I am speaking of an intelligent writing which is graven 
in the soul of him who has learned, and can defend itself, and 
knows when to speak and when to be silent. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 333 

Phaedr. You mean the word of knowledge which has a living 
soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than 
an image ? 

Soc. Yes, of course that is what I mean. — Phaedrus/i. 581. 
Painting, imitation. See Imitation, etc. 
Painting, deception in. See Likeness of the world. 
Parents, what the children owe to the. See Children, etc. 

Ath. Neither God, nor a man who has understanding, will 

ever advise any one to neglect his parents. To a discourse con- 
cerning the honor and dishonor of parents, a prelude such as 
the following, about the service of the Gods, will be a suitable 
introduction: — There are ancient customs about the Gods 
which are universal, and they are of two kinds; some of the 
Gods we see with our eyes and honor them, of others we 
honor the images ; raising statues of them which we adore ; 
and though they be lifeless, yet we imagine that the living 
Gods have a good will and gratitude to us on this account. 
Now, if a man has a father or mother, or their father or mother 
treasured up in his house stricken in years, let him consider 
that no statue can be more potent to grant his requests than 
they are, who are sitting at his hearth, if only he knows how 
to show true service to them. 

Cle. And what do you call the true mode of service ? 

Ath. I will tell you, my friend, for such things are worth 
listening to. 

Cle. Proceeds 

Ath. Oedipus, as tradition says, when dishonored by his sons, 
invoked on them the fulfillment of those curses from the God 
which every one declares to have been heard and ratified by 
the Gods ; and Amyntor in his wrath invoked curses on his 
son Phoenix, and Theseus upon Hippolytus, and innumerable 
others have also called down wrath upon their children, which 
is a plain proof that the Gods listen to the imprecations of 
parents ; for the curses of a parent are, as they ought to be, 
mighty against his children as no others are. And shall we 
suppose that the prayers of a father or mother who is spe- 
cially dishonored by his or her children, are heard by the Gods 
in accordance with nature ; and that if a man is honored by 
'hem, and in the gladness of his heart earnestly entreats the 
Gods in his prayers to do them good, he is not equally heard, 
and that they do not minister to his request? If not, they 
would be very unjust ministers of good, and that we affirm to 
be contrary to their nature. 



334 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Cle. Certainly. 

Ath. May we not think, as I was saying just now, that we 
can possesss no image which is more honored by the Gods, than 
that of a father or grandfather, or of a mother stricken in 
years? whom when a man honors, the heart of the God re- 
joices, and he is ready to answer their prayers. And, truly, 
the figure of an ancestor is a wonderful thing, far higher than 
that of a lifeless image. For when they are honored by us, 
they join in our prayers, and when they are dishonored, they 
utter imprecations against us ; but lifeless objects do neither. 
And, therefore, if a man makes a right use of his father and 
grandfather and other aged relations, he will have the best of 
all images which can procure him the favor of the Gods. 

Cle. Excellent. 

Ath. Every man of understanding fears and respects the 
prayers of his parents, knowing well that many times and to 
many persons they have been accomplished. Now, these things 
being thus ordered by nature, good men think that they are the 
gainers by having aged parents living, to the end of their life, 
or if they depart early, they are deeply lamented by them ; 
and to the bad they are very terrible. Wherefore let every 
man honor with every sort of lawful honor, his own parents 
agreeably to what has now been said. — Laws, iv. 442. 
Parents, brave sons of brave. See State, heroes, etc. 
Parental sorrow to be lightly borne. See Sorrow. 
Parricides. 

But what if the people go into a passion, and aver that a 

grown-up son ought not to be supported by his father, but that 
the father should be supported by the son ? He did not bring 
him into the world in order that when he was grown up he 
himself should be the servant of his own servants, and should 
support him and his rabble of slaves and companions ; but that, 
having such a protector, he might be emancipated from the 
government of the rich and aristocratic, as they are termed. 
And so he bids him and his companions depart, just as any 
Other father might drive out of the house a riotous son and 
his party of revelers. 

By heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a 
monster he has been fostering in his bosom ; and when he 
wants to drive him out, he will find that he is weak and his 
son strong. 

Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant w r ill use vio- 
lence ? What ! beat his father if he opposes him ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 335 

• 

Yes, he will ; and he will begin by taking away his arms. 

Then he is a parricide, and a cruel, unnatural son to an aged 
parent whom he ought to cherish ; and this is real tyranny, 
about which there is no mistake ; as the saying is, the people 
who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, 
has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus 
liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the 
harshest and bitterest form of slavery. — The Republic^ ii. 
398. 
Parties, political. 

Ath. Consider, then, to whom our State is to be intrusted. 

For there is a thing which has occurred times without number 
in States — 

Oh. What? 

Ath. That when there has been a contest for power, and the 
conquerors have monopolized the government, and have re- 
fused all share to the defeated party and their descendants, they 
have lived watching one another, in perpetual fear that some 
one will come into power who has a recollection of former 
wrongs, and will rise up against them. Now, according to our 
view, such governments are not polities at all, nor are laws 
right which are passed for the good of particular classes and 
not for the good of the whole State. States which have such 
laws are not polities but parties, and their notion of justice is 
simply unmeaning. I say this, because I am going to assert 
that we must not intrust the government in your State to any 
one because he is rich, or because he possesses any advantage, 
such as strength, or stature, or again birth ; but he who is 
most obedient to the laws of the State, he shall win the palm; 
and to him who is victorious in the first degree, shall be given 
the highest office and chief ministry of the Gods ; and the 
second to him who bears the second palm ; and in a similar 
ratio shall all the other offices be assigned to their holders. 
And when I call the rulers servants or ministers of the law, I 
give them this name not for the sake of novelty, but because I 
certainly believe that upon their service or ministry depends 
the well or ill-being of the State. For that State in which 
the law is subject and has no authority, I perceive to be on the 
highway to ruin ; but I see that the State in which the law is 
above the rulers, and the rulers are the inferiors of the law, 
has salvation, and every blessing which the Gods can confer. 
— Laws, iv. 242. 



836 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Passion, incorrupt, the end of reason. 

You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first 

sight to be a kind of desire, but now we should say the con- 
trary ; for in the conflict of the soul, spirit is arrayed on the 
side of the rational principle. 

Most assuredly. 

But a further question arises : Is spirit different from 
reason also, or only a kind of reason ; in which latter case, in- 
stead of three principles in the soul, there will be only two, 
the rational and the concupiscent ; or rather, as the State was 
composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counselors, so may 
there not be in the individual soul a third element which is 
passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by education, is the 
auxiliary of reason ? 

Yes, he said, there must be a third. — The Republic, ii. 267. 
Patients and doctors. See Doctors. 
Patriarchal State. 

Ath. They could hardly have wanted lawgivers as yet ; 

nothing of that sort was likely to have existed in their days, 
for they had no letters at this early stage ; they lived by habit 
and the customs of their forefathers, as they are called. 

die. Probably. 

Ath. But there was already existing a form of government 
which, if I am not mistaken, is generally termed a lordship, and 
this still remains in many places, both among Hellenes and 
barbarians, and is the government which is declared by Homer 
to have prevailed among the Cyclopes : — 

"They have neither councils nor judgments, but they dwell in 
hollow rocks on the tops of high mountains, and every one is the 
judge of his wife and children, and they do not trouble themselves 
about one another." 

Cle. That must be a charming poet of yours ; I have read 
some other verses of his, which are very clever ; but I do not 
know much of him, for foreign poets are not much read among 
the Cretans. 

Meg. But they are in Lacedaemon, and he appears to be 
the prince of them all ; the manner of life, however, which he 
describes is not Spartan, but rather Ionian, and he seems quite 
to confirm what you are saying, carrying back the ancient state 
of mankind by the help of tradition, to barbarism. 

Ath. Yes ; and we may accept his witness to the fact that 
there was a time when primitive societies had this form. 



PLATO 9 S BEST THOUGHTS. 33? 

Cle. Very true. 

Aih. And did not such States spring out of single habita- 
tions and families who were scattered and thinned in the de- 
vastations ; and the eldest of them was their ruler, because 
with them government originated in the authority of a father 
and a mother, whom, like a flock of birds, they followed, form- 
ing one troop under the patriarchal rule and sovereignty of 
their parents, which of all sovereignties is the most just? 

Cle. Yery true. — Laws, iv. 209. 
Patriotism. See Individual, the State greater, etc. 
Patroclus and Achilles. See Achilles. 
Paupers and criminals co-existing. See Criminals. 
Peace in view of death. See Calmness. 
Peace, national. See National. 
People swayed by rulers. See Rulers, swaying, etc. 
Persian princes, how cared for. 

After the birth of the royal child, he is tended, not by a 

good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by the best of the royal 
eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and especially 
with the fashioning and formation of his limbs, in order that 
he may be as shapely as possible ; which being their calling, 
they are held in great honor. And when the young prince is 
seven years old he is put upon a horse and taken to the riding- 
masters and begins to go out hunting. And at fourteen years 
of age he is handed over to the royal schoolmasters, as they 
are termed ; these are four chosen men, reputed to be the best 
among the Persians of a certain age ; and one of them is the 
wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and 
a fourth the most valiant. The first instructs him in the ma- 
gianism of Zoroaster the son of Oromasus, which is the wor- 
ship of the Gods, and teaches him also the duties of his 
royal office ; the second, who is the justest, teaches him always 
to speak the truth ; the third, or most temperate, forbids him 
to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be ac- 
customed to be a freeman and king indeed, — lord of himself 
first, and not a slave ; the most valiant makes him bold and 
fearless, telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a 
slave. — Alcihiades I. iv. 538. 

Persian State, freedom in the. See Freedom in the, etc. 
Persuasion better than force. See Legislation. 
In the days of old the Gods had the whole earth dis- 
tributed among them by allotment ; there was no quarreling ; 
22 



338 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

and you cannot suppose that the Gods did not know what was 
proper for each of them to have ; or, knowing this, that they 
would seek to procure for themselves by contention that which 
more properly belonged to others. Each of them by just ap- 
portionment obtained what they wanted, and peopled their own 
districts ; and when they had peopled them they tended us human 
beings who belonged to them as shepherds tend their flocks, 
excepting only that they did not use blows or bodily force, as 
shepherds do, but governed us like pilots from the stern of the 
vessel, which is an easy way of guiding animals, holding our 
souls by the rudder of persuasion, according to their own pleas- 
ure ; thus did they guide all mortal creatures. — Critias, ii. 
595. 
Persuasion the crown of rhetoric. 

Soc. What is that which, as you say, .is the greatest good 

of man, and of which you are the creator ? Answer us. 

Gor. That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being 
that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to 
rulers the power of ruling over others in their several States. 

Soc. And what would you consider this to be ? 

Gor. What is there greater than the word which persuades 
the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the 
citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting? — 
if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the 
physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the 
money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treas- 
ures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and 
persuade the multitude. 

Soc. Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately 
explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric ; and 
you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the arti- 
ficer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that 
this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of 
rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion ? 

Gor. No : the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates ; 
for persuasion is the crown of rhetoric. — Gorgias, iii. 37. 
Persuasion the greatest art. 

Pro. I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that 

the art of persuasion far surpassed every other ; this, as he 
says, is by far the best of them all, for to it all things sub- 
mit, not by compulsion, but of their own free will. — Philebus 
iii 198. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 339 

Persuasion, the art of. 

Str. But the art of the lawyer, of the populai orator, 

and the art of conversation may be called in one word the art 
of persuasion. 

Theaet. True. 

Str. And of persuasion, there may be said to be two 
kinds ? 

Theaet. What are they ? 

Str. One is private, and the other public 

But that sort of hireling whose conversation is pleasing and 
who baits his hook with pleasure and only exacts his main- 
tenance as the price of his flattery, we should all, if I am not 
mistaken, describe as possessing an art of sweetening, or mak- 
ing things pleasant. — Sophist, iii. 456. 
Philosopher willing to die. See Boldness. 

I must try to make more successful defense before you 

than I did before the judges. For I am quite ready to ac- 
knowledge, Simmias and Cebes, that I ought to be grieved at 
death, if I were not persuaded that I am going to other Gods 
who are wise and good (of this I am as certain as I can be of 
anything of the sort), and to men departed (though I am not 
so certain of this last) who are better than those whom I leave 
behind ; and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, 
for I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for 
the dead, and as has been said of old, some far better thing for 
the good than for the evil 

And now I will make answer to you, my judges, and 
show that he who has lived as a true philosopher has reason to 
be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after death 
he may hope to receive the greatest good in the other world. 
And how this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavor to 
explain. For I deem that the true disciple of philosophy is 
likely to be misunderstood by other men ; they do not perceive, 
that he is ever pursuing death and dying ; and if this is true, 
why, having had the desire of death all his life long, should he 
repine at the arrival of that which he has been always pursu- 
ing and desiring ? 

Simmias laughed and said : Though not in a laughing 
humor, I swear that I cannot help laughing, when I think 
what the wicked world will say when they hear this. They 
will say that it is delightfully true, and our people at home 
will agree with them in saying that the life which philosophers 



340 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

desire is in reality death, and that they have found them out 
to be deserving of the death which they desire. 

And they are right, Simmias, in saying so, with the excep- 
tion of the words " they have found them out ; " for they have 
not found out what is the nature of that death which the true 
philosopher desires, or how he deserves or desires death. But 
let us leave them and have a word with ourselves : Do we be- 
lieve that there is such a thing as death ? 

To be sure, replied Simmias. 

And is this anything but the separation of soul and body ? 
And being dead is the completion of the separation when the 
soul exists in herself, and is parted from the body and the body 
is parted from the soul — that is death ? 

Exactly : that and nothing else, he replied. — Pkaedo, L 
389. 

Philosopher, curiosity does not make a. See Curiosity. 
Philosopher characterized. 

Soc. Then, as this is your wish, I will describe the 

leaders ; for there is no use in talking about the inferior sort. 
In the first place, the lords of philosophy have never, from 
their youth upwards, known their way to the Agora, or the 
dicastery, or the council, or any other political assembly ; they 
neither see nor hear the laws or votes of the State written or 
recited ; the eagerness of political societies in the attainment 
of offices, — clubs, and banquets, and revels, and singing- 
maidens, do not enter even into their dreams. Whether any 
event has turned out well or ill in the city, what disgrace may 
have descended to any one from his ancestors, male or female, 
are matters of which the philosopher no more knows than he 
can tell, as they say, how many pints are contained in the 
ocean. Neither is he conscious of his ignorance. For he 
does not hold aloof in order that he may gain a reputation ; 
but the truth is, that the outer form of him only is in the city ; 
his mind, disdaining the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human 
things, is " flying all abroad," as Pindar says, measuring with 
line and rule the things which are under and on the earth and 
above the heaven, interrogating the whole nature of each and 
all, but not condescending to anything which is within reach. 

Theod. What do you mean, Socrates ? 

Soc. I will illustrate my meaning, Theodorus, by the jest 
which the clever, witty Thracian handmaid made about Thales, 
when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 341 

She said, that he was so eager to know what was going on in 
heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet. This 
is a jest which is equally applicable to all philosophers. For 
the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next door 
neighbor ; he is ignorant, not only of what he is doing, but he 
hardly knows whether he is a man or an animal ; he is search- 
ing into the essence of man, and busy in inquiring what be- 
longs to such a nature to do or suffer different from any other ; 
I think that you understand me, Theodorus ? 

Theod. I do, and what you say is true. 

Soc. And thus, my friend, on every occasion, private as 
well as public, as I said _ at first, when he appears in a law- 
court, or in any place in which he has to speak of things which 
are at his feet and before his eyes, he is the jest, not only of 
Thracian handmaids but of the general herd, tumbling into 
wells and every sort of disaster through his inexperience. His 
awkwardness is fearful, and gives the impression of imbecil- 
ity. When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say 
in answer to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows 
no scandals of any one, and they do not interest him ; and 
therefore he is laughed at for his sheepishness ; and when 
others are being praised and glorified, in the simplicity of his 
heart he cannot help laughing openly and unfeignedly ; and 
this again makes him look like a fool. When he hears a 
tyrant or king eulogized, he fancies that he is listening to the 
praises of some keeper of cattle, — a swineherd, or shepherd, 
or cowherd, who is congratulated on the quantity of milk 
which he squeezes from them ; and he remarks that the creat- 
ure whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze the wealth 
is of a less tractable and more insidious nature. Then, again, 
he observes that the great man is of necessity as ill-mannered 
and uneducated as any shepherd, — for he has no leisure, and 
he is surrounded by a wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hear- 
ing of enormous landed proprietors of ten thousand acres and 
more, our philosopher deems this to be a trifle, because he has 
been accustomed to think of the whole earth ; and when they 
sing the praises of family, and say that some one is a gentleman 
because he has had seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he 
thinks that their sentiments only betray a dull and narrow 
vision in those who utter them, and who are not educated 
enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man 
has had thousands and thousands of progenitors, and among 



342 PLATO* S BEST THOUGHTS. 

them have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and 
barbarians, many times over. And when the people pride 
themselves on having a pedigree of twenty-five ancestors, which 
goes back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, he cannot un- 
derstand their poverty of ideas. Why they are unable to cal- 
culate that Amphitryon had a twenty-fifth ancestor, who might 
have been anybody, and was such as fortune made him, and he 
had a fiftieth, and so on ? He amuses himself with the notion 
that they cannot count, and thinks that a little arithmetic would 
have got rid of their senseless vanity. Now, in all these cases 
our philosopher is derided by the vulgar, partly because he is 
thought to despise them, and also because he is ignorant of 
what is before him, and always at a loss. 

Theod. That is very true, Socrates. 

Soc. But, O my friend, when he draws the other into upper 
air and gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the con- 
templation of justice and injustice in their own nature and in 
their difference from one another and from all other things ; 
or from the commonplaces about the happiness of kings to the 
consideration of government, and of human happiness and 
misery in general — what they are, and how a man is to attain 
the one and avoid the other — when that narrow, keen, little 
legal mind is called to account about all this, he gives the phi- 
losopher his revenge : for dizzied by the height at which he is 
hanging, whence he looks into space, which is a strange ex- 
perience to him, he being dismayed and lost, and stammering 
out broken words, is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens 
or any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye for the 
situation, but by every man who has not been brought up as a 
slave. Such are the two characters, Theodorus : the one of 
the freeman called by you useless, when he has to perform 
some menial office, such as packing up a bag, or flavoring a 
sauce, or fawning speech ; the other, of the man who is able 
to do all this kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows 
not how to wear his cloak like a gentleman ; still less with the 
music of discourse can he hymn the true life which is lived by 
immortals or men blessed of heaven. — Theaetelus, iii. 376. 
Philosopher and Sophist. 

Sir. The art of dialectic would be attributed by you only 

to the philosopher pure and true ? - 

Theaet. Who but he can be worthy ? 

Str. This is the region in which we shall always discover 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 343 

the philosopher, both now and hereafter ; like the Sophist, he 
is not easily discovered, but for a different reason. 

Theaet. For what reason ? 

Str. Because the Sophist runs away into the darkness of 
not-being, in which he has learned by habit to feel about, and 
cannot be discovered himself because of the darkness of the 
place. Is not that true ? 

Theaet. Quite so. 

Str. And the philosopher, always holding converse through 
reason with the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light ; 
for the eyes of the soul of the multitude are unable to endure 
the vision of the divine. 

Theaet. Yes ; that is quite as true as the other. 

Str. Well, the philosopher may hereafter be more fully con- 
sidered by us, if we are disposed ; but the Sophist plainly must 
not be allowed to escape until we have had a good look at him. 

Theaet. Very good. — Sophist iii. 492. 
Philosophers and Statesmen, border-ground between. 

Soc. What manner of man was he who came up to you 

and censured philosophy ; was he an orator who himself prac- 
tices in the courts, or an instructor of orators, who makes the 
speeches with which they do battle ? 

Cri. He was certainly not an orator, and I doubt whether' 
he had ever been into court ; but they say that he knows the 
business, and is a clever man, and composes wonderful speeches. 

Soc. Now I understand, Crito ; he is one of an amphibious 
class, whom I was on the point of mentioning — one of those 
whom Prodicus describes as on the border-ground between 
philosophers and statesmen - — they think that they are the 
wisest of all men, and that they are generally esteemed the 
wisest ; nothing but the rivalry of the philosophers stands in 
their way ; and they are of the opinion that if they can prove 
the philosophers to be good for nothing, no one will dispute 
their title to the palm of wisdom, for that they are themselves 
really the wisest, although they are apt to be mauled by Euthy- 
demus and his friend, when they get hold of them in conversa- 
tion. This opinion which they entertain of their own wisdom 
is very natural ; for they have a certain amount of philosophy, 
and a certain amount of political wisdom ; there is reason in 
what they say, for they argue that they have just enough of 
both, while they keep out of the way of all risks and conflicts 
and reap the fruits of their wisdom. — Euthydemus, i. 211. 



344 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Philosopher, despising bodily pleasures. See Bodily pleasure. 
Philosophers, dizzy. 

1 have not a bad notion which came into my head only 

this moment : I believe that the primeval givers of names were 
undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, 
in their search after the nature of things, are always getting 
dizzy from going round and round and then they imagine that 
the world is going round and round and moving anyhow ; and 
this appearance, which arises out of their own internal condi- 
tion, they suppose to be a reality of nature ; they think that 
there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, 
and that all is full of every sort of motion and change. — 
Cratylus, i. 650. 
Philosophic nature, rare. 

— — Neither is there any reason why I should again set in 
array the philosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember 
that courage, magnanimity, apprehension, memory, were his 
natural gifts. And you objected that, although no one could 
deny what I then said, still, if you leave words and look at 
facts, the persons who are thus described are some of them 
manifestly useless, and the greater number wholly depraved ; 
we were then led to inquire into the grounds of these accusa- 
tions, and we had arrived at the point of asking why are the 
many bad, which question of necessity brought us back to the 
examination and definition of the true philosopher. 

Exactly. 

And now we have to consider the corruptions of the phil- 
osophical nature, why so many are spoiled and so few escape 
spoiling — I am speaking of those whom you call useless but 
not wicked ; and after that we will consider the imitators of 
philosophy, what manner of natures are they who aspire after 
a profession which is above them and of which they are un- 
worthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon 
philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reproba- 
tion of which we speak. 

What are these corruptions, he said ? 

I will see if I can explain them to you, I said. Every 
one will admit that a nature having in perfection all the qual- 
ities which make a philosopher, is a plant that rarely grows 
among men — there are not many of them. 

They are very rare. — The Republic, ii. 317. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 345 

Philosophy to be followed. 

Soc. Do you then be reasonable, Crito, and do not mind 

whether the teachers of philosophy are good or bad, but think 
only of Philosophy herself. Try and examine her well and 
truly, and if she be evil seek to turn away all men from her, 
and not your sons only ; but if she be what I believe that she 
is, then follow her and serve her, you and your house, as the 
saying is, and be of good cheer. — Euthydemus, i. 212. 
Philosophy delivering the soul. 

He who is a philosopher or lover of learning, and is en- 
tirely pure at departing, is alone permitted to attain to the di- 
vine nature. And this is the reason, Simmias and Cebes, why 
the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshly lusts, 
and endure and refuse to give themselves up to them, — not 
because they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the 
lovers of money, and the world in general ; nor like the lovers 
of power and honor, because they dread the dishonor or dis- 
grace of evil deeds. 

No, Socrates, that would not become them, said Cebes. 

No indeed, he replied ; and therefore they who have a care 
of their own souls, and do not merely live moulding and fash- 
ioning the body, say farewell to all this ; they will not walk in 
the ways of the blind : and when Philosophy offers them puri- 
fication and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to 
resist her influence, and whither she leads they turn and fol- 
low. — Phaedo, i. 411. 
Philosophy in early youth. 

At present, I said, even those who study philosophy in 

early youth, or in the intervals of money-making and house- 
keeping, do but make an approach to the most difficult branch 
of the subject, and then take themselves off (I am speaking of 
those who have the most training, and by the most difficult 
branch I mean dialectic) ; and in after-life they perhaps go to 
a discussion which is held by others, and to which they are in- 
vited, and this they deem a great matter, as the study of phi- 
osophy is not regarded by them as their proper business : then, 
a* years advance, in most cases their light is quenched more 
truly than Heracleitus' sun, for they never rise again. 

But what ought to be their course ? 

Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and 
what philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender 
age : let their bodies be taken care of during the period of 



346 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

growth, to be hereafter the servants of philosophy ; as the man 
advances to mature intelligence he should increase the gymnas- 
tics of the soul ; but when the strength of our citizens fails, 
and is past civil and military duties, then let them range at 
will and have no other serious employment, as we intend them 
to live happily here, and, this life ended, to have a similar hap- 
piness in another. — The Republic, ii. 325. 
Philosophy in the State. 

When persons who are unworthy of education approach 

philosophy and make an alliance with her who is in a rank 
above them, what sort of ideas and opinions are likely to be 
generated ? Will they not be sophisms captivating to the ear, 
yet having nothing in them genuine or worthy of or akin to 
true wisdom ? 

No doubt, he said. 

Then there is a very small remnant, Adeimantus, I said, of 
worthy disciples of philosophy : perchance some noble nature, 
brought up under good influences, and detained by exile in her 
service who in the absence of temptation remains devoted 
to her ; or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the politics 
of which he contemns or neglects ; and perhaps there may 
be a few who, having a gift for philosophy, leave other arts, 
which they justly despise, and come to her ; and peradventure 
there are some who are restrained by our friend Theages' bridle 
(for Theages, you know, has had everything to draw him away ; 
but his ill-health keeps him from politics). My own case of 
the internal sign is indeed hardly worth mentioning, as very 
rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been vouchsafed to any one 
else. Those who belong to this small class, have tasted how 
sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also 
seen and been satisfied of the madness of the multitude, and 
known that there is no one who ever acts honestly in the ad- 
ministration of States, nor any helper who defends the cause 
of the just by whose aid he may be saved. Such a defender 
may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts ; 
he would not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither 
would he be able alone to resist all their fierce natures, and 
therefore he would be of no use to the State or to his friends, 
and would have to throw away his life before he had done any 
good to himself or others. When he reflects upon all this, he 
holds his peace, and does his own business. He is like one 
who retires under the shelter of a wall in the storm of dust 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 347 

and sleet which the driving wind hurries along ; und when he 
sees the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content if 
only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or un- 
righteousness, and depart in peace and good will, with bright 
hopes. 

Yes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he 
departs. 

A great work, — yes ; but not the greatest, unless he find a 
State suitable to him ; for in a State which is suitable to him 
he will have a larger growth, and be the saviour of his country 
as well as of himself. 

Enough, then, of the causes why philosophy is in such an 
evil name ; how unjustly, has been explained : and now is 
there anything more which you wish to say ? 

Nothing more on that subject, he replied ; but I should like 
to know which of the governments now existing is in your 
opinion the one adapted to her. 

Not any of them, I said ; and that is the very accusation 
which I bring against them : not one of them is worthy of the 
philosophic nature ; and hence that nature is warped and de- 
formed ; as the exotic seed which is sown in a foreign land be- 
comes denaturalized, and is vanquished and degenerates into 
the nature stock, even so this growth of philosophy, instead of 
persisting, receives another character. But if philosophy ever 
finds in the State that perfection which she herself is, then 
will be seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other 
things, whether natures of men or institutions, are but hu- 
man ; and now, I know, that you are going to ask what that 
State is. 

No, he said ; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask 
another question — whether it is the State of which we are 
the founders and inventors, or some other? 

Yes, I replied, ours in most respects ; but you may remember 
our saying before that some living authority would always be 
required in the State, whose idea of the constitution would be 
\he same which guided you originally when laying down the laws. 

That was said, he replied. 

Yes, but imperfectly said; you frightened us with objec- 
tions, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long 
and difficult ; and even what remains is the reverse of easy. 

What is that ? 

The question how the study of philosophy may be so or- 



348 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

dered as to be consistent with the preservation of the State ; 
for all great things are attended with risk : as the saying is, 
" Hard is the good." 

Still, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the inquiry 
will then be complete. 

I shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if 
at all, by a want of power : of my zeal you shall have ocular 
demonstration ; and please to remark in what I am about to say 
how courageously and unhesitatingly I affirm that a State ought 
not to have philosophy studied after the present fashion. — The 
Republic, ii. 323. 
Philosophy, too much, is ruinous. 

Philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the 

proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much phi- 
losophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good 
parts, still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is neces- 
sarily ignorant of all those things which a gentleman and a 
person of honor ought to know; for he is ignorant of the laws 
of the State, and of the language which ought to be used in the 
dealings of man with man, whether private or public, and alto- 
gether ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of 
human character in general. And people of this sort, when 
they betake themselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous 
as I imagine the politicians to be, when they make their ap- 
pearance in the arena of philosophy. For, as Euripides says, — 

" Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest portion of 
the day to that in which he thinks himself to excel most," 

and anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreci- 
ates and praises the opposite from partiality to himself, and 
because he thinks that he will thus praise himself. The 
true principle is to unite them. Philosophy, as a part of edu- 
cation, is an excellent thing, and there is no disgrace to a man 
while he is young in pursuing such a study ; but when he is 
more advanced in years, then the thing becomes ridiculous, and 
I feel towards philosophers as I do towards those who lisp and 
imitate children. For when I love to see a little child, who is 
not of an age to speak plainly, lisping at his play ; there is an 
appearance of grace and freedom in his utterance, which is 
natural to his childish years. And when I hear some small 
creature carefully articulating its words, I am offended ; the sound 
is disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of slavery. But 
when I see a man lisping as if he were a child, that appears to 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 349 

me ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of stripes. And I have 
the same feeling about students of philosophy ; when I see a 
youth so engaged, that I consider to be quite in character, and 
becoming a man of a liberal education, and him who neglects 
philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire 
to anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the 
study in later life, and not leaving off, I think that he ought to 
be beaten, Socrates ; for, as I was saying, such an one, even 
though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate. — Gor- 
gias, iii. 73. 

Philosophy, freedom of. See Freedom of Philosophy. 
Physical force inferior to persuasion. See Legislation and Per- 
suasion. 
Physician, the false and the true. 

Neither will he be able to distinguish the pretender in 

medicine from the true physician, nor between any other true 
and false professor of knowledge. Let us consider the matter 
in this way : If the wise man or any other man wants to dis- 
tinguish the true physician from the false, what is he to do ? 
He will not talk to him about medicine ; and that, as we were 
saying, is the only thing which the physician understands. 

True. 

And on the other hand, knows nothing of science, for this 
has been assumed to be the province of wisdom. 

True. 

And further, since medicine is science, we must infer that he 
does not know anything of medicine. 

Exactly. 

The wise man will indeed know that the physician has some 
kind of science or knowledge ; but when he wants to discover 
the nature of this he will ask, What is the subject-matter ? For 
each science is distinguished, not as science, but by the nature 
of the subject. Is not that true ? 

Yes ; that is quite true. 

And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having 
the subject-matter of health and disease ? 

Yes. 

And he who would inquire into the nature of medicine must 
pursue the inquiry into health and disease, and not into what 
is extraneous? 

True. 

And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a 
physician in what relates to these ? 



350 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. ^ 

He will. 

He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether 
what he does is right in relation to these ? — Charmides, i. 27. 
Physician for the State. See State, physician for the, etc. 
Physician, legislator compared to a. See Legislator. 
Physician, tried by boys. 

I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried in a 

court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What would 
he reply in such a case, if some one were to accuse him, say- 
ing, " my boys, many evil things has this man done to you : 
he is the death of you, especially of the younger ones among 
you, cutting and burning and starving and suffocating you, 
until you know not what to do; he gives you the bitterest 
potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike 
the variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you ! " 
"What do you suppose that the physician would reply when he 
found himself in such a predicament ? If he told the truth 
he could only say, " All this, my boys, I did with a view to 
health," and then would there not just be a clamor among a 
jury like that ? How they would cry out ! — Gorgias, iii. 113* 
Physicians and patients. See Doctors, etc. 
Physicians and cookery. See Cookery. 
Piety, conceptions of. See Holiness, etc. 
Pleasant, just and good. See Just judge. 
Pleasure as related to pain. See Pain. 
Pleasure and pain, qualities of. See Pain, qualities of, etc. 
Pleasure to be desired. 

Soc. Let us next assume that in the soul herself, there is 

an antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and consoling, 
and an expectation of pain, fearful and anxious. 

Pro. Yes ; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which 
is of the soul only, and is produced by expectation without the 
body. 

Soc. Right ; and I think that the examination of these two 
kinds, unalloyed as I suppose them to be, and not compounds 
of pleasure and pain, will most clearly show whether the whole 
class of pleasure is to be desired, or whether this quality of en- 
tire desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of 
the classes which have been mentioned ; and whether pleasure 
and pain, like heat and cold, and other things of this kind, are 
not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not to be desired, 
as being not in themselves good, but sometimes and in some 
instances admitting of the nature of good. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 351 

Pro. You say most truly that this is the track which the 
investigation should follow. — Phikbus, iii. 168. 
Pleasure, victory over. 

Ath. Have we not heard of Iccus of Tarentum, who. with 

a view to the Olympic and other contents, in his zeal for his 
art, and also because he was of a manly and temperate consti- 
tution, never had any connection with a woman or a youth 
during the whole time of his training? And the same is said 
of Crison and Astylus and Diopornpus and many others, and 
yet, Cleinias, they were far worse educated in their minds than 
your and my fellow-citizens, and in their bodies far more 1 

(He. No doubt this fact has been often affirmed positively by 
the ancients of these athletes. 

Ath. And shall they be willing to abstain from what is ordi- 
narily deemed a pleasure for the sake of a victory in wrestling, 
running, and the like ; and our young men be incapable of a 
similar endurance for the sake of a much nobler victory, which 
is the noblest of all, as from their youth upwards we will tell 
them, charming them, as we hope, into the belief of this, by 
tales in prose and verse ? 

Cle. Of what victory are you speaking? 

Ath. Of the victory over pleasure, which if they win they 
will live happily, or if conquered the reverse of happily. And, 
further, will not the fear of impiety enable them to master that 
which other inferior people have mastered ? 

Cle. I dare sav. — Laws, iv. 355. 
Pleasures of the body. See Bodily, etc. 
Pleasures of the intelligent. See Intelligence. 
Pleasures and pains mixed and unmixed. See Body and Soul. 
Pleasures, true. 

Pro. Which are the true pleasures, Socrates, and what is 

the right conception of them? 

Soc. True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of 
color and form, and most of those which arise from smells ; 
those of sound, again, and in general those of which the want 
is painless and unconscious, and the gratification afforded by 
them palpable to sense, and pleasant and unalloyed with pain. 
— Philebus, iii. 190. 
Pleasures of Knowledge. See Knowledge. 
Pleasures as hindrances. 

Soc. Do you wish to have the greatest and most vehement 

pleasures for your companions in addition to the true ones ? 



352 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Why, Socrates, they will say, how can we ? seeing that they 
are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us ; they trouble 
the souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness ; 
they prevent us from coming to the birth, and are commonly 
the ruin of our children when they do come to the birth, caus- 
ing them to be forgotten and unheeded ; but the other true and 
pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to be of our kindred, 
and the pleasures which accompany health and temperance, 
and are in a manner the handmaidens and inseparable at- 
tendants of virtue as of a God, — mingle these and not the 
others ; there would be great want of sense in any one who 
desires to see the fair and untroubled stream, and to find in 
the admixture what is the highest good in man and in the uni- 
verse, and to divine what is the true form of good — there 
would be great want of sense in his allowing the pleasures, 
which are always in the company of folly and vice, to mingle 
with mind in the cup : Is not this a very rational and suitable 
reply, which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as well 
as on that of memory and true opinion, to the question which 
has been asked of us ? 

Pro. Most certainly. — Philebus, iii. 204. 
Pleasures, harmless. See Amusements. 
Poetry, imitative. See Imitative. 
Poetry expelled from the State. 

Poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying 

them up ; she lets them rule instead of ruling them as they 
ought to be ruled, with a view to the happiness and virtue of 
mankind. 

I cannot deny it. 

Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of 
the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator 
of Hellas, and that he is profitable for the management and 
administration of human things, and that you should take him 
up and get to know him and regulate your whole life according 
to him, we may love and honor the intentions of these excellent 
people, as far as their lights extend ; and we are ready to ac- 
knowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of 
tragedy writers ; but we must remain firm in our conviction 
that hymns to the Gods and praises of famous men are the 
only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For 
if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, 
either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of man- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 353 

kind, which by common consent has ever been deemed the best, 
but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State. 

That is most true, he said. 

Let this, then, be our excuse for expelling poetry, that the 
argument constrained us ; but let us also make an apology to 
her, lest she impute to us any harshness or want of politeness. 
We will tell her, that there is an ancient quarrel between phi- 
losophy and poetry ; of which there are many proofs, such as 
the saying of " the yelping hound howling at her lord," or of 
one " mighty in the vain talk of fools," and " the mob of sages 
circumventing Zeus," and the " subtle thinkers who are beg- 
gars after all ; " and there are ten thousand other signs of an- 
cient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us as- 
sure our sweet friend, and the sister arts of imitation, that if 
she will only prove her title to existence in a well-ordered 
State we shall be delighted to receive her, knowing that we 
ourselves also are very susceptible of her charms ; but we may 
not on that account betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, 
that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when 
you see her in the garb of Homer ? 

Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed. 

Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from 
exile, on this condition — that she is to make a defense of her- 
self in lyrical or some other metre ? 

Certainly. 

And to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and 
yet not poets I think that we may grant a further privilege ; 
they shall be allowed to speak in prose on her behalf : let 
them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to 
States and to human life, and we will gladly listen, for if this 
can be proved we shall surely be the gainers, that is to say, if 
there is a use in poetry as well as a delight ? 

Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers. 

If her defense fails, then, my dear friend, though much 
against our will, we must give her up, after the manner of 
lovers who abstain when they think that their love is not good 
for them ; for we too are inspired by that love of poetry which 
the education of noble States has implanted in us, and there- 
fore we would have her appear at her best and truest ; but so 
long as she is unable to make good her defense, even though 
our ears may listen, this argument of ours will be like a charm 
to us, and into the childish love which the many have of her 
23 



354 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

we shall take care not to fall again, for we see that poetry, 
being such as she is, is not to be pursued in earnest or re- 
garded seriously as attaining to the truth ; and he who listens 
to her will be on his guard against her seductions, fearing for 
the safety of the city which is within him, and he will attend 
to our words. — The Republic, ii. 438. 
Poets, poor. 

Ctesippus said : I like to see you blushing, Hippothales, 

and hesitating to tell Socrates the name ; when, if he were 
with you but for a very short time, he would be plagued to 
death by hearing of nothing else. Indeed, Socrates, he has 
literally deafened us, and stopped our ears with the praises of 
Lysis ; and if he is a little intoxicated, there is every likeli- 
hood that we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of Ly- 
sis. His performances in prose are bad enough, but nothing 
at all in comparison with his verse ; and when he drenches us 
with his poems and other compositions, that is really too bad ; 
and what is even worse, is his manner of singing them to his 
love ; this he does in a voice which is truly appalling, and we 
cannot help hearing him ; and now he has a question put to 
him by you, and lo ! he is blushing. — Lysis, i. 42. 
Poets our guides. 

Let us proceed no further in this direction (for the road 

seems to be getting troublesome), but take the other in which 
the poets will be our guide ; for they are to us in a manner 
the fathers and authors of wisdom, and they speak of friends 
in no light or trivial manner, but God himself, as they say, 
makes them and draws them to one another ; and this they 
express, if I am not mistaken, in the following words : — 

" God is ever drawing like towards like, and making them acquainted." 

I dare say that you have heard those words. 

Yes, he said ; I have. — Lysis, i. 53. 
Poets, madness of the. See Madness of the prophet, etc. 
Poets like painters. 

Must we not infer that all the poets, beginning with Homer, 

are only imitators ; they copy images of virtue and the like, 
but the truth they never reach ? The poet is like a painter 
who, as has already been observed, will make a likeness of a 
cobbler though he understands nothing of cobbling ; and his 
picture is good enough for those who know no more than he 
does, and judge only by colors and figures. Also the poet lays 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 355 

over his words and expressions certain colors taken from the 
several arts, himself understanding their nature only enough to 
imitate them ; and other people who are as ignorant as he is, 
and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cob- 
bling, or of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and 
harmony and rhythm he speaks very well — such is the sweet 
influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And I 
think that you must know, for you have often seen what a 
poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the 
colors which music puts upon them, and recited in prose ? 

Yes, he said. 

They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but 
only blooming ; and now the bloom of youth has passed away 
from them ? 

Exactly. — The Republic, ii. 431. 
Poets, the talk about the. 

The talk about the poets seems to me like a common- 
place entertainment to which a vulgar company have recourse ; 
who, because they are not able to converse or amuse one an- 
other, while they are drinking, with the sound of their own 
voices and conversation by reason of their stupidity, raise the 
price of flute-girls in the market, hiring for a great sum the 
voice of a flute instead of their own breath, to be the medium 
of intercourse among them : but where the company are real 
gentlemen and men of education, you will see no flute-girls, 
nor dancing-girls, nor harp-girls ; and they have no nonsense or 
games, but are contented with one another's conversation, of 
which their own voices are the medium, and which they carry 
on by turns and in an orderly manner, even though they are 
very liberal in their potations. And a company like this of 
ours, and men such as we profess to be, do not require the 
help of another's voice, or of the poets whom you cannot in- 
terrogate about the meaning of what they are saying ; people 
who cite them declaring, some that the poet has one meaning, 
and others that he has another ; and the point which is in dis- 
pute can never be decided. This sort of entertainment they 
decline, and prefer to talk with one another, and put one an- 
other to the proof in conversation. — Protagoras, i. 147. 
Poets, tragic, promoters of tyranny. 

The tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and others 

who have the perfect form of government, if we object to hav- 
ing them in our State, because they are the eulogists of tyr- 
anny. 



356 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Yes, lie said, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive 
us. 

But still, I said, they go about to other cities and attract 
mobs, and hire voices fair and loud and persuasive, and draw 
the cities over to tyrannies and democracies. 

Very true. 

Moreover, they are paid for this and receive honor — the 
greatest honor from tyrants, and the next greatest from democ- 
racies ; but the higher they ascend our constitution hill, the 
more their reputation fails, and seems unable from shortness of 
breath to proceed farther. 

True. — The Republic, ii. 398. 
Poets destroyed by popular demands. 

Aih. The true legislator will persuade, and, if he cannot 

persuade, will compel the poet to express as he ought, by fair 
and noble words, in his rhythms, the figures, and in his melodies, 
the music of temperate, and brave, and in every way good men. 

Cle. And do you really imagine, Stranger, that this is the 
way in which poets generally compose in States at the present 
day ? As far as I can observe there is nothing of the sort, 
except among us and among the Lacedaemonians, as you now 
tell me ; in other places novelties are always being introduced 
in dancing and in music, generally not under the authority of 
any law, but at the instigation of lawless pleasures ; and these 
pleasures are so far from being the same, as you describe the 
Egyptian to be, or having the same principles, that they are 
never the same. — Laws, iv. 189. 
Political bond. 

When the foundation of politics is in the letter only, and 

in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we won- 
der, Socrates, at the miseries that there are, and always will 
be, in States? Any other art, built on such a foundation, 
would be utterly undermined, — there can be no doubt of that. 
Ought we not rather to wonder at the strength of the political 
bond ? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, 
and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, 
though many of them, like ships foundering at sea, are perish- 
ing and have perished, and will hereafter perish, through the 
incapacity of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of 
ignorance of the highest truths — I mean to say, that they are 
wholly unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sci- 
ences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most per- 
fect knowledge. — Statesman, iii. 588. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 357 

Political parties. See Parties. 

Politicians as philosophers. See Laws, makers of. 

Politicians not Statesmen. 

Str. But who are these elected kings and priests who now 

come into view with a crowd of retainers, as the former class 
disappears and the scene changes ? 

Y. Soc. Whom do you mean ? 

Str. How strangely they look ! 

Y. Soc. Why strangely ? 

Str. A minute ago I thought that they were all sorts of ani- 
mals ; for many of them are like lions and centaurs, and many 
more like satyrs and the weak and versatile sort of animals, — 
Protean shapes ever changing their form and nature ; and now, 
Socrates, I begin to see who they are. 

Y. Soc. Who are they ? You seem to be gazing on some 
strange vision. 

Str. Yes ; every one looks strange when you do not know 
him ; and at first sight, coming suddenly upon him, I did not 
recognize the politician and his troop. 

Y. Soc. Who is he ? 

Str. The chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wiz- 
ards, who must at any cost be separated from the true king or 
Statesman, if we are ever to see daylight in the present inquiry. 

Y. Soc. That certainly is not a hope to be lightly renounced. 
— Statesman, iii. 576. 
Popular liberty. See Democracy. 
Popular opinion. See Opinion, public. 
Popular influence on Poetry. See Poetry, etc. 
Possessing and having. See Having. 
Poverty and wealth equally deteriorating. See Wealth. 
Poverty and riches in Age. 

They think that old age sits lightly upon you, not because 

of your happy disposition, but because you are rich, and wealth 
is well known to be a great comforter. 

That is true, he replied ; they do not believe me : and there 
is something in what they say ; not, however, so much as they 
imagine. I might answer them as Themistocles answered the 
Seriphian who was abusing him and saying that he was famous, 
not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian ; " If 
you had been an Athenian and I a Seriphian, neither of us 
would have been famous," And to those who are not rich and 
are impatient of old age, the same reply may be made ; for 



358 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

neither can a good poor man lightly bear age, nor can a bad rich 
man ever be at peace with himself. — ■ The Republic, ii. 150. 
Praise and esteem distinguished. See Esteem. 
Prayer with every enterprise. 

Soc. I see that I shall receive in my turn a perfect and 

splendid feast of reason. And now, Timaeus, you, I suppose, 
are to follow, first offering up a prayer to the Gods according 
to custom. 

Tim. All men, Socrates, who have any degree of right feel- 
ing, at the beginning of every enterprise, whether small or 
great, always call upon God. And we, too, who are going to 
discourse of the nature of the universe, how created or how ex- 
isting without creation, if we be not altogether out of our wits, 
must invoke and pray the Gods and goddesses that we may say 
all things in a manner pleasing to them and likewise consistent 
with ourselves. Let this, then, be our invocation of the Gods, 
to which I add an exhortation of myself that I may set forth 
this high argument in the manner which will be most intelligi- 
ble to you, and will most accord with my own intent. — Tim- 
aeus, ii. 523. 
Preamble to law, distinguished from the matter. 

All this time, from early dawn until noon, we have been 

talking about laws in this charming retreat : now we are going 
to promulgate our laws, and what has preceded was only the 
prelude of them. Why do I mention this ? For this reason : 
Because all discourses and vocal exercises have preludes and 
overtures, which are a sort of artistic beginnings, intended to 
help the strain which is to be performed ; lyric measures and 
every other sort of music have preludes framed with wonderful 
care. But of the truer and higher strain of law and politics, 
no one has ever yet uttered any prelude, or composed or pub- 
lished any, as though there was no such thing in nature. 
Whereas our present discussion seems to me to imply that there 
is — these double laws, of which we were speaking, are not 
exactly double, but they are in two parts, the law and the pre- 
lude of the law. The arbitrary command, which was compared 
to the commands of the physicians, whom we described as of 
the meaner sort, was the law pure and simple ; and that which 
preceded, and was described by our friend as hortatory only, 
was, in fact, an exhortation, and is analogous to the preamble 
of a discourse. For I imagine that all this language of concil- 
iation, which the legislator has been uttering in the preface of 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 359 

the law, was intended to create good-will in the person whom 
he addressed, in order that, by reason of this good- will, he 
might more intelligently receive his command, that is to say, 
the law. And therefore, in my way of speaking, this is more 
rightly described as the preamble than as the matter of the 
law. — Laws, iv. 250. 
Presentiment of death in Socrates. 

Soc. Do not repeat the old story — that he who likes will 

kill me and get my money ; for then I shall have to repeat the 
old answer that he will be a bad man and will kill the good, 
and that the money will be of use to him ; but that he will 
wrongly use that which he wrongly took, and if wrongly, basely, 
and if basely, hurtfully. 

CaL How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never 
come to harm ! you seem to think that you are living in an- 
other country, and can never be brought into a court of jus- 
tice, as you very likely may be brought by some miserable and 
mean person. 

Soc. Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not 
know that in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. 
And if I am brought to trial and incur the dangers of which 
you speak, he will be a villain who brings me to trial — of that 
I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent. 
Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you 
why I anticipate this? 

CaL By all means. 

Soc. I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian 
living who practices the true art of politics ; I am the only poli- 
tician of my time. Now, seeing that when I speak I speak not 
with any view of pleasing, and that I look to what is best and 
not to what is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts 
and graces which you recommend, 1 shall have nothing to say 

in the justice court For I shall not be able to rehearse 

to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and 
which, although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers 
or the enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be benefits and 
advantages. And if any one says that I corrupt young men, 
and perplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old men, and 
use bitter words towards them, whether in private or public, it 
is useless for me to reply, as I truly might : " All this I do for 
the sake of justice, and with a view to your interest, my judges, 
and of that only." And therefore there is no saying what may 
happen to me. 



360 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Cat. And do you think, Socrates, that a man, who is thus 
defenseless, is in a good position ? 

Soc. Yes, Callicles, if he have that defense which you have 
often admitted that he should have ; if he be his own defense, 
and have never said or done anything wrong, either in respect 
of Gods or men ; for that has often been acknowledged by us 
to be the best sort of defense. And if any one could convict 
me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I 
should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, 
or before a few, or by myself alone ; and if I died for want of 
ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if I died 
because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure 
that you would not find me repining at death. For no man 
but an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is 
afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below, having 
one's soul full of injustice, is the last and worst of all evils. — 
Gorgias, iii. 112. 
Pride, personal. 

Soc. I dare say that you may be surprised to find, O son 

of Cleinias, that I, who am your first lover, not having spoken 
to you for many years, when the rest of the world were weary- 
ing you with their attentions, am the last of your lovers who 
still speaks to you. The reason was, that I was hindered from 
speaking to you by a power — not human but divine, the nature 
of which I will some day explain to you ; that impediment has 
been now removed, and I present myself before you, hoping 
that the hindrance will not again occur. Meanwhile, I have 
observed that your pride has been too much -for the pride of 
your admirers ; they were very numerous, but they have all 
run away, overpowered by your superior force of character ; 
not one of them remains. And I want you to understand the 
reason why you have overpowered them. You imagine that 
you have no need of any other man at all, as you have great 
possessions and abundance of all things, beginning with the 
body, and ending with the soul. In the first place, you think 
that you are the fairest and tallest of the citizens, and this every 
one who has eyes sees to be true ; in the second place, that 
you are among the noblest of them, highly connected both on the 
father's and the mother's side, and sprung from one of the most 
distinguished families in your own State, which is the greatest in 
Hellas, and having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort, 
who can assist you when in need ; and there is one potent rela- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 861 

tive, who is more to you than all the rest, Pericles, the son of 
Xanthippus, whom your father left guardian of you and your 
brother, and who cannot only do as he pleases in this city, but 
in all Hellas, and among many and mighty barbarous nations. 
Moreover, you are rich ; but I must say that you value your- 
self least of all upon your possessions. And all these things 
have lifted you up, and you have overcome your lovers, and 
they have acknowledged that you were too much for them. 
Have you not remarked their absence ? And now I know that 
you wonder why I have not gone away like the rest of them, 
and what can be my motive in remaining. — Alcibiades L iv. 
515. 

Priest, the, a King. See King, etc. 

Primeval race, without procreation. See Spontaneous life. 
Primitive Society. See Patriarchal State. 
Prime of life, the age of be^ettin^. 

What is the prime of life ? May not that be defined as 

a period of about twenty years in a woman's life, and thirty in 
a man's. 

Which years do you mean to include ? 

A woman, I said, may begin to bear children to the State at 
twenty years of age, and continue to bear until forty ; a man 
may begin at five-and -twenty, when he has passed the point at 
which the pulse of life beats quickest, and continue to beget 
children until he be fifty-five. 

Certainly, he said, both in men and women that is the prime 
of physical as well as of intellectual vigor. 

Any one above or below the prescribed ages who takes part 
in the public hymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy 
and unrighteous thing ; the child of which he is the father, if 
it steals into life, will have been conceived under other auspices 
than those of sacrifice and prayers, which at each hymeneal 
priestesses and priests and the whole city will offer, that the 
new generation may be better and more useful than their good 
and useful parents : whereas his child will be the offspring of 
darkness and strange lust. — The Republic, ii. 286. 
Principle and reason to be our guides. 

Soc. Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one ; 

but if wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the danger ; and 
therefore we ought to consider whether I shall, or shall not 
do as you say. For I am and always have been one of those 
natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason 



362 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best ; 
and now that this fortune has come upon me, I cannot put 
away the conclusion at which I had arrived : the principles 
which I have hitherto honored and revered I still honor, and 
unless we can at once find other and better principles, I am 
certain not to agree with you ; no, not even if the power of the 
multitude could inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, 
deaths, frightening us like children with hobgoblin terrors. — 
Grito, i. 350. 

Procreation, primeval race without. See Spontaneous life. 
Production, three kinds of. 
St?\ In the first place, there are two kinds of creation. 

Theaet. What are they ? 

Str. One of them is human and the other divine. 

Theaet I do not follow. 

Str. Every power, as you may remember our saying origi- 
nally, which is the cause of things afterwards existing which 
did not exist before, was defined by us as creative. 

Theaet. I remember. 

Str. Looking, now, at the world and all the animals and 
plants which grow upon the earth from seeds and roots, and at 
inanimate substances which form within the earth, fusile or 
non-fusile, shall we say that they come into existence — not 
having existed previously — by the creation of God, or shall 
we agree with vulgar opinion about them ? 

Theaet. What is that ? 

Str. The opinion that nature brings them into being from 
some spontaneous and unintelligent cause. Shall we say this, 
or that they come from God, and are created by divine reason 
and knowledge ? 

Theaet. I dare say that, owing to my youth, I may often 
waver in my view, but when I look at you and see that you 
incline to refer them to God, at present I defer to your 
authority. 

Str. Nobly said, Theaetetus, and if I thought that you were 
one of those who would hereafter change your mind, I would 
have gently argued with you, and forced you to assent ; but as I 
perceive that you will come of yourself and without any argu- 
ment of man to that belief which, as you say, attracts you, I will 
leave time to do the rest. Let me suppose, then, that things 
which are made by nature are the work of divine art, and that 
things which are made by man out of these are works of human 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 363 

art. And so there are two kinds of making and production, 
the one human and the other divine. — Sophist, iii. 506. 
Progression of human life. 

■ What is implied in the word " recollection," but the de- 
parture of knowledge, which is ever being forgotten and is re- 
newed and preserved by recollection and appears to be the same 
although in reality new, according to that law of succession 
by which all mortal things are preserved, not absolutely the 
same but by substitution, the old worn-out mortality leaving 
another new and similar existence behind — unlike the divine 
which is always the same and not another? And in this way, 
Socrates, the mortal body, or mortal anything, partakes of im- 
mortality ; but the immortal in another way. Marvel not then 
at the love which all men have of their offspring ; for that uni- 
versal love and interest is for the sake of immortality. — The 
Symposium, i. 500. 

Property in Government. See Government. 
Prophet, madness of the. See Madness of the, etc. 
Protector become a tyrant. 

The people have always some champion whom they nurse 

into greatness. 

Yes, that is their way. 

This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs ; 
when he first appears above ground he is a protector. 

Yes, that is quite clear. 

How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant ? 

Clearly when he does what the man is said to do in the tale 
of the Arcadian temple of Lycaean Zeus. 

What tale ? 

The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single 
human victim minced up with the entrails of other victims is 
destined to become a wolf. Did you never hear that ? 

Oh, yes. 

And the protector of the people is like him ; having a mob 
entirely at his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the 
blood of kinsmen ; by the favorite method of false accusation 
he brings them into court and murders them, making the life 
of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips tasting 
the blood of his fellow citizens ; some of whom he kills and 
others he banishes, at the same time proclaiming abolition 
of debts and partition of lands: and after this, what can be 
his destiny but either to perish at the hands of his enemies, or 
from being a man to become a wolf — that is a tyrant ? 



364 PLATO'S BEST TB0tTG3TS. 

Inevitably. 

This, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the 
rich. 

The same. 

And then he is driven out, and comes back, in spite of his 
enemies, a tyrant full grown. 

That is clear. 

And if they are unable to drive him out, or get him con- 
demned to death by public opinion, they form the design of 
putting him out of the way secretly. 

Yes, he said, their usual way. 

Then comes the famous request of a body-guard, which is 
made by all those who have got thus far in their career, " Let 
not the people's friend," as they say, " be lost to them." 

Exactly. 

The people readily assent ; all their fears are for him — 
they have no fear for themselves. 

Very true. 

And when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of 
being an enemy of the people sees this, then, my friend, as the 
oracle said to Croesus, — 

" By pebbly Hernias' shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed to be a 
coward." 

And quite right too, said he, for, if he were, he would* never 
be ashamed again. 

But if he is caught he dies. 

Of course. 

And he, the protector of whom we spoke, is not fallen in his 
might, but himself the overthrower of many, is to be seen 
standing up in the chariot of State with the reins in his hand, 
no longer protector, but tyrant absolute. — The Republic, ii. 
394. 
Prudence and temperance. 

Cle. I suppose, Megillus, that this companion virtue of 

which the Stranger speaks must be temperance ? 

Ath. Yes, Cleinias, temperance in the vulgar sense, not that 
which in the exaggerated language of some philosophers is 
demonstrated to be prudence, but that which is the natural gift 
of children and animals, and makes some of them live conti- 
nently and others incontinently, but when isolated was, as we 
said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods. I 
think that you must understand my meaning ? 

Cle. Certainly. — Laws, iv. 237. 



PLATO 9 S BEST THOUGHTS, 365 

Public opinion compared to a great beast. See Opinion, public, 

etc. 
Public -works, construction of. 

— r- Soc. Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were engaged in 
the administration of political affairs, and were advising one 
another about some public work, such as walls, docks, or tem- 
ples of the largest size, ought we not to examine ourselves, 
first, as to whether we know or do not know the art of building, 
and who taught us ? — would not that be necessary, Callicles ? 

Cat. True. 

Soc. In the second place, we should have to consider 
whether we had ever constructed any private house, either of 
our own or for our friends, and whether this building was a 
success or not ; and if upon consideration we found that we 
had had good and eminent masters, and had been successful in 
building, not only with their assistance, but without them, by 
our own unaided skill, — in that case prudence would not dis- 
suade us from proceeding to the construction of public works. 
But if we had no master to show, and only a number of worth- 
less buildings or none at all, then, surely, it would be ridicu- 
lous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another to 
undertake them. Is not this true ? 

Gal. Certainly. — Gorgias, iii. 105. 
Public men, criminality of. See Criminality, etc. 
Pugnacity, a motive to authorship. See Authorship. 
Punishment, effect of, on evil-doers. 

If you will think, Socrates, of the effect which punish- 
ment has on evil-doers, you will see at once that in the opinion 
of mankind virtue may be acquired; no one punishes the evil- 
doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done 
wrong, — only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that 
way. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does 
not retaliate for a past wrong, which cannot be undone ; he 
has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who 
is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred 
from doing wrong again. He clearly punishes for the sake of 
prevention, thereby implying that virtue is capable of being 
taught. This is the notion of all who retaliate upon others 
either privately or publicly. And the Athenians, too, your 
own citizens, like other men, retaliate on all whom they regard 
as evil-doers ; which argues them to be of the number of those 
who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. — Pro - 
tagoras, i 124. 



366 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Punishment, office of twofold. See Injustice. 

Now the proper office of punishment is twofold ; he who 

is rightly punished ought either to become better and profit by- 
it, or he ought to be made an example to his fellows, that they 
may see what he suffers, and fear and become better. Those 
who are improved, when they are punished by Gods and men, 
are those whose sins are curable; and they are improved, as 
in this world so also in another, by pain and suffering ; for 
there is no other way in which they can be delivered from 
their evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst 
crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made 
examples ; for, as they are incurable, the time has passed at 
which they can receive any benefit themselves. But others 
get good when they behold them forever enduring the most 
terrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of 
their sins ; there they are, hanging up as examples, in the 
prison-house of the world below, a spectacle and a warning to 
all unrighteous men who come thither. — Goryias, iii. 116. 
Punishment of souls, the. See Soul after death. 
Pure and impure soul. See Impure. 
Purifications. 

Str. As to the question which you were asking about the 

name which was to comprehend all these arts of purification, 
whether of animate or inanimate substances, the spirit of dia- 
lectic is in no wise particular about fine words, if she may be 
only allowed to have a general name for all other purifications, 
binding them up together and separating them off from the 
purification of the soul or intellect. For this is the purifica- 
tion at which she wants to arrive, and this we should under- 
stand to be her aim. 

Theaet. Yes, I understand ; and I agree that there are two 
sorts of purification, and that one of them is concerned with 
the soul, and that there is another which is concerned with the 
body. — Sophist, iii. 461. 
Purification by refutation. 

Str. There is the time-honored mode which our fathers 

commonly practiced towards their sons, and which is still adopted 
by many — either of roughly reproving their errors, or of 
gently advising them, which may be called by the general term 
of admonition. 

Theaet. True. 

Str. But whereas some appear to have arrived at the con- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 367 

elusion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who 
thinks himself wise is willing to learn any of those things, in 
which he is conscious of his own cleverness, and that the ad- 
monitory sort of instruction gives much trouble and does little 
good — 

Theaet. There they are quite right. 

Str. Accordingly, they set to work to eradicate the spirit of 
conceit in another way. 

Theaet. In what way. 

Str. They cross-examine a man as to what he is saying, 
when he thinks that he is saying something and is saying noth- 
ing ; he is easily convicted of inconsistency in his opinions ; 
these they collect, and placing them side by side, show that 
they contradict one another about the same things, in rela- 
tion to the same things, and in the same respect. He seeing 
this is angry with himself, and grows gentle towards others, 
and thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh 
notions, in a way which is most entertaining to hear, and pro- 
duces the most lasting good effect on the person who is the 
subject of the operation. For as the physician considers that 
the body will receive no benefit from taking food until the 
internal obstacles have been removed, so the instructor of the 
soul is conscious that his patient will receive no benefit from 
the applications of knowledge until he is refuted, and from ref- 
utation learns modesty ; he must be purged of his prejudices, 
and think that he knows only what he knows, and no more. 

Theaet. That is certainly the best and most temperate state. 

Str. For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must admit that 
refutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications, and he 
who has not been refuted, though he be the great King himself, 
is in the highest degree impure ; he is uninstructed and de- 
formed in those things in which he who would be truly blessed 
ought to be pure and fair. 

Theaet. Yery true. — Sophist, iii. 464. 
Purification, legislative. See Legislative, etc. 
Purification, Colonization a means of. 

Another piece of good fortune must not be forgotten, 

which, as we were saying, the Heraclid colony had, and which 
is also ours, — that we have escaped division of land and the 
abolition of debts ; for these are always a source of dangerous 
contention, and a city which is driven to legislation upon such 
matters can neither allow the old ways to continue, nor yet 



368 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

venture to alter them. We must have recourse to prayers, as 
men say, and hope that a slight change may be cautiously ef- 
fected in a length of time. And such a change can be accom- 
plished by those who have abundance of land, and having also 
many debtors, are willing, in a kindly spirit, to share with those 
who are in want, sometimes remitting and sometimes giving, 
holding fast in a path of moderation, and deeming poverty to 
be the increase of a man's desires and not the diminution of his 
property. For this is the chiefest foundation of a State, and 
upon this lasting basis may be erected afterwards whatever 
political order is suitable under the circumstances; but if the 
change be based upon an unsound principle, the political super- 
structure which is added will hardly succeed. That is a 
danger, which, as I am saying, is escaped by us, and yet we had 
better say how we, if we had not escaped, might have escaped ; 
and we may venture now to assert that no other way of escape, 
whether narrow or broad, can be devised but a just content- 
ment : upon this rock our city shall be built : for there ought to 
be no disputes among citizens about property. If there are 
quarrels of long standing among them, no legislator of any 
degree of sense will proceed a step in the arrangement of the 
State until they are settled. But that they to whom God has 
given, as he has to us, to be the founders of a new State free 
from enmity — that they should create themselves enmities, by 
reason of their mode of dividing lands and houses, would be 
superhuman folly and wickedness. — Laws, iv. 261. 

Quarreling unholy. 

Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the 

habit of quarreling as dishonorable, should anything be said of 
the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the Gods 
against one another, which are quite untrue. Far be it from 
us to tell them of the battles of the giants, and embroider them 
on garments ; or of all the innumerable other quarrels of Gods 
and heroes with their friends and relations. If they would 
only believe us we would tell them that quarreling is unholy, 
and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel be- 
tween citizens ; this is what old men and old women should 
begin by telling children, and the same when they grow up. — - 
The Republic, ii. 201. 
Quietness, temperance is. 
™ — In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 369 

have temperance abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, 
in your opinion, is Temperance ? 

At first he hesitated, and was very unwilling to answer : 
then he said that he thought temperance was doing things 
orderly and quietly, such things for example as walking in the 
streets, and talking, or anything else of that nature. In a 
word, he said, I should answer that, in my opinion, temperance 
is quietness. 

Are you right, Charmides ? I said. No doubt some would 
affirm that the quiet are the temperate ; but let us see whether 
there is any meaning in this ; and first tell me whether you 
would not acknowledge temperance to be of the class of the 
honorable and good ? 

Yes. — Charmides, i. 13. 

Race, community of. See Colonization, 
Races, metallic symbols of. See Metallic. 
Real, shadows seeming. See Shadows, etc. 
Real being. See Being: 

Reason and principle, our guides. See Principle. 
Reason, incorrupt passion the rod of. See Passion. 
Reason, steps of. See Hypotheses. 

Reason in the sphere of sense. See Intellect and Knowledge. 
Reason the rule of life. See Life, etc. 
Recollection, learning a process of. See Learning. 
Reconciling judge. 

Ath. Now, which would be the better judge, one who de- 
stroyed the bad, and required the good to govern themselves ; 
or one who, while allowing the good to govern, let the bad 
live, and made them voluntarily submit ? Or, lastly, there 
might be a third excellent judge, who, finding the family dis- 
tracted, not only did not destroy any one, but reconciled them 
to one another forever after, and gave them laws which they 
mutually observed, and was able to keep them friends. 

Cle. The last would be by far the best sort of judge and 
legislator. — Laws, iv. 158. 
Reflecting and unchanging, the soul. 

Were we not saying long ago that the soul when using 

the body as an instrument of perception, that is to say, when 
using the sense oi sight or hearing or some other sense (for 
the meaning of perceiving through the body is perceiving 
through the senses), — were we not saying that the soul too is 
24 



370 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and 
wanders and is confused ; the world spins round her, and she is 
like a drunkard when possessed by change ? 

Very true. 

But when returning into herself she reflects ; then she passes 
into the other world, the abode of purity, and eternity, and im- 
mortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and 
with them she ever lives, when she is by herself and is not let 
or hindered ; then she ceases from her erring ways, and being 
in communion with the unchanging is unchanging. And this 
state of the soul is called wisdom ? 

That is well and truly said, Socrates, he replied. 

And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, 
as far as may be inferred from this argument, as well as from 
the preceding one ? 

I think, Socrates, that, in the opinion of every one who fol- 
lows the argument, the soul will be infinitely more like the un- 
changeable, — even the most stupid person will not deny that. 

And the body is more like the changing ? 

Yes. — Phaedo, i. 407. 
Reflection, not sensation, the source of knowledge. See Sensation. 
Refutation a common good. 

You are only doing what you denied that you were doing 

just now, trying to refute me, instead of pursuing the argu- 
ment. 

And what if I am ? How can you think that I have any 
other motive in refuting you but what I should have in exam- 
ining into myself ? which motive would be just a fear of my 
unconsciously fancying that I knew something of which I was 
ignorant. And at this moment I pursue the argument chiefly 
for my own sake, and perhaps in some degree also for the sake 
of my other friends. For is not the discovery of things as 
they truly are a common good to all mankind ? 

Yes, certainly, Socrates, he said. 

Then, I said, be cheerful, sweet sir, and give your opinion in 
answer to the question which I asked, without minding whether 
Critias or Socrates is the person refuted ; attend only to the 
argument, and see what will come of the refutation. 

I think that you are right, he replied ; and I will do as you 
say. — Charmides, i. 22. 
Refutation, a purification. See Purification. 
Remembrance and burial of the dead. See Burial, etc. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 371 

Respiration and inspiration. 

Let us further consider the phenomena of respiration, and 

inquire what are the real causes of it. They are as follows : — 
Seeing that there is no such thing as a vacuum into which any 
of those things which are moved can enter, and the breath is 
carried from us into the external air, the next point is, as will 
be clear to every one, that it does not go into a vacant space, 
but pushes its neighbor out of its place, and that which is 
thrust out again thrusts out its neighbor ; and in this way 
everything of necessity at last comes round to that place from 
whence the breath came forth, and enters in there, and follows 
with the breath, and fills up the place ; and this goes on like 
the circular motion of a wheel, because there can be no such 
thing as a vacuum. Wherefore also the breast and the lungs, 
which emit the breath, are again filled up by the air which sur- 
rounds the body and which enters in through the pores of the 
flesh and comes round in a circle ; and, again, the air which is 
sent away and passes out through the body forces the breath 
within to find a way round through the passage of the mouth 
and the nostrils. Now, the origin of this may be supposed to 
be as follows : — Every animal has his inward parts about the 
blood and the veins as warm as possible ; . he has within him a 
fountain of fire, which we compare to the texture of a net of 
fire extended through the centre of the body, while the outer 
parts are composed of air. Now, we must admit that heat 
naturally' precedes outward to its own place and to its kindred 
element; and as there are two exits for the heat, the one 
through the body outwards, and the other through the mouth 
and nostrils, when it moves towards the one, it drives round 
the other air, and that which is driven round falls into the fire 
and is warmed, and that which goes forth is cooled. But when 
the condition of the heat changes, and the particles at the other 
exit grow warmer, the hotter air inclining in that direction and 
carried towards its native element, fire, pushes round the other ; 
and thus, by action and reaction, there being this circular agita- 
tion and alternation produced by the two, — by this double 
cause, I say, inspiration and expiration are produced. — Tim- 
aeusj ii. 570. 
Rest and motion of things. 

Some one says to me, " Stranger, are all things in rest 

and nothing in motion, or is the exact opposite of this true, or 
are some things in motion and others at rest ? " To this I 



372 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

shall reply that some are in motion and others at rest. " And 
do not things which move, move in place, and are not the 
things which are at rest, at rest m a place ? " Certainly. 
" And some move or rest in one place and some in more places 
than one ? " You mean to say, we shall rejoin, that those 
things which rest at the centre move in the same place, as 
when the circumference goes round and the circle is said to be 
at rest ? " Yes." And we observe that, in the revolution, the 
motion which carries round the larger and the lesser circle at 
the same time is proportionally distributed to greater and 
smaller, and is greater and smaller in a certain proportion. 
Here is a wonder which might be thought an impossibility, that 
the same motion should impart swiftness and slowness in due 
proportion to larger and lesser circles. Very true. "And 
when you speak of bodies moving in many places, you seem to 
me to mean those which move from one place to another, and 
sometimes have one centre of motion and sometimes several in 
the course of their revolutions ; and sometimes impinging upon 
each other they come against bodies which are at rest, and are 
divided by them, or meeting other bodies which are coming 
violently from an opposite direction unite with them and inter- 
penetrate them." — Laws, iv. 405. 
Retribution for the erring. See Punishment, etc. 
Retribution for injustice. See Injustice, etc. 
Reverence, youthful, for the aged. See Mind, etc., reverenced. 
Rewards, glorious. 

, The Olympic victor I said, is deemed happy in receiving 

a part only of the happiness which is the lot of our citizens, 
who have won a more glorious victory and have a more com- 
plete maintenance at the public cost. For the victory which 
they have won is the salvation of the whole State ; and the 
crown with which they and their children are crowned is the 
fullness of all that life needs ; they receive rewards from the 
hands of their country while living, and after death have an 
honorable burial. 

Yes, he said, they are are indeed glorious rewards. — The 
Republic, ii. 292. 
Rhadamanthus, the decision of. 

The so-called decision of Rhadamanthus is worthy of all 

admiration. He knew that the men of his own time believed 
and had no doubt that there were Gods, which was a reason- 
able belief in those days, because most men were the sons of 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 373 

Gods, and according to tradition he was one himself. He ap- 
pears to have thought that he ought to commit judgment to no 
man, but to the Gods only, and in this way suits were simply 
and speedily decided by him. For he made the two parties at 
issue take an oath respecting the points in dispute, and so got 
rid of the matter speedily and safely. But now that a certain 
portion of mankind do not believe at all in the existence of 
the Gods, and others imagine that they have no care of us, and 
the opinion of most men and of the worst men is that in re- 
turn for a small sacrifice and flattering words they will aid 
them in abstracting a great deal of money, and deliver them 
from divers and great penalties, the way of Rhadamanthus is 
no longer suited to the needs of justice, for as the opinions of 
men about the Gods are changed, the laws should also be 
changed. — Laws, iv. 458. 
Rhapsode, the profession of a. See Homer. 
Rhetoric and dialecticians. 

Soc. I am a great lover of these processes of division and 

generalization ; they help me to speak and think. And if I 
find any man who is able to see a One and Many in nature, 
him I follow, and walk in his steps as if he were a God. And 
those who have this art, I have hitherto been in the habit of 
calling dialecticians ; but God knows whether the name is right 
or not. And I should like to know what name you would give 
to your or Lysias' disciples, and whether this may not be that 
famous art of rhetoric which Thrasymachus and others practice? 
Skillful speakers they are, and impart their skill to any who 
will consent to worship them as kings and to bring them gifts. 
Phaedr. Yes, they are royal men ; but their art is not the 
same with the art of those whom you call, and rightly, in my 
opinion, dialecticians. — Phaedrus, i. 571. 

Rhetoric, flattery in. See Flattery. 
Rhetoric, persuasion the crown of. See Persuasion. 
Rhetoric, the art of discourse. 

Soc, Why if you call rhetoric the art which treats of dis- 
course, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call 
them arts of rhetoric ? 

Gov. Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has 
only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand ; 
but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which oper- 
ates and is perfected through the medium of discourse. And 
therefore I am justified, as I maintain, in saying that rhetoric 
treats of discourse. 



374 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Soc. I do not know whether I entirely understand you, but 
I dare say that I shall soon find out : please to answer me a 
question : you would allow that there are arts ? 

Gov. Yes. 

Soc. And in some of the arts a great deal is done and noth- 
ing or very little said ; in painting, or statuary, or many other 
arts, the work may proceed in silence ; and these are the arts 
with which, as I suppose you would say, rhetoric has no con- 
cern ? 

Gov. You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates. 

Soc. And there are other arts which work wholly by words, 
and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the 
arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing 
draughts ; in some of which words are nearly coextensive with 
things : but the greater number of them are dependent wholly 
on words for their efficacy and power : and I take your meaning 
to be that rhetoric is an art of this better sort ? 

Gov. Exactly. — Gorgias, iii. 35. 
Rhetoric an experience, process, or habit. 

Pol. I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the 

same question which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to 
answer : What is rhetoric ? 

Soc. Do you mean what sort of an art ? 

Pol. Yes. 

Soc. Not an art at all, in my opinion, if I am to tell you 
the truth, Polus. 

Pol. Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric ? 

Soc. A thing of which, I was lately reading in a book of 
of yours, you say that you have made an art. 

Pol. What thing ? 

Soc. I should say a. sort of experience. 

Pol. Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience ? 

Soc. That is my view, if that is yours. 

Pol. An experience in what ? 

Soc. An experience in producing a sort of delight and grati- 
fication. 

Pol. And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a 
fine thing ? 

Soc. What are you saying, Polus ? Why do you ask me 
whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet 
told you what rhetoric is ? 

Pol. Why, did you not tell me that rhetoric was a sort of 
experience ? 






PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 375 



Soc. As you are so fond of gratifying others, will you 
gratify me in a small particular ? 

Pol. I will. 

Soc. Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery ? 

Pol. What sort of an art is cookery ? 

Soc. Not an art at all, Polus. 

Pol. What then? 

Soc. I should say an experience. 

Pol. In what ? I wish that you would tell me. 

Soc An experience in producing a sort of delight and grat- 
ification, Polus. 

Pol. Then are cookery and rhetoric the same ? 

Soc. No, they are only different parts of the same pro- 
fession. 

Pol. And what is that ? 
• Soc. I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous ; I 
should not like Gorgias to imagine that I am ridiculing his 
profession, and therefore I hesitate to answer. For whether 
or no this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practices I 
really do not know : from what he was just now saying, noth- 
ing appeared of what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric 
which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole. — Gov- 
gias, iii. 47. 

Rhetorician, the skillful. 

Soc. Until a man knows the truth of the several partic- 
ulars of which he is writing or speaking, and is able to define 
them as they are, and having defined them again to divide 
them until they can be no longer divided, and until in like 
manner he is able to discern the nature of the soul and dis- 
cover the different modes of discourse which are adapted to 
different natures, and to arrange and dispose them in such a 
way that the simple form of speech may be addressed to the 
simpler nature, and the complex and composite to the complex 
nature — until he has accomplished all this, he will be unable 
to handle arguments according to rules of art, as far as their 
nature allows them to be subjected to art, either for the pur- 
pose of teaching or persuading ; that is the view which is im- 
plied in the whole preceding argument. 

Phaedr. Yes, that was our view, certainly. 

Soc. Secondly, as to the justice of the censure which was 
passed on speaking or writing discourses — did not our previ- 
ous argument show — ? 



376 PLATO* S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Phaedr. Show what ? 

Soc. That whether Lysias or any other writer that ever 
was or will be, whether private man or statesman, tries his 
hand at authorship in making laws, and fancies that there is a 
great certainty and clearness in his performance, the fact of 
his writing as he does is only a disgrace to him, whatever men 
may say. For entire ignorance about the nature of justice 
and injustice, and good and evil, and the inability to distin- 
guish the dream from the reality, cannot in truth be otherwise 
than disgraceful to him, even though he have the applause of 
the whole world. 

Phaedr. Certainly. 

Soc. But he who thinks that in the written word there is 
necessarily much which is not serious, and that neither poetry 
nor prose, spoken or written, are of any great value — if, like 
the compositions of the rhapsodes, they are only recited in 
order to be believed, and not with any view to criticism or in- 
struction ; and who thinks that even the best of them are but 
a reminiscence of what we know, and that only in principles of 
justice and goodness and nobility taught and communicated 
orally and written in the soul, which is the true way of writ- 
ing, is there clearness and perfection and seriousness ; and 
that such principles are like legitimate offspring ; being, in the 
first place, that which the man finds in his own bosom ; sec- 
ondly, the brethren and descendants and relations of his idea 
which have been duly implanted in the souls of others ; and 
who cares for them and no others — this is the right sort of 
man ; and you and I, Phaedrus, would pray that we may become 
like him. 

Phaedr. That is most assuredly my desire and prayer. 

Soc. And now the play is played out ; and of rhetoric 
enough. — Phaedrus, i. 582. 
Rhetorician to make good use of his art. 

Gor. I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I 

will endeavor to reveal to you. the whole nature of rhetoric. 
You must have heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of 
the Athenians and the plan of the harbor were devised in ac- 
cordance with the counsels, partly of Themistocles and partly 
of Pericles and not at the suggestion of the builders. 

Soc. Certainly, Gorgias, that is the tradition about Themis- 
tocles, and I myself heard the speech of Pericles when he ad- 
vised us about the middle wall. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 377 

Gor. And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision 
has to be given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advis- 
ers ; they are the men who win their point. 

Soc. I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked 
what is the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, 
when I look at the matter in this way, to be a marvel of great- 
ness. 

Gor. A marvel indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how 
rhetoric comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior 
arts. Let me offer you a striking example of this. On sev- 
eral occasions I have been with my brother Herodicus or some 
other physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow 
the physician to give him medicine, or apply the knife or hot 
iron to him ; and I have persuaded him to do for me what he 
would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. 
And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to 
any city, and there had to argue in the Ecclesia or any other 
assembly as to which should be elected, the physician would 
have no chance ; but he who could speak would be chosen if 
he wished, and in a contest with a man of any other profession 
the rhetorician more than any one would have the power 
of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively 
to the multitude that any of them, and on any subject. Such 
is the power and quality of rhetoric, Socrates. And yet rhet- 
oric ought to be used like any other competitive art, not against 
everybody, — the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength 
any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of 
fence ; because he has powers which are more than a match 
either for enemy or friend, he ought not therefore to strike, 
stab, or slay his friends. And suppose a man who has been 
trained in the palaestra and is a skillful boxer, and in the full- 
ness of his strength he goes and strikes his father or mother 
or one of his familiars or friends, that is no reason why the 
trainer or master of fence should be held in detestation or 
banished, — surely not. For they taught this art for a good 
purpose, as an art to be used against enemies and evil-doers, in 
self-defense, not in aggression, and others have perverted their 
instructions, making a bad use of their strength and skill. 
But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is the art 
in fault or bad in itself ; I should rather say that those wha 
make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same holds 
good of rhetoric ; for the rhetorician can speak against all men 



378 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

and on any subject, and in general he can persuade the multi- 
tude of anything better than any other man, but he ought not 
on that account to defraud the physician or any other artist of 
his reputation merely because he has the power ; he ought to 
use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. 
And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use 
of his strength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on 
that account to be held in detestation or banished. For he 
was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his instruc- 
tions, and he abuses them. And therefore he is the person 
who ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, 
and not his instructor. — Gorgias, iii. 41. 
Rhetoricians, two sorts of. 

Soc. Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at 

what is best in their speeches, and to desire only the greatest 
improvement of the citizens, or are they too bent upon giving 
them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their 
own interest, playing with the people as with children, and try- 
ing to amuse them, but never considering whether they are 
better or worse for this ? 

Cat. I must distinguish. There are some who have a real 
care of the public in what they say, while others are such as 
you describe. 

Soc. I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of 
two sorts ; one which is mere flattery and disgraceful declama- 
tion ; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and 
improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say 
what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience ; 
but have you ever known such a rhetoric ; or if you have, and 
can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, will you tell 
me who he is ? 

Cal. But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any 
such among the orators who are at present living. 

Soc. Well, then, can you mention any one of a former gen- 
eration, who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who 
found them worse and made them better, from the day that he 
began to make speeches ? for, indeed, I do not know of such a 
man. — Gorgias, iii. 94. 
Rhetoricians, none noble. See Noble , etc. 
Rhythm, the order of motion. 

Ath. I was speaking at the commencement of our dis- 
course, as you will remember, of the fiery nature of young 



PLATO 9 S BEST THOUGHTS. 379 

creatures ; I said that they were unable to keep quiet either in 
limb or voice, and that they called out and jumped about in a 
disorderly manner ; and that no other animal attained to any per- 
ception of order, but man only. Now the order of motion is 
called rhythm, and the order of the voice, in which high and 
low are duly mingled, is called harmony ; and both together are 
termed choric song. And I said that the Gods had pity on us, 
and gave us Apollo and the Muses to be our playfellows and 
leaders in the dance ; and Dionysus, as I dare say that you will 
remember, was the third. 

Ole. I quite remember. — Laws, iv. 194. 
Rich man, bad company. 

May I ask, Cephalus, whether you inherited or acquired 

the greater part of your wealth ? 

Acquired ! Socrates ; do you want to know how much I ac- 
quired? In the art of making money I have been midway be- 
tween my father and grandfather ; for my grandfather, whose 
name like my own was Cephalus, doubled and trebled the value 
of his inheritance, but my father Lysanias reduced the prop- 
erty below what I now have ; and I shall be satisfied if I leave 
my sons a little more than I received. 

That was why I asked you the question, I said, because I 
saw that you were indifferent about money, which is a charac- 
teristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than 
of those who have acquired them ; for the latter have a second 
love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the affec- 
tion of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their 
children, besides that natural love of money for the sake of use 
and enjoyment which is common to them and all men. And 
hence they are very bad company, for they talk about nothing 
but the praises of wealth. 

That is true, he said. 

Yes, that is very true, I said ; but may I ask another ques- 
tion? — What do you consider to be the greatest blessing 
which you have reaped from wealth ? — The Republic, ii. 150. 
Rich man, the true and noble. See Noble, etc. 
Riches in government. See Money a ruler. 
Riches and poverty in age. See Poverty. 
Riches an evil left to children. See Children. 
Ridicule no test of truth. 

But then, I said, as we have determined to speak our 

minds, we must not fear the jests of the wits which will be di- 



380 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

rected against this sort of innovation ; how they will talk of 
women's attainments in music as well as in gymnastic, and 
above all about their wearing armor and riding upon horse- 
back ! 

Very true, he replied. 

Yet having begun, we must go on and attack the difficulty ; 
at the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their 
life to be serious. Not long ago, as we shall remind them, the 
Greeks were of the opinion, which is still generally received 
among the barbarians, that the sight of a naked man was ridic- 
ulous and improper ; and when first the Cretans and then the 
Lacedaemonians introduced naked exercises, the wits of that 
day might have ridiculed them equally. 

No doubt. 

But when experience showed that to let all things be uncov- 
ered was far better than to cover them up, and the ludicrous 
effect to the outward eye vanished before the approval of rea- 
son, then the man was seen to be a fool who laughs or directs 
the shafts of his ridicule at any other sight but that of folly 
and vice, or seriously inclines to measure the beautiful by any 
other standard but that of the good. 

Yery true, he replied. 

First, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in 
earnest, let us ask about the nature of woman ; Is she capable 
of sharing either wholly or partially, in the actions of men or 
not at all ? And is the art of war one of those arts in which 
she can or cannot share ? That will be the best way of com- 
mencing the inquiry, and will probably lead to the fairest con- 
clusion. 

That will be best. — The Republic, ii. 276. 
Ridicule at self-conceit. See Laughter. 
Right and duty versus life and death. See Death and life. 
Right, ridicule no test of. See Ridicule. 
Right determined by might. See Might. 
Right and wrong determined by the State. 

Soc. Again, in politics, while affirming that right and 

wrong, honorable and disgraceful, holy and unholy, are in real- 
ity to each State such as the State thinks and makes lawful, 
and that in determining these matters no individual or State is 
wiser than another, still the followers of Protagoras will not 
deny that in determining the sphere of expediency one coun- 
selor is better than another, and one State wiser than another ; 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 381 

they will scarcely venture to maintain, that what a city deems 
expedient will always be really expedient. But in the other 
case, I mean when they speak of justice and injustice, piety and 
impiety, they are confident that these have no natural or essen- 
tial basis — the truth is that which is agreed on at the time of 
agreement, and as long as the agreement lasts ; and this is the 
philosophy of many who do not altogether go along with Pro- 
tagoras. — Thaeatetus, iii. 374 
Right opinion, differences as to. See Differences , etc. 
Righteous judge. See Judge, etc. 
Round world. See Earth, rotundity of the. 
Rulers swaying the people. 

Your own Agathocles pretended to be a musician, but 

was really an eminent Sophist ; also Pythocleides and Cean ; 
and there were many others; and all of them, as I was saying, 
adopted these arts as veils or disguises because they were afraid 
of the envy of the multitude. But that is not my way, for I 
do not believe that they effected their purpose, which was to 
deceive the government, who were not blinded by them ; and 
as to the people, they have no understanding, and only repeat 
what their rulers are pleased to tell them. — Protagoras, i. 
117. 
Rulers in the State, who should be. 

Now then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the 

greatest of the waves, yet shall the word be spoken, even 
though the overflowing of the laughing wave shall drown me 
in laughter and dishonor ; and do you attend to me. 

Proceed. 

I said : Until, then, philosophers are kings, or the kings and 
princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, 
and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those com- 
moner natures who follow either to the exclusion of the other 
are compelled to stand aside, cities will never cease from ill — 
no, nor the human race, as I believe — and then only will our 
State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day : 
this was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I was wanting to 
utter, if it had not seemed too extravagant; for to be con- 
vinced that in no other State can there be private or public 
happiness is indeed a hard thing. 

Socrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider 
that the word which you have spoken is one at which numer- 
ous persons, and very respectable persons too, pulling off their 



382 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

coats in a moment and seizing any weapon that comes to hand, 
will run at you might and main, intending to do heaven knows 
what ; and if you don't prepare an answer, and put yourself 
in motion, you will be " pared by their fine wits," and no mis- 
take. 

You got me into the scrape, I said. 

And I was quite right ; however, I will do all I can to get 
you out ; but I can only give you wishes and exhortations, 
and also, perhaps, I may be able to fit answers to your ques- 
tions better than another — that is all. And now having 
such an auxiliary, you must do your best to show the unbe- 
lievers that you are right. 

I ought to try, I said, since you offer me such valuable 
assistance. And I think that, if there is to be a chance of our 
escaping, we must define who these philosophers are who, as 
we say, are to rule in the State ; then we shall be able to de- 
fend ourselves : there will be discovered to be some natures 
who ought to rule and to study philosophy ; and others who 
are not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be followers 
rather than leaders. — The Republic, ii. 301. 
Rulers, who and what they must be. 

The women and children are done with but there remains 

the further question of the rulers, which I must now investi- 
gate from the beginning. We were saying, as you will re- 
member, that they were to be lovers of their country, tried by 
the test of pleasures and pains, and neither in labors, nor fears, 
nor any other change of circumstances were to lose their pa- 
triotism ; he was to be rejected who failed but he who al- 
ways came forth pure, like goiJ tried in the refiner's fire, was 
to be made a ruler, and to receive honors and rewards in life 
and after death. That was the sort of thing which was being 
said, and then the argument turned aside and veiled her face ; 
not liking to stir the question which has now arisen. 

I perfectly remember, he said. 

Yes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding 
the bold word ; but now let me dare to say, — that the perfect 
guardian must be a philosopher. 

Yes, he said, let that be proclaimed. 

And do not suppose that there will be many of them, — 
for the gifts which we said were essential rarely grow to- 
gether ; they are mostly found in shreds and patches. 

What do you mean ? he said. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 383 

You are aware, I replied, that persons who have quick in- 
telligence, memory, sagacity, shrewdness, and similar gifts, are 
not often of a nature which is willing at the same time to live 
orderly and in a peaceful and settled manner ; and this is equally 
true of the high-spirited and magnanimous ; they are driven 
any way by their impetuosity, and all solid principle goes out 
of them. 

Very true, he said. 

On the other hand, those steadfast, immovable natures which 
in a battle are impregnable to fear and can better be depended 
on are equally immovable when there is anything to be learned; 
they seem to be in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go 
to sleep over any intellectual toil. 

Quite true. 

And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary 
in those to whom the higher education is to be imparted, and 
who are to share in any office or command. 

Certainly, he said. 

And will they be a class which is rarely found ? 

Yes, indeed. 

Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labors 
and dangers and pleasures which we mentioned before ; and 
there is another kind of probation which we did not mention, 
he must be exercised also in many kinds of knowledge, to see 
whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all, 
or will faint under them, as many do amid the toils of the 
games. 

Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing them. — The Re- 
public, ii. 330. 
Rulers compared to gold and silver. 

1 have only told you half. Citizens, we shall say to them 

in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differ- 
ently. Some of you have the power of command, and these 
he has composed of gold, wherefore also they have the greatest 
honor ; others of silver, to be auxiliaries ; others again who are 
to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has made of brass and 
iron ; and the species will generally be preserved in the chil- 
dren. But as you are of the same original family, a golden 
parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a 
golden son. And God proclaims to the rulers, as a first prin- 
ciple, that before all they should watch over their offspring, 
and see what elements mingle in their nature ; for if the son 



384 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, 
then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the 
ruler must not be pitiful towards his child because he has to 
descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just 
as there may be others sprung from the artisan class . who are 
raised to honor, and become guardians and auxiliaries. For an 
oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, 
it will then be destroyed. — The Republic, ii. 240. 
Rulers must be characterized by truth and virtue. 

Inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the 

eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region 
of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you 
which of the two kinds should be the rulers of our State ? 

And how can we truly answer that question ? he said. 

Ask yourself, I replied, which of the two are better able to 
guard the laws and institutions of our State ; and let them be 
our guardians. 

Very good. 

Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian 
who is to keep anything should have eyes rather than no 
eyes? 

There can be no question of that. 

And are not those who are truly and indeed without the 
knowledge of the true being of each thing, and have in their 
souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to 
look at the very truth and to that original to repair, and having 
perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty, 
goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered and to guard 
and preserve the order of them — are they not, I say, simply 
blind ? 

Assuredly, he replied, that is very much their condition. 

And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, 
besides being their equals in experience and not inferior to 
them in any particular of virtue, have also the knowledge of 
the truth ? 

There can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who 
have this great and preeminent quality, if they do not fail in 
any other respect. 

Suppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can 
unite this and the other excellences. 

By all means. 

In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 385 

the philosopher was to be ascertained ; about which, if we are 
agreed, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also be agreed 
that such an union of qualities is possible, and that those 
in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in 
the State. — The Republic, ii. 310. 
Rulers compared to pilots and physicians. 

Str. I must again have recourse to my favorite images ; 

through them, and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers. 

T. Soc. What images ? 

Str. The noble pilot and the wise physician, who " is worth 
many another man;" in the similitude of these let us endeavor 
to discover some image of the king. 

T. Soc. What sort of an image ? 

Str. Well, such as this : every man will reflect that he 
suffers strange things at their hands ; the physician saves any 
whom he wishes to save, and many whom he wishes to injure 
he injures — cutting or burning them, and at the same time 
requiring them to bring him payments, which are a sort of trib- 
ute, of which a very small part is spent upon the sick man, 
and the greater part is consumed by him and his domestics ; 
and the finale is, that he receives money from the relations of 
the sick man or from some enemy of his, and puts him out of 
the way. And the captains of ships are guilty of numberless 
evil deeds of the same kind ; they play false and leave you 
ashore when the hour of sailing arrives, or they wreck their 
vessels and cast away freight and lives ; not to speak of other 
rogueries. Now suppose that we, bearing all this in mind, 
were to determine, after consideration, that neither of these 
arts shall any longer be allowed to exercise absolute control 
either over freemen or over slaves, but that we will summon 
an assembly either of all the people, or of the rich only, and 
that anybody who likes, whatever may be his calling, or even 
if he have no calling, may offer an opinion either about ships 
or about diseases ; whether as to the manner in which physic 
or surgical instruments are to be applied to the patient, or 
about the vessels and the nautical instruments which are re- 
quired in navigation, and how to meet the dangers of winds 
and waves which are incidental to the voyage — how to behave 
when encountering pirates ; and what is to be done- with the 
old-fashioned galleys, if they have to fight with others of a 
similar build : and that, whatever shall be decreed by the mul- 
titude on these points, upon the advice of persons skilled or 



386 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

unskilled, shall be written down on triangular tablets and col- 
umns, or embalmed unwritten as national customs ; and that in 
all future time vessels shall be navigated and remedies admin- 
istered to the patient after this fashion. 

Y. Soc. What a strange notion ! 

Sir. Suppose, further, that the admirals and physicians are 
appointed annually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole 
people, and that they are elected by lot, and that after their 
election they navigate vessels and heal the sick according to 
the written rules. 

Y. Soc. Worse and worse. 

Str. But hear what follows : when the year of office has ex- 
pired, the admiral or physician has to come before a court of 
review, in which the judges are either selected from the wealthy 
classes or chosen by lot out of the whole people ; and anybody 
who pleases may accuse them, and he will lay to their charge, 
that during the past year they have not navigated their vessels 
or healed their patients, according to the letter of the law or 
according to the ancient customs of their ancestors ; and if 
either of them is condemned, there must be persons to fix what 
he is to suffer or pay. 

Y. Soc. He who is willing to take a command under such 
conditions, deserves to suffer any penalty. — Statesman, ill. 583. 
Rulers and warriors, gentleness of. See Gentleness. 
Rulers, qualities of. See Magistrates. 

Salvation of human life. See Human life, etc. 
Science of time. 

Soc. And now let me see whether you agree with Laches 

and myself in a third point. 

Nic. What is that ? 

Soc. I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is 
not one knowledge or science of the past, another of the pres- 
ent, a third of what will be and will be best in the future ; 
but that of all three there is one science only : for example, 
there is one science of medicine which is concerned with the 
inspection of health equally in all times, present, past, and fu- 
ture ; and of husbandry in like manner, which is concerned 
with the productions of the earth in all times. As to the gen- 
eral's art, yourselves will be my witnesses, that the general 
has to think of the future as well as the present ; and he con- 
siders that he is not to be the servant of the soothsayer, but 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 887 

his master, because he knows better what is happening or is 
likely to happen in war : and accordingly the law places the 
soothsayer under the general, and not the general under the 
soothsayer. Am I not correct, Laches ? 

La. Quite correct. 

Soc. And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same 
science has understanding of the same things, whether future, 
present, or past ? 

Nic. Yes, indeed, Socrates ; that is my opinion. — Laches, 
i. 92, 
Science versus sense. 

You, I replied, have in your mind a sublime conception 

of how we know the things above. And I dare say that if a 
person were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceil- 
ing, you would still think that his mind was the percipient and 
not his eyes. And you are very likely right and I may be a 
simpleton, but in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of 
being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards and 
whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, 
seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that 
he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science ; his 
soul is looking, not upwards, but downwards, whether his way 
to knowledge is by water or by land, in whichever element he 
may lie on his back and float. — The Republic, ii. 357. 
Science, certain knowledge necessary to. 

I must add that the power of dialectic alone can re- 
veal this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous 
sciences. 

Of that assertion you may be as certain as of the last. 

And certainly no one, will argue that there is any other 
method or way of comprehending all true existence ; for the 
irts in general are concerned with the wants or opinions of 
men, or are cultivated for the sake of production and con- 
struction or for the care of such productions and construc- 
tions ; and as to the mathematical arts which, as we were say- 
ing, have some apprehension of true being — geometry and 
the like — they only dream about being, and never can they 
behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses 
which they use unexamined and are unable to give an account 
of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, 
and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also con- 
structed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that 
euch a conventional statement will ever become science ? 



388 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Impossible, he said. 

Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first 
principle, and is the only science which does away with hypoth- 
eses in order to make certain of them ; the eye of the soul, 
which is literally buried in an outlandish slough, is by her 
taught to look upwards ; and she uses as handmaids, in the 
work of conversion, the sciences which we have been discuss- 
ing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have 
some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and 
less clearness than science : and this, in our previous sketch, 
was called understanding. But there is no use in our disput- 
ing about names when we have realities of such importance to 
consider. 

No, he said ; any name will do which expresses the thought 
clearly. — The Republic, ii. 361. 

Science of government, wherein resident. See Government, sci- 
ence of. 

Science, political, not attained by the many. See Government, sci- 
ence of. 

Science, political, refining of. 

Str. There are, however, natures more nearly akin to the 

king, and more difficult to discern ; the examination of them 

may be compared to the process of refining gold. 

Y. Soc. What is your meaning ? 

Str. The workmen begin by sifting away the earth and 
stones and the like; they then draw off in the fire, which is 
the only way of abstracting them, the more precious elements of 
copper, silver, or other metallic substance, which have an affin- 
ity to gold ; these are at last refined away by the use of tests, 
and the gold is left quite pure. 

Y. Soc. Yes, that is- the way in which these things are said 
to be done. 

Str. In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has 
been separated from political science ; and what is precious and 
of a kindred nature has been left ; there remain the nobler 
arts of the general and the judge, and the higher sort of ora- 
tory, which is an ally of the royal art, and persuades men to do 
justice, and assists in guiding the helm of States. What way 
can be found of taking them away, leaving him whom we seek 
alone and unalloyed ? 

Y. Soc. That is clearly what has to be attempted. — States- 
man, iii. 589. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 389 

Sculpture, deception in. See Likeness-making. 
Sea, evil influence of the, on cities. See Cities. 
Seen and unseen. 

What would you say of the many beautiful — whether 

men or horses or garments or any other things which may be 
called equal or beautiful, — are they all unchanging and the 
same always, or quite the reverse ? May they not rather be 
described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same, 
either with themselves or with one another ? 

The latter, replied Cebes ; they are always in a state of 
change. 

And these you can touch and see and perceive with the 
senses, but the unchanging things you can only perceive with 
the mind — they are invisible and are not seen ? 

That is very true, he said. 

Well then, Socrates, let us suppose that there are two sorts 
of existences, one seen, the other unseen. 

Let us suppose them. 

The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging ? 

That may be also supposed. 

And, further, is not one part of us body, and the rest of us 
soul? 

To be sure. 

And to which class may we say that the body is more alike 
and akin ? 

Clearly to the seen : no one can doubt that. 

And is the soul seen or not seen ? 

Not by man, Socrates. 

And what we mean by " seen " and " not seen " is that 
which is pr is not visible to the eye of man ? 

Yes, to the eye of man. 

And what do we say of the soul ? is that seen or not seen ? 

Not seen. 

Unseen then ? 

Yes. 

Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to 
the seen ? 

That is most certain, Socrates. 1 — Phaedo, i. 407. 
Self-assertion of Hippias. 

Eud. I am sure that Hippias will have no objection to 

answer anything that you ask him ; tell me, Hippias, if Soc- 
rates asks you a question, will you answer him ? 

l For the further discussion of this point, see Reflecting, eto. 



390 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Hippias. Indeed, Eudicus, I should be strangely inconsistent 
if I refused to answer Socrates, when at each Olympic festival, 
as I went up from my house at Elis to the temple of Olympia, 
where all the Hellenes were assembled, I continually professed 
my willingness to perform any of the exhibitions which I had 
prepared, and to answer any questions which any one had to 
ask. 

Soc. Truly, Hippias you are a happy man if at every Olym- 
pic festival you have such an encouraging opinion of your own 
powers when you go up to the temple. I doubt whether any 
muscular hero would be as fearless and confident in offering 
his body to the combat at Olympia, as you are in offering your 
mind. 

Hip. And with good reason, Socrates ; for since the day 
when I first entered the lists at Olympia I never found any 
one who was my superior in anything. 

Soc. What an ornament, Hippias, will the reputation of your 
wisdom be to the city of Elis and to your parents ! But to 
return : what do you say of Odysseus and Achilles ? Which 
of the two is the better of them ? and in what particular does 
either surpass the other ? For when you were exhibiting and 
company was in the room, though I could not follow you, I did 
not like to ask what you meant, because there were other 
people present, and I was afraid that the question might inter- 
rupt your exhibition. — Lesser Hippias, iv. 493. 
Self-conceit of youth. 

At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's 

soul, which -they perceive to be void of all fair accomplishments 
and pursuits and of every true word, which are the best guard- 
ians and sentinels in the minds of men who are dear to the 
Gods. 

None better. 

False and boastful words and conceits mount upwards in- 
stead of them, and occupy the vacant post. 

They are sure to do so. 

And so the young man returns into the country of the lotus- 
eaters and takes up his abode there in the face of all men ; and 
if any help be sent by his friends to the oligarchical part of 
him the same vain conceits shut the gate of the king's fastness ; 
they will not allow the new allies to pass. And if private in- 
dividuals, venerable for their age, come and parley, they do not 
receive them; there is a battle and they win ; then modesty 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 391 

which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into exile by 
them. They affirm temperance to be unmanliness and her also 
they contemptuously eject ; and they pretend that moderation 
and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and meanness, and by 
the help of a rabble of evil appetites they drain them beyond 
the border. .... Neither does he receive or let pass into the 
fortress any true word of advice, if any one says to him that 
some pleasures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires, 
and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honor 
some, and curtail and reduce others, whenever this is repeated 
to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike 
and that one is as honorable as another. — The Republic, ii. 
388. 

Self-conceit, laughter at. See Laughter, etc. 
Self-conceit purged out by refutation. See Purification, etc. 
Self-control. See Intemperance and Self -mastery. 
Self-deception. 

Crat. You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have at- 
tended to these matters, and possibly I might even turn you 
into a disciple. But I fear that the converse is more probable 
and I already find myself moved to say to you what Achilles 
in the " Prayers " says to Ajax, — 

'* Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, king of men, 
You appear to have spoken in all things much to my mind." 

And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give 
answers much to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthy- 
phro, or whether some Muse may have long been an inhabi- 
tant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself. 

Soc. Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my 
own wisdom ; I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought 
to stop and ask myself what am I saying, for there is nothing 
worse than self-deception — when the deceiver is always at 
home and always with you — that is indeed terrible, and there- 
fore I ought often to retrace my steps and endeavor to " look 
before me and behind me " in the words of the aforesaid 
Homer. — Cratylus, i. 667. 
Self-elevation. See Elevation, etc. 
Self-gratification. See Intemperance. 
Self-ignorance. 

Soc. Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self 

may be shown ? 

Pro. What are they ? 



392 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Soc. In the first place, about money: the ignorant may 
fancy himself richer than he is. 

Pro. Yes, that is a very common error. 

Soc. And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or 
fairer than he is, or that he has some other advantage of per* 
son which he has not really. 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. And yet surely by far the greatest number err about 
the goods of the mind ; they imagine that they are a great 
deal better than they are. 

Pro. Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion. 

Soc. And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the 
mass of mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses 
in them a spirit of contention and lying conceit of wisdom ? 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. And may not all this be truly called an evil condi- 
tion ? 

Pro. Yery evil. 

Soc. But we must pursue the division a step further, Protar- 
chus, if we would find the singular mixture of pleasure and 
pain ; — pain is envy of the playful sort. 

Pro. How can we make the further division which you sug- 
gest? 

Soc. All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit 
of themselves may be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two 
classes — one of them having power and might ; and the other 
the reverse. 

Pro. Certainly. 

Soc. Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of 
them who are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when 
they are laughed at, may be truly called ridiculous, but those 
who can defend themselves may be more truly described as 
strong and formidable, for ignorance in the powerful is hateful 
and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in 
fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth 
is, ridiculous. — Philehus, iii. 188. 
Self-knowledge and temperance. 

But, Socrates, he said, I will withdraw my previous admis- 

sions, rather than admit that a man can be temperate or wise, 
who does not know himself ; and I am not ashamed to confess 
that I was in error. For self-knowledge would- certainly be 
maintained by me to be the very essence of knowledge, and in 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 393 

this I agree with him who dedicated the inscription, " Know 
thyself ! " at Delphi. That word, if I am not mistaken, is put 
there as a sort of salutation which the God addresses to those 
who enter the temple; as much as to say that the ordinary 
salutation of " Hail ! " is not right, and that the exhortation 
" Be temperate ! " would be a far better way of saluting one 
another. The notion of him who dedicated the inscription was, 
as I believe, that the God speaks to those who enter his tem- 
ple not as men speak ; but, when a worshiper enters, the first 
word which he hears is " Be temperate ! " This, however, like 
a prophet he expresses in a sort of riddle, for " Know thy- 
self ! " and " Be temperate ! " are the same, as I maintain, and 
as the writing implies [o-ox^pova, yvwOt creairroi/], and yet they 
may be easily misunderstood ; and succeeding sages who added 
"■ Never too much," or, " Give a pledge, and evil is nigh at 
hand," would appear to have misunderstood them ; for they im- 
agined that " Know thyself ! " was a piece of advice which the 
God gave, and not his salutation of the worshipers at their 
first coming in ; and they wrote their inscription under the 
idea that they would give equally useful pieces of advice. 
Shall I tell you, Socrates, why I say all this ? My object is 
to leave the previous discussion (in which I know not whether 
you or I are more right, but, at any rate, no clear result was 
attained), and to raise a new one in which I will attempt to 
prove, if you deny, that temperance is self-knowledge. 

Yes, I said, Critias ; but you come to me as though I pro- 
fessed to know about the questions which I ask, and as though 
I could, if only I would, agree with you. Whereas the fact is 
that I inquire with you into the truth of that which is ad- 
vanced from time to time, just because I do not know ; and 
when I have inquired, I will say whether I agree with you or 
not. Please then to allow me time to reflect. 

Reflect, he said. 

I am reflecting, I replied, and discover that temperance, or 
wisdom, if implying a knowledge of anything, must be a sci- 
ence, and a science of something. 

Yes, he said, the science of itself. — Charmides, i. 20. 
Self-mastery. See Intemperance. 

There is something ridiculous in the expression " master 

of himself;" for the master is also the slave and the slave the 
master ; and in all these modes of speaking the same person ia 
denoted. 



394 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Certainly. 

The meaning is, I believe, that the human soul has a better 
principle, and has also a worse principle ; and when the better 
principle controls the worse, then a man is said to be master of 
himself ; and this is a term of praise : but when, owing to evil 
education or association, the better principle, which is less, is 
overcome by the worse principle, which is greater ; in this case 
he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprinci- 
pled. -. 

Yes, there is reason in that. 

And now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there 
you will find one of these two conditions realized ; for the 
State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of 
self, if the words " temperance " and " self-mastery " truly ex- 
press the rule of the better over the worse. — The Republic, 
ii. 256. 
Self-motion. 

Aih. When one thing moves another, and that another, 

will there be any primary changing element? Can there 
be, considering that what changes first will always have been 
changed by another? There cannot. And when the self- 
moved changes other, and that again other, and thus, thou- 
sands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must 
not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self- 
moving principle ? 

Cle. Very true, and I quite agree. 

Aih. Or, to put the question in another way : If, as most of 
these philosophers have the audacity to affirm, all things were 
at rest in one mass, which of the above-mentioned principles 
of motion would first spring up among them ? 

Cle. Clearly the self-moving ; for there could be no change 
in them arising out of any external cause, if there had been 
no previous change in themselves. 

Aih. Then we must say that self-motion being the origin 
and beginning of motion, as well among things at rest as 
among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of 
change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves 
other is second. 

Cle. Quite true. — Laws, iv. 407. 
Self-moving power of the soul. 

— : — The soul is immortal, for that is immortal which is ever 
in motion ; but that which moves another and is moved by an- 



PLAfO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 395 

other, in ceasing to move ceases also to live. Therefore, only 
that which is self-moving, never leaving self, never ceases to 
move, and is the fountain and beginning of motion to all that 
moves besides. Now, the beginning is unbegotten, for that 
which is begotten has a beginning ; but the beginning itself 
has no beginning, for if a beginning were begotten of some- 
thing, that something would not be a beginning. But that which 
is unbegotten must also be indestructible ; for if beginning were 
destroyed, there could be no beginning out of anything, or 
anything out of a beginning ; and all things must have a be- 
ginning. And therefore the self-moving is the beginning of 
motion ; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten, else 
the whole heavens and all creation would collapse and stand 
still, and never again have motion or birth. But if the self- 
moving is immortal, he who affirms that self-motion is the very 
idea and essence of the soul will not be put to confusion. For 
the body which is moved from without is soulless ; but that 
which is moved from within has a soul, for such is the nature 
of the soul. But if the soul be truly affirmed to be the self- 
moving, then must she also be without beginning, and immor- 
tal. — Phaedrus, i. 550. 
Self-praise, ill manners. 

Charmides blushed, and the blush heightened his beauty, 

for modesty is becoming in youth ; he then said very ingenu- 
ously, that he really could not at once answer, either yes, or 
no, to the question which I had asked : For, said he, if I affirm 
that I am not temperate, that would be a strange thing for me 
to say of myself, and also I should give the lie to Critias, and 
many others, who think that I am temperate, as he tells you : 
but, on the other hand, if I say that I am, I shall have to praise 
myself, which would be ill manners ; and therefore I have no 
answer to make to you. — Charmides, i. 12. 
Self-ruling. See Intemperance, etc., and Self-mastery. 
Self-sacrifice of Achilles. See Achilles. 
Self-slavery. See Self-mastery. 
Self-taught men. 

La. Socrates ; did you never observe that some persons, 

who have had no teachers, are more skillful than those who 
have, in some things ? 

Soc. Yes, Laches, I have observed that ; but you would not 
be very willing to trust them if they only professed to be mas 



396 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

ters of their art, unless they could show some proof of their 
skill or excellence in one or more works. 

La. That is true. — Laches, i. 78. 
Self- wise disputers. See Disputers. 
Sensation, not a sufficient source of knowledge. 

Soc. The simple sensations which reach the soul through 

the body are given at birth to men and animals by nature, but 
their reflections on these and on their relations to being and 
use, are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained, by 
education and long experience. 

Theaet. Assuredly. 

Soc. And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being? 

Theaet. Impossible. 

Soc. And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a 
knowledge of that thing ? 

Theaet. He cannot. 

Soc. Then knowledge does not consist in impressions of 
sense, but in reasoning about them ; in that only, and not in 
the mere impression, truth and being can be attained ? 

Theaet. Clearly. — Theaetetus, iii. 390. 
Sense, bodily, a bar to truth. See Bodily pleasures, etc. 
Sense versus science. See Science, etc. 
Sense, reason in the sphere of. See Intellect and knowledge. 
Sense, soul at first without. 

By reason of all these affections, the soul when inclosed 

in a mortal body is at first without intelligence ; but when the 
stream of growth and nutriment flows in with diminished speed, 
and the courses of the soul attaining a calm go their own way 
and become steadier as time advances, then the revolutions of 
the several circles return to their natural figure, and call the 
same and the other by their right names, and make the pos- 
sessor of them a rational being. And if these combine in him 
with any true nurture or education, he attains the fullness and 
health of the perfect man, and escapes the worst disease of all ; 
but if he neglects education he walks lame while alive to the 
end of his journey, and returns imperfect and good for nothing 
to the world below. — Timaeus, ii. 536. 
Senses, the source of knowledge. 

Must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at 

any object, observes that the thing which he sees aims at be- 
ing some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be that 
other, — he who makes this observation must have hatl a pre- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 397 

vious knowledge of that to which the other, although similar, 
was inferior? 

Certainly. 

And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals 
and of absolute equality ? 

Precisely. 

Then we must have known equality previously to the time 
when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all 
these apparent equals strive to attain absolute equality, but fall 
short of it? 

That is true. 

And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only 
been known, and can only be known, through the medium of 
sight or touch, or of some other of the senses, which are alike 
in this respect ? 

Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of 
them is the same as the other. 

And from the senses then is derived the knowledge that all 
sensible things aim at an absolute equality of which they fall 
short — is not that true ? 

Yes. 

Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, 
we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we 
could not have referred to that standard the equals which are 
derived from the senses ? — for to that they all aspire, and of 
that they fall short ? 

That, Socrates, is certainly to be inferred from the previous 
statements. — Phaedo, i. 402. 

Sensible images, some truths have not. See Images. 
Sensual and earthly. See Earthly, etc. 

Sensual love, laws against, impossible. See Laws against sensual love. 
Sensuality and gluttony. See Gluttony, etc. 
Shades and images, the dead are our. See Dead. 
Shadows seeming real. * 
Let me show you in a figure, how far our nature is en- 
lightened or unenlightened: — Behold! human beings living in 
an underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light 
and reaching all along the den ; they have been here from their 
childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they 
cannot move, and can only see before them ; for the chains are 
arranged in such a manner as to prevent them from turning 
round their heads. Above and behind them the light of a fire 



398 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners 
there is a raised way ; and you will see, if you look, a low wall 
built along the way, like the screen which marionette players 
have in front of them, over which they show the puppets. 

I see. 

And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall some 
apparently talking and others silent, carrying vessels and stat- 
ues, and figures of animals, made of wood and stone and vari- 
ous materials, and which appear over the wall ? 

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange 
prisoners. 

Like ourselves, I replied ; and they see only their own shad- 
ows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on 
the opposite wall of the cave ? 

True, he said ; how could they see anything but the shad- 
ows if they were never allowed to move their heads ? 

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner 
they would only see the shadows ? 

Yes, he said. 

And if they were able to talk with one another, would they 
not suppose that they were naming what was actually before 
them? 

Very true. 

And suppose, further, that the prison had an echo which came 
from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy that the 
voice which they heard was that of a passing shadow ? 

No question, he replied. 

Beyond question, I said, the truth would be to them just 
nothing but the shadows of the images. 

That is certain. 

And now look again, and see how they are released and 
cured of their folly. At first, when any one of them is liber- 
ated and compelled suddenly to turn his neck round and go up 
and look at the light, he will suffer sharp pains ; the glare 
will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of 
which in his former state he had seen the shadows ; and then 
imagine some one saying to him, that what he saw before was 
an illusion, but that now he is approaching real being and has 
a truer sight and vision of more real things, — what will be his 
reply ? And you may further imagine that his instructor is 
pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name 
them, — will he not be in a difficulty ; Will he not fancy that 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 399 

the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects 
which are now shown to him? 

Far truer. 

And if he is compelled to look at the light, will he not have 
a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take 
refuge in' the objects of vision which he can see, and which he 
will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are 
now being shown to him ? 

True, he said. 

And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a 
steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into 
the presence of the sun himself, do you not think that he will be 
pained and irritated, and when he approaches the light he will 
have his eyes dazzled, and will not be able to see any of the 
realities which are now affirmed to be the truth ? 

Not all in a moment, he said. 

He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper 
world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflec- 
tions of men and other objects in the water, and then the ob- 
jects themselves ; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon 
and the stars; and he will see the sky and the stars by night, 
better than the sun, or the light of the sun, by day ? 

Certainly. 

And at last he will be able to see the sun, and not mere re- 
flections of him in the water, but he will see him as he is in 
his own proper place, and not in another ; and he will contem- 
plate his nature. 

Certainly. 

And after this he will reason that the sun is he who gives 
the seasons and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in 
the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things 
which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold ? 

Clearly, he said, he would come to the other first and to this 
afterwards. 

And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom 
of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he 
would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them ? 

Certainly, he would. 

And if they were in the habit of conferring honors on those 
who were quickest to observe and remember and foretell which 
of the shadows when they moved, went before, and which fol- 
lowed after, and which were together, do you think that he 



400 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

would care for such honors and glories, or envy the possessors 
of them ? Would he not say with Homer, — 

."Better to be a poor man, and have a poor master," 

and endure anything, rather than to think and live after their 
manner ? 

Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything 
than live after their manner. 

Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out 
of the sun to be replaced in his old situation, would he not be 
certain to have his eyes full of darkness ? 

To be sure, he said. 

And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in meas- 
uring the shadows with the prisoners who had never move'd out 
of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes 
are steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this 
new habit of sight might be very considerable), would he not 
be ridiculous ? Men would say of him that up he went and 
down he came without his eyes ; and that there was no use in 
even thinking of ascending ; and if any one tried to loose 
another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the 
offender in the act, and they would put him to death. 

No question, he said. — The Republic, ii. 341. 
Shams or simulations. See Cookery. 
Simplicity of good men. See Good men. 
Sin, God not the author of. See Evil, etc. 
Sleep, quiet and unquiet. 

I do not think that we have adequately determined the 

nature and number of the appetites, and until this is accom- 
plished the inquiry will always be perplexed. 

Well, but you may supply the omission. 

Very true, I said ; and observe the point which I want to 
understand. Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appe- 
tites are deemed to be unlawful ; every man appears to have 
them, but in some persons they are controlled by the laws and 
by reason, and the better desires prevail over them, — either they 
are wholly banished or they are few and weak : while in the 
case of others they are stronger, and there are more of them. 

Which appetites do you mean ? 

I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and hu- 
man and ruling power is asleep ; when the wild beast in our nat- 
ure, gorged with meat or drink, starts up and leaps about and 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 401 

seeks to go and satisfy his desires, there is no conceivable folly 
or crime, however shameless or unnatural, — not excepting in- 
cest or parricide, or the eating of forbidden food, — of which 
at such a time, you know, a man may not believe himself to 
be capable. 

Most true, he said. 

But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when 
before going to sleep he has awakened his rational powers, and 
fed them on noble thoughts and inquiries, collecting himself in 
meditation ; after having indulged his appetites neither too 
much nor too little, but just enough to lay them to sleep, and 
prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from interfering 
with the higher principle — which he leaves in the solitude of 
pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the knowl- 
edge of the unknown, whether in past, present, or future : when 
again he has allayed the passionate element, if he has a quarrel 
against any one — I say, when, after pacifying the two irrational 
principles, he rouses up the third, which is reason, before he takes 
his rest, then, as you know, he attains truth most nearly, and is 
least likely to be the sport of fanciful and lawless visions. 

I quite agree. — The Republic, ii. 400. 
Social strife, origin of. See Metallic races. 
Society, primitive. See Patriarchal State. 
Socrates, the death of. 

Me, already, as the tragic poet would say, the voice of 

fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison ; and I think that I 
had better repair to the bath first, in order that the women may 
not have the trouble of washing my body after I am dead. 

When he had done speaking, Crito said : And have you any 
commands for us, Socrates — anything to say about your chil- 
dren, or any other matter in which we can serve you ? 

Nothing particular, he said : only, as I have always told you, 
I would have you to look to yourselves ; that is a service 
which you may always be doing to me and mine as well as to 
yourselves. And you need not make professions ; for if you 
take no thought for yourselves, and walk not according to the 
the precepts which I have given you, not now for the first 
time, the warmth of your professions will be of no avail. 

We will do our best, said Crito. But in what way would 
you have us bury you ? 

In any way that you like ; only you must get hold of me, 

and take care that I do not walk away from you. Then 
26 



402 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

he turned to us, and added with a smile : — I cannot make Crito 
believe that I am the same Socrates who has been talking 
and conducting the argument ; he fancies that I am the other 
Socrates whom he will soon see a dead body — and he asks, 
How shall he bury me ? And though I have spoken many 
words in the endeavor to show that when I have drunk the 
poison I shall leave you and go to the joys of the blessed, — 
these words of mine, with which I comforted you and myself, 
have had, as I perceive, no effect upon Crito. And therefore 
I want you to be surety for me now, as he was surety for me 
at the trial : but let the promise be of another sort ; for he 
was my surety to the judges that I would remain, but you 
must be my surety to him that I shall not remain, but go away 
and depart; and then he will suffer less at my death, and not 
be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I 
would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, 
Thus we lay out Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the grave 
or bury him ; for false words are not only evil in themselves, 
but they infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer then, my 
dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, and 
do with that as is usual, and as you think best. 

When he had spoken these words, he arose and told us to 
wait until he went into the bath-chamber with Crito ; and we 
waited, talking and thinking of the subject of discourse, and 
also of the greatness of our sorrow : he was like a father of 
whom we were being bereaved, and we were about to pass the 
rest of our lives as orphans. When he had taken the bath his 
children were brought to him — (he had two young sons and 
an elder one) ; and the women of his family also came, and 
he talked to them and gave them a few directions in the pres- 
ence of Crito ; and he then dismissed them and returned to us. 

Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time 
had passed while he was within. When he came out, he sat 
down with us again after his bath, but not much was said. 
Soon the jailer, who was the servant of the eleven, entered 
and stood by him, saying : To you, Socrates, whom I know to 
be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to 
this place, I will not impute the angry feelings of other men, 
who rage and swear at me when, in obedience to the authori- 
ties, I bid th^m drink the poison — indeed I am sure that you 
will not be angry with me ; for others, as you are aware, and 
not I, are the guilty cause. And so fare you well, and try to 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 403 

bear lightly what must needs be ; you know my errand. Then 
bursting into tears he turned away and went out. 

Socrates looked at him and said ; I return your good wishes, 
and will do as you bid. Then turning to us, he said, How 
charming the man is : since I have been in prison he has al- 
ways been coming to see me, and at times he would talk to 
me, and was as good as could be, and now see how generously 
he sorrows for me. But we must do as he says, Crito ; let 
the cup be brought, if the poison is prepared : if not, let the 
attendant prepare some. 

Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hill-tops, and I know 
that many a one has taken the draught late, and after the an- 
nouncement has been made to him, he has eaten and drunk, and 
enjoyed the society of his beloved ; do not hasten then, there 
is still time, 

Socrates said : Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are 
right in doing thus, for they think that they will gain by the 
delay ; but I am right in not doing thus, for I do not think 
that I should gain anything by drinking ,the poison a little 
later ; I should be sparing and saving a life which is already 
gone : I could only laugh at myself for this. Please then to 
do as I say, and not to refuse me. 

Crito made a sign to the servant, who was standing by ; and 
he went out, and having been absent for some time, and re- 
turned with the jailer carrying the cup of poison. Socrates 
said : You, my good friend, who are experienced in these mat- 
ters, shall give me directions how I am to proceed. The man 
answered : You have only to walk about until your legs are 
heavy, and then to lie down, and the poison will act, At the 
same time he handed the cup to Socrates, who in the easiest 
and gentlest manner, without the least fear or change of color 
or feature, looking at the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as 
his manner was, took the cup and said : What do you say 
about making a libation out of this cup to any God ? May I, 
or not? The man answered : We only prepare, Socrates, just 
so much as we deem enough. I understand, he said : yet I 
may and must ask the Gods to prosper my journey from this 
to that other world — even so — and so be it according to 
my prayer. Then holding the cup to his lips, quite readily 
and cheerfully he drank off the poison. And hitherto most of 
us had been able to control our sorrow; but now when we saw 
him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the draught, we 



404 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears 
were flowing fast ; so that I covered my face and wept over 
myself, for certainly I was not weeping over him, but at the 
thought of my own calamity in having lost such a friend. Nor 
was I the first, for Crito, when he found himself unable to re- 
strain his tears, had got up and moved away, and I followed ; 
and at that moment, Apollodorus, who had been weeping all 
the time, broke out into a loud and passionate cry which made 
cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness : What 
is this strange outcry ? he said. I sent away the women mainly 
in order that they might not offend in this way, for I have 
heard that a man should die in peace. Be quiet then, and 
have patience. When we heard that, we were ashamed, and 
refrained our tears ; and he walked about until, as he said, his 
legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back, according to 
the directions, and the man who gave him the poison now and 
then looked at his feet and legs ; and after a while he pressed 
his foot hard and asked him if he could feel ; and he said, No ; 
and then his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and showed us 
that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them himself, and 
said : When the poison reaches the heart, that will be the end. 
He was beginning to grow cold about the groin, when he un- 
covered his face, for he had covered himself up, and said (they 
were his last words) — he said : Crito, I owe a cock to Ascle- 
pius ; will you remember to pay the debt ? The debt shall be 
paid, said Crito ; is there anything else ? There was no 
answer to this question ; but in a minute or two a movement 
was heard, and the attendants uncovered him ; his eyes were 
set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth. 

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, whom I may 
truly call the wisest, and justest, and best of all the men whom 
I have ever known. — Phaedo, i. 444. 
Socrates, presentiment of death in. See Presentiment, etc. 
Soldiers and Rulers. See Gentleness. 
Solitude of the lost soul. 

For after death, as they say, the genius of each indi- 
vidual, to whom he belonged in life, leads him to a certain 
place in which the dead are gathered together, whence after 
judgment they must go into the world below, following the 
guide, who is appointed to conduct them from this world to 
the other : and when they have there received their due and 
remained their time, another guide brings them back again 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 405 

after many revolutions of ages. Now this journey to the other 
world is not, as Aeschylus says in the Telephus, a single and 
straight path, — no guide would be wanted for that, and no 
one could miss a single path ; but there are many partings of 
the road, and windings, as I must infer from the rites and sac- 
rifices which are offered to the Gods below in places where 
three ways meet on earth. The wise and orderly soul follows 
in the path, and knows what is happening ; but the soul which 
desires the body, and which, as I was relating before, has long 
been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sightj 
is, after many struggles and many sufferings, hardly and with 
violence carried away by her attendant genius, and when she 
arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered, if she 
be impure and have done impure deeds, or been concerned in 
foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers of these, 
and the works of brothers in crime, — from that soul every one 
flees and turns away ; no one will be her companion, no one 
her guide, but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until cer- 
tain times are fulfilled, and when they are fulfilled, she is borne 
irresistibly to her own fitting habitation ; as every pure and 
just soul which has passed through life in the company and 
under the guidance of the Gods has also her own proper home. 
— Phaedo, i. 438. 

Song and harmony, choral. See Choral, etc. 
Sons, unfilial. See Parricides. 

Sons, brave, of brave fathers. See State, heroes, etc. 
Sons of good fathers, why they turn out ill. See Fathers, etc. 
Sophist and Philosopher. See Philosopher and Sophist. 
Sophist summarized. 

■ Sir. And who is the maker of the longer speeches ? Is 

he the statesman or the public orator ? 

Theaet. The latter. 

Str. And what shall we call the other ? Is he the philoso- 
pher or the Sophist ? 

Theaet. The philosopher he cannot be, for upon our view 
he is ignorant ; but since he is an imitator of the wise he will 
have a name which is formed by an adaptation of the word 
croc/>os. What shall we name him ? I am pretty sure that I 
cannot be mistaken in terming him the true and very Sophist 

Str. Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a 
chain from one end to the other ? 

Theaet. By all means. 



406 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Str. He, then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows : 
He who, belonging to the conscious or dissembling section of 
the art of making contradictions, is an imitator of appearance, 
and has divided off from the art of image-making, which is a 
branch of phantastic, that further division of creative art, the 
juggling of words, a creation human, and not divine — any one 
who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood and lineage 
will say the very truth. 

Theaet Undoubtedly. — Sophist, iii. 510. 
Sophists, are they corrupters ? 

Do you really think, as people are fond of saying, that 

our youth are corrupted by the Sophists, or .that private teach- 
ers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of ? 
Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all 
Sophists ? And do they not educate to perfection alike young 
and old, men and women, and fashion them after their own 
hearts ? . . . . 

To that I quite assent, he replied. 

Then let me crave your assent also to a further observation. 

What are you going to say ? 

Why, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the world 
calls Sophists and esteems rivals, do but teach the collective 
opinion of the many, which are the opinions of their assemblies ; 
and this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who 
should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast 
who is fed by him — he would learn how to approach and han- 
dle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dan- 
gerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his several 
cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is 
soothed or infuriated ; and you may suppose, further, that when, 
by constantly living with him, he has become- perfect in all this 
he calls his knowledge wisdom, and he makes a system or art, 
which he proceeds to teach, not that he has any real notion of 
what he is teaching, but he names this honorable and that dis- 
honorable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance 
with the tastes and tempers of the great brute, when he has 
learnt the meaning of his inarticulate grunts. Good he pro- 
nounces to be what pleases him, and evil what he dislikes ; and 
he can give no other account of them except that the just and 
noble are the necessary, having never himself seen, and having 
no power of explaining to others, the nature of either, or the 
immense difference between them. Wcmld not he be a rare 
educator ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 407 

Indeed, he would. 

And in what respects does he who thinks that wisdom is the 
discernment of the tastes and pleasures of the assembled multi- 
tude, whether in painting or music, or, finally, in politics, differ 
from such an one ? For I suppose you will agree that he who 
associates with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or 
other work of art or the service which he has done the State, 
making them his judges, except under protest, will also experi- 
ence the fatal necessity of producing whatever they praise. 
And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in 
confirmation of their notions about the honorable and good. 
Did you ever hear any of them which were not ? 

No, nor am I likely to hear. — The Republic, ii. 318. 
Sorrow, manifestations of. 

Reflect : — our principle is that the good man will not 

consider death terrible to a good man. 

Yes, that is our principle. 

And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as 
though he had suffered anything terrible ? 

He will not. 

Such an one, as we further maintain, is enough for himself and 
his own happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men. 

True, he said. 

And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the de- 
privation of fortune, is to him of all men least terrible. 

Assuredly. 

And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear 
with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which 
may befall him. 

Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another. 

Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of 
famous men, and making them over to women (and not even to 
women who are good for anything), or to men of a baser sort, 
that those who are being educated by us to be the defenders of 
their- country may scorn to do the like. 

That will be very right. 

Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets 
not to depict Achilles, who is the son of a goddess, as first 
lying on his side, then on his back, and then on his face ; then 
starting up and sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the bar- 
ren sea, now taking the dusky ashes in both his hands and 
pouring them over his head, of bewailing and sorrowing in the 



408 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

various modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he 
describe Priam, the kinsman of the Gods, as praying and be- 
seeching, 

" Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name." 

Still more earnestly will we beg of him not to introduce the 
Gods lamenting and saying, — 

" Alas! my misery! alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow." 

— The Republic, ii. 210. 

Sorrow, parental, to be lightly borne. 

Some of us have fathers and mothers still living, and we 

would urge them, if, as is likely, we shall die, to bear the calam- 
ity as lightly as possible, and not to condole with one another ; 
for they have sorrows enough, and will not need any one to 
stimulate them. While we gently heal their wounds, let us 
remind them that the Gods have heard the chief part of their 
prayers ; for they prayed, not that their children might live 
forever, but that they might be famous and brave. And this 
which is the greatest good they have attained. A mortal man 
cannot expect to have everything in his own life turning out 
according to his will ; and they, if they bear their misfortunes 
bravely, will be truly deemed brave fathers of the brave. But 
if they give way to their sorrows, either they will be suspected 
of not being our parents, or we of not being such as our pane- 
gyrists declare. Let not either of the two alternatives happen, 
but rather let them be our chief and true panegyrists, who 
show in their lives that they are true men, and had men for 
their sons. The ancient saying, "never too much," appears to 
be, and really is, well said. For he whose happiness rests with 
himself, if possible, wholly, and if not, as far as is possible, — 
who is not hanging in suspense on other men, or changing with 
the vicissitude of their fortune, — has his life ordered for the 
best. He is the temperate and valiant and wise ; and when 
his riches come and go, when his children are given and taken 
away, he will remember the proverb, " Neither rejoicing over- 
much nor grieving overmuch," for he relies upon himself. And 
such we would have our parents to be — that is our word and 
wish, and as such we now offer ourselves, neither lamenting 
overmuch, nor fearing overmuch, if we are to die at this instant. 
And we entreat our fathers and mothers to retain these feel- 
ings throughout their future life, and to be assured that they 
will not please us by sorrowing and lamenting over us. But, 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 409 

if the dead have any knowledge of the living, they will dis- 
please us most by making themselves miserable and by taking 
their misfortunes to heart, and they will please us best if 
they bear their loss lightly and temperately. For our life will 
have the noblest end which is vouchsafed to man, and should 
be glorified rather than lamented. And if they will direct their 
minds to the care and nurture of our wives and children, they 
will soonest forget their misfortunes, and live more honorably 
and uprightly, and in a way that is more agreeable to us. — 
Menexenus, iv. 579. 
Sorrow, suppressed. 

— — "Were we not saying that a good man, when he loses his 
son or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the 
loss with more equanimity than another ? 

Yes. 

But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that, although 
he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow ? 

Yes, he said, the latter is the truer statement. 

Tell me : will he be more likely to struggle and hold out 
against his sorrow, when he is seen by his equals, or when he 
is by himself alone. 

He will be more likely to hold out when he is in company. 

But when he is left alone he will not mind saying or doing 
many things which he would be ashamed of any one hearing or 
seeing ? 

True. 

There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids 
him resist, while passion urges him to indulge his sorrow ? 

True. — The Republic, ii. 435. 
Sorrow, patience under. 

The law would say that to be patient under suffering is 

best, and that we should not give way to impatience, as there 
is no knowing whether such things are good or evil ; and noth- 
ing is gained by impatience ; also, because no human thing is of 
serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that which 
at the moment is most required. 

What is most required ? he asked. 

That we should take counsel about the past, and when 
the dice have been thrown, order our affairs accordingly by 
the advice of reason, not, like children who have had a fall, 
keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting 
up a howl, when we should be accustoming the soul forth- 



410 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

with to apply a remedy, raising up that which Is sickly and 
fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by a real cure. 

Yes, he said, there is no better way of meeting the attacks 
of fortune. 

Yes, I said ; and the higher principle is ready to follow this 
suggestion of reason ? 

Clearly. 

And the other principle which inclines us to recollection of 
our troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of 
them, we may call irrational, indolent, and cowardly ? 

Indeed, we may. — The Republic, ii. 436. 
Soul, immortality of the. See Self-moving power of the soul.*/ 

Soc. I have heard from certain wise men and women who 

spoke of things divine that — 

Men. What did they say ? 

Soc. They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive. 

Men. What was lhat ? and who were they ? 

Soc. Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had 
studied how they might be able to give a reason of their pro- 
fession ; there have been poets also, such as the poet Pindar 
and other inspired men. And what they say is — mark, now 
and see whether their words are true — they say that the soul 
of man is immortal, and at one time has an end, which is 
termed dying, and at another time is born again, but is never 
destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always 
in perfect holiness. For in the ninth year Persephone sends 
the souls of those from whom she has received the penalty of 
ancient crime back again into the light of this world, and these 
are they who become noble kings and mighty men and great 
in wisdom, and are called saintly heroes in after ages. The 
soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many 
times, and having seen all things that there are, whether in 
this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all ; 
and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remem- 
brance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about every- 
thing ; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all 
things, there is no difficulty in her eliciting, or as men say 
learning, all out of a single recollection, if a man is strenuous 
and does not faint ; for all inquiry and all learning is but rec- 
ollection. — Meno, i. 255. 

Are you not aware, I said, that the soul is immortal and im- 
perishable ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 411 

He looked at me in astonishment, and said : No, by heaven ; 
surely you are not prepared to affirm that ? 

Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too, for there is no difficulty. 

I see a great difficulty ; but I should like to hear you state 
this argument of which you make so light. 

Listen, then. 

I am attending* 

You speak of good and of evil ? 

Yes, he replied. 

Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and 
destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving 
element the good ? 

Yes. 

And you admit that everything has a good and also an evil ; 
as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes, and disease of the whole 
body ; as mildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of iron 
and steel : in everything, or in almost everything, there is an 
inherent evil and disease ? 

Yes, he said. 

And anything which is infected by any of these evils is 
made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies ? 

True. 

The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruc- 
tion of each ; and if this does not destroy them there is nothing 
else that will, for good certainly will not destroy them, nor, 
again, that which is neither good nor evil. 

Certainly not. 

If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent cor- 
ruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain 
that of such a nature there is no destruction ? 

That may be assumed. 

Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul ? 

Yes, he said, there are all the evils of which we were speak- 
ing : unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance. 

But do any of these dissolve or destroy her ? — and here do 
not let us fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and 
foolish, when they are detected, perish through their injustice, 
which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body : 
The evil of the body is a disease which wastes and reduces and 
annihilates the body ; and all the things of which we were just 
now speaking come to annihilation through their own inherent 
evil clinging to them and destroying them. Is not this true ? 



4i2 PLATC S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Yes, he said. 

Now consider the soul in the same way. Do the injustice 1 
and other evils of the soul waste and consume the soul ? Do 
they, by inhering in her and clinging to her at last, bring her 
to death, and separate her from the body ? 

Certainly not. 

And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything 
can perish from without through external affection of evil, 
which could not be destroyed from within by any internal cor- 
ruption ? 

It is, he replied. 

Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, 
whether staleness, decomposition, or any other kind of badness, 
when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy 
the body ; although if the corruption of food communicates 
corruption to the body, then the body also suffers from inter- 
nal corruption or disease and perishes ; but that the body, be* 
ing one thing, can be destroyed by the badness of food, which 
is another thing, without any internal infection — that will 
never be admitted by us ? 

Very true. 

And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can pro- 
duce an evil of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, 
which is one thing, can be dissolved by any external evil which 
belongs to another ? 

Yes, he said, there is reason in that. 

Either, then, let us refute this argument, or, while this ar- 
gument of ours remains unrefuted, let us never say that fever, 
or any other disease, or the knife put to the throat, or even 
the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can 
destroy the soul, until the soul also is proved to become more 
unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being 
done to the body ; but that the soul or anything else which is 
not destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an ex- 
ternal one, is not to be supposed. 

No one, he replied, will ever show that the souls of men 
become more unjust in consequence of death. 

And if some one who would rather not admit the immortal- 
ity of the soul boldly denies this, and says that the dying do 
really become more evil and unrighteous, then, if the speaker 
is right, I suppose that injustice, like disease, must be assumed 
to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take this disorder 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 413 

die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil 
has, and which kills them sooner or later in quite another way 
from that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at 
the hands of others as the penalty of their deeds ? 

Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, 
will not be so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered 
from evil. But I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth, 
and that injustice which murders others keeps the murderer alive 
— aye, and unsleeping too ; so far removed is her dwelling- 
place from being a house of death. 

True, I said ; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the 
soul is unable to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is 
appointed to be the destruction of the body destroy a soul or 
anything which is not a body. 

Yes, that can hardly be. 

But the soul which cannot be destroyed by evil, whether in- 
herent or external, must exist forever, and, if existing forever, 
must be immortal ? 

Certainly. 

That is the conclusion, I said ; and if a true conclusion, then 
the souls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed 
they will not diminish in number. Neither will they increase, 
for the increase of the immortal natures must come from some- 
thing mortal, and all things would thus end in immortality. 

Very true. 

But the argument will not allow us to believe this, nor yet 
to believe that the soul, in her true nature, is full of variety 
and difference and dissimilarity. 

What do you mean ? he said. 

The soul, I said, as is now proven, being immortal, must be 
the fairest of compositions, and cannot be compounded of 
many elements ? 

Certainly not. — The Republic, ii. 440. ^ 
Soul, change to all things having a. 

Ath. All things which have a soul change, and possess in 

themselves a principle of change, and in changing move accord- 
ing to law and the order of destiny : lesser changes of nature 
move on level ground, but greater crimes sink into the abyss, 
that is to say, into Hades and other places in the world below, 
of which the very names terrify men, and about which they 
cfream that they live in them absent from the body. And 
whenever the soul receives more of good and evil from her 



414 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

own energy and the strong influence of others, when she has 
communion with divine virtue and becomes divine, she is car- 
ried into another and better place, which is also divine and 
perfect in holiness ; and when she has communion with evil, 
then she also changes the place of her life. 

" For that is the justice of the Gods who inhabit heaven." 

O youth or young man, who fancy that you are neglected by 
the Gods, know that if you become worse you shall go to the 
worse souls, or if better to the better, and in every succession 
of life and death you will do and suffer what like may fitly 
suffer at the hands of like. This is a divine justice, which 
neither you nor any other unfortunate will ever glory in es- 
caping, and which the ordaining powers have specially or- 
dained ; take good heed of them, for a day will come when 
they will take heed of you. If you say, I am small and will 
creep into the depths of the earth, or I am high and will fly 
up to heaven, you are not so small or so high but that you 
shall pay the fitting penalty, either in the world below or in 
some yet more savage place still whither you shall be con- 
veyed. — Laws, iv. 417. 
Soul, imperishability of the. ** 

What do we call that principle which does not admit of 

death ? 

The immortal, he said. 

And does the soul admit of death ? 

No. 

Then the soul is immortal ? 

Yes, he said. 

And may we say that this is proven ? 

Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied. 

And supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not 
three be imperishable ? 

Of course. 

And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm 
principle came attacking the snow, must not the snow have re- 
tired whole and unmelted — for it could never have perished, 
nor could it have remained and admitted the heat ? 

True, he said. 

Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperisha- 
ble, the fire, when assailed by cold, would not have perished or 
have been extinguished, but would have gone away unaffected ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 415 

Certainly, he said. 

And the same may be said of the immortal : if the immortal 
is also imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot 
perish ; for the preceding argument shows that the soul will 
not admit of death, or ever be dead, any more than three or 
the odd number will admit of the even, or fire, or the heat in 
the fire, of the cold. Yet a person may say : " But although 
the odd will not become even at the approach of the even, why 
may not the odd perish and the even take the place of the 
odd ? " Now to him who makes this objection, we cannot an- 
swer that the odd principle is imperishable ; for this has not 
been acknowledged, but if this had been acknowledged, there 
would have been no difficulty in contending that at the ap- 
proach of the even the odd principle and the number three 
took their departure ; and the same argument would have held 
good of fire and heat and any other thing. 

Very true. 

And the same may be said of the immortal : if the immortal 
is also imperishable, then the soul will be imperishable as well 
as immortal ; but if not, some other proof of her imperishable- 
ness will have to be given. 

No other proof is needed, he said ; for if the immortal, 
being eternal, is liable to perish, then nothing is imperishable. 

Yes, replied Socrates, all men will agree that God, and the 
essential form of life, and the immortal in general, will never 
perish. 1 — Phaedo, i. 437. 
Soul, truth attained by the. 8 ^ 

What, again, shall we say of the actual acquirement of 

knowledge ? — is the body, if invited to share in the inquiry, a 
hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have sight and hearing 
any truth in them ? Are they not, as the poets are always 
telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they are in- 
accurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses ? 
For you will allow that they are the best of them? 

Certainly, he replied. 

Then when does the soul attain truth ? for in attempting to 
consider anything in company with the body she is obviously 
deceived. 

Yes, that is true. 

Then must not existence be revealed to her in thought, if at 

all? 

1 See the continuation of this discussion on p. 418. 



416 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Yes. 

And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself, 
and none of these things trouble her — neither sounds nor 
sights nor pain nor any pleasure, — when she has as little us 
possible to do with the body, and has no bodily sense or feel- 
ing, but is aspiring after true being? 

That is true. 

And in this the philosopher dishonors the body ; his soul 
runs away from the body and desires to be alone and by her- 
self? 

That is true. — Phaedo, i. 391. 
Soul, philosophy delivering the. ^See Philosophy delivering, etc. 
Soul degenerated by the body. See Body affecting soul. 
Soul, solitude of the lost. See Solitude. V 
Soul, nature of the. ,/ 

Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves — What is that 

which, as we imagine, is liable to be scattered away, and about 
which we fear ? and what, again, is that about which we have 
no fear ? And then we may proceed to inquire whether that 
which suffers dispersion is or is not of the nature of soul — 
our hopes and fears as to our own souls will turn upon the an- 
swer to these questions. 

Very true, he said. 

Now the compound or composite may be supposed to be 
naturally capable as of being compounded so also of being dis- 
solved ; but that which is uncompounded, and that only, must 
be, if anything is, indissoluble. 

Yes ; I should imagine so, said Cebes. 

And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and 
unchanging, whereas the compound is always changing and 
never the same. 

That I also think, he said. 

Then, now, let us return to the previous discussion. Is that 
idea or essence, which in the dialectical process we define as 
essence or true existence — whether essence of equality, beauty, 
or anything else : are these essences, I say, liable at times to 
some- degree of change ? or are they each of them always what 
they are, having the same simple self-existent and unchanging 
forms, and not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or 
at any time ? 

They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes. 1 — • 
Phaedo, i. 406. 

l For the continuation of this discussion, see Seen and unseen* 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 417 

Soul, reflecting and unchanging. See Reflecting, etc. 
Soul resembling the divine. See Divine, etc.,/ 

Listen all ye who have just now heard the laws about 

Gods, and about our dear forefathers : — Of all the things which 
a man has, next to the God, his soul is the most divine and 
most truly his own. Now in every man there are two parts : 
the better and superior part, which rules, and the worse and 
inferior part, which serves ; and the ruler is always to be pre- 
ferred to the servant. Wherefore I am right in bidding every 
one next to the Gods, who are our masters, and those who in 
order follow them, to honor his own soul, which every one 
seems to honor, but no one honors as he ought ; for honor is a 
divine good, and no evil thing is honorable ; and he who thinks 
that he can honor the soul by word or gift, or any sort of com- 
pliance, without making her in any way better, seems to honor 
her, but honors her not at all. For example, every man, from 
his very boyhood, fancies that he is able to know everything, and 
thinks that he honors his soul by praising her, and he is very 
ready to let her do whatever she may like. But I mean to 
say that in acting thus he only injures his soul, and does not 
honor her ; whereas, in our opinion, he ought to honor her as 
second only to the Gods. Again, when a man thinks that 
others are to be blamed, and not himself, for the errors which 
he has committed, and the many and great evils which befell 
him in consequence, and is always fancying himself to be ex- 
empt and innocent, he is under the idea that he is honoring his 
soul ; whereas the very reverse is the fact, for he is really in- 
juring her. And when, disregarding the word and approval of 
the legislator, he indulges in pleasure, then again he is far 
from honoring her ; he only dishonors her, and fills her full of 
evil and remorse ; or when he does not endure to the end the 
labors and fears and sorrows and pains which the legislator ap- 
proves, but gives way before them, then, by yielding, he does 
not honor the soul, but by all such conduct he makes her to be 
dishonorable ; nor when he thinks that life at any price is a 
good, does he honor her, but yet once more he dishonors her ; 
for the soul having a notion that the world below is all evil, he 
yields to her, and does not resist and teach or convince her 
that, for aught she knows, the world of the Gods below, in- 
stead of being evil, may be the greatest of all goods. Again, 
when any one prefers beauty to virtue, what is this but the 
real and utter dishonor of the soul ? For such a preference 
27 



418 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

implies that the body is more honorable than the soul : and 
this is false, for there is nothing of earthly birth which is more 
honorable than the heavenly, and he who thinks otherwise of 
the soul has no idea how greatly he undervalues this wonderful 
possession. — Laws, iv. 252. 
Soul, impure and pure. See Impure, etc. & 
Soul, sensual and earthly. See Earthly. * 
Soul, transmigration of the. 

The happiest both in themselves and their place of abode 

^are those who have practiced the civil and social virtues which 
are called temperance and justice, and are acquired by habit 
and attention without philosophy and mind. 

Why are they the happiest ? 

Because they may be expected to pass into some gentle so- 
cial nature which is like their own, such as that of bees or wasps 
or ants, or even back again into the form of man, and just and 
moderate men to spring from them. 

That is not impossible. — Phaedo, i. 411. 
Soul, self-moving. See Self-moving.,^ 
Soul, indestructible. >j 

Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not 

the soul, if she is immortal, be also imperishable ? 

Most certainly. 

Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him 
may be supposed to die, but the immortal retires at the ap- 
proach of death and is preserved safe and sound ? 

True. 

Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and im- 
perishable, and our souls will truly exist in another world ! — 
Phaedo, i. 437. 
Soul, care for the. */ 

O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal, what 

care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion 
of time which is called life, but of eternity ! And the danger 
of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear 
to be awful. If death had only been the end of all, the wicked 
would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have 
been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil 
together with their souls. But now, inasmuch as the soul is 
manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil 
except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom. For 
the soul when on her progress to the world below takes noth- 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 419 

ing with her but nurture and education ; and these are said 

greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed, at the very 

beginning of his pilgrimage in the other world. — Phaedo, i. 

437. 

Soul, at first without sense. See Sense. " 

Soul, giving life to the body. 

Soc. You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness 

of the word i/^x^ (soul), and then of the word crw/xa (body)? 

Her. Yes. 

Soc. If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I 
should imagine that those who first used the name i/^r) meant 
to express that the soul when in the body is the source of life, 
and gives the power of breath and revival, and when this re- 
viving power fails then the body perishes and dies, and this, if 
I am not mistaken, they called psyche. But please stay a mo- 
ment ; I fancy that I can discover something which will be 
more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid 
that they will scorn this explanation. What do you say to an- 
other ? 

Her. Let me hear. 

Soc. What is that which holds and carries and gives life and 
motion to the entire nature of the body ? What is that but 
the soul? 

Her. Just that. 

Soc. And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or 
soul is the ordering and containing principle of all things ? 

Her. Yes ; I do. 

Soc. Then you may well call that power cfyvaixrj which 
carries and holds nature, and this may be refined away into 
xj/v X v- 

Her. Certainly; and I think that this is a more scientific 
derivation. 

Soc. True ; and yet I cannot help laughing if I am to sup- 
pose that this is the original meaning. 

Her. But what shall we say of the next word ? 

Soc. You mean crQ>fia (the body). 

Her. Yes. 

Soc. That may be variously interpreted ; and yet more vari- 
ously if a little permutation is allowed. For some say that 
./he body is the grave (a-rj/xu) of the soul, which may be thought 
to be buried in our present life ; or again the index of the 
soul, because the soul indicates (o^aiVet) through the body ; 



420 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, and 
they were under the impression that the soul is suffering the 
punishment of sin, and that the body is an inclosure or prison 
in which the soul is incarcerated, kept (o-w/xa o-wf^rai), as the 
name o-w/xa implies, until the penalty is paid ; according to this 
view, not even a letter of the word need be changed. ■ — Cra- 
tylus, i. 638. 

Soul, harmony of, and form. See Harmony of, etc.-/ 
Soul, its part in our action./ 

Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an 

easy question — whether the soul has these three principles or 
not? 

*• An easy question ! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds 
that hard is the good. 

Very true, I said ; and I confess that the method which we 
are employing, in my judgment, seems to be altogether inade- 
quate to the accurate solution of this question ; for the true 
method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a 
solution not below the level of the previous inquiry. 

May we not be satisfied with that ? he said ; under the cir- 
cumstances, I am quite content. # 

I too, I replied, shall be extremely w T ell satisfied. 

Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said. 

Can I be wrong, I said, in acknowledging that in the indi- 
vidual there are the same principles and habits which there are 
in the State ? for if they did not pass from one to the other, 
whence did they come ? Take the quality of passion or spirit ; 
it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, which is 
characteristic of the Thracians, Scythians, and in general of 
the northern nations, when found in States, does not originate 
in the individuals who compose them ; and the same may be 
said of the love of knowledge, which is the special character- 
istic of our part of the world, or the love of money, which may, 
with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyp- 
tians. 

Exactly, he said. 

There is no difficulty in understanding this. 

None whatever. 

But the difficulty begins as soon as we raise the question 
whether these principles are three or one - ; whether, that is to 
say, we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with an- 
other, and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 421 

appetites ; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each 
sort of action — to determine that is the difficulty. 

Yes, he said, there lies the difficulty. — The Republic, ii. 261. 
Soul, disfiguration of the.-f 

Her immortality may be proven by the previous argument 

and by other arguments ; but to see her as she really is, not 
as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body 
and other miseries, you should look upon her with the eye of 
reason, in her original purity, and then her beauty would be 
discovered, and in her image justice would be more clearly seen, 
and injustice, and all the things which we have described. Thus 
far we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at 
present, but we must remember that we have seen her only in 
a condition which may be compared to that of the sea- God 
Glaucus, whose original image can hardly be discerned because 
his natural members are broken off and crushed, and in many 
ways damaged by the waves, and incrustations have grown over 
them of sea- weed and shells and stones, so that he is liker to 
some sea-monster than to his natural form. And the soul is 
in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not 
there, Glaucon, not there must we look. 

Where then? 

At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and 
what converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the 
immortal and eternal and divine ; 'also how different she would 
become if wholly following this superior principle, and borne 
by a divine impulse out of the ocean in which she now is, and 
disengaged from the stones and shells and things of earth and 
rock which in wild variety grow around her because she feeds 
upon earth, and is crusted over by the good things of this life 
as they are termed : then you would see her as she is, and 
know whether she have one form only or many, or what her 
nature is. Of her character and affections in this present life 
I have said enough. 

True, he said. — The Republic, ii. 440. 
Soul made prior to the body. See Corporeal essence. 
Soul, disorders of the. See Mind, etc. V 
Soul, compared to a vessel.^ 

I have heard a philosopher say that at this moment we 

are dead, and that the body (crco/xa) is a tomb (o-%*.a) and that 
the part of the soul which is the seat of the desires is liable to 
be blown and tossed about ; and some ingenious man, probably 



422 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

a, Sicilian or an Italian, playing with the word, invented a tale 
in which he called the soul a vessel (tti^os), meaning a believ- 
ing (jtl(ttck6s) vessel, and the ignorant he called the uninitiated 
or leaky, and the place in the souls of the uninitiated in which 
the desires are seated, being the intemperate and incontinent 
part, he compared to a vessel full of holes, because they can 
never be satisfied. He is not of your way of thinking, Calli- 
cles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades, meaning 
the invisible world (aeiSe?), these uninitiated or leaky persons 
are the most miserable, and that they carry water to a vessel 
which is full of holes in a similarly holey colander. The col- 
ander, as he declares, is the soul, and the soul which he com- 
pares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, which is full of 
holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a bad memory and 
want of faith. — Gorgias, iii. 81. 

Soul, effect of harmony and order in the. See Harmony, etc.^ 
Soul, health of body and. See Body, etc. 

Soul and body, two processes of training. See Body and soul, etc. 
Soul after death. - 

Whatever was the habit of the body during life would 

be distinguishable after death, either perfectly, or in a great 
measure and for a considerable time. And I should imagine 
that this is equally true of the soul, Callicles ; when a man is 
stripped of the body, all the natural or acquired affections of 
the soul are laid open to view. And when they come to the 
judge, as those from Asia come to Rhadamanthus, he places 
them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not know- 
ing whose the soul is : perhaps he may lay hands on the soul 
of the great king, or of some other king or potentate, who has 
no soundness in him, but his soul is marked with the whip, and 
is full of the prints and scars of perjuries, and crimes with 
which each action has stained him, and he is all crooked with 
falsehood and imposture, and has no straightness, because he 
has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full of 
deformity and disproportion, which is caused by license and 
luxury and insolence and incontinence, and dispatches him ig- 
nominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punish- 
ment which he deserves. — Gorgias, iii. 116. 
Soul, waxen heart of the. </ 

Soc. The explanation of truth and error is as follows : 

when the wax in the soul of any one is deep and abundant, 
and smooth and perfectly tempered, then the impressions which 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 423 

pass through the senses and sink into the [waxen] heart of 
the soul, as Homer says in a parable, meaning to indicate the 
likeness of the soul to wax {ktjp Krjpbs) — these, I say, being 
pure and clear, and having a sufficient depth of wax, are also 
lasting, and minds such as these easily learn and easily retain, 
and are not liable to confusion, but have true thoughts, for 
they have plenty of room, and having clear impressions of 
things, as we term them, quickly distribute them into their 
proper places on the block. And such men are called wise. 
Do you agree ? 

Theaet. Entirely. 

Soc. But when the heart of any one is shaggy, as the poet 
who knew everything says, or muddy and of impure wax, or 
very soft, or very hard, then there is a corresponding defect in 
the mind : the soft are good at learning, but apt to forget ; 
and the hard are the reverse ; the shaggy and rugged and 
gritty, or those who have an admixture of earth or dung in 
their composition, have the impressions indistinct, as also the 
hard, for there is no depth in them ; and the soft too are in- 
distinct, for their impressions are easily confused and effaced. 
Yet greater is the indistinctness when they are all jostled to- 
gether in a little soul, which has no room. These are the nat- 
ures which have false opinion ; for when they see or hear or 
think of anything, they are slow in assigning the right objects 
to the right impressions : in their stupidity they confuse them, 
and are apt to see and hear and think amiss ; and such men 
are said to be deceived in their knowledge of objects, and ig- 
norant. 

Theaet. No man, Socrates, can say anything truer than that. 
— Theaetetus, iii. 400. 
Soul, original and primeval. */ 

Aih. I suppose that I must repeat the singular argument 

of those who manufacture the soul according to their own im- 
pious notions; they affirm that which is the first cause of the 
generation and destruction of all things, to be not first but last, 
and that which was last to be first, and hence they have fallen 
into error about the true nature of the Gods. 

Ole. Still I do not understand you. 

Ath. Nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be ignorant of 
the nature and power of the soul, especially in what relates to 
her origin : they do not know that she is among the first of 
bodies, and before them all, and is the chief author of their 



424 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

changes and transpositions. And if this is true, and if the 
soul is older than the body, must not the things which are of 
the soul's kindred be of necessity before those which appertain 
to the body ? 

Cle. Certainly. 

Ath. Then thought and attention and mind and art and 
law will be prior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and 
light ; and the great and primitive works and actions will be 
works of art ; they will be the first, and after them will come 
nature and works of nature, which, however, is a wrong term to 
apply to them ; these will follow, and be under the govern- 
ment of art and mind. 

Cle, But why is the word u nature " wrong ? 

Ath. Because those who use the term mean to say that nat- 
ure is the first creative power ; but if the soul turn out to be 
the primeval element and not fire or air, then in the truest 
sense and beyond other things the soul may be said to have a 
natural or creative power : and this would be true if you 
proved that the soul is older than the body, but not otherwise. 

Cle. You are quite right. — Laivs, iv. 403. 
Soul, like a book. 

Soc. Well, now, I wonder whether you would agree in 

my explanation of this phenomenon. 

Pro. What is your explanation ? 

Soc. I think that the soul at such times is a like a book. 

Pro. How so ? 

Soc. Memory and perception meet, and they and their at- 
tendant feelings seem to me almost to write down words in the 
soul, and when the inscribing feeling writes, truly, then true 
opinion and true propositions grow in our souls, — but when 
the scribe within us writes falsely the result is false. 

Pro. I quite assent and agree to your statement. 

Soc. I must bespeak your favor also for another artist, who 
is busy at the same time in the chambers of the soul. 

Pro. Who is that ? 

Soc. The painter, who paints the images of the words which 
the scribe or registrar has already written down. 

Pro. But when and how does he do this ? 

Soc. When abstracting from sight, or some other sense, the 
opinions which he then received or the words which he heard, 
he retains the image of them in his mind ; that is a very com- 
mon mental phenomenon. 

Pro. Certainly. — Philebus, iii. 176. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 425 

Soul, divided, feelings' of body and. See Body and soul, mixtures of. 

Soul, envy, a pain of the. See Envy, etc. 

Soul, the just and wise. See Just, etc. 

Soul, definition of the. See Mind, movement of. 

Soul, prior to the body. See also Body and soul, etc. 

Ath. Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and 

absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, 
and that the body is second and conies afterwards, and is born 
to obey the soul which is the ruler ? 

Ole. Nothing can be more true. 

Ath. Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul 
was prior to the body the things of the soul were also prior to 
those of the body ? 

Cle. Certainly, 

Ath. And characters and manners, and wishes and reason- 
ings, and true opinions, and reflections, and recollections are 
prior to length and breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if 
the soul is prior to the body. 

Ole. Of course. 

Ath. In the next place, must we not of necessity admit that 
the soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honorable, just 
and unjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be 
the cause of all things ? 

Cle. Certainly. 

Ath. And as the soul orders and inhabits all things moving 
every way, must we not say that she orders also the heavens? 

Cle. Of course. 

Ath. One soul or more ? More than one — - I will answer for 
you ; at any rate, we must not suppose that there are less than 
two — one the author of good, and the other of evil. 

Cle. Very true. 

Ath. Yes, very true ; the soul then directs all things in 
heaven, and earth, and sea by her movements, and these are 
described by the terms — will, consideration, attention, delib- 
eration, opinion true and false, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, 
hatred, contentment, and other primary motions akin to these ; 
which again receive the secondary motions of corporate sub-* 
stances, and guide all things to growth and decay, to composi- 
tion and decomposition, and to the qualities which accompany 
them, such as heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness 
and softness, blackness and whiteness, bitterness and sweetness, 
and all those other qualities which the soul uses, herself a god- 



426 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

dess, when truly receiving the divine mind and disciplining all 
things rightly to their happiness ; but when the companion of 
folly, doing the very contrary of all this. Shall we assume 
this, or do we still entertain doubts ? 

Cle. There is no room at all for doubt. 

Ath. Shall we say, then, that soul is the nature which con- 
trols heaven and earth, and the whole world ? Is it the prin- 
ciple of wisdom and virtue, or that which has neither wisdom 
nor virtue ? Suppose that we make answer as follows : — 

Cle. How would you answer ? 

Ath. If, my friend, we say that the whole path of heaven, 
and the movement of all that is therein, is by nature akin to 
the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and pro- 
ceeds by kindred laws, then, as is plain, we must say that the 
best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good 
path. 

Cle. True. 

Ath. But when the world moves wildly and irregularly, then 
the evil soul guides it. 

Cle. True again. — Laws, iv. 408. 
Soul, sun and stars without. 

Ath. Are we assured that there are two things which lead 

men to believe in the Gods, as we have already stated? 

Cle. What are they ? 

Ath. One is the argument about the soul, which has been 
already mentioned — that it is the eldest and most divine of 
all things, to which motion attaining generation gives perpetual 
existence ; the other was an argument from the order of motion 
of the heavens, and of all things under the dominion of the 
mind which ordered the universe. If a man look upon the 
world not lightly or foolishly, there was never any one so god- 
less who did not experience an effect opposite to that which the 
many imagine. For they think that those who handle these 
matters by the help of astronomy, and the accompanying arts 
of demonstration, may become godless; because they see, as far 
as they can see, things happening by necessity, and not by an 
intelligent will accomplishing good. 

Cle. But what, then, is the fact ? 

Ath. Just the opposite of that opinion which once prevailed 
among men, that the sun and stars are without soul. Even in 
those days men wondered about them, and that which is now 
ascertained was then conjectured by some who had a more 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 427 

exact knowledge of them — that if they had been things with- 
out soul, and had no mind, they could never have moved ac- 
cording to such exact calculations ; and even at that time some 
ventured to hazard the conjecture that mind was the orderer 
of the universe. But these same persons, again mistaking the 
nature of the soul, which they conceived to be younger and 
not older than the body, once more overturned the world, or 
rather, I should say, themselves, for what they saw before their 
eyes in heaven, all appeared to be full of stones, and earth, 
and many other lifeless bodies, and to these they assigned the 
various causes of all things. Such studies gave rise to much 
atheism and perplexity, and the poets took occasion to be 
abusive, — comparing the philosophers to she-dogs, uttering 
vain howlings, and saying other nonsense of the same sort. 
But now, as I said, the case is reversed. 

Cle. How is that ? 

Aih. No man can be a true worshiper of the Gods who 
does not know these two principles — that the soul is the eld- 
est of all things born, and is immortal and rules over all bodies ; 
moreover, as I have now said several times, he who has not 
contemplated the mind of nature which is said to exist in the 
stars, and acquired the previous training, and seen the connec- 
tion of them with music, and harmonized them all with laws 
and institutions, is not able to give a reason of such things as 
have a reason. And he who is unable to acquire this in addi- 
tion to the ordinary virtues of a citizen, can hardly be a good 
ruler of a whole State ; but he should be the subordinate of 
other rulers. — Laws, iv. 477. 
Souls, punishment of. See Soul after death. 
Speech, common, having a divine meaning. 

His words are like the images of Silenus which open ; 

they are ridiculous when you first hear them : he clothes him- 
self in language that is as the skin of the wanton satyr — for 
his talk is of pack- asses and smiths and cobblers and curriers, 
and he is always repeating the same things in the same words, 
so that an ignorant man who did not know him might feel dis- 
posed to laugh at him ; but he who opens the mask and sees 
what is within will find that they are the only words which 
have a meaning in them, and also the most divine, abounding 
in fair examples of virtue, and of the widest comprehension, 
or rather extending to the whole duty of a good and honorable 
man. — The Symposium, i. 512. 



428 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Speech and thought. 

Theaet. Give me the knowledge which you would wish 

me to gain. 

Str. Is not thought the same as speech, with this exception : 
thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with her- 
self? 

Theaet Quite true. 

Str. But the stream of thought which flows through the 
lips and is audible is called speech. 

Theaet. True. 

Str. And we know that in speech there is affirmation and 
denial ? 

Theaet. Yes, that we know. 

Str. When the affirmation or denial takes place silently and 
in the mind only, what would you call that but opinion ? 

Theaet. There can be no other name. 

Str. And when this state of opinion is presented, not sim- 
ply, but in some form of sense, ought you not to call it phan- 
tasy ? 

Theaet. Certainly. 

Str. And seeing that language is true and false, and that 
thought is the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion 
is the end of thinking, and phantasy or imagination is the 
union of sense and opinion, the inference is that these also, as 
they are akin to language, should have an element of false as 
well as true ? 

Theaet. Certainly. — Sophist, iii. 504. 
Spherical form of the earth. See Earth, rotundity of the. 
Spiritual truths, uncertainty of. 

I dare say that you, Socrates, feel as I do, how very hard 

or almost impossible is the attainment of any certainty about 
questions such as these in the present life. And yet I should 
deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them 
to the uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had ex- 
amined them on every side. For he should persevere until he 
has attained one of two things : either he should discover or 
be taught the truth about them ; or, if this is impossible, I 
would have him take the best and most irrefragable of human 
theories, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through 
life — not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some 
word of God which will more surely and safely carry him. — * 
Phaedo, i. 414. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 429 

Spontaneous life. See Life. 

Starry heavens, the symbols of truth. See Heavenly bodies^ etc. 

Stars and sun, without soul. See Soul, sun and stars. 

State, loyalty to the. See Citizen, etc. 

State the, a parent. See Citizen, etc. 

State, authority of the. See Citizen, etc. 

State, right of the. See Citizen, etc. 

State, more than the individual. See Citizen, etc. 

State, rulers of the, who and what they must be. See Rulers. 

State, poetry expelled from the. See Poetry. 

State, origin of the. See Individual. 

State, lies for the good of the. See Lies. 

State, object of constructing the. 

■ How would you answer, Socrates, said he, if a person 

Were to say that you make your citizens miserable, and miser- 
able of their own accord; for they are the actual owners of 
the city, and are none the better ; whereas other men acquire 
lands, and build large and handsome houses, and have every- 
thing handsome about them, offering sacrifices to the Gods on 
their own account, and practicing hospitality ; moreover, as you 
were saying just now, they have gold and silver, and all that 
is usual among the favorites of fortune ; while our poor citi- 
zens are no better than mercenaries who are fixed in the city 
and do nothing but mount guard ? 

Yes, I said ; and you may add that they are only fed, and 
not paid, in addition to their food, like other men ; and there- 
fore they cannot make a journey % of pleasure, they have no 
money to spend on a mistress or any other luxurious fancy, 
which, as the world goes, is thought to be happiness ; and many 
other accusations of the same nature might be added. 

But, said he, let us suppose all that included in the charge. 

You mean to ask, I said, what is to be our answer ? 

Yes, he replied. 

If we proceed on the path along which we are already going, 
I said, my belief is that we shall find the answer. Even if our 
guardians were such as you describe, there would not be any- 
thing wonderful in their still being the happiest of men ; but 
let that pass, for our object in the construction of the State is the 
greatest happiness of the whole, and not that of any one class ; 
and in a State which is ordered with a view to the good of the 
whole, we think that we are most likely to find justice, and in 
the ill-ordered State injustice : and, having found them, we 



430 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

shall then be able to decide which of the two is the happier. 
At present we are constructing the happy State, not piecemeal, 
or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole ; 
and by and by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of 
State. If we were painting a statue, and some one were to 
come and blame us for not putting the most beautiful colors on 
the most beautiful parts of the body — for the eyes, he would 
say, ought to be purple, but they are black — -in that case we 
might fairly answer, sir, do not imagine that we ought to beau- 
tify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes ; but 
see whether, by giving this and the other features their due, we 
make the whole beautiful. And so I would say now, do not com- 
pel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness which will 
make them anything but guardians ; for we also should have no 
difficulty in clothing our husbandmen in fine linen, and setting 
crowns of gold on their heads, bidding them till the ground no 
more than they like. There would be nothing easier than to al- 
low our potters to repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, 
passing round the glittering bowl, while their wheel is conven- 
iently at hand, and working at pottery as much as they like, and 
no more ; in this way we may make every class happy — and 
then as you imagine, the whole State will be happy. But do not 
suggest this ; for, if we listen to you, the husbandman will be no 
longer a husbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and 
no class will have any distinct character. Now this is not of 
much importance where the corruption of society, and preten- 
sion to be what you are not, extends only to cobblers ; but 
when the guardians of the laws of the government are only 
seemers and not real guardians, that, you will observe, is the 
utter ruin of the State : as, on the other hand, with them 
alone rests the order and happiness of a State. If we then 
really mean that our guardians are to be the saviours and not 
the destroyers of the State, and the advocate of the other view 
is talking of peasants at a festival, enjoying a life of rev- 
elry, rather than fulfilling the duties of citizens, we mean dif- 
ferent things, and he is speaking of something which is not a 
State. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing 
our guardians we look to their greatest happiness, or whether 
this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State 
as a whole. But if so, the guardians and auxiliaries, and all 
others equally with them, must be compelled or induced to do 
their own work in the best way ; and then the whole State 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 431 

growing up in a noble order, the several classes will only have 
to receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to 
them. 

I think that you are quite right. — The Republic, ii. 243. 
State, unity in the. 

The State may increase to any size which is consistent 

with unity ; that, I think, is the limit. 

Very good, he said ; 

Here then, I said, is another order which will have to be 
conveyed to our guardians, — that our city is to be neither 
large nor small, but of such a size as is consistent with unity. 

And surely, said he, this is not a very severe order which 
we impose upon them* 

And the other, said I, of which we were speaking before, is 
lighter still, — I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the 
guardians when inferior, and of elevating the offspring of the 
lower classes, when naturally superior, into the rank of guar- 
dians. The intention was, that, in the case of the citizens gen- 
erally, we should put each individual man to the use for which 
nature designed him, and then every man would do his own 
business, and be one and not many, and the whole city would be 
one and not many. * 

Yes, he said ; there will be even less difficulty in that. 

These things, my good Adeimantus, are not, as might be 
supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care 
be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing, — - a thing, 
however, which I would rather call not great, but enough for 
our purpose. 

What may that be ? he asked. 

Education, I said, and nurture. For if our citizens are well 
educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their 
way through all this as well as other matters. — The Republic, 
ii. 247. 

State, courage in the. See Courage, etc. 
State, highest good in the. See Evil, etc. ; also Injustice. 
State, ideal philosophers to be kings in the. See Rulers, etc. 
State, philosophy in the. See Philosophy, etc. 
State, weakness in the. 

Where a body is weak the addition of a touch from with- 
out may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no 
external provocation, a commotion may arise within ; in the same 
way where there is weakness in the State there is also likely 



432 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

to be illness, of which the occasion may be very slight, one 
party introducing their democratical, the other their oligar- 
chical allies, and the State falls sick, and is at war with her- 
self and may be at times distracted, even when there is no ex- 
ternal cause ? — 

Yes surely. 

And then democracy comes into being after the poor have 
conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing 
some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of free- 
dom and power ; and this is the form of government in which 
the magistrates are commonly elected by lot. — The Republic, 
ii. 384. 
State, physician for the. 

Soc. If you and I were physicians, and were advising one 

another that we were competent to practice as State-physicians, 
should I not ask you, and would you not ask me, Well, but 
how about Socrates himself, has he good health ? and was any 
one else ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or free- 
man ? And I should make the same inquiries about you. 
And if we arrived at the conclusion that no one, whether citi- 
zen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better 
for the medical skill of either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, 
what an absurdity to think that we or any human being should 
be so silly as to set up as a State-physician, and advise others 
like ourselves to do the same, without having first practiced in 
private, whether successfully or not, and acquired experience of 
the art. Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar 
when you are learning the potter's art ; which is a foolish 
thing ? 

CaL True. — Gorgias, iii. 105. 
State, right and wrong" determined by the. See Right. 
State, education the foundation of the. See Education, etc. 
State, divine bonds in the. See Divine, etc. 
State, actual and ideal. 

Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way 

hither in the search after justice and injustice. 

True, he replied ; but what of this ? 

I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, 
we are to require that the just man should in nothing fail of 
absolute justice; or may we be satisfied with an approximation, 
and the attainment in him of a higher degree of justice than is 
to be found in other men ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 438 

The approximation will be enough. 

And we inquired into the nature of absolute justice, and into 
the character of the perfectly just man and the possibility of his 
existence, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust only that we 
might have an ideal. We were to look at them in order that 
we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness accord- 
ing to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in 
which we resembled them, not with any view of showing that 
they could exist in fact. 

True, he said. 

How would a painter be the worse painter because, after 
having painted with consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beau- 
tiful man, he was unable to show that any such man could ever 
have existed ? 

He would not. 

Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State ? 

To be sure. 

And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to 
prove the possibility of a city being ordered in the manner 
described ? 

Surely not, he replied. 

That is the truth, I said. * But if, at your request, I am to 
try and show how and under what condition the possibility is 
highest, I must ask you, having this in view, to repeat your 
former admissions. 

What admissions ? 

I want to know whether ideas are ever realized in fact ? 
Is not speech more than action and must not the actual, what- 
ever a man may think, fall short of the truth ? What do you 
say? 

I agree. 

Then you must not insist on my proving that the actual 
State will in every respect coincide with the ideal : if we are 
only able to discover how a city may be governed nearly as we 
proposed, you will admit that we have discovered the possibility 
which you demand ; and will be contented — will not you ? 

Yes, I will. — The Republic, ii. 299. 

State, a luxurious. 

The question which you would have me consider is, not 

only how a State, but how a luxurious State is to be created ; 

and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we 

shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice grow up, 
28 



434 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

I am certainly of opinion that the true and healthy constitution 
of the State is the one which I have described. But if you 
wish to see the State in a fever I have no objection. For I 
suppose that many will be dissatisfied with the simpler way of 
life. They will be for adding sofas, and tables, and other fur- 
niture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, 
and cakes, not of one sort only, but in profusion and variety ; 
we must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first 
speaking, such as houses and clothes and shoes ; and the arts of 
the painter and embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and 
gold and ivory and other materials of the arts will be required. 

True, he said. 

Then we must enlarge our borders ; for the original healthy 
State is too small. Now will the city have to fill and swell 
with a multitude of callings which are not required by any 
natural want ; such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, 
of whom one large class have to do with postures and colors, 
another are musicians ; there will be poets and their attendant 
train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors ; also makers 
of divers kinds of utensils, including women's ornaments. And 
we shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in re- 
quest, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well 
as confectioners and cooks ; and swineherds, too, who were not 
needed and therefore had no place in the former edition of our 
State, but are needed now ? They must not be forgotten : and 
there will be hosts of animals, if people are to eat them. 

Certainly. 

And living in this way we shall have much greater need of 
physicians than before ? 

Much greater. 

And the country which was enough to support the original 
inhabitants will be too small now, and not enough ? 

Quite true. 

Then a slice of our neighbor's land will be wanted by us for 
pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like 
ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give them- 
selves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth ? 

That, Socrates, will be unavoidable. 

And then we shall go to war, Glaucon, — that will be the 
next thing. 

So we shall, he replied. 

Then, without determining as yet whether war does good op 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS, 435 

harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have discovered 
.war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of 
almost all the evils in States, private as well as public. 

Undoubtedly. — The Republic, ii. 194. 
State, what most conduces to the excellence of the. 

Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own 

business, and not being a busybody ; we said so again and 
again, and many others have said the same. 

Yes, we said so. 

Then this doing in a certain way one's own business may be 
assumed to be justice. Do you know why ? 

I do not, and should like to be told. 

Because I think that this alone remains in the State when 
the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are 
abstracted ; and this is the ultimate cause and condition of the 
existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also 
their preservative ; and we were saying that if the three were 
discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one* 

That follows of necessity. 

Still, I said, if a question should arise as to which of these 
four qualities contributed most by their presence to the excel- 
lence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, 
or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law 
ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watch- 
fulness in the rulers would claim the palm, or whether this 
which I am about to mention, and which is found in children 
and women, bond and free, artisan, ruler, subject, is not the one 
which conduces most to the excellence of the State, — this 
quality, I mean, of every one doing his own work, and not be- 
ing a busybody, — the question would not be easily determined. 

Certainly, he replied, to answer the question would not be 
easy. 

Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own 
work appears to compete with the other virtues of wisdom, tem- 
perance, and courage? 

Yes, he said. 

And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice ? 

Exactly. 

Look at the matter in another light. Are not the rulers in 
a State those to whom you would intrust the office of de- 
termining causes ? 

Certainly. 



436 PLAfo's BEST TBOtJGBfiS. 

And they will act on the principle that individuals are neither 
to take what is another's, nor to be deprived of what is their 
own. 

Yes ; that will be their principle. 

Which is a just principle ? 

Yes. 

Then on this view, also, justice will be admitted to be the 
having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him ? 

That is true 

Let us not, I said, be over-positive as yet ; but if, on trial, 
this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as 
in the State, then there will be no longer any room for doubt ; 
if not, there must be another inquiry. Let us, however, finish 
the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under 
the impression that, if we could first examine justice on the 
larger scale, there would be less difficulty in recognizing her in 
the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, 
and accordingly we constructed one, as good a one as we could, 
knowing well that in the good State justice would be surely 
found. Let us now apply what we discovered there to the 
individual, and if they agree, we are satisfied ; or, if there be a 
difference in the individual, we will come back to the State 
and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two 
when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which 
justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed 
we will fix in our souls. 

That is reasonable ; and let us do as you say. — The Re* 
public, ii. 258. 
State, an allegory of the. 

1 perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having 

plunged me into such a hopeless discussion ; and now you shall 
hear the parable in order that you may judge better of the 
meagreness of my imagination: for the treatment which the 
the best men experience from their States is so grievous that no 
single thing on earth can be compared with them ; and there- 
fore if I would defend them I must have recourse to fiction, 
and make a compound of many things, like the fabulous unions 
of goats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine, then, 
a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and 
stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a 
similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not 
much better. Now the sailors are quarreling with one another 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 437 

about the steering ; every one is of opinion that he ought to 
steer, though he has never learned and cannot tell who taught 
him or when he learned, and will even assert that the art of 
navigation cannot be taught, and is ready to cut in pieces him 
who says the contrary. They throng about the captain, and do 
all that they can to make him commit the helm to them ; and if 
he refuses them and others prevail, they kill the others or throw 
them overboard, and having first chained up the noble captain's 
senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take 
possession of the ship and make themselves at home with the 
stores ; and thus, eating and drinking, they continue their voy- 
age with such success as might be expected of them. Him 
who is their partisan and zealous in the design of getting the 
ship out of the captain's hands into their own, whether by force 
or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, 
able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man and call him a 
good-for-nothing ; but they have not even a notion that the 
true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky 
and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art, if he 
intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship ; 
while at the same time he must and will be the steerer, 
whether other people like or not ; and they think that to com- 
bine the exercise of command with the steerer's art is impossi- 
ble. Now in vessels which are thus circumstanced, and among 
sailors of this class, how will the true pilot be regarded ? Will 
he not be called by the mutineers a prater, a star-gazer, a good- 
for-nothing ? 

Of course, said Adeimantus. 

I do not suppose, I said, that you would care to hear the in- 
terpretation of the figure, which is an allegory of the true phi- 
losopher in his relation to the State ; for you understand 
already. 

Certainly. — The Republic, ii. 314. 
State, well ordered, a waking reality. 

You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention 

of the legislator ; he did not aim at making any one class in 
the State happy above the rest ; the happiness was to be in the 
whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion 
and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and there- 
fore benefactors of one another ; to this end he created them, 
not that they should please themselves, but they were to be his 
instruments in binding up the State. 



438 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

True, he said, I had forgotten. 

Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in com- 
pelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others ; 
we shall explain to them that in other States, men of their 
class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics : and this 
is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and 
the government would rather not have them. Now the wild 
plant which owes culture to nobody, has nothing to pay for 
culture. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers 
of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and 
have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have 
been educated, and you are better able to share in the double 
duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go 
down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of 
seeing in the dark ; for all is habit ; and by accustoming your- 
selves you will see ten thousand times better than the dwellers 
in the den, and you will know what the images ar.e, and of 
what they are images, because you have seen the beautiful and 
just and good in their truth. And thus the order of our State 
and of yours will be a reality, and not a dream only, as the 
order of States too often is ; for in most of them men are 
fighting with one another about shadows and are distracted in 
the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. 
Whereas the truth is, that the State in which the rulers are 
most reluctant to govern is best and most quietly governed, and 
the State in which they are most willing, the worst. 

Quite true, he replied. 

And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to share in 
turn the toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the 
greater part of their time with one another in the heaven of 
ideas ? 

Impossible, he answered ; for they are just men, and the 
commands which we impose upon them are just ; there can be 
no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern neces- 
sity and not like our present ministers of State. 1 — The Repub- 
lic, ii. 346. 
State, the corrupting art of the advocate in the. 

There are many noble things in human life, but to most 

of them attach evils which corrupt and spoil them. Is not 
justice noble which has been the civilizer of humanity ? How 
then can the advocate of justice be other than noble ? And 
1 For the remainder of this thought see Office-Seekers. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 439 

yet upon this profession which is presented under the fair name 
of science, has come an evil reputation. In the first place, we 
are told that by ingenious pleas and the help of an advocate, 
the law enables a man to win a particular cause, whether just 
or unjust ; and that both the art and the power of speech 
which is thereby imparted are at the service of him who is 
willing to pay for them. Now, in 6ur State this so-called art, 
whether really an art or only an experience and practice desti- 
tute of any art, ought if possible never to come into existence, 
or if existing among us should listen to the request of the leg- 
islator and go away into another land, and not # speak contrary 
to justice. If the offenders obey we say no more ; but if they 
disobey let them hear the voice of the law : If any one thinks 
that he will pervert the power of justice in "the minds of the 
judges, and unseasonably litigate or advocate, let any one who 
likes indict him for malpractices of law and dishonest advo- 
cacy, and let him be judged in the court of select judges ; and 
if he be convicted let the court determine whether he may 
be supposed to act from a love of money or from contentious- 
ness. And if he be supposed to act from contentiousness, the 
court shall fix a time during which he shall not be allowed to 
institute or plead a cause ; and if he be supposed to act as he 
does from love of money, in case he be a stranger he shall 
leave the country, and never return under penalty of death ; 
but if he be a citizen he shall die, because he is a lover of 
money, however gained ; and equally, if he be judged to have 
acted more than once from contentiousness, he shall die. — 
Laws, iv. 449. 
State, the order of the. 

Aih. Do we not see that the city is the trunk, and are 

not the younger guardians, who are chosen lor their natural 
gifts, placed in the head of the State, having their souls all full 
of eyes, with which they look about the whole city? They 
keep watch and hand over their perceptions to the memory, 
and inform the elders of all that happens in the city ; and 
those whom we compared to the mind, because they have many 
wise thoughts — that is to say, the old men — take counsel, 
and making use of the younger men as their ministers, and ad- 
vising with them, — in this way both together truly preserve the 
whole State — Shall this be the order of our State, or shall 
we have some other order ? Shall we say that they are all 
alike the owners of the State, and not merely individuals 



440 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

among them, who have had the most careful training and 
education ? 

Cle. That, my good sir, is impossible. 

Ath. Then we ought to proceed to some more exact train- 
ing than that which has preceded. .... 

Gle. I bow to your authority, Stranger : let us proceed in 
the way which you propose: 

Ath. Then, as would appear, we must compel the guardians 
of our divine state to perceive, in the first place, what that 
principle is which is the same in all the four — the same, as 
we affirm, in courage and in temperance, and in justice and in 
prudence, and which being one, we call, as we ought, by the 
single name of virtue. To this, my friends, we will, if you 
please, hold fast, and not let go until we have sufficiently ex- 
plained what that is to which we are to look, whether to be 
regarded as one or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way. 
Are we likely ever to be in a virtuous condition, if we cannot 
tell whether virtue is many, or four, or one ? Certainly, if 
you will take our advice, we shall in some way contrive that 
this principle has a place amongst us ; but if you have made 
up your mind that we should let the matter alone, we will. — 
Laws, iv. 475. 
State, heroes who have died for the. 

Such were the actions of the men who are here interred, 

and of others who have died on behalf of their country ; many 
and glorious things I have told of them, and there are yet 
many more and more glorious things remaining to be told, 
which many days and nights would not suffice to tell. Let them 
not be forgotten, and let every man remind their descendants 
that they also are soldiers who must not desert the ranks of 
their ancestors, or fall behind from cowardice. Even as I ex- 
hort you this day, and in all future time, and on every occasion 
on which I meet with any of you, I shall continue to remind 
and exhort you, O ye sons of heroes, that you strive to be the 
bravest of men. And I think that I ought now to repeat to 
you what your fathers desired to have said to you who are 
their survivors, when they went out to battle, in case anything 
happened to them. I will tell you what I heard them say, and 
what, if they had only speech, they would fain be saying, judg- 
ing from what they then said. And you must imagine that 
you hear them saying what I now repeat to you. 

Sons, the event proves that your fathers were brave men ; 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 441 

for we might have lived dishonorably, but have preferred to 
die honorably rather than bring you and your children into 
disgrace, and rather than dishonor our fathers and forefathers ; 
considering that life is not life to one who is a dishonor to his 
race, and that to such an one neither men nor Gods are 
friendly, either while he is on the earth or after death in the 
world below. Remember our words, then, and whatever is 
your aim let virtue be the condition of the attainment of your 
aim, and know that without this all possessions and pursuits 
are dishonorable and evil. For neither does wealth bring 
honor to the owner, if he be a coward ; of such an one the 
wealth belongs to another, and not to himself. Nor does 
beauty and strength of body, when dwelling in a base and 
cowardly man, appear comely, but the reverse of comely, mak- 
ing the possessor more conspicuous, and manifesting forth his 
cowardice. And all knowledge, when separated from justice 
and virtue, is seen to be cunning and not wisdom ; wherefore 
make this your first and last and only and everlasting desire, 
that if possible you may exceed not only us but all your an- 
cestors in virtue ; and know that to excel you in virtue only 
brings us shame, but that to be excelled by you is a source of 
joy to us. And we shall most likely be defeated, and you will 
most likely be victors in the contest, if you learn so to order 
your lives as not to misuse or waste the reputation of your an- 
cestors, knowing that to a man who has any self-respect, noth- 
ing is more dishonorable than to be honored, not for his own 
sake, but on account of the reputation of his ancestors. The 
honor of parents is a fair and noble treasure to their posterity, 
but to have the use of a treasure of wealth and honor, and to 
leave none to your successors, because you have neither money 
nor reputation of your own, is alike base and dishonorable. 
And if you follow our precepts you will be received by us as 
friends, when the hour of destiny brings you hither; but if 
you neglect our words and are disgraced in your lives, no one 
will receive you friendly. This is the message which is to be 
delivered to our children. — Menexenus, iv. 576. 
State, the mother of her citizens. 

To the State we would say : — Let her take care of our 

parents and sons, educating the one in principles of order, and 
worthily cherishing the old age of the other. But we know 
that she will of her own accord take care of them, and does 
not need exhortation from us. 



442 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

These, ye children and parents of the dead, are the words 
which they bid us proclaim to you, and which I do proclaim to 
you with the utmost good-will. And on their behalf I be- 
seech you, the children, to imitate your fathers, and you, par- 
ents, to be of good cheer about yourselves ; for we will nour- 
ish your age, and take care of you both publicly and privately 
in any place in which one of us may meet one of you who are 
the parents of the dead. And the care which the city shows 
you yourselves know ; for she has made provision by law con- 
cerning the parents and children of those who die in war ; and 
the highest authority is specially intrusted with the duty of 
watching over them above all other citizens, in order to see 
that there is no wrong done to them. She herself takes part 
in the nurture of the children, desiring as far as it is possible 
that their orphanhood may not be felt by them ; she is a par- 
ent to them while they are children, and when they arrive at 
the age of manhood she sends them to their several duties, 
clothing them in armor ; she displays to them and recalls to 
their minds the pursuits of their fathers, and puts into their 
hands the instruments of their fathers' virtues ; for the sake of 
the omen, she would have them begin and go to rule over their 
own houses arrayed in the strength and arms of their fathers. 
And she never ceases honoring the dead every year, celebrat- 
ing in public the rites which are proper to each and all ; and 
in addition to this, holding gymnastic and equestrian festivals, 
and musical festivals of every sort. She is to the dead in the 
place of a son and heir, and to their sons in place of a father, 
and to their parents and elder kindred in the place of a pro- 
tector — ever and always caring for them. Considering this, 
you ought to bear your calamity the more gently : for thus 
you will be most endeared to the dead and to the living, and 
your sorrows will heal and be healed. And now do you and 
all, having lamented the dead together in the usual manner, go 
your ways. — Menexenus, iv. 578. 
States destroyed by ignorance. See Ignorance, etc. 

Ath. Consider what is really the greatest ignorance. I 

should like to know whether you and Megillus would agree 
with me about this : for my opinion is — 

Gle. What? 

Ath. That the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that 
which he nevertheless thinks to be good and noble, and loves 
and embraces that which he knows to be unrighteous and evil 



PLATO S BEST THOUGHTS. 443 

This disagreement between the sense of pleasure and the judg- 
ment of reason in the soul is, in my opinion, the worst igno- 
rance ; and the greatest too, because affecting the great mass 
of the human soul; for the principle which feels pleasure and 
pain in the individual, is like the mass or populace in a State. 
And when the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or 
reason, which are her natural lords, that I call folly, just as in 
the State, when the multitude refuses to obey their rulers and 
the laws ; or, again, in the individual, when fair reasonings 
have their habitation in the soul and yet do no good, but rather 
the reverse of good. All these cases I term the worst igno- 
rance, whether in individuals or in States. I am not speaking, 
Stranger, as you will understand, of the ignorance of handi- 
craftsmen. 

Cle. Yes, my friend, we understand and agree. 

Ath. Let this, then, in the first place declare and affirm that 
the citizen who does not know these things ought never to 
have any kind of authority intrusted to him ; he must be stig- 
matized as ignorant, even though he be skillful in calculation 
and versed in all sorts of accomplishments, and feats of mental 
dexterity ; and the opposite are to be called wise, even al- 
though, in the words of the proverb, they know neither how 
to read nor how to swim ; and to them, as to men of sense, 
authority is to be committed. For, O my friends, how can 
there be the least shadow of wisdom when there is no har- 
mony ? There is none ; but the noblest and greatest of har- 
monies may be truly said to be the greatest wisdom ; and of 
this he is a partaker who lives according to reason ; whereas 
he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and 
the opposite of the saviour of the State : he is ignorant of 
political wisdom. — Laws, iv. 218. 

Statesmen, are they good teachers of virtue ? See Virtue, etc. 
— — Any. Have there not been many good men in this city ? 

Soc. Yes, certainly, Anytus : and many good statesmen also 
there always have been, and there are still, in the city of Ath- 
ens. But the question is whether they were also good teachers of 
their own virtue ; — not whether there are, or have been, good 
men, but whether virtue can be taught, is the question which 
we have been discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the 
good men of our own and of other times knew how to impart 
to others that virtue which they had themselves ; or is this vir- 
tue incapable of being communicated or imparted by one man 






444 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

to another? That is the question which I and Meno have 
been arguing. Look at the matter in your own way. Would 
you not admit that Themistocles was a good man ? 

Any. Certainly ; no man better. 

Soc. And must not he then have been a good teacher, if 
any man ever was a good teacher, of his own virtue ? 

Any. Yes, certainly, — if he wanted to be that. 

Soc. But would he not have wanted ? He would, at any 
rate, have desired to make his own son a good man and a gen- 
tleman ; he could not have been jealous of him, or have inten- 
tionally abstained from imparting to him his own virtue. Did 
you never hear that he made Cleophantus, who was his son, a 
famous horseman ? — he would stand upright on horseback and 
hurl a javelin ; and many other marvelous things he could do 
which his father had him taught ; and in anything which the 
skill of a master could teach him he was well trained. Have 
you not heard from our elders of this ? 

Any. I have. 

Soc. Then no one could say that^ his son showed any want 
of capacity ? 

Any. Possibly not. 

Soc. But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hear- 
ing that Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, was a wise or 
good man, as his father was? 

Any. I have certainly never heard that. 

Soc. And if virtue could have been taught, would his father 
Themistocles have sought to train him in minor accomplish- 
ments, and allowed him who, as you must remember, was his 
own son, to be no better than his neighbors in those qualities 
in which he himself excelled ? 

Any. Indeed, indeed I think not. 

Soc. Here, then, is a teacher of virtue whom you admit to 
be among the best men of the past. — Meno, i. 268. 
Statesmen, called divine. 

Soc. Not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, 

did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke gov- 
ern States. And this was the reason why they were unable to 
make others like themselves, — because their virtue was not 
grounded on knowledge. 

Men. That is probably true, Socrates. 

Soc. But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which 
remains is that statesmen must have guided States by right 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 445 

opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion ; for 
diviners and also prophets say many things truly, but they know 
not what they say. 

Men. Very true. 

Soc. And may we not, Meno, truly call those men divine 
who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand 
deed and word?' 

Men. Certainly. 

Soc. Then we shall also be right in calling those divine 
whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, 
as well as all poets. Yes, and statesmen, above all, may be said 
to be divine and illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, 
in which condition they say many grand things, not knowing,, 
what they say. 

Men. Yes. 

Soc. And the women too, Meno, call good men divine ; and 
the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say " that he is a 
divine man." 

Men. And I think, Socrates, that they are right ; although 
very likely our friend Anytus may take offense at the word. — 
Meno, i. 275. 

Statesmen and politicians distinguished. See Politicians, etc. 
Strangers, treatment of. 

— In his relations to strangers, a man should consider that a 

contract is a most holy thing, and that all concerns and wrongs 
of strangers are more directly dependent on the protection of 
God, than the wrongs done to citizens ; for the stranger having 
no kindred and friends, is more to be pitied by Gods and men. 
Wherefore, also, he who is most able to assist him is most zeal- 
ous in his cause ; and he who is most able is the divinity and 
God of the stranger, who follows in the train of Zeus, the God 
of strangers. And for this reason, he who has a spark of cau- 
tion in him, will do his best to pass through life without sinning 
against the stranger. And of offenses committed, whether 
against strangers or fellow-countrymen, that against suppliants 
is the greatest. For the God who witnessed to the agreement 
made with the suppliant, becomes in a special manner the guar- 
dian of the sufferer ; and he will certainly not suffer unavenged. 
— Laws, iv. 255. 

Strength, physical, inferior to persuasion. See Legislation and Per* 
suasion. 



446 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Style, mixed and unmixed. 

Suppose, I answered, that a just and good man in tho 

course of narration comes on some saying or action of another 
good man, — I should imagine that he will like to personate 
him, and will not be ashamed of this sort of imitation : he will 
be most ready to play the part of the good man when he is 
acting firmly and wisely ; in a less degree when his steps falter, 
owing to sickness or love, or again from intoxication or any 
other mishap. But when he comes to a character which is un- 
worthy of him, he will not make a study of that ; he will dis- 
dain his inferiors, and will wear their likeness, if at all, for a 
moment only when they are doing some good ; at other times 
he will be ashamed to play a part which he has never practiced, 
nor will he like to fashion and frame himself after the baser 
models ; he feels that the serious use of such an art would be 
beneath him, and his mind revolts at it. 

That is what I should expect, he replied. 

Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have 
illustrated out of Homer, that is to say, his style will be both 
imitative and narrative ; but there will be very little of the 
former, and a great deal of the latter. Do you agree ? 

Certainly, he said ; that is the model which such a speaker 
must necessarily take. 

But another sort of character will narrate anything, and the 
wdrse he is the more unscrupulous he will be ; nothing will be 
beneath him : moreover, he will be ready to imitate anything, 
not as a joke, but in right good earnest, and before a large 
audience. As I was just now saying, he will attempt to repre- 
sent the roll of thunder, the rattle of wind and hail, or the 
creaking of wheels and pulleys, and the various sounds of flutes, 
pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of instruments ; also he will bark 
like a dog, bleat like a sheep, and crow like a cock ; his entire 
art will consist in imitation of voice and gesture, and there will 
be very little narration. 

That, he said, will be his mode of speaking. 

These, then, are the two kinds of style ? 

Yes. 

And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is 
simple and has but slight changes ; and if the harmony and 
rhythm are also chosen for their simplicity, the result is that 
the speaker, if he speaks correctly, is always pretty much the 
same in style, and keeps within the limits of a single harmony 






PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 447 



(for the changes are not great), and also keeps pretty nearly 
the same rhythm ? 

That is quite true, he said. 

Whereas the other style requires all sorts of harmonies and 
all sorts of rhythms, if the music is to be expressive of the 
variety and complexity of the words ? 

That is also perfectly true, he replied. 

And do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, com- 
prehend all poetry, and every form of expression in words ? 
No one can say anything except in one or other of them, or in 
both together ? 

They include all, he said. 

And shall we receive one or both of the two pure styles ? or 
would you include the mixed ? 

I should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue. 

Yes, I said, Adeimantus ; but the mixed style is also very 
charming : and indeed the pantomimic, which is the oppo- 
site of the one chosen by you, is the most popular style 
with children and their instructors, and with the world in 
general. 

I do not deny it. 

But I suppose you mean to say that such a style is unsuita- 
ble to our State, in which human nature is not twofold or mani- 
fold, for one man plays one part only ? 

Yes ; quite unsuitable. — The Republic, ii. 220. 

Substitution and succession in life. See Unity, etc., the greatest. 
Suffering, community of. See Evil, etc. 
Suffering evil, less than doing it. See Injustice. 
Suffering, intermediate state between pleasure and. See Interme- 
diate, etc. 
Sufficiency of the good. 

Soc. And is not and was not this a further point which 

was conceded between us — 

Pro. What was the point ? 

Soc. That the good differs from all other things ? 

Pro. In what way ? 

Soc. In that the being who possesses good always, every- 
where, and in all things, has the most perfect sufficiency, and 
is never in need of anything else. 

Pro. Exactly. 

Soc. And did we not endeavor to make an ideal division of 
them into two distinct lives, so that pleasure was wholly ex- 






448 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

eluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part 
whatever in pleasure ? 

Pro. That we did. 

Soc. And did we think that either of them alone would be 
sufficient ? 

Pro. Certainly not. 

Soc. And if we erred in any point, then let any one who 
will, take up the inquiry again, and assuming memory and wis- 
dom and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same 
class, let him consider whether he would desire to possess or 
acquire, I will not say pleasure, however abundant or intense, 
if he has no real perception that he is pleased, nor any con- 
sciousness of what he feels, nor any recollection, however mo- 
mentary, of the feeling, — but would he desire to have anything 
at all, if these were wanting to him ? And about wisdom I 
ask the same question ; can you conceive that any one would 
choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather 
than having a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure de- 
void of wisdom, rather than having a certain degree of wis- 
dom ? 

Pro. Certainly not, Socrates ; but why repeat such ques- 
tions any more ? — Philebus, iii. 201. 

* Summum Bonum" in the State. See Evil, the greatest, etc., and 

Good, greatest. 
Sun and stars without soul. See Soul, etc. 
Superhuman knowledge. See Knowledge. 
Suspicious character, a. 

■ Your cunning and suspicious character, who has com- 
mitted many crimes and fancies himself to be a master in 
wickedness when he is among men who are like himself, is 
wonderful in his precautions against others, because he judges 
of them by himself: but when he gets into the company of 
men of virtue, who have the experience of age, he appears to 
be a fool again, owing to his unseasonable suspicion ; he can- 
not recognize an honest man, because he has nothing in himself 
which will tell him what an honest man is like ; at the same 
time, as the bad are more numerous than the good, and he 
meets with them oftener, he thinks himself and others think 
him rather wise than foolish. — The Republic, ii. 234. 
Symbols, the starry heavens are. See Heavenly bodies. 
Symbols, metallic, of races. See Metallic, etc. 






PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 449 

Talents, natural. 

Come, now, and we will ask you a question : — when you 

said that one man has natural gifts and another not, was this 
your meaning ? — that the former will acquire a thing easily 
which the latter will have a difficulty in acquiring ; a little 
learning will lead the one to discover a great deal ; whereas 
the other, after a great deal of learning and application, will 
only forget what he has learned ; or again, you may mean, that 
the one has a body which is a good servant to his mind, while 
the body of the other is at war with liis mind —would these 
be the sort of differences which distinguish the man of capac- 
ity from the man who is wanting in capacity ? 

The existence of such differences, he said, will be univer- 
sally allowed. — The Republic, ii. 279. 
Talking, idle. See Idle. 
Taste, what is a true. See Life, the nobler. 
Teachers, skillful and unskillful. 

As Lysimachus and Melesias, in their anxiety to improve 

the minds of their sons, have asked our advice about them, we 
too should tell them who our teachers were, if we say that we 
have had any, and prove them to be men of merit and expe- 
rienced trainers of the minds of youth and really our teachers. 
Or if any of us says that he has no teacher, but that he has 
works to show of his own ; then he should point out to them, 
what Athenians or strangers, bond or free, he is generally ac- 
knowledged to have improved. But if he can show neither 
teachers nor works, then he should tell them to look out for 
others ; and not run the risk of spoiling the children of friends, 
which is the most formidable accusation that can be brought 
against any one by those nearest to him. As for myself, Lysim- 
achus and Melesias, I am the first to confess that I have never 
had a teacher ; although I have always from my earliest youth 
desired to have one. But I am too poor to give money to the 
Sophists, who are the only professors of moral improvement ; 
and to this day I have never been able to discover the art my- 
self, though I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches may 
have learned or discovered it ; for they are far wealthier than 
I am, and may therefore have learnt of others. And they are 
older too ; so that they have had more time to make the discov- 
ery. And I really believe that they are able to educate a 
man ; for unless they had been confident in their own knowl- 
edge, they would never have sooken thus decidedly of the pur* 
29 



450 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

suits which are advantageous or hurtful to a young man. I 
repose confidence in both of them ; but I am surprised to find 
that the j differ from one another. And therefore, Lysima- 
chus, as Laches suggested that you should detain me, and not 
let me go until I answered, I in turn earnestly beseech and ad- 
vise you to detain Laches and Nicias, and question them. I 
would have you say to them : Socrates avers that he has 
no knowledge of the matter, — he is unable to decide which 
of you speaks truly ; neither discoverer nor student is he of 
anything of the kind. But you, Laches and Nicias, should 
either of you tell us who is the most skillful educator whom 
you have ever known ; and whether you invented the art 
yourselves, or learned of another ; and if you learned, who 
were your respective teachers, and who were their brothers in 
the art ; and then, if you are too much occupied in politics to 
teach us yourselves, let us go to them, and present them with 
gifts, or make interest with them, or both, in the hope that 
they may be induced to take charge of all our families, in or- 
der that they may not grow up inferior, and disgrace their an- 
cestors. But if you are yourselves original discoverers in that 
field, give us some proof of your skill. Who are they who, 
having been inferior persons, have become under your care 
good and noble ? For if this is your first attempt at educa- 
tion, there is a danger that you may be trying the experiment 
not on the " vile corpus " of a Carian slave, but on your own 
sons, or the sons of your friend, and as the proverb says, 
" Break the large vessel in learning to make pots." — Laches, 
i. 78. 

Teachers, lawyers not. See Lawyers, etc. 
Temperance and modesty. _ See Modesty, etc. 
Temperance and justice. See Justice, etc. 
Temperance, harmony of. See Harmony, etc. 
Temperate man, the. 

Ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has 

the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or 
spirited principle to be the subject and ally ? 

Certainly. 

And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and 
gymnastic will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining 
the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating and 
soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion with harmony 
and rhythm? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 451 

Quite true, he said. 

And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having 
learned truly to know their own functions, will rule over the 
concupiscent part of every man, which is the largest and most 
insatiable ; over this they will set a guard, lest waxing great 
with the fullness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, and no 
longer confined to her own sphere, the concupiscent soul should 
attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural-born 
subjects, and overturn the whole life of man ? 

Very true, he said. 

The two will be the defenders of the whole soul and the 
whole body against attacks from without; the one counseling, 
and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously exe- 
cuting his commands and counsels. 

True. 

And he is to be deemed courageous in whom the element of 
spirit holds fast in pain and in pleasure the command of reason 
about which he ought or ought not to fear? 

Right, he replied. 

And he is wise who has in him that little part which rules 
and gives orders ; that part being supposed to have a knowl- 
edge of what is for the interest of each and all of the three 
other parts ? 

Assuredly. 

And would you not say that he is temperate who has these 
same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling 
principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and de- 
sire, are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not 
rebel ? 

Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance, 
whether in the State or individual. — The Republic, ii. 268. 
Temperate and intemperate life, the. 

Let us say that the temperate life is one kind of life, and 

the rational another, and the courageous another, and the 
healthful another ; and to these four let us oppose four other 
lives, — the foolish, the cowardly, the intemperate, the dis- 
eased. He who knows the temperate life will describe it as in 
all things gentle, having gentle pains and gentle pleasures, and 
placid desires and loves not insane ; whereas the intemperate 
life is impetuous in all things, and has violent pains and pleas- 
ures, and vehement and stinging desires, and loves utterly in- 
sane ; and in the temperate life the pleasures exceed the pains 



452 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

and in the intemperate life the pains exceed the pleasures in 
greatness and number and intensity. Hence one of the two 
lives is naturally and necessarily more pleasant and the other 
more painful, and he who would live pleasantly cannot possibly 
choose to live in temperately. And if this is true, the inference 
clearly is that no man is voluntarily intemperate ; but that the 
whole multitude of men lack temperance in their lives, either 
from ignorance or from want of self-control or both. And the 
same holds of the diseased and healthy life ; they both have 
pleasures and pains, but in health the pleasure exceeds the 
pain, and in sickness the pain exceeds the pleasure. Now, our 
intention in choosing the lives is not that the painful should 
exceed, but the life in which pain is exceeded by pleasure we 
determine to be the more pleasant life. And we should say 
that the temperate life has the elements both of pleasure and 
pain fewer and minuter and less concentrated than the intem- 
perate. — Laws, iv. 259. 
Temperate man, duty of the. 

And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both 

in relation to Gods and to men ; for he would not be temperate 
if he did not ? Certainly he will do what is proper. In his re- 
lation to other men he will do what is just ; and in his relation 
to the Gods he will do what is holy ; and he who does what is 
just and holy cannot be other than just and holy ? Very true. 
And he must be courageous, for the duty of a temperate man is 
not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, 
whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to 
endure when he ought ; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate 
man being as we have described, also just and courageous and 
holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the 
good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he 
does : and he who does well must of necessity be happy and 
blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable : now this 
latter is he whom you were applauding — ■ the intemperate, who 
is the opposite of the temperate. Such is my position which 
I assert to be true, and if I am right then I affirm that he 
who desires to be happy must pursue and practice temper- 
ance and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will 
carry him ; he had better order his life so as not to need pun- 
ishment. — Gorgias, iii. 98. 
Thought, boldness in. See Boldness, 
Thought and speech. See Speech. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 453 

Time, science of. See Science. 

Trade, ruining virtue. See Money, a ruler. 

Trade, men of, their money-sting. See Business men. 

Traditional forms adhered to. 

Ath. Long ago in Egypt they appear to have recognized 

the very principle of which we are now speaking — that their 
young citizens must be habituated to forms and strains of vir- 
tue. These they fixedj and exhibited the patterns of them in 
their temples ; and no painter or artist is allowed to innovate 
upon them, or to leave the traditional forms and invent new 
ones. To this day, no alteration is allowed either in these arts, 
or in music at all. And you will find that their works of art 
are painted or moulded in the same forms which they had ten 
thousand years ago ; this is literally true and no exaggeration, 
«=■* their ancient paintings and sculptures are not a whit better 
or worse than the work of to-day, but are made with just the 
same skill. 

Cle. How extraordinary ! 

Ath, I should rather say, how wise and worthy of a great 
legislator ! I know that other things in Egypt are not so good* 
But what I am telling you about music is true and deserving 
of consideration, because showing that a lawgiver may institute 
melodies which have a natural truth and correctness without 
any fear of failure* To do this, however, must be the work 
of God, or of a divine person ; in Egypt they have a tradi- 
tion that their ancient chants are the composition of the God- 
dess Isis. And therefore, as ' I was saying, if a person could 
only find in any way the natural melodies, he might confidently 
embody them in a fixed and legal form. For the love of nov- 
elty which arises out of pleasure in the new, and weariness of 
the old, has not strength enough to vitiate the consecrated song 
and dance, under the plea that they have become antiquated. 
At any rate they are far from being antiquated in Egypt. — 
Laws , iv. 186. 

Transformation of man. See Man, etc. 
Truth, ridicule, no test of. See Ridicule. 
Truthfulness must characterize the lover of learning. See Learn* 

ing. 
Truths, spiritual, uncertainty of. See Spiritual, etc. 
Tyrant, produced from a protector. See Protector, 
Tyrant and king distinguished. See King, 






454 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

Unity in the State. See State, unity, etc. 
Unity and individuality. See Individuality, etc. 
Unjust, misery of the. See Misery, etc. 

Vanity of youth. See Self-conceit. 

Virtue, can it be taught ? See Statesmen, are they good teachers f 

The best and wisest of our citizens are unable to impart 

their political wisdom to others : as, for example, Pericles, the 
father of these young men, who gave them excellent instruc- 
tion in all that could be learned from masters, in his own de- 
partment of politics neither taught them nor gave them 
teachers, but they were allowed to wander at their own free- 
will, in a sort of hope that they would light upon virtue of 
their own accord. Or take another example : There was 
Cleinias the younger brother of our friend Alcibiades, of whom 
this very same Pericles was the guardian ; and he being in 
fact under the apprehension that Cleinias would be corrupted 
by Alcibiades, took him away, and placed him in the house of 
Ariphron to be educated ; but before six months had elapsed, 
Ariphron sent him back, not knowing what to do with him. 
And I could mention numberless other instances of persons 
who were good themselves, and never yet made any one else 
good, whether friend or stranger. Now I, Protagoras, having 
before me these examples, am inclined to think that virtue can- 
not be taught. But then, again, when I listen to your words, I 
am disposed to waver ; and I believe that there must be some- 
thing in what you say, because I know that you have great ex- 
perience, and learning, and invention. And I wish that you 
would, if possible, show me a little more clearly that virtue 
can be taught. — Protagoras, i. 120. 
Virtue, the gift of God. 

Soc. To sum up our inquiry, — the result seems to be, if 

we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural 
nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. 
Nor is the instinct accompanied by reason, unless there may be 
supposed to be among statesmen any one who is also the edu- 
cator of statesmen. And if there be such an one, he may be 
said to be among the living what Tiresias was among the dead, 
who " alone," according to Homer, " of those in the world 
below has understanding; but the rest flit as shades;" and 
he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality among 
shadows. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 455 

Men. That is excellent, Socrates. 

Soc. Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the 
virtuous by the gift of God. — Meno, i. 276. 
Virtue, the basis and bond of love. See Love, etc. 
Virtue and justice, rewards of. See Justice, etc. 
Virtue, not by chance, but order. 

The virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instru- 
ment or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to 
them not by chance but as the result of the order and truth 
and art which are imparted to them. Am I not right ? I main- 
tain that I am. And is not the virtue of each thing dependent 
on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which 
makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? 
That is my view. And is not the soul which has an order of 
her own better than that which has no order of her own ? 
Certainly. — Gorgias, iii. 98. 

Virtue, laws answering to. See Lmvs answering to, etc. 
Virtue, the law-giver's aim. 

Ath. Remember, my good friend, what I said at first about 

the Cretan laws, that they looked to one thing only, and this, 
as you both agreed, was war ; and I replied that such laws, in 
so far as they tended to promote virtue, were good : but in 
that they regarded a part only, and not the whole of virtue, I 
disapproved of them. And now I hope that you in your turn 
will follow and watch me if I legislate with a view to anything 
but virtue, or only with a view to a part of virtue. For I 
consider that the true law-giver, like an archer, aims only at 
that on which some eternal beauty is always attending, and dis- 
misses everything else, whether wealth or any other benefit, 
when separated from virtue. — Laws, iv. 233. 
Voice, inner. See Inner. 

War, women, and children. 

You agree then, I said, that men and women are to have 

a common way of life such as we have described — common 
education, common children ; and they are to watch over the 
citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going out to 
war ; they are to guard together, and to hunt together like 
dogs ; and always and in all things women are to share with 
the men ? And in so doing they will act for the best and will 
not violate, but preserve the natural relation of the sexes. 
I agree with you, he replied. 



456 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

The inquiry, I said, has yet to be made, whether such a 
community will be found possible — - as among other animals so 
also among men — and if possible, in what way possible ? 

That, he said, is just the question which I was going to ask. 

There is no difficulty I said, in seeing how war will be 
carried on by them. 

How ? 

Why, of course they will go on expeditions together ; and 
will take with them any of their children who are strong 
enough, that, like the children of artisans in general, they may 
look on at the work, which they will have to do when they 
are grown up ; and besides looking, on they will be able to 
help and be of use in war, and to wait upon their fathers and 
mothers. Did you never observe in the arts how the potters' 
boys look on and help, long before they touch the wheel ? 

Certainly. 

And shall potters be more careful than our guardians in ed- 
ucating their children and giving them the opportunity of see- 
ing and practicing their duties ? 

The notion would be ridiculous, he said. 

There is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with 
other animals, the presence of their cubs will be the greatest 
incentive to valor. 

That is quite true, Socrates ; and yet if they are defeated 
which may often happen in war, how great the danger is ! the 
children will be lost as well as their parents, and the State will 
never recover. 

True, I said; but would you never allow them to run any risk? 

I am far from saying that. 

Well, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not run 
the risk when there is a chance of their improvement ? 

Clearly. — The Republic, ii. 293. 
War and discord. See Discord. 
War, geometry in. See Geometry. 
"War of Gods and giants. See Essence, etc. 
War, two kinds of. 

Ath. Come, now, and let us all join in asking this ques- 
tion of Tyrtaeus : most divine poet, we will say to him, the 
excellent praise which you have bestowed on those who excel 
in war sufficiently proves that you are wise and good, and I 
and Megillus and Cleinias of Cnosus do, as I believe, entirely 
agree with you. But we should like to be quite sure that we 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 457 

are speaking of the same men ; tell us, then, do you agree with 
us in thinking that there are two kinds of war ; or what would 
you say ? A far inferior man to Tyrtaeus would have no diffi- 
culty in replying quite truly, that there are two kinds of war, 
— one which is universally called civil war and is, as we were 
just now saying, of all wars the worst ; the other, as we should 
all admit, in which we fall out with other nations who are of a 
different race, is a far milder form of warfare. 

Cle. Certainly, far milder. 

Ath. Well, now, when you praise and blame war in this 

high-flown strain, whom are you praising or blaming, and to 

which kind of war are you referring ? I suppose that you 

must mean foreign war, if I am to judge from expressions of 

yours in which you say that you abominate those — 

" Who refuse to look upon fields of blood, and will not draw near and strike at 
their enemies. '» 

And we shall naturally go on to say to him, — You, Tyrtaeus, 
certainly appear to praise those who distinguish themselves in 
external and foreign war ; and he must admit this. 

Cle. Certainly. — Laws, iv. 160. 
War, expeditions of. 

— - Now for expeditions of war much consideration and many 
laws are required ; the great principle of all is that no one of 
either sex should be without a commander; nor should the 
mind of any one be accustomed to do anything either in jest 
or earnest of his own motion, but in war and in peace he 
should look to and follow his leader, and in the least things be 
under his guidance ; for example, he should stand or move, or 
exercise, or wash, or take his meals, or get up in the night to 
keep guard and deliver messages when he is bidden ; and in 
the hour of danger he should not pursue and not retreat ex- 
cept by order of his superior ; and in a word, not teach the 
soul or accustom her to know or understand how to do any- 
thing apart from others. Of all soldiers the life should be in 
common and together ; there neither is nor ever will be a 
higher, or better, or more scientific principle than this for the 
attainment of salvation and victory in war. And from youth 
upwards we ought to practice this habit of commanding others, 
and of being commanded by others ; anarchy should have no 
place in the life of man or of the beasts who are subject to 
man. I may add that all dances ought to be performed with a 
it-view to military excellence, and agility and ease should be cul* 



458 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

tivated with a similar view ; and also endurance of the want 
of meats and drinks, and winter cold and summer heat, and 
hard couches ; and, above all, care should be taken not to destroy 
the natural qualities of the head and the feet by surrounding 
them with extraneous coverings, and so hindering their natural 
growth of hair and soles. For these are the extremities, and 
of all the parts of the body, whether they are preserved or not 
is of the greatest consequence ; the one is the servant of the 
whole body and the other the master in whom all the ruling 
senses are by nature set. Let the young man, when I say 
this, imagine that he hears the praises of the military life ; 
and the law shall be as follows : He shall serve in war who is 
enrolled or appointed to some special service, and if any one 
wrongly absents himself, and without the leave of the generals, 
he shall be indicted before the military commanders for fail- 
ure of service when the army comes home. — Laws, iv. 452. 
Warriors, gentleness of. See Gentleness, etc. 
Warfare, naval. See Minos. 
Wars, civil, how arising. 

When a young man who has been brought up as we are just 

now describing, in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones' 
honey and has come to associate with fierce and dangerous nat- 
ures who are able to provide for him all sorts of refinements 
and varieties of pleasure, — then, as you may imagine, the 
change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into 
the democratical. 

Inevitably. 

And as in the city like was helping like, and the change 
was effected by an alliance from without assisting one division 
of the citizens, so the young man also changes by a class of 
desires from without assisting the unsatisfied desires within him, 
that which is akin and alike again helping that which is akin 
and alike. 

Certainly. 

And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical princi- 
ple within him, whether the influence of friends or kindred, ad- 
vising or rebuking him, then there arises a faction and an op- 
posite faction, and the result is a civil war. 

It must be so. — The Republic, ii. 388. 
Wealth and poverty equally deteriorating. 

There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the 

arts. 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 459 

What are they ? 

Wealth, I said, and poverty. 

How do they act ? 

The process is as follows : When a potter becomes rich he 
no longer takes the same pains with his art ? 

Certainly not. 

He grows more and more indolent and careless ? 

Very true. 

And the result is that he becomes a worse potter ? 

Yes ; he greatly deteriorates. 

But, on the other hand, if he has no money, and is unable 
to buy tools or instruments, he will not work equally well him- 
self, nor will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally 
well. 

Certainly not. 

Then workmen, and also their works, are apt to degenerate 
under the influence both of poverty and of wealth ? 

That is evident. 

Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, which the 
guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city 
unobserved. 

What evils ? 

Wealth, I said, and poverty ; for the one is the parent of 
luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and vicious- 
ness, and both of discontent. — The Republic, ii. 245. 
Wickedness, the road to. 

Ath. I should wish the citizen to be as receptive of virtue 

as possible ; this will surely be the aim of the legislator in all 
his laws is evident. 

Cle. Certainly. 

Ath. What I have been proposing appears to me to have 
some use ; for a person will listen with more gentleness and 
good-will to the precepts addressed to him by the legislator, 
when his soul is not altogether unprepared to receive them. 
Even a little done in the way of conciliation gains his ear, and 
is always worth having. For there is no great inclination or 
readiness on the part of mankind to be made as good, or as 
quickly good, as possible. The case of the many proves the 
wisdom of Hesiod, who says that the road to wickedness is 
smooth and very short, and there is no need of perspiring : — 

" But before virtue the immortal Gods have placed the sweat of 
labor, and long and steep is the way thither, and rugged at first 



460 PLATO'S BEST THOUGMTS. 

but when you have reached the top, then, however difficult, it be- 
comes easy. 

Gle. Yes ; and he certainly speaks Well. — Laws, iv. 246. 
Wine, divers effect of. 

* Soc. The wine which I drink when I am in health, ap- 
pears sweet and pleasant to me ? 

Theaet. True. 

Soc. For, as has been already acknowledged, the patient 
and agent meet together and produce sweetness and a percep- 
tion of sweetness, which are in simultaneous motion, and the 
perception which comes from the patient makes the tongue 
percipient, and the quality of sweetness which arises out of 
and is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be and 
to appear sweet to the healthy tongue. 

Theaet Certainly ; that has been already acknowledged. 

Soc. But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon me as 
if I were another and a different person ? 

Theaet. Yes. 

Soc. The combination of the draught of wine, and the Soc- 
rates who is sick, produces quite another result which is the 
sensation of bitterness in the tongue, and the motion and crea- 
tion of bitterness in the wine, which becomes not bitterness but 
bitter ; as I myself become not perception but percipient ? 

Theaet. True. — Theaetetus, iii. 360. 
"Wine, forbidden. 

Ath. I have first to add a crown to my discourse about 

drink. 

Gle. What more would you say ? 

Ath. I should say that if a city seriously means to adopt this 
practice of drinking, under due regulation and with a view to 
the enforcement of temperance, and in like manner, and on 
the same principle, will allow of other pleasures, designing to 
gain the victory over them — in this way all of them may be 
used. But if the State makes drinking an amusement only, and 
whoever likes may drink whenever he likes, and with whom he 
likes, and add to this any other indulgences, I shall never agree 
or allow that this city or this man should adopt such a usage of 
drinking. I would go farther than the Cretans and Lacedae- 
monians, and am disposed rather to the law of the Carthagin- 
ians, that no one while he is on a campaign should be allowed 
to taste wine at all; but I would say that he should drink 
water during all that time, and that in the city no slave, male 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 461 

or female, should ever drink wine ; and that no rulers should 
drink during their year of office, nor pilots of vessels, nor 
judges while on duty should taste wine at all ; nor any one 
who is going to hold a consultation about any matter of impor- 
tance, nor in the daytime at all, unless in consequence of exer- 
cise or as medicine ; nor again at night, when any one, either 
man or woman, is minded to get children. There are number- 
less other cases, also, in which those who have good sense and 
good laws ought not to drink wine, so that if what I say is 
true, no city will need many vineyards. Their husbandry and 
their way of life in general will follow an appointed order, and 
their cultivation of the vine will be the most limited and mod- 
erate of their employments. And this, Stranger, shall be the 
crown of my discourse about wine, if you agree. 

Cle. Excellent : we agree. — Laws, iv. 203. 
Wine-drinking, a bad practice. 

« Socrates took his place on the couch and supped with the 

rest ; and then libations were offered, and after a hymn had 
been sung to the God, and there had been the usual ceremo- 
nies, they were about to commence drinking when Pausanias 
said : And now my friends, how can we drink with least injury 
to ourselves ? I can assure you that I feel severely the effect of 
yesterday's potations and must have time to recover, and I 
suspect that most of you are in the same predicament, for you 
were of the party yesterday. Consider this. He would there- 
fore ask, How can the drinking be made easiest ? 

I entirely agree, said Aristophanes, that we should, by all 
means, avoid hard drinking, for I was myself one of those who 
were yesterday drowned in drink. 

I think that you are right, said Eryximachus the son of 
Acumenus ; but I should like to hear one other person speak. 
What are the inclinations of our host ? 

I am not able to drink, said Agathon. 

Then, said Eryximachus, the weak heads like myself, Aris- 
todemus, Phaedrus, and others who never can drink, are for- 
tunate in finding that the stronger ones are not in a drinking 
mood. (I do not include Socrates, who is able either to drink 
or to abstain, and will not mind whichever we do.) Well, as 
none of the company seem disposed to drink much, I may be 
forgiven for saying, as a physician, that drinking deep is a bad 
practice, which I never follow if I can help, and certainly do 
not recommend to another, least of all to any one who still 
feels the effects of yesterday's carouse. 



462 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

I always do what you advise, and especially what you pre- 
scribe as a physician, rejoined Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian, and 
the rest of the company, if th,ey are wise, will do the same. 

All agreed that drinking was not to be the order of the day. 
— The Syposium, i. 471. 
"Wise and just soul. See Just, etc. 
Wisdom, as differing from other sciences. 

1 want to know what is that which is not wisdom, and of 

which wisdom is the science ? 

That is precisely the old error, Socrates, he said. You come 
asking in what wisdom differs from the other sciences ; and then 
you try to discover some respect in which they are alike : but 
they are not, for all the other sciences are of something else, 
and not of themselves ; wisdom alone is a science of other 
sciences, and of itself. And of this, as I believe, you are very 
well aware ; and that you are only doing what you denied that 
you were doing just now, trying to refute me, instead of pursu- 
ing the argument. 

And what if I am ? How can you think that I have any 
other motive in refuting you but what I should have in exam- 
ining into myself ? which motive would be just a fear of my 
unconsciously fancying that I knew something of which I was 
ignorant. And at this moment I pursue the argument chiefly 
for my own sake, and perhaps in some degree also for the sake 
of my other friends. For is not the discovery of things as 
they truly are a common good to all mankind? 

Yes, certainly, Socrates, he said. 

Then, I said, be cheerful, sweet sir, and give your opinion in 
answer to the question which I asked, never minding whether 
Critias or Socrates is the person refuted ; attend only to the 
argument, and see what will come of the refutation. 

I think that you are right, he replied ; and I will do as you 
say. 

Tell me, then, I said, what you mean to affirm about wisdom. 

I mean, he said, that wisdom is the only science which is the 
science of itself and of the other sciences as well. 

But the science of science, I said, will also be the science of 
tjie absence of science. 

Very true, he said. 

Then the wise or temperate man, and he only, will know 
himself, and be able to examine what he knows or does not 
know, and see what others know, and think that they know and 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 463 

do really know ; and what they do not know, and fancy that 
they know, when they do not. No other person will be able 
to do this. And this is the state and virtue of wisdom, or 
temperance, and self-knowledge, which is just knowing what 
a man knows, and what he does not know. That is your 
view ? 

Yes, he said — Charmides, i. 21. 
Wisdom, advantages of. 

What profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom 

or temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom ? If, indeed, 
as we were supposing at first, the wise man had been able to 
distinguish what he knew and did not know, and that he knew 
the one and did not know the other, and to recognize a similar 
faculty of discernment in others, there would certainly have 
been a great advantage in being wise, for then we should never 
have made a mistake, but have passed through life the unerring 
guides of ourselves and of those who were under us ; and we 
should not have attempted to do what we did not know, but we 
should have found out those who knew, and confided in them ; 
nor should we have allowed those who were under us to do 
anything which they were not likely to do well ; and they 
would be likely to do well just that of which they had knowl- 
edge ; and the house or state which was ordered or administered 
under the guidance of wisdom, and everything else of which 
wisdom was the lord, would have been well ordered ; for truth 
guiding, and error having been expelled, in all their doings, 
men would have done well, and would have been happy. Was 
not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of 
wisdom — to know what is known and what is unknown to us ? 

Very true, he said. 

And now you perceive, I said, that no such science is to be 
found anywhere. 

I perceive, he said. 

May we assume, then, I said, that wisdom, viewed in this 
new light merely as a knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, 
has this advantage — that he who possesses such knowledge 
will more easily learn anything which he learns ; and that 
everything will be clearer to him, because, in addition to the 
knowledge of individuals, he sees the science, and this also will 
better enable him to test the knowledge which others have of 
what he knows himself ; whereas the inquirer who is without 
this knowledge may be supposed to have a feebler and weaker 



464 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

insight ? Are not these, my friend, the real advantages which 
are to be gained from Wisdom ? And are not we looking and 
seeking after something more than is to be found in her ? 

That is very likely, he said. — Charmides, i. 28. 
Wisdom, the sway of. 

^— — Let us suppose that wisdom is such as we are now defin- 
ing, and that she has absolute sway over us ; then each action 
will be done according to the arts or sciences, and no one pro- 
fessing to be a pilot when he is not, or any physician or gen- 
eral, or any one else pretending to know matters of which he 
is ignorant, will deceive or elude us ; our health will be im- 
proved ; our safety at sea, and also in battle, will be assured ; 
our coats and shoes, and all other instruments and implements 
will be well made, because the workmen will be good and true. 
Aye, and if you please, you may suppose that prophecy, which 
is the knowledge of the future, will be under the control of 
Wisdom, and that she will deter deceivers and set up the true 
prophet in their place as the revealer of the future. Now I 
quite agree that mankind, thus provided, would live and act 
according to knowledge, for wisdom would watch and prevent 
ignorance from intruding on us. But we have not as yet dis- 
covered why, because we act according to knowledge, we act 
well and are happy, my dear Critias. 

Yet I think, he replied, that if you discard knowledge you 
will hardly find the crown of happiness in anything else. — 
Charmides, i. 30. 
Wisdom, a means of good. 

You perceive that in things which we know every one 

will trust us, — Hellenes and barbarians, men and women, — 
and we may do as we please about them, and no one will like 
to interfere with us ; we shall be free, and masters of others ; 
and these things will be really ours, for we shall be benefited 
by them. But in things of which we have no understanding, 
no one will trust us to do as seems good to us — they will 
hinder us as far as they can ; and not only strangers, but father 
and mother, and the friend, if there be one, who is dearer still, 
will also hinder us ; and we shall be subject to others ; and 
these things will not be ours, for we shall not be benefited by 
them. Do you admit that? 

He assented. 

And shall we be friends to others ? and will any others love 
us, in as far as we are useless to them ? 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 465 

Certainly not. 

Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can any- 
body love anybody else, in as far as they are useless to them ? 

No. 

And therefore, my boy, if you are wise, all men will be 
your friends and kindred, for you will be useful and good ; but 
if you are not wise, neither father, nor mother, nor kindred, 
nor any one else, will be your friends. And in matters of 
which you have as yet no knowledge can you have any conceit 
of knowledge ? 

That is impossible, he replied. 

And you, Lysis, if you require a teacher, have not as yet 
attained to wisdom. 

True. 

And therefore you are net conceited, having nothing of which 
to be conceited ? 

Indeed, Socrates, I think not. — Lysis, i. 48. 
Wisdom makes men fortunate. 

— — In what company shall we find a place for wisdom — 
among the goods or not ? 

Among the goods. 

And now, I said, think whether we have left out any consid- 
erable goods. 

I do not think that we have, said Cleinias. 

Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have 
left out the greatest of them all. 

What is that ? he asked. 

Fortune, Cleinias, I replied ; which all, even the most fool- 
ish, admit to be the greatest of goods. 

True, he said. 

On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, son of Axio 
chus, have you and I escaped making a laughing-stock of our- 
selves to the strangers. 

Why do you say that? 

Why, because we have already spoken of fortune, and are 
but repeating ourselves. 

What do you mean ? 

I mean that there is something ridiculous in putting fortune 
again forward, and saying the same thing twice over. 

He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied : 
Surely wisdom is good fortune ; even a child may know that. 

The simple-minded youth was amazed ; and, observing this, 
30 



466 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

I said to him : Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute-players 
are most fortunate and successful in performing on the flute ? 

He assented. 

And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and read- 
ing letters ? 

Certainly. 

Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate 
on the whole than wise pilots ? 

None, certainly. 

And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would 
you rather take the risk — in company with a wise general, or 
with a foolish one ? 

With a wise one. 

And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a com- 
panion in a dangerous illness — a wise physician, or an igno- 
rant one ? 

A wise one. 

You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more for- 
tunate than to act with an ignorant one? 

He assented. 

Then wisdom always makes men fortunate : for by wisdom 
no man would ever err, and therefore he must act rightly and 
succeed, or his wisdom would be wisdom no longer. 

We contrived at last somehow to agree in a general conclu- 
sion, that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then 
recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You 
remember, I said, our making the admission that we should be 
happy and fortunate if many good things were present with 
us? 

He assented. 

And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good 
things, if they profited us not, or if they profited us ? 

If they profited us, he said. 

And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not 
use them ? For example, if we had a great deal of food and 
did not eat, or a great deal of drink and did not drink, should 
we be profited ? 

Certainly not, he said. — Euthydemus, i. 181. 
Wisdom through the touch. 

How I wish, said Socrates, taking his place as he was de- 
sired, that wisdom could be infused by touch, out of the fuller 
into the emptier man, like water which is poured through wool 



PLATO 9 S BEST THOUGHTS. 467 

out of a fuller vessel into an emptier one ; in that case how 
much I should prize sitting by you ! For you would have 
filled me full of much and beautiful wisdom, in comparison of 
which my own is of a very mean and questionable sort, no 
better than a dream ; but yours is bright and only beginning, 
and was manifested forth in all the splendor of youth the day 
before yesterday, in the presence of more than thirty thousand 
Hellenes. 

You are mocking, Socrates, said Agathon, and ere long you 
and I will have to settle who bears off the palm of wisdom. — 
The Symposium , i. 471. 
Wise endurance. See Courage, 
"Wit, no bar to progress. See Ridicule, etc. 
Wives, community of. See Community, etc. 
Woman, only a lesser man. 

Can you mention any pursuit of man in which the male 

sex has not all these qualities in a far higher degree than the 
female ? Need I waste time in speaking of the art of weav- 
ing, and the management of pancakes and preserves, in which 
womankind does really appear to be great, and in which for 
her to be beaten is the most absurd of all things ? 

You are quite right, he replied, in maintaining the general 
inferiority of the female sex ; at the same time many women 
are in many things superior to many men, though speaking 
generally, what you say is true. 

And so, I said, my friend, in the administration of a State 
neither a woman as a woman, nor a man as a man has any 
special function, but the gifts of nature are equally diffused in 
both sexes ; all the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women 
also, and in all of them a woman is only a weaker man. 

Very true. — The Republic, ii. 280. 
Woman, ambitious. See Ambitious, etc. 
Women and war. See War. 
Wonder is philosophic. 

Soc. I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a 

true insight into your nature when he said that you were a 
philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher and 
philosophy begins in wonder ; he was not a bad genealogist who 
said that Iris, the messenger of heaven, is the child of Thaumas 
(wonder). — Theaetetus, iii. 356, 
Words, a lie in, an imitation. 
I do not comprehend you. 



468 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

The reason is I replied, that you attribute some grand mean- 
ing to me ; but I am only saying that deception, or being de- 
ceived or uninformed about realities in the highest faculty, 
which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold 
the lie, is what mankind least like ; — that, I say, is what they 
utterly detest. 

There is nothing more hateful to them. 

And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul 
of him who is deceived may be called the true lie ; for the lie 
in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of a 
previous affection of the soul, not pure unadulterated falsehood. 
Am I not right ? 

Perfectly right. — The Republic, ii. 205. 
Words, opposition of. See Contradiction, etc. 
World, future state of. See Future state, etc. 
World, made immortal. See Immortal, etc. 
Writing, and painting. See Painting. 
Wrong-doing, disgrace of. 

Sue. I certainly think that I and you and every man do 

really believe, that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injus- 
tice : and not to be punished than to be punished. 

Pol. And I should say neither I nor any man ; would you 
yourself, for example, suffer rather than do injustice ? 

Soc. Yes, and you, too ; I or any man would. 

Pol. Quite the reverse ; neither you, nor I, nor any man. 

Soc. But will you answer ? 

Pol. To be sure, I will ; for I am curious to hear what you 
are going to say. 

Soc. Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose 
that I am beginning at the beginning : — Which of the two, 
Polus, in your opinion, is the worst? — to do injustice or to 
suffer ? 

Pol. I should say that suffering was worst. 

Soc. And which is the greater disgrace? — Answer. 

Pol. To do. — Gorgias, iii. 61. 
Wrong-doing, judgment for, to be sought. 

Soc. To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of 

evils ; but to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and 
greatest of all ? 

Pol. That is true. 

Soc. Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend ? 
You deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 469 

criminal and unpunished : I, on the other hand, maintained that 
he or any other who like him has done wrong and has not been 
punished, is and ought to be, the most miserable of all men ; 
and that the doer of injustice, whether Archelaus or any other, 
is more miserable than the sufferer ; and he who escapes pun- 
ishment, more miserable than he who suffers. Was not that 
what I said ? 

Pol. Yes. 

Soc. And that has been proved to be true ? 

Pol. Certainly. 

Soc. Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use 
of rhetoric ? If we admit what has been just now said, every 
man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, 
for he will thereby suffer great evil ? 

Pol. True. 

Soc. And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does 
wrong, he ought of his own accord to go where he will be im- 
mediately punished; he will run to the judge, as he would to 
the physician, in order that the disease of injustice may not be 
rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul ; 
must we not allow that, Polus, if our former admissions are to 
stand ? and is there any other inference which is consistent whh 
them? 

Pol. To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer. 

Soc. Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a 
man to excuse his own injustice, or that of his parents or friends, 
or children or country ; but may be of use to any one who 
holds that instead of excusing he ought to . accuse — himself 
above all, and in the next degree, his family, or any of his 
friends who may be doing wrong ; if he does not want to con- 
ceal, but to bring to light the iniquity, that the wrong-doer may 
suffer and be healed, and if he would force himself and others 
to stand firm, closing their eyes manfully, and letting the phy- 
sician cut, as I may say, and burn them, in the hope of attain- 
ing the good and the honorable, not regarding the pain ; but if 
he have done things worthy of stripes, allowing himself to be 
scourged, or if of bonds to be bound, or if of a fine to be 
fined, or if of exile to be exiled, or if of death to die, and 
himself being the first to accuse himself, and his own rela- 
tions, and using rhetoric to this end, that his and their just ac- 
tions may be made manifest, and that they themselves may be 
delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil. Them. Po- 



470 PLATO 9 S BEST THOUGHTS. 

lus, rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say " Yes " or 
" No " to that ? 

Pol. To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very 
strange, though probably in agreement with your premises. 

Soc. Is not this the conclusion if the premises are not dis- 
proven ? 

Pol. Yes ; that is true. 

Soc. And from the opposite point of view of doing harm to 
some one, whether he be an enemy or not — I except the case 
in which I am myself suffering injury at the hands of another, 
for I must take precautions against that — but if my enemy in- 
jures a third person, then in every sort of way by word as well 
as deed, I should try to prevent his being punished, or appear- 
ing before the judge ; and if he appears, I should contrive that 
he should escape, and not suffer punishment: if he has stolen a 
sum of money, let him keep and spend what he has stolen on 
him and his, regardless of religion and justice ; and if he have 
done things worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be im- 
mortal in his wickedness ; or, if this is not possible, let him at 
any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. — Gorgias^ iii. 68. 
Wrong-doing, responsibility and voluntariness in. 

Soc. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought 

to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies 
both of himself and of the State, acting so that he may have 
temperance and justice present with him and be happy, not 
suffering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the never-ending 
desire to satisfy them leading a robber's life. Such an one is 
the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of com- 
munion, and he who is incapable of communion is also inca- 
pable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that 
communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and 
justice bind together heaven and earth and Gods and men, and 
that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not dis- 
order or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philoso- 
pher you seem to me never to have observed that geometrical 
equality is mighty, both among Gods and men ; you think that 
you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not care 
about geometry. Well, then, either the principle that the 
happy are made happy by the possession of justice and temper- 
ance, and the miserable miserable by the possession of vice, 
must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the conse- 
quences ? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 471 

and about which you asked me whether I was in earnest when 
I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his son and his 
friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he should 
use his rhetoric — all these consequences are true. And that 
which you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty 
is also true, viz: that to do injustice, if more disgraceful than 
to suffer is in that degree worse ; and the other position which 
according to Polus Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that he 
who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and have a 
knowledge of justice — has also turned out to be true. And 
now, let us proceed in the next place, to consider whether you 
are right in throwing in my teeth that I am unable to help my- 
self or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save them in the 
extremity of danger, or that I am like an outlaw to whom any 
one may do what he likes ; he may box my ears, which was a 
brave saying of yours; or he may take away my goods or 
banish me, or even do his worst and kill me, and this, as you 
say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which 
has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated 
once more. I tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears 
wrongfully is not the worst evil that can befall a man, nor to 
have my face and purse cut open, but that to smite and slay 
me and mine wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil ; 
aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at 
all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to 
the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer. These 
truths, which have been already set forth as I state them in 
the previous discussion, would seem now, if I may use an ex- 
pression which is certainly bold, to have been fixed and riveted 
by us in iron and adamantine bonds ; and unless you or some 
other still more enterprising hero shall break them, there is no 
possibility of denying what I say. For what I am always say- 
ing is, that I know not the truth about these things, and yet 
that I have never known anybody who could say anything else, 
any more than you can, and not be ridiculous. This has 
always been my position, and if this position is a true one, and 
if injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and 
yet there is if possible a greater than the greatest evils, in an 
\njust man not suffering retribution, what is that defense with- 
out which a man will be truly ridiculous? Must not the de- 
fense be one which will avert the greatest of human evils ? 
And will not the worst of all defenses be that with which a 



472 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends ? 
and next will come that which is unable to avert the next 
greatest evil ; thirdly, that which is unable to avert the third 
greatest evil ; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of 
evil so is the honor of being able to avert them in their several 
degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am 
I not right, Callicles ? 

Gal. Yes, quite right. 

Soc. Seeing, then, that there are these two evils, the doing 
injustice and the suffering injustice, — and we affirm that to do 
injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil, — 
how can a man succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the 
one of not doing and the other of not suffering injustice — 
must he have the power or only the will to obtain them ? I 
mean whether a man will escape injustice if he has only the 
will to escape, or must he have provided himself with the 
power ? 

Gal. He must have provided himself with the power ; that 
is clear. 

Soc. And what do you say of doing injustice ? Is the will 
only sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice. 
or must he have provided himself with power and art; and if 
he have not studied and practiced will he be unjust still ? 
Surely you might say, Callicles, whether you think that Polus 
and I were right in admitting to the conclusion that no one 
does wrong voluntarily, but that all do wrong against their 
will? 

Gal. Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done. — Gor- 
gias, iii. 99. 
Wrong-doing. See Injustice. 

Young men, training of. 

Youth instructed in military arts. See Military arts. 

You have never acquired the knowledge of the most 

beautiful kind of song in your military way of life, which is 
modeled after the camp, and is not like that of dwellers in 
cities ; and you have your young men herding and feeding to- 
gether like young colts. No one takes his own individual colt 
and drags him away from his fellows against his will, raging 
and foaming, and gives him a groom for him alone, and trains 
and rubs him down privately, and gives him the qualities in 
education which will make him not only a good soldier, but 



PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 473 

also a governor of a state and of cities. Such an one, as we 
were saying at first, would be a greater warrior than he of 
whom Tyrtaeus sings ; and he would honor courage every- 
where, but always as the fourth, and not as the first part of 
virtue, either in individuals or States. — Laws, iv. 196. 
Youth, philosophy in early. See Philosophy. 
Youth to be tested by trial. 

-r Therefore, as I was just now saying, we must inquire 

who are the best guardians of their own conviction that the 
interest of the State is to be the rule of all their actions. We 
must watch them from their youth upwards, and make them 
perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to 
be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to 
be selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected. That 
will be the way ? 

Yes, 

And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts pre- 
scribed for them, in which they will give further proof of the 
same qualities. 

Very right, he replied. 

And then, I said, we must try them with enchantments ™ 
that is the third sort of test — and see what will be their be- 
havior : like those who take colts amid noises and cries to see 
if they are of a timid nature, so must we take our youth amid 
terrors of some kind, and again pass them into pleasures, and 
try them more thoroughly than gold is tried in the fire, in or- 
der to discover whether they are armed against all enchant- 
ments, and of a noble bearing always, good guardians of them- 
selves and of the music which they have learned, and retain- 
ing under all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious 
nature, such as will be most serviceable to the man himself and 
to the State. And he who at every age, as boy and youth 
and in mature life, has come out of the trial victorious and 
pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the State ; he 
shall be honored in life and death, and shall receive sepulture 
and other memorials of honor, the greatest that we have to 
give. — The Republic, ii. 238. 
Youth, the avaricious. See Miserly men. 
Youth, self-conceit of. See Self-conceit. 
Youthful genius. See Genius, etc. 
Youth and children, education of. See Children, etc. 
Ath. Let me once more recall our doctrine of right edu- 



474 PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. 

cation ; which, if I am not mistaken, depends on the due reg* 
ulation of convivial intercourse. 

Cle. You talk rather grandly. 

Ath. Pleasure and pain I maintain to be the first percep- 
tions of children, and I say that they are the forms under 
which virtue and vice are originally present to them. As to 
wisdom and true and fixed opinions, happy is the man who ac- 
quires them, when declining in years ; and he who possesses 
them, and the blessings which are contained in them, is a per- 
fect man. Now, I mean by education that training which is 
given by suitable habits to the first instincts of virtue in chil- 
dren ; when pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred, are 
rightly implanted in souls not yet capable of understanding the 
nature of them, and who find them, after they have attained 
reason, to be in harmony with her. This harmony of the soul, 
when perfected, is virtue ; but the particular training in respect 
of pleasure and pain, which leads you always to hate what you 
ought to hate, and love what you ought to love, from the be- 
ginning to the end, may be separated off ; and, in my view, will 
be rightly called education. 

Cle. I think, Stranger, that you are quite right in all that 
you have said and are saying about education. 

Ath. I am glad to hear that you agree with me ; for, in- 
deed, the true discipline of pleasure and pain which, when 
rightly ordered, is a principle of education, has been often re- 
laxed and corrupted in human life. And the Gods, pitying 
the toils which our race is born to undergo, have appointed 
holy festivals, in which men alternate rest with labor ; and 
have given them the Muses, and Apollo the leader of the 
Muses, and Dionysus, as the partners in their revels, that they 
may improve what education they have, at the festivals of the 
Gods, and by their aid. I should like to know whether a com- 
mon saying is true to nature or not. For what men say is 
that the young of all creatures cannot be quiet in their bodies 
or in their voices ; they are always wanting to move, and cry 
out ; at one time leaping and skipping, and overflowing with 
sportiveness and delight at something, and then again uttering 
all sorts of cries. But, whereas other animals have no percep- 
tion of order or disorder in their movements, that is, of rhythm 
or harmony, as they are called, to us, the Gods, who, as we say, 
have been appointed to be our partners in the dance, have 
given the pleasurable sense of harmony and rhythm 



PLATO 9 S BEST THOUGHTS. 475 

Ath. The inference at which we arrive for the third or 
fourth time is, that education is the constraining and directing 
of youth towards that right reason, which the law affirms, and 
which the experience of the best of our elders has agreed to 
be truly right. In order, then, that the soul of the child may 
not be habituated to feel joy and sorrow in a manner at vari- 
ance with the law, and those who obey the law, but may rather 
follow the law and rejoice and sorrow at the same things as 
the aged, — in order, I say, to produce this effect, songs appear 
to have been invented, which are really charms, and are de- 
signed to implant the harmony of which we speak. And be- 
cause the mind of the child is incapable of enduring serious 
training, they are called plays or songs, and are performed in 
play ; just as when men are sick and ailing in their bodies, 
their attendants give them wholesome diet in pleasant meats 
and drinks, but unwholesome diet disagreeable in things, in 
order that they may learn as they ought, to like the one and 
to dislike the other. — Laws, iv. 182. 

Zeal right and wrong. 

Soc. Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one ; 

but if wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the danger ; and 
therefore we ought to consider whether I shall or shall not 
do as you say. For I am and always have been one of those 
natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason 
may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best ; 
and now that this fortune has come upon me, I cannot put 
away the conclusion at which I had arrived : the principles 
which I have hitherto honored and revered I still honor, and 
unless we can at once find other and better principles I am cer- 
tain not to agree with you ; no, not even if the power of the 
multitude could inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, 
deaths, frightening us like children with hobgoblin terrors.— 
Crito, i, 350, 



A MONUMENT OF MODERN SCHOLARSHIP. 



2f0fDpffs Btafogups of plain, 

THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO. 

Translated into English, with Analysis and Introductions, 
By B. JOWETT, M. A. 

MASTER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD, AND REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK. 

A NEW AND CHEAPER EDITION. 

Four Volumes, Crown 8vo, $8.00 per Set, in Cloth* 

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The present work of Professor Jowett will be welcomed with profound 
interest, as the only adequate endeavor to transport the most precious mon- 
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ture. The noble reputation of Professor Jowett both as a thinker and a 
scholar, it may be premised, however, is a valid guarantee for the excel- 
lence of his performance. He is known as one of the most hard-working 
students of the English Universities, in the departments of philology and 
criticism, whose exemplary diligence is fully equaled by his singular acute- 
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place in English letters, no man exhibits less of the pride of position, or is 
devoted to the cultivation of learning with greater simplicity of purpose 
and an equal almost child-like sweetness of life. A devoted adherent of 
the Established Church, he is free from ecclesiastical prejudices. Without 
the natural passion for innovation which is so often the principal spur of 
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the peculiar distinction of Professor Jowett is his eminence as a scholar, 
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A New Edition, Library Styles 



?Ul}p Ijisforg of jRomp, 

FROM THE EARLIEST TIME TO TlfE PERIOD OF ITS DECLINE. 

By Dr. THEODOR MOMMSEN. 

Translated, with the author's sanction and additions, by the Rev. W. P. Dickson, Regius 
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%\* Ilisforg of (Jpwp, 

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UNIFORM WITH MOMMSEN'S HISTORY OF ROME. 
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r Curtius's History of Greece is similar in plan and purpose to Mommsen's 
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liprlfg of SSnrbitf ln'sfopg. 

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